Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 24.08.2026
#
CNR No. DLHC012344182018
+
RC.REV. 422/2018, CM APPL. 35563/2018 (Stay), CM APPL.
5176/2026 (Seeking reimbursement by the petitioner of the
property tax deposited by the respondent), CM APPL.
5395/2026 (Seeking increase of the rate of user charges), CM
APPL. 31564/2026 (Seeking speedy decision of the petition),
CM APPL. 31565/2026 (Dir.) & CM APPL. 31566/2026
(Delay of 75 days in Re-filing the application)
GIRDHARI LAL & ORS
.....Petitioners
Through:
Appearance not given.
versus
AKHIL BANSAL & ORS
Through:
.....Respondents
Mr. Akhil Bansal, Advocate
(Respondent No. 1 in person),
Mr. Shaym D. Nandan and Ms.
Nandan Menon, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
1.
JUDGEMENT (Oral)
The present Petition, filed under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 19581, read with Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, seeks to assail the Judgment dated 10.07.20182 passed by the
learned
Additional
Rent
Controller,
Shahdara
District,
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi3, in Eviction Petition, being ARC No.
DRC Act
Impugned Judgement
Learned ARC
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:19:17
RC.REV. 422/2018
981/2016.
2.
By way of the Impugned Judgement, the Application seeking
leave to defend filed on behalf of the Petitioners came to be dismissed
and an Eviction Order was consequently passed in favour of the
Respondents in respect of the Subject premises, being Shop No. 258,
Anaj Mandi, Shahdara, Delhi4.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
3.
Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, at the
outset, submits that the challenge in the present Petition is confined to
two aspects.
4.
Firstly, it is submitted that Respondent No.1 was, even at the
time of institution of the Eviction Petition, in possession and use of
suitable accommodation at 4648/21, Daryaganj, New Delhi5, from
where he was admittedly carrying on his professional activities.
5.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the mere fact
that the aforesaid premises was itself a tenanted accommodation could
not, at the stage of consideration of the Application seeking leave to
defend, render the same irrelevant for determining whether the
Respondent No.1 had a bona fide requirement for the Subject
premises. It is, therefore, contended that the availability and suitability
of the said accommodation, particularly in the context of the
professional requirement pleaded by Respondent No.1, raised a triable
issue as to whether the Subject premises were genuinely required for
establishing his office.
6.
Secondly, learned Counsel submits that the Petitioners had
Subject premises
Daryaganj Property
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:19:17
RC.REV. 422/2018
specifically brought on record, by way of their Additional Rejoinder
Affidavit, the availability of Property bearing No. 283A, First
Floor, situated at the back side of the Subject premises6, which,
according to the Petitioners, was available for being utilised by
Respondent No.1 for his professional office.
7.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the learned
ARC erred in declining to consider the aforesaid material merely on
the ground that the said property had not been specifically pleaded in
the original Application seeking leave to defend. It is contended that
the availability of the said premises was directly relevant to the
question of alternative accommodation and, at the very least, disclosed
a triable issue warranting grant of leave to defend.
8.
Per contra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents supports the Impugned Judgment and submits that the
learned ARC has duly considered the respective contentions of the
parties and, upon examination of the material placed on record,
correctly concluded that no triable issue arose warranting grant of
leave to defend.
9.
It is submitted that the Daryaganj Property was admittedly a
tenanted accommodation and, following the death of the father of
Respondent No.1, the tenancy stood in the name of his mother,
consequently, the same could not be equated with an owned premises
available to Respondent No.1 for establishing his independent
professional office.
10.
Learned Counsel for the Respondents further submits that the
contention regarding Property 283A was raised only subsequently, in
the Additional Rejoinder Affidavit, despite the property admittedly
Property 283A
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:19:17
RC.REV. 422/2018
being in existence even at the time when the application seeking leave
to defend was filed.
11.
Learned counsel for the Respondents thus submits that the
Petitioners could not seek to introduce, at a subsequent stage, a fact
which was within their knowledge and which ought to have formed
part of the original affidavit seeking leave to defend. In any event, it is
submitted that the Petitioners placed no material before the learned
ARC to establish that the said premises was in the possession or share
of Respondent No.1 or that the same was actually available to him for
use as an office.
12.
Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents
accordingly submits that the findings returned by the learned ARC are
findings based upon the material available on record and do not suffer
from any perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error warranting
interference in exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction under
Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
13.
