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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No.220 of 2026 & CMP(M)
No.2225 of 2025
Date of decision:18.08.2026
The Govt. of H.P. & another
...Appellants
Versus
Prem Dass & others
...Respondents
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the appellants
:
Mr. Baldev Singh Negi, Additional
Advocate General.
For the respondents :
Mr. Bhupinder Ahuja, Advocate, for all
the respondents except respondents
No.2(iv).
Romesh Verma, Judge(oral):
CMP(M) No.2225 of 2025
In sequel to order dated 10.04.2026, 22.05.2026 and
15.07.2026, consequential steps for bringing on record the legal
representatives of deceased respondent No.2(iv) have not been taken.
Consequently, the appeal is ordered to be dismissed as having been
abated qua said respondent.
2.
The instant application has been filed for condonation of
266 days delay in filing the appeal. As per the averments as made in
the application, the impugned judgment was passed on 29.10.2024.
The certified copy of the judgment was applied by the learned counsel
for the applicants on 29.10.2024 and the same was delivered on
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
the judgment?
-213.11.2024 in the office of District Attorney, Bilaspur. Thereafter, the
District Attorney intimated the department that civil appeal has been
dismissed by the District Judge. On the receipt of office letter from
District
Attorney,
Bilaspur,
the
case
was
forwarded
to
the
Superintending Engineer, Bilaspur and in this process the case file
went through different channels and thus the delay has occurred in
filing the instant appeal. Therefore, it is prayed that the delay in filing
the appeal is neither intentional nor willful, but the same has occurred
under unavoidable circumstances.
3.
Learned counsel for the non-applicants has no objection
in case the application is allowed.
4.
Consequently, in view of the averments made in the
application, which is duly supported by an affidavit and in view of
submissions as made by learned Additional Advocate General, the
present application is allowed and delay in filing the appeal is
condoned. Appeal be registered. Accordingly, the application stands
disposed of.
RSA No.220 of 2026
5.
The present appeal arises out of the judgment and
decree, dated 29.10.2024, as passed by the learned District Judge,
Bilaspur, H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 15/13 of 2024, whereby the appeal
preferred by the present appellants/defendants has been ordered to be
dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 06.04.2024, as passed
-3by the learned Civil Judge, Jhandutta, District Bilaspur, H.P., have
been affirmed, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondents was
partly decreed by directing the State to pay compensation to the
plaintiffs along with statutory benefits.
6.
Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs/ respondents
filed a suit for permanent prohibitory, mandatory injunction and
compensation in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Jhandutta, DistrictBilaspur, HP on the ground that the defendants/State constructed a
road, namely, Jhandutta-Nand-Nagraon through the land being owned
and possessed by the plaintiffs comprising Khewat No. 24, khatauni
No. 24, Khasra Nos.22 and 31, situated at Village Nagraon, Tehsil
Jhandutta, District Bilaspur, H.P.
7.
It was averred by the plaintiffs that the Government
notification was duly issued for acquisition of some of the lands of the
adjoining villages but no action was taken to make the payment to the
affected persons including plaintiffs. The plaintiffs requested the
officials of the appellants/State to pay the amount of compensation on
account of utilization of the land of the present respondents but except
for making assurances, no effective steps were taken by the
appellants/State in that regard. It was further averred that the
defendants are very influential, resourceful and clever persons. They
are trying to grab the suit land and also trying to dig road, change the
-4nature, threatening to cut trees and destroy the crops without any right,
title and interest over the suit land.
8.
As per plaintiffs, servants and agents of the appellants/
defendants threatened to dig the adjacent land of the road, to destroy
the crops, to cut the trees, break stones, and to change the nature of
the suit land. Therefore, decree for permanent prohibitory, mandatory
injunction and compensation was sought from the learned trial Court.
9.
The suit was contested by the defendants/State by raising
preliminary objections qua maintainability, limitation, cause of action,
valuation, jurisdiction, estoppel etc. in the written statement.
10.
