The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
17. Further, where employees or workmen are engaged through a contractor, it remains within the contractor’s discretion to determine whom to engage and the manner in which such persons are selected and deputed to the principal employer. If contractual employees engaged through a contractor and deployed to work are accorded the same benefits as permanent employees, it would amount to conferring legitimacy upon a process that may not be governed by any prescribed mechanism of selection. Accordingly, even assuming that the work performed by the Contractual Workmen and the permanent employees of Respondent No. 1 was similar, parity in benefits could not, in the facts of the present case, be granted to the Contractual Workmen deputed by Respondent No. 2. The Appellant has also failed to establish that Respondent No. 2 was a sham contractor engaged by Respondent No. 1 to avoid payment of lawful wages to the Contractual Workmen. On this ground as well, the Appellant’s claim for equal pay is liable to fail.
18. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the Appellant has failed to make out any ground warranting interference with the Impugned Order. Accordingly, the present Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment Reserved on: 10.04.2026
Judgment Delivered on: 29.05.2026
%
+
LPA 1191/2024
GENERAL SECRETARY ALL INDIA KAMGAR
UNION
.....Appellant
versus
MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LTD AND
ORS.
.....Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case
For the Appellant
:
Mr. Fidel Sebastian and Mr. Rishi
Nandy, Advocates.
For the Respondents
:
Mr. Chandan Kumar and Mr. Vikram
Sharma, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA
JUDGMENT
TEJAS KARIA, J
1.
The present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the
Order dated 27.02.2024 (“Impugned Order”) passed in W.P.(C) 6597/2018
(“Writ Petition”) titled as “Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. V. General
Secretary, All India Kamgar Union and Ors.” whereby the learned Single
Judge had set aside the award dated 12.03.2018 (“Award”) passed by the
Deputy
Chief
Labour
Commissioner
in
ND-20(04)2017-P.A.DYC
(“Application”).
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
16:15:22
LPA 1191/2024
2.
The Appellant is a Trade Union comprising of various types of
workmen employed by Respondent No. 1, M/s Mahanagar Telephone
Nigam Limited. Respondent No. 1 is one of the oldest telecom service
providers in India and a company duly incorporated under the Companies
Act, 1956. Respondent No. 2 is the Annual Maintenance Contract (“AMC”)
contractor of Respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 3 is the learned Deputy
Chief Labour Commissioner who had passed the Award.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3.
In the year 2016, Respondent No. 1 invited bids for the AMC
pursuant to Tender Enquiry dated 08.07.2016 (“Tender”), which was
ultimately awarded to Respondent No. 2.
4.
The Appellant filed the Application before Respondent No. 3 under
Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Central
Rules, 1971 (“Rules”), seeking parity in salary and allowances for the 64
contractual workmen deputed by Respondent No. 2 to Respondent No. 1
(“Contractual Workmen”), who were engaged as technicians and superskilled technicians in terms of the Tender, with those payable to the
permanent workmen of Respondent No. 1 in the category of Phone
Mechanic, on the ground that they discharged duties of a similar nature.
5.
Upon adjudication of the Application, Respondent No. 3 passed the
Award, directing that all Contractual Workmen deployed by Respondent No.
2 in the establishment of Respondent No. 1 would be entitled to the pay
scale of ₹12500–₹27170, together with additional dearness allowance at the
rate of 117.1% per month, for the contractual period from 15.10.2016 to
14.10.2017.
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
16:15:22
LPA 1191/2024
6.
Respondent No. 2, thereafter, preferred an appeal before Respondent
No. 3 by letter dated 27.04.2018. However, the said appeal was rejected on
the ground that no appellate remedy is provided under Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of
the Rules.
7.
Thereafter, Respondent No. 1 instituted the Writ Petition challenging
the Award passed by Respondent No. 3. By the Impugned Order, the learned
Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition and set aside the Award. Aggrieved
thereby, the Appellant has preferred the present Appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
8.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant made the following
submissions:
8.1
The Impugned Order is contrary to the principles of natural
justice and is unsustainable in law. The learned Single Judge
failed to duly appreciate the law laid down by the Supreme
Court in State of Punjab and Ors. v. Jagjit Singh and Ors.,
(2017) 1 SCC 148, wherein it was held that the principle of
equal pay for equal work extends to daily-wage, casual, and
contractual employees who discharge duties similar to those
performed by permanent employees.
