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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 4719 of 2024
Gopinath Ganguly & Anr.
Vs
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioners
:
Mr. Antarikhya Basu,
Mr. Anirban Dutta,
Mr. Sayan Mukherjee,
Ms. Madhumita Basak.
For the O. P. No.2
:
Mr. Apalak Basu,
Mr. Samik Sarkar,
Ms. Indira Chatterjee.
For the State
:
Ms. Samira Grewal.
Judgment reserved on
:
02.09.2026
Judgment delivered on
:
24.09.2026
Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
1.
The revisional application has been preferred praying for quashing
and/or setting aside of the proceedings in ACGR Case No: 4235 of 2022
arising out of Bansdroni Police Station Case No: 172/2022 dated
24.09.2022 under Sections 120B/420/406 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 pending before the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at
Alipore, 24 Parganas (South), corresponding to Charge Sheet No. 94 of
2023 dated 09.06.2023, under Sections 120B/420/406 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860.
2.
The petitioners’ case in short is that the petitioner no. 1 is the father of
the petitioner no. 2. The maternal aunt and the mother of the opposite
party no. 2 were joint owners of 2 plots of land being plot no. 3 and 43
situated at Adiganga Road, Police Station Bansdroni, Kolkata 700070.
After the death of his mother, the opposite party no. 2 and his brother
became the legal heirs of the property being plot no. 3 measuring upto 5
cottahs and plot no. 43 measuring upto 11 cottahs as their father died
prior to their mother's death.
3.
Thereafter, said legal heirs entered into Development Agreements dated
26.12.2005 with M/s Sudhama Construction being the proprietorship
firm of Petitioner no.1. On 27.12.2005, a General Power of Attorney was
executed by the owners in respect of petitioner no. 1 giving him right to
sign, execute and submit Deed of Conveyance and enter into Agreement
of Sale.
4.
The said plots had local encumbrances and operational difficulties for
which the owners decided to include local contractors/developers. Plot
no. 3 was sold to petitioner no. 2 and an Indenture of Sale dated
13.04.2011 was executed between the petitioners. Thereafter, on
24.11.2022, the General Power of Attorney executed earlier was revoked
and on the same day a fresh General Power of Attorney dated was
executed by the owners in favour of Petitioner no. 1, one Sudhir Mallick
and one Samir Kumar Chatterjee (local developers) only in respect of
plot no. 43. On the same day, a new development agreement was also
executed in respect of plot no. 43 incorporating the names of the local
developers.
5.
The construction of plot no. 43 as per the Development Agreement dated
24.11.2011 was completed and the possession of the owners' allocation
was handed over to the owners including Opposite party no. 2.
Suddenly in the year 2020, the opposite party no. 2 and others filed two
consumer cases in respect of the plots being CC/241/2020 &
CC/290/2020.
6.
On the self-same issues that were raised in the consumer case being
CC/290/2020 which was filed in respect of plot no. 3, the Opposite
party no. 2 lodged a written complaint which led to the registration of
the present case, being Bansdroni Police Station Case No. 172/2022
dated 24.09.2022 under Sections 120B/420/406 of I.P.C, 1860. The
allegation levelled against the petitioners are to the effect that 45% of
the constructed area which was to be given to the owners was sold by
Petitioner no. 1 to Petitioner no.2 in a fraudulent manner. It was
further alleged that on 23.09.2022, a man representing himself to
be the manager of Petitioner no. 1 met the opposite party and
showed him a copy of authorization wherein it was written that
opposite party and others have authorized Petitioner no. 1 to sell
45% of the property. The signatures on the said document are
forged. During investigation only the Development Agreement
dated 26.12.2005 pertaining to plot no. 3 was seized.
7.
Upon conclusion of the investigation, Charge Sheet No. 94 of 2023 dated
09.06.2023 under Section 120B/420/406 of I.P.C was submitted. The
allegations related to forgery was dropped.
8.
The grounds for quashing of proceedings, as made out by the petitioners
herein, are as follows:(i)
There is a delay of almost thirteen years in lodging complaint
and no explanation for the same has been given in the written
complaint by the opposite party.
(ii)
The opposite party no. 2 has already instituted a consumer case
on self-same facts. He is resorting to giving a purely civil case a
criminal colour.
(iii)
The allegations leveled against the petitioner even if taken to be
true without admitting to the same, reveal a case that is civil in
nature. Even if the allegations are taken to be true, a simple
breach of contract cannot amount to penal offences under Section
420/406. There is no mens rea on the part of the petitioner to
cause deception from the very inception of the transaction. There
was no entrustment of any property that was subsequently
misappropriated for the own use of the petitioners. In fact, the
opposite party has suppressed all documents such as the
subsequent power of attorneys, revocation of the power of
attorney dated 27.12.2005, development agreement dated
24.11.2011 that would prove that no case is made out against the
petitioners.