On merits, it was averred that the road in question had
been constructed by Gram Panchayat in the year 1995 with
verbal/express consent of the plaintiffs and their predecessor in
interest including other land owners. It is further submitted that
defendants started maintaining the said road during the year 2002
after which HRTC buses started plying over the said road. The total
length of the road is 21.250 kms on both sides and the land falls in
Village Nagraon. The road was constructed in the year 1995 by the
Gram Panchayat with the express/implied/verbal consent of the
plaintiffs and his predecessor in interest. The road is in existence since
1995 and has been passed for the vehicular traffic during 2002. Since
the road was constructed with the consent of the plaintiffs, therefore,
they are estopped to file the present suit. The defendants have spent
-5huge amount to provide all weather road connectivity to the public at
large, therefore, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit filed by
the plaintiffs.
11.
The plaintiffs filed replication to the written statement
wherein the contents of the plaint were reiterated.
12.
On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court on
20.08.2022 framed the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief of
injunction(s), as prayed for? ......OPP
2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief of
compensation, in alternative or in addition to aforesaid
relief? .....OPP
3. Whether the present suit is not maintainable, as
alleged? .....OPD
4. Whether the suit is time barred, as alleged? .....OPD
5. Whether the plaintiffs have not come to the court with
clean hands, as alleged? .....OPD
6. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped to file the present
suit by their own, acts, conducts, omissions and
commissions, as alleged? OPD
7. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose
of court fee and jurisdiction, as alleged? .....OPD
8. Whether the plaintiffs have not complied with the
mandatory provisions of section 80 CPC, as alleged?
......OPD
9. Relief.”
13.
The learned trial court directed the respective parties to
adduce evidence in support of their contentions to corroborate their
respective case. The learned trial court vide its judgment and decree
-6dated 06.04.2024 partly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents
and defendants/State were directed to pay the compensation to the
plaintiffs alongwith statutory benefits including solatium, interest etc.
within the period of three months, treating it as a case of deemed
acquisition in line with Ext. PW-1/B, Ext. PW-1/C and Ext. PW-1/D
awarded by it. The defendants/State were further directed to pay legal
costs and expenses of Rs. 10,000/- to the plaintiffs.
14.
Feeling dissatisfied by the judgment and decree, dated
06.04.2024, the defendants/State preferred an appeal before the
learned First Appellate Court on 30.05.2024, which came to be
dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 29.10.2024.
15.
Still feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments and
decrees, the appellants/State have preferred the present regular
second appeal.
16.
It is contended by Mr. Diwakar Dev Sharma, learned
Additional Advocate General appearing for the State that the
impugned judgments and decrees, as passed by the learned courts
below, are erroneous and are liable to be quashed and set aside. He
submits that the suit, as filed by the plaintiffs/respondents is not
maintainable, since the claim as put forth by the plaintiffs/respondents
is highly belated and the plaintiffs/respondents are not entitled for any
compensation on account of the fact that the road was constructed on
the implied and express consent of the present respondents.
-717.
On the other hand, Mr. Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, learned
counsel for the respondents has defended the judgments and decrees
as passed by the learned courts below. He submits that the land of the
respondents was utilized for the construction of the road in question,
therefore, in view of the mandate as laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, whereby it has been repeatedly held that no person
can be deprived of his property without following the due process of
law the impugned judgments and decrees deserve to be affirmed by
imposing huge and special cost upon the appellants/State.
18.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have
also gone through the material available on the case file.
19.
With the consent of the parties, the case is finally heard at
admission stage on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the judgments and decrees passed by the
learned Courts below are based on mis-appreciation
and misinterpretation of the
oral
as well as
documentary evidence placed on record.”
20.
The Court of the first instance as also the First Appellate
Court have concurrently held that the land of the plaintiffs/respondents
was utilized for construction of road, namely, Jhandutta-Nand-Nagraon
without payment of compensation to them. No dispute has been raised
as to such findings of fact. It has only been contended on behalf of the
defendants/State that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was time barred. In
alternative, it was contended that since the plaintiffs/respondents
-8remained silent for such a long period, they were estopped from
raising the stale claim. Principle of acquiescence has also been sought
to be applied against the plaintiffs/respondents on the premise that
they were aware about the construction of road and the road was
constructed with their implied consent and now they cannot, turn
around to raise objections against the construction of road.
21.
The defendants/appellants are constituents of a welfare
State. It is well settled that the welfare State cannot claim adverse
possession against its citizens. Thus, the suit on the basis of title
cannot be said to be time barred, which right could only be defeated by
proof of perfection of title by way of adverse possession by the other.