8.2
The learned Single Judge erred in concluding that the duties
performed by the Contractual Workmen were distinct from
those discharged by the permanent employees of Respondent
No. 1. According to the Appellant, the Impugned Order is nonspeaking in nature and reflects non-application of mind,
particularly as no cogent reasons were assigned for drawing a
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
16:15:22
LPA 1191/2024
distinction between the permanent employees of Respondent
No. 1 and the Contractual Workmen, despite the settled legal
position that equal work warrants equal pay.
8.3
The learned Single Judge failed to consider that, before
Respondent No. 3, the only contention raised was that the
Contractual Workmen were not performing skilled work, which
contention was
rejected by
Respondent No. 3
upon
consideration of the work details furnished by Respondent No.
1. The very same material was subsequently relied upon by the
learned Single Judge to conclude that the Contractual Workmen
were not performing duties comparable to those of the
permanent employees of Respondent No. 1, without affording
the Appellant an opportunity to address the issue or lead
evidence in that regard.
8.4
The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that, although the
contractors engaged by Respondent No. 1 changed from time to
time, the contracted workmen substantially remained the same,
and some of them continued to work with Respondent No. 1 for
periods extending beyond ten years. On this basis, it was
contended that the contractual arrangement was a sham devised
to deny the Contractual Workmen wages commensurate with
the nature of work performed by them.
8.5
The learned Single Judge, while deciding the Writ Petition,
failed to appreciate that livelihood constitutes the means by
which a person secures the necessities of life, and that the right
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
16:15:22
LPA 1191/2024
to livelihood forms an integral part of the right to life.
Deprivation of livelihood, it was contended, would therefore
amount to an infringement of the right to life itself.
9.
In view of the aforesaid submissions, it was prayed that the present
Appeal be allowed and the Impugned Order be set aside.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
10.
The learned Counsel for the Respondents made the following
submissions:
10.1. The doctrine of equal pay for equal work can be invoked only
upon a clear establishment that the eligibility criteria, mode of
recruitment, nature and quality of duties, degree of effort,
reliability, confidentiality, dexterity, functional requirements,
responsibilities, and status attached to both posts are identical.
In the present case, according to the Respondents, the
Contractual Workmen were performing an entirely different set
of duties, and there was no comparability whatsoever between
their functions and the skills and responsibilities of the
permanent employees of Respondent No. 1. In the absence of
complete identity between the two posts, no claim of
equivalence could be sustained. Accordingly, there was no
identity between the work performed by the Contractual
Workmen and that discharged by the permanent employees of
Respondent No. 1.
10.2. The Contractual Workmen were not employees of Respondent
No. 1 and, therefore, no question arose of claiming pay parity
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
16:15:22
LPA 1191/2024
with the permanent employees of Respondent No. 1. A pay
scale is attached to a definite post, and since the Contractual
Workmen did not hold any post under Respondent No. 1, any
comparison between them and the permanent employees of
Respondent No. 1 was inherently untenable in law. There was
no permanent workman of Respondent No. 1 deployed for
tower maintenance with whom the wages of the Contractual
Workmen could legitimately be compared.
10.3. The learned Single Judge had rightly held that the Contractual
Workmen did not discharge any specific role under Respondent
No. 1 but were working under the control and supervision of
Respondent No. 2. The contract awarded to Respondent No. 2
was neither sham nor bogus, but was a genuine contract entered
into on a principal-to-principal basis. Consequently, according
to the Respondents, the said workmen could not, in any
manner, be regarded as direct employees of Respondent No. 1.
10.4. The learned Single Judge had correctly held, on the basis of the
pleadings and material placed on record by Respondent No. 1,
that the permanent employees of Respondent No. 1 were
responsible for discharging the duties of a lineman, wireman,
cable splicer, and such other functions as may be assigned by
its officials. It was, therefore, contended that the nature of
duties performed by the permanent employees of Respondent
No. 1 was materially different from that performed by the
Contractual Workmen. On that basis, the Respondents
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
16:15:22
LPA 1191/2024
submitted that the Award was legally unsustainable and was
rightly set aside by the learned Single Judge.