(iv)
Nothing was seized by the investigating agency apart from the first
development agreement dated 26.12.2005.
(v)
The possession letter mentions, an agreement dated 24.11.2011
which indicates that the Opposite party was aware of the
subsequent
documents
executed
by
the
parties
and
has
completely suppressed all such facts.
(vi)
The criminal proceeding was instituted with an ulterior motive to
wreak vengeance on the petitioner and as such is liable to be
quashed based on the principles laid down in the landmark
judgment of the Apex court, State of Haryana vs Ch. Bhajan
Lal (AIR 1992 SC 604).
9.
The following judgments are relied upon by the petitioners:(i) V. J. Jose Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2009) 3 SCC 78.
(ii) B. Suresh Yadav Vs. Sharifa bee reported in (2007) 13 SCC
107.
(iii) Vinod Natesan Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2019) 2 SCC
401.
(iv) Lalit Chaturvedi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in
2024 SCC OnLine SC.
(v) State of Haryana Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors. reported in AIR
1992 SC 604.
(vi) Delhi Race Club Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported
in (2024) 10 SCC 690.
10.
The State has placed the case diary.
11.
In Naresh Kumar & Anr. Vs The State of Karnataka & Anr., in
Criminal Appeal No. ……….. of 2024 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.
1570 of 2021), decided on March 12, 2024, the Supreme Court
held:“5. Under these circumstances, we are of the considered
view that this is a case where the inherent powers
should have been exercised by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code as the
powers are there to stop the abuse of the process and to
secure the ends of justice.
6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court
recognized that although the inherent powers of a High
Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High
Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal
proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. This
is what was held:
“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This
power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose
of preventing abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint
discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the
nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential
ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to
be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing
civil transactions may also have a criminal
texture. But the High Court must see whether a
dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is
given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a
situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in
fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the
High Court should not hesitate to quash the
criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process
of the court.”
(emphasis supplied)
Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra),
this Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. (2021)
14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot
be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In
Usha Chakraborty & Anr. v. State of West Bengal
& Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon
Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where
a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a
cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be
quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
7. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties
relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of
contract, by one of the parties, would not attract
prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as held by
this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab and
Anr. (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the
distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere
breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa
Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC
293, has held that every breach of contract would not
give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to
be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest
intention at the time of making the promise.”
12.
In Anukul Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., in Criminal
Appeal No. 4250 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2682 of
2020), decided on September 24, 2025, the Supreme Court held:“11. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it
is necessary to recapitulate the settled legal principles
governing the exercise of inherent powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C. It is well established that though the High
Court possesses wide and plenary inherent jurisdiction,
such power is not unbridled or unlimited, but
circumscribed by self-imposed restraints evolved
through judicial pronouncements.
11.1. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal10 , at paragraph 102, laid down illustrative
categories where quashing of proceedings is justified.
These are:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or,
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act
concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
The categories in Bhajan Lal are illustrative and not
exhaustive, but they provide guiding principles to
balance two competing considerations – (a)preventing
abuse of process of law, and (b)ensuring that criminal
proceedings are not stifled at the threshold on disputed
questions of fact.
11.2. Equally, this Court has consistently cautioned that
the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot embark upon a “minitrial” or
weigh the sufficiency of evidence, which falls within the
domain of the trial Court. The scope of enquiry is
confined to whether, on a plain reading of the FIR /
complaint and accompanying material, the ingredients
of the alleged offence are disclosed. [See: Rajiv Thapar
v. Madal Lal Kapoor 11 , HMT Watches v. Abida12,
and Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. the State (Govt.
of NCT of Delhi) and others13].
11.3. In Md. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar 14 ,
it was reiterated that appreciation of contradictions or
inconsistencies in witness statements lies within the
exclusive domain of the trial Court and not in
proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Similarly, in CBI
v. Aryan Singh15 , it was emphasized that the High
Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by examining the
merits of the prosecution’s case and holding that
charges were not proved, which is a matter strictly for
trial.
11.4. Nevertheless, an exception has been recognized
where the defence relies upon unimpeachable,
incontrovertible evidence of sterling quality – such as
documents of undisputed authenticity – which ex facie
demonstrate that continuation of criminal proceedings
would be unjust and oppressive. This principle was
recognized in Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd v.
Rajvir Industries Ltd16, and followed in subsequent
decisions.
11.5. Thus, the cumulative principles that emerge are:
while the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C is
extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, it is the
duty of the High Court to intervene where continuation
of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of
process of law, or where the dispute is purely of a civil
nature and criminal colour has been artificially given to
it. Conversely, where disputed questions of fact arise
requiring adjudication, the matter must ordinarily
proceed to trial.
17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions,
deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into
criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v.