22.
Admittedly, the respondents/plaintiffs are the title holders
of the suit land. Being owners of the suit property, they may file a suit
at any stage until and unless the said right is defeated by the present
appellants/ defendants by perfection of title by way of adverse
possession.
23.
Being
the
owners
of
the
suit
land,
the
plaintiffs/respondents are well within their right to file a suit for
permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction, since the suit land
was utilized by the State for construction of the road in question
without adopting due process of law including the payment of
compensation.
-924.
Admittedly,
the
appellants/defendants
were
not
in
possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs had consented
for construction of road through their lands. When specifically asked
this question from the learned Additional Advocate General, he is
unable to answer the query of the Court in this regard. No document
has been appended with the present proceedings which may
demonstrate that the present respondents had orally consented for the
construction of the road in question.
25.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held that no
person can be forcibly deprived of his property without any legal
sanction and without following the due process of law and depriving
payment of just and fair compensation. The State being a welfare
State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status
beyond what is provided by the Constitution. The Court has held as
follows:
“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in
1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed
by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Vidaya Devi vs The State
Of Himachal Pradesh on 8 January, 2020 Article 31 guaranteed the
right to private property 1, which could not be deprived without due
process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the
Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it
continued to be a human right 2 in a welfare State, and a
Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article
-10300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save
by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property except in accordance with the procedure established by
law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly
included in Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article The State of
West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2
Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without
following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as
also the constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution.
Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held
that:
“ 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article
300A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of
"eminent domain" may interfere with the right of property of a
person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a
public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must
be paid.” (emphasis supplied)
12.4
In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5, this Court held
that:
“21. If the right of property is a human right as also a
constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in
accordance with law. Article 300A of the Constitution protects
such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such
right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of the
Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.” (emphasis
supplied) 4 (2005) 7 SCC 627.
12.5
In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P. &
Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human
right in the following words:
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different
political thinkers that some amount of property right is an
indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic
oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that
liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property.
-11"Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the
opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the
seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are
to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7 this Court
held as follows :
“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the powers of
the State that no person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation
without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is
not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300A. In
other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.”
(emphasis supplied) 10.3. In this case, the Appellant could
not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without
any legal sanction, and without following due process of law,
there is no deprivation.”
12.7
In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly
dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without
following due process of law, and depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC 354.
7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596. payment of just compensation, being a
fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her
predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely
baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in
compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State
could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the
sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in
Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held
that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being
a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a
status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the
right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or
statutory right, but also a human right. 8 (2013) 1 SCC 353. Human
-12rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as
right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights
have gained a multi− faceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the
High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the
land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse” possession.
The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea
of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty
of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for
over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over
the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the
property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of
the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay
and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of
action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the
Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which
must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and
circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of
fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the
delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts
to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a
constitutional Court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to
promote justice, and not defeat it.
12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors.,10 this Court
while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows : “There are
authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to
put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them
decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational
facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true
that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches
debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right
has been violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of
T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32 or 226 of the
Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario
-13altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the
land belonging to the Appellants without any sanction of law. The
Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of
compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid
down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory
mode.” (emphasis supplied)
13. In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate person, who
is a widow coming from a rural area has been deprived of her private
property by the State without resorting to the procedure prescribed
by law. The Appellant has been divested of her right to property
without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over half a
century. The cause of action in the present case is a continuing one,
since the Appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her property in
1967 without legal sanction or following due process of law. The
present case is one where the demand for justice is so compelling
since the State has admitted that the land was taken over without
initiating acquisition proceedings, or any procedure known to law.
We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and
142 of the Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to
the appellant.
26.
To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in (2022) 7
SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs. State of H.P. and
others has held as under:
“14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody can be
deprived of liberty or property without due process, or authorization
of law. The recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the
decision of the King’s Bench in Entick v. Carrington17 and by this
court in Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh18. Further,
in several judgments, this court has repeatedly held that rather than
enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher
responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted within the confines of
legality, and therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule of
law.