11.
In view of the above submissions, the present Appeal deserves to be
dismissed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
12.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
Impugned Order.
13.
By way of the present Appeal, the Appellant has assailed the
Impugned Order passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the Writ
Petition preferred by Respondent No. 1 came to be allowed on the finding
that the nature of duties performed by the permanent employees of
Respondent No. 1 and the Contractual Workmen was distinct, and that the
Award passed by Respondent No. 3 was, therefore, legally unsustainable,
since equal pay cannot be granted for unequal work.
14.
It is the case of the Appellant that the learned Single Judge erred in
holding that the nature of duties performed by the permanent employees of
Respondent No. 1 and the Contractual Workmen was different, despite the
settled legal position that contractual employees are entitled to equal pay
where they perform equal work. It was further contended that, although the
contractors engaged by Respondent No. 1 changed periodically, the
Contractual Workmen substantially remained the same, with some of them
continuing to work with Respondent No. 1 for periods exceeding ten years.
On this basis, it was urged that the contractors engaged by Respondent No. 1
were sham contractors, engaged only to deny the Contractual Workmen
wages commensurate with the work performed by them.
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
16:15:22
LPA 1191/2024
15.
The proposition that contractual employees are entitled to equal pay
for equal work was not disputed by learned counsel for the Respondents.
However, it was submitted on behalf of the Respondents that the nature of
work performed by the permanent employees of Respondent No. 1 and the
Contractual Workmen was substantially different and, therefore, the
Contractual Workmen were not entitled to claim parity in pay with the
permanent employees of Respondent No. 1. It was further submitted that the
Contractual Workmen did not hold any post under Respondent No. 1 and
were deputed through a contractor, namely Respondent No. 2; consequently,
any comparison with the permanent employees of Respondent No. 1 was
inherently untenable in law.
16.
The first question that arises for consideration is whether the scope of
work of the Contractual Workmen was the same as that of the permanent
employees of Respondent No. 1. The permanent employees of Respondent
No. 1 were responsible for discharging the duties of a lineman, wireman,
cable splicer, and such other functions as may be assigned by the officials of
Respondent No. 1. In contrast, the duties of the Contractual Workmen, as
delineated in the Scope of Services under the Tender executed between
Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2, were confined to “carrying out
electrical, mechanical and technical maintenance services at cell sites”.
Thus, the nature and scope of the duties performed by the permanent
employees of Respondent No. 1 and the Contractual Workmen were
materially different. There was no permanent workman of Respondent No. 1
deployed for maintenance of towers with whom the wages of the
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
16:15:22
LPA 1191/2024
Contractual Workmen could legitimately be compared; consequently, there
was no basis for the Contractual Workmen to claim parity in pay.
17.
Further, where employees or workmen are engaged through a
contractor, it remains within the contractor’s discretion to determine whom
to engage and the manner in which such persons are selected and deputed to
the principal employer. If contractual employees engaged through a
contractor and deployed to work are accorded the same benefits as
permanent employees, it would amount to conferring legitimacy upon a
process that may not be governed by any prescribed mechanism of selection.
Accordingly, even assuming that the work performed by the Contractual
Workmen and the permanent employees of Respondent No. 1 was similar,
parity in benefits could not, in the facts of the present case, be granted to the
Contractual Workmen deputed by Respondent No. 2. The Appellant has also
failed to establish that Respondent No. 2 was a sham contractor engaged by
Respondent No. 1 to avoid payment of lawful wages to the Contractual
Workmen. On this ground as well, the Appellant’s claim for equal pay is
liable to fail.
18.
In view of the foregoing analysis, we are of the considered opinion
that the Appellant has failed to make out any ground warranting interference
with the Impugned Order. Accordingly, the present Appeal is dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
TEJAS KARIA, J
DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ
MAY 29, 2026
'Ak’
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
16:15:22
LPA 1191/2024
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