Learned Counsel for the Respondents therefore submits that the
Petitioners are, in substance, seeking a re-appreciation of the material
already considered by the learned ARC, which would fall outside the
permissible scope of interference in the present proceedings. The
Petition, according to learned Counsel, accordingly deserves to be
dismissed and the Impugned Judgment does not warrant interference.
ANALYSIS:
14.
This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and, with
their able assistance, perused the material available on record,
including the Impugned Order and the documents placed before the
learned ARC.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:19:17
RC.REV. 422/2018
15.
Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioners, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
16.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd.7, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v.
Dilbahar Singh8, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain
Dua9, has consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is
supervisory and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
17.
The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.10, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
Grover11.
18.
In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-B of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
(1998) 8 SCC 119
(2014) 9 SCC 78
(2022) 6 SCC 30
2024:DHC:9322
2025:DHC:11285
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:19:17
RC.REV. 422/2018
Supreme Court read as under:
“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
19.
In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC/RC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining
the decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
20.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Orders
suffer from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:19:17
RC.REV. 422/2018
learned ARC/RC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an
erroneous premise of law.
21.
It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioners against the
Impugned Order are required to be examined.
22.
At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce
the relevant paragraphs of the Impugned Judgment. The same read as
under:
“39. Respondents have further taken the plea that the petitioner is
having rented office at Dayraganj and have big residential house at
Sahibabad measuring 800 sq. yds. Petitioner in their petition
themselves have disclosed before filing leave to defend that
petitoner no. 1 is operating from office of his father late Sh. Kailash
Chand Bansal at 4648/21, Daryaganj New Delhi and his father was
tenant there and was practically as Chartered Accountant and after
the death of his father the landlord of the said office at Daryaganj
has accepted the mother of petitioner no. 1 as tenant. Therefore, the
premises at Daryaganj is a rented premises and the same can not be
equivalent to the own premises as the petitioner no. 1 has to pay the
rent for rented premises despite having his own property which can
be used for the same purpose, moreover, the mother of petitoner no.
1 is now tenant of Daryaganj property and not the petitioner. The
respondent has not filed any document to counter the said
submission.
***
42. The respondent has also taken the plea in additional rejoinder
affidavit that the property no. 283-A first floor back side of the
property in question belongs to petitioner no. 1 and can be used by
the petitioner no. 1. This fact was in existance at the stage of filing
of leave to defend but the same was not disclosed in leave to
defend and was filed later on. Therefore, the facts which were in
existence before the filing of leave to defend but was not
incorporated in leave to defend (the property no. 283-A was not
included in the leave to defend), therefore, as per well settled law it
can not to be taken into account then also the petitoner have stated
that the said property belongs to petitoner no. 7 and is exclusive use
of petitioner no. 7 and his family. Respondent has not filed any site
plan of the property no. 283-A and has also not filed any document
or photographs to show that the same is not in possession of
petitoner no. 7 or the same falls within the share of petitoner no. 1.
Accordingly, this plea of respondent does not raise any triable
issue.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:19:17
RC.REV. 422/2018
***
45. As such, I hold that the requirement of the petitioner no. 1 for
his office at the shop no. 258, Anaj Mandi, Shahdara, Delhi-110032
is a bonafide requirement because the respondents/there ancestors
are in possession of suit property for last 65-70 years but the
property was not ever asked to be vacated by the petitioners or their
forefather's but when the petitioner no. 1 requires the property for
opening his office at the tenanted premises as he is a practicing
advocate in Delhi mainly at Karkardooma Courts and most of the
clients will be from East Delhi, therefore, there is no reason to
doubt on the bonafide requirement of the petitioners. Moreover,
respondents have also failed to show that petitioner has other
suitable accommodation for his bonafide requirement.
46. Therefore, in view of above mentioned position of law, the
present contention of the respondent does not raise any triable issue
of such a nature that would disentitle the landlord from obtaining
an order for the recovery of possession of the suit premises.”
(Emphasis supplied)
23.