-1415. When it comes to the subject of private property, this court has
upheld the high threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossess
an individual of their property, and even more so when done by the
State. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab19 this court rejected the
contention that the petitioners in the case were trespassers and
could be removed by an executive order, and instead concluded that
the executive action taken by the State and its officers, was
destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law. This court, in
another case - State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander
Prasad Singh and Ors. 20, held: “A lessor, with the best of title, has
no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a
lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by
forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry' in the
lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods to resume
possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the
expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible
dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed
otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that
the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better
position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition
stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and
Governmental authorities should have a 'legal pedigree'”.
16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-a-vis
their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a
constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State
must meet while acquiring land, the question remains – can the
State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal
responsibility towards those from whom private property has been
expropriated? In these facts and circumstances, we find this
conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the
grounds of equity and fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s actions, or
lack thereof, have in fact compounded the injustice meted out to the
appellants and compelled them to approach this court, albeit
belatedly. The initiation of acquisition proceedings initially in the
1990s occurred only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such
judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend the benefit of
-15the court’s directions to those who specifically approached the
courts. The State’s lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this
action of initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect
to the lands of those writ petitioners who had approached the court
in earlier proceedings, and not other land owners, pursuant to the
orders dated 23.04.2007 (in CWP No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013
(in CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage,
the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land required
for public use in the manner prescribed by law.
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which
conclude either way – as contended by both sides in the present
dispute – however, the specific factual matrix compels this court to
weigh in favour of the appellant-land owners. The State cannot
shield itself behind the ground of delay and laches in such a
situation; there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in a
much earlier case - Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, held:
‘11…..."Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party
has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet
put the other party in a situation in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are
most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that
delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always
important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in
taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the
remedy."
-1619. The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in
a clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit
disbursal of compensation as required by law, only to those
for which it was specifically prodded by the courts, rather
than to all those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which
is also violative of the appellants’ prevailing Article 31 right (at
the time of cause of action), undoubtedly warranted
consideration, and intervention by the High Court, under its
Article 226 jurisdiction. This court, in Manohar (supra) - a
similar case where the name of the aggrieved had been
deleted from revenue records leading to his dispossession
from the land without payment of compensation – held:
6“Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, we
are satisfied that the case projected before the court by the
appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating
from any State which professes the least regard to being a
welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned counsel
that, at this stage at least, the State should be gracious
enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay the
compensation to the respondent, the State has taken an
intractable attitude and persisted in opposing what appears to
be a just and reasonable claim of the respondent.
Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights
available to the citizens are declared by the Constitution.
Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth
Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300-A has been
placed in the Constitution, which reads as follows: “300-A.
Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of
law.—No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.” 8.This is a case where we find utter lack of
legal authority for deprivation of the respondent's property by
the appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this
case was an eminently fit one for exercising the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution…
-1720. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while dealing with
a similar fact situation, this court held as follows: (SCC p. 359
para11)
“11“There are authorities which state that delay and laches
extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these
authorities
pertain
to
service
jurisprudence,
grant
of
compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago,
recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and
other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that
there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and
laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his
fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226
of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different
scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the appellants without
any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for
grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either
comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.”
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court finds that
the contentions raised by the State, do not inspire confidence
and deserve to be rejected. The State has merely averred to
the appellants’ alleged verbal consent or the lack of
objection, but has not placed any material on record to
substantiate this plea. Further, the State was unable to
produce any evidence indicating that the land of the
appellants had been taken over or acquired in the manner
known to law, or that they had ever paid any compensation. It
is pertinent to note that this was the State’s position, and
subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as well, in the
other writ proceedings.”
27.
The learned Courts below have duly appreciated the oral
as well as documentary evidence placed on record and have rightly
-18come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled for grant of
decree for compensation against the defendants.
28.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that no
person can be deprived of his properties without adopting due process
of law, therefore, under such circumstances, plea as set up by the
appellants-State is not tenable in the facts and circumstances of the
case. Once they have utilized the land of the villagers without adopting
due process of law, now the plea as raised by the present appellants is
not permissible, that too, at the stage of Regular Second Appeal.
29.
DW-1 has admitted in his deposition that qua the
construction of similar road certain persons have been paid the
amount of compensation. The defendants have adopted the policy of
pick and choose which is not permissible in the eyes of law. Once the
defendants have chosen to pay the compensation to similar situated
persons, in that event, the plaintiffs cannot be discriminated. However,
in the present case, decree for compensation has been passed in
favour of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the said finding does not call for any
interference by this Court.