M/s. NEPC India Ltd. 17 , it was held that criminal
law cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in
commercial or contractual matters, and that such
misuse amounts to abuse of process. The following
paragraphs from the decision are apposite:
“9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations
made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged
against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has
to be examined as a whole, but without examining the
merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a
meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment
of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the
complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for
quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear
abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal
proceeding is found to have been initiated with
malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause
harm, or where the allegations are absurd and
inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to
stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power
should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce
the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the
necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint,
merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not
been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be
quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only
where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts
which are absolutely necessary for making out the
offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil
wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil
wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial
transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from
furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil
law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature
and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a
criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint
relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract,
for which a civil remedy is available or has been
availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal
proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the
complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.
10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of
a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely
civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on
account of a prevalent impression that civil law
remedies are time consuming and do not adequately
protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a
tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading
to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There
is also an impression that if a person could somehow be
entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood
of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes
and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence,
by applying pressure though criminal prosecution
should be deprecated and discouraged.”
18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami and another
v. State of Uttaranchal and others18 , it was
emphasized that criminal prosecution must not be
permitted as an instrument of harassment or private
vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam19
, this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in
respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to
harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation,
constitute an abuse of process.
19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @
Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
others 20 , this Court disapproved the practice of using
criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil remedies,
observing that money recovery cannot be enforced
through criminal prosecution where the dispute is
essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to
direct settlements in such matters but to apply the
settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following
paragraphs are relevant in this context:
“9. What we have been able to understand is that there
is an oral agreement between the parties. The
Respondent No.4 might have parted with some money in
accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that
the appellant – herein owes a particular amount to be
paid to the Respondent No.4. However, the question is
whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be
said to have been committed by the appellant.
10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded
that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be
something more than prima facie on record to indicate
that the intention of the accused was to cheat the
complainant right from the inception. The plain reading
of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality.
11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent
pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race
Club (1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh” reported
in (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire
law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach
of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It
appears that this very decision was relied upon by the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the
High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter
on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the
petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making
payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a
condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High
Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court
may either allow the petition saying that no offence is
disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case
for quashing is made out. Why should the High Court
make an attempt to help the complainant to recover the
amount due and payable by the accused. It is for the
Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to
look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of
money or in any other proceedings, be it under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB
Code, 2016.
12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that
the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil
nature.
13. We also enquired with the learned counsel
appearing for the Respondent No.4 whether his client
has filed any civil suit or has initiated any other
proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears that
no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money till this
date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a
civil dispute between the parties by filing a First
Information Report and seeking the help of the Police.
This amounts to abuse of the process of law.
14. We could have said many things but we refrain from
observing anything further. If the Respondent No.4 has
to recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or
seek any other appropriate remedy available to him in
law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal
proceedings.
15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the
High Court has passed the impugned order. The High
Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/to the Respondent No.4 and thereafter directed him to
appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for
the purpose of settlement. That’s not what is expected of
a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article
226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application
filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any other
criminal proceedings. What is expected of the High Court
is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled
in the FIR along with the other material on record, if
any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the
wellsettled principles as enunciated in the decision of
this Court in the “State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan
Lal & Others” Reported in 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335.””
13.
In Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited and Ors. vs State of Uttar Pradesb
& Anr., (2024) 10 SCC 690, wherein the Supreme Court held:“38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails to
spell out any of the aforesaid ingredients noted above. We
may only say, with a view to clear a serious misconception
of law in the mind of the police as well as the courts below,
that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of criminal
breach of trust as defined under Section 405IPC, punishable
under Section 406IPC, is committed by the accused, then in
the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also
committed the offence of cheating as defined and explained
in Section 415IPC, punishable under Section 420IPC.”
14.
From the materials on record including the case diary it appears
that the dispute in the present case is clearly a civil dispute and in
such cases of alleged breach of agreement, it has to be prima facie
shown that there was/is criminal intent present. Admittedly there was a
business arrangement in respect of development of a property between
the parties. A case is also pending before the consumer forum on the
same issue.
15.
The materials on record, herein including the case diary, do not prima
facie show presence of the ingredients required to constitute the
offences alleged against the petitioners herein, with also absence of
criminal intent and as such the proceeding in this case is liable to be
quashed in the interest of Justice, to prevent an abuse of the process of
law.
16.
CRR 4719 of 2024 is thus allowed.
17.
The proceeding in ACGR Case No: 4235 of 2022 arising out of Bansdroni
Police Station Case No: 172/2022 dated 24.09.2022 under Sections
120B/420/406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 pending before the
Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Alipore, 24 Parganas
(South), is hereby quashed in respect of the petitioners namely
Gopinath Ganguly and Rajesh Ganguly.
18.
All connected Applications, if any, stand disposed of.
19.
Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
20.
Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary
compliance.
21.
Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied
expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities.
(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)
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