Adverting to the facts of the present case, the first contention
urged on behalf of the Petitioners pertains to the availability of the
Daryaganj Property. The learned ARC has not disputed that
Respondent No.1 was carrying on his professional activities from the
said premises. However, the learned ARC has specifically examined
the nature of the said accommodation and recorded that the same was
a tenanted premises, the tenancy whereof, following the demise of the
father of Respondent No.1, stood in the name of his mother. In this
backdrop, the learned ARC concluded that the said accommodation
could not be equated with premises owned by Respondent No.1 and
available to him for establishing his independent professional office.
24.
The submission advanced on behalf of the Petitioners, in
substance, seeks a different assessment of the suitability of the
Daryaganj Property. However, the fact that Respondent No.1 was
using the said premises has neither been overlooked nor disregarded
by the learned ARC.
25.
On the contrary, the nature of the said accommodation, namely,
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:19:17
RC.REV. 422/2018
that it was a tenanted premises and that Respondent No.1 himself was
not the tenant thereof, was expressly taken into consideration while
examining whether the same could constitute a reasonably suitable
alternative accommodation for the professional requirement pleaded
by Respondent No.1. The finding returned by the learned ARC,
therefore, cannot be said to suffer from any failure to consider the
material circumstance relied upon by the Petitioners.
26.
More importantly, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the
question before this Court is not whether, upon an independent
assessment, the Daryaganj Property could also be regarded as suitable
accommodation for Respondent No.1. The enquiry is confined to
whether the conclusion arrived at by the learned ARC, upon
consideration of the material placed before it, is so perverse,
unreasonable or legally infirm as to warrant interference in exercise of
the limited jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
27.
A perusal of the Impugned Judgement, however, indicates that
the learned ARC has furnished cogent reasons for declining to treat
the tenanted premises at Daryaganj as equivalent to an independently
owned premises available to Respondent No.1 for his professional
requirement. The mere possibility of another view being taken on the
suitability of the said accommodation, therefore, cannot furnish a
ground for interference in the present proceedings.
28.
Coming to the second contention concerning Property No.
283A, the learned ARC has expressly taken note of the plea sought to
be raised by the Petitioners in their Additional Rejoinder Affidavit.
The learned ARC has recorded that the existence of the said property
was known to the Petitioners even at the time when the Application
seeking leave to defend was filed, yet no reference thereto was made
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:19:17
RC.REV. 422/2018
in the said Application and the plea was introduced only subsequently.
29.
The learned ARC, therefore, declined to take the said plea into
consideration at that stage. Significantly, however, the learned ARC
did not rest the finding solely on the ground that the plea had not been
raised in the Application seeking leave to defend. The learned ARC
proceeded to examine the substance of the contention as well and
noted that, according to the Respondents, the said property belonged
to Respondent No.7 and was in his exclusive use and occupation.
30.
The learned ARC further noted that the Petitioners had not
placed on record any site plan, document or photograph to
demonstrate either that the said property fell within the share of
Respondent No.1 or that it was otherwise in his possession and
available for being utilised as an office.
31.
Thus, contrary to the submission advanced on behalf of the
Petitioners, the learned ARC did not reject the contention merely on
the ground that the same had not been pleaded in the Application
seeking leave to defend. The finding, therefore, rests both upon the
stage at which the plea was sought to be introduced and,
independently, upon the absence of material establishing the alleged
availability and suitability of the said premises.
32.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered view that neither of the two grounds urged by the
Petitioners discloses a triable issue of such a nature as would warrant
interference with the Impugned Judgement. The learned ARC has
considered the respective assertions of the parties and has returned
reasoned findings in respect of both the Daryaganj Property and
Property No. 283A.
33.
Therefore, what the Petitioners essentially seek is for this Court
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:19:17
RC.REV. 422/2018
to undertake a fresh appreciation of the very same material and
substitute its own assessment for that of the learned ARC. Such an
exercise would, in substance, amount to an appellate reappreciation of
the record, which is impermissible within the limited revisional
jurisdiction vested in this Court under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC
Act.
34.
This Court finds no perversity, patent illegality, material
irregularity or jurisdictional infirmity in the adjudication adopted by
the learned ARC. The findings returned are supported by reasons and
are based upon the material which was before the learned ARC at the
relevant stage. No ground has, therefore, been made out for exercise
of the limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
DECISION:
35.
Accordingly, the present Petition is devoid of merit and is,
consequently, dismissed.
36.
The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
is disposed of in aforementioned terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
AUGUST 24, 2026/nd/DJ
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:19:17
RC.REV. 422/2018
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review