30.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with scope of
interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs.
Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under:
“18. It has been noted time and again that without insisting for the
statement of such a substantial question of law in the memorandum
of appeal and formulating the same at the time of admission, the
High Courts have been issuing notices and generally deciding the
-19second appeals without adhering to the procedure prescribed under
Section 100 of the CPC. It has further been found in a number of
cases that no efforts are made to distinguish between a question of
law and a substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers
under this section in several cases, the findings of fact of the first
appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in
mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right
attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to
be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The
conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a
second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add
or to enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided
on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not
be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this
section. Further, a substantial question of law has to be
distinguished from a substantial question of fact. This Court in Sir
Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd.
(AIR 1962 SC 1314) held that : "The proper test for determining
whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in
our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether
it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so
whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally
settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court
or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative
views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general
principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled
and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the
plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a
substantial question of law.
" 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the
grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of
fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate
court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial
court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the
witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for
interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate
court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where
-20from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are
possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be
interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other
approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere
where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate
court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of
law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements
made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence
or arrived at by ignoring material evidence.
20. to 22 xx xx xx xx
23. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not
previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and
must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if
answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are
concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there
must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question
should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by
court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law
for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point
raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question
involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will,
therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case
whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the
case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for
striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to
do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding
prolongation in the life of any lis.”
31.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs. Vasanthi,
2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the aforesaid
burden is a question of fact which had to be determined by a court of
fact after appreciating the evidence available on record. Under CPC,
a first appellate court is the final court of fact. No doubt, a second
appellate court exercising power(s) under Section 100 CPC can
interfere with a finding of fact on limited grounds, such as, (a) where
-21the finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in
ignorance of relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on
misreading of evidence; and (d) where it is perverse. But that is not
the case here.
17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in paragraph 29 of
its judgment, accepted the endorsement (Exb. A-2) made on the
back of a registered document (Exb. A-1) after considering the oral
evidence led by the plaintiffappellant and the circumstance that
signature(s)/thumbmark of D-1 and D-2 were not disputed, though
claimed as one obtained on a blank paper. The reasoning of the first
appellate court in paragraph 29 of its judgment was not addressed
by the High Court. In fact, the High Court, in one line, on a flimsy
defense of use of a signed blank paper, observed that genuineness
of Exb. A-2 is not proved. In our view, the High Court fell in error
here. While exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, it ought not
to have interfered with the finding of fact returned by the first
appellate court on this aspect; more so, when the first appellate court
had drawn its conclusion after appreciating the evidence available on
record as also the circumstance that signature(s)/thumbmark(s)
appearing on the document (Exb.A2) were not disputed. Otherwise
also, while disturbing the finding of the first appellate court, the High
Court did not hold that the finding returned by the first appellate court
is based on a misreading of evidence, or is in ignorance of relevant
evidence, or is perverse. Thus, there existed no occasion for the
High Court, exercising power under Section 100 CPC, to interfere
with the finding of the first appellate court regarding payment of
additional Rs. 1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 over and above the sale
consideration fixed for the transaction.
18. Once the finding regarding payment of additional sum of
Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by the first appellate court is
sustained, there appears no logical reason to hold that the plaintiff
(Annamalai) was not ready and willing to perform its part under the
contract particularly when Rs. 4,70,000, out of total consideration of
Rs. 4,80,000, was already paid and, over and above that, additional
sum of Rs.1,95,000 was paid in lieu of demand made by D-1 & D-2.
This we say so, because an opinion regarding plaintiff’s readiness
and willingness to perform its part under the contract is to be formed
-22on the entirety of proven facts and circumstances of a case including
conduct of the parties. The test is that the person claiming
performance must satisfy conscience of the court that he has treated
the contract subsisting with preparedness to fulfill his obligation and
accept performance when the time for performance arrives.”
32.
No other point was raised by the learned counsel for the
parties.
33.
Both the Courts below have rightly appreciated the point
in controversy after considering the oral as well as documentary
evidence placed on record. The substantial question of law is
answered accordingly.
34.
In view of above, the present appeal being devoid of any
merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. Pending
application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
August 18, 2026
(vt)
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
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