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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 17 March 2026
Pronounced on: 01 July 2026
+
W.P.(C) 10731/2025
GAURAV KUMAR
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Shyam Mehta, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Mohit Paul, Ms. Rangoli Seth, Ms.
Sanjleena Lal and Mr. Rohit, Advs.
versus
HIGH COURT OF DELHI, THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR
GENERAL & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Ms. Beenashaw N. Soni, Adv.
with Ms. Mansi Jain, Adv. for DHC
Mr. Ravi Kant Srivastava, SPC with Mr.
Robert Laishram, Adv. for UOI
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
01.07.2026
%
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1.
By order dated 3 July 2013, the petitioner was appointed as a
Temporary Chauffeur in this Court, with effect from 14 June 2013 till
further orders.
2.
The petitioner continued on probation, without being confirmed
till, on 10 February 2016, the competent Committee of this Court
decided to terminate the services of the petitioner under Rule 5 of the
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Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1985, on the
ground that he had failed to complete his probation period
successfully, as there were several complaints against him. Following
the recommendation of the Committee, the services of the petitioner
was terminated by this Court vide Office Order dated 4 March 2016.
3.
The petitioner challenged the said decision before this Court by
way of WP (C) 2115/2018, which was dismissed by a Division Bench
of this Court by judgment dated 13 August 2018. Review Petition
354/2018, seeking review of the decision, was also dismissed on 26
October 2018.
4.
The petitioner challenged these decisions before the Supreme
Court by way of SLP (C) 1871/2019.
5.
By the following order dated 15 February 2022, the Supreme
Court disposed of the said SLP:
“Delay condoned.
Leave granted.
The appellants were appointed by the respondent as Temporary
Chauffeur(s)/Driver(s). Their probation were not cleared and they
were terminated from service on account of their unsatisfactory
performance.
Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi vide its impugned order
dated 13.08.2018 has confirmed the order of termination of the
appellants passed by the concerned Committee of respondent.
Being aggrieved by the said impugned order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, the appellants filed
Review Petition(s) but failed.
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Now the appellants are before this Court impugning the order dated
13.08.2018 confirming the termination order as well as the Order
dated 26.10.2018 passed in the Review Petition(s) confirming the
order dated 13.08.2018.
In compliance of this Court’s order dated 07.01.2022, the
appellants have filed an undertaking before this court stating that
they will perform their duties diligently with the respondent
henceforth and shall not give any reason for any complaint in
performing their duties in the future with the respondent.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the cases and more
particularly having regard to the Undertaking filed before this
Court by the appellants, we are of the view that one more
opportunity should be granted to the appellants to improve their
performance in duties. Hence the impugned order(s) are set aside.
The respondent is directed to continue the services of the
appellants initially on a probation for
a period of two years from the date of re-joining on duties with the
respondent.
The Appeals are disposed of accordingly.”
6.
The petitioner was, accordingly, allowed to rejoin as Chauffeur
vide Memorandum dated 14 March 2022 issued by this Court, with
effect from the date of his joining. As directed by the Supreme Court,
the Memorandum stated that the petitioner would initially be on
probation for a period of two years with effect from the date of
rejoining service.
7.
Consequent on the petitioner’s rejoining service, the following
Office Order came to be issued by this Court on 31 March 2022:
“No.: 412/E-9/Estt.-I/DHC
Date: 31.03.2022
OFFICE ORDER
Pursuant to Orders dated 15.02.2022 passed by Hon'ble Supreme
of India in Civil Appeal No (S) 1341-1342 of 2022 arising out of
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SLP (C) Nos. 2496-2497 of 2022 and Civil Appeal No(S) 13431344 of 2022 arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 6571-6572/2019 titled as
"Gaurav Kumar v. High Court of Delhi" and "Gopal Singh v.
High Court of Delhi", respectively, the Competent Authority has
been pleased to allow, the below mentioned officials, to re-join
their duties as Chauffeur on the establishment of this Court:S.No Name of the
Candidate
1.
Mr.
Gopal
Singh S/o Late
Sh. Sita Ram
2.
Post to which
appointed
Temporary
Chauffeur in the
Level 5 of Pay
Matrix (as per
7th
Pay
Commission)
Mr.
Gaurav Temporary
Kumar S/o Sh. Chauffeur in the
Manoj Kumar Level 5 of Pay
Matrix (as per
7th
Pay
Commission)
Note: (1)
Remarks
Rejoined
as
Chauffeur
w.e.f.
14.03.2022 (AN) till
further
orders
against one of the
existing posts of
Chauffeur.
Rejoined
as
Chauffeur
w.e.f.
21.03.2022 (FN) till
further
orders
against one of the
existing posts of
Chauffeur.
The above officials shall be on probation initially
for a period of two years from the date of their rejoining in this Court, with a stipulation that expiry
of the period of probation shall not result in their
automatic confirmation.
(2)
Their work and conduct shall be closely watched
and reported regularly.
Sd/(Kishor Kumar)
Joint Registrar (Estt-I).
Date: 31.03.2022
Endst. No.: 5105-5114/Estt-I/E-9/DHC”
8.
On 30 August 2022, the petitioner represented to this Court,
requesting that his service as Chauffeur be treated as continuous with
effect from the date of his initial appointment in 2013. The said
representation was rejected by this Court, and the decision
communicated to the petitioner on 11 January 2023.
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9.
The petitioner, thereafter, moved MA 1401-1402/2023 in SLP
(C) D 1871/2019, praying for a direction to this Court to treat the
petitioner as continuing in service as Chauffeur with effect from the
date of his initial appointment in 2013.
10.
By the following order dated 10 July 2023, the Supreme Court
allowed the petitioner to withdraw the said MAs:
“1.
Learned counsel for the Appellant seeks permission to
withdraw these miscellaneous applications.
2.
Permission is granted.
3.
Hence, these miscellaneous applications are dismissed as
withdrawn.”
11.
The petitioner has now petitioned this Court by means of the
present writ petition, praying for the very same relief as was sought in
MA 1401-1402/2023 before the Supreme Court, i.e., that his service
as Chauffeur be treated as continuous with effect from 14 June 2013,
with all consequential benefits, including salary, emoluments, arrears,
seniority and promotion. The prayer clause in the writ petition reads
thus:
“It is, therefore, most humbly and respectfully prayed that this
Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to:
(a)
Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate
writ, order or direction compelling the Respondents to
include the period of duty from 14.06.2013 to 04.03.2016
as part of Petitioner’s service and pay the Petitioner, salary,
emoluments, benefits including arrears, and consider his
seniority, promotions etc. on that basis;
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(b)
Issue a writ of certiorari or an appropriate writ,
order or direction quashing and setting aside the order/
decision recorded in the Minutes of Meeting dated
14.12.2022 of the ‘Committee for Appointment of Officials
of High Court’, High Court of Delhi at New Delhi;
(c)
by an appropriate writ, order or direction as an
interim measure direct the Respondents to count the past
service of the Petitioner during pendency of the present
petition;
(d)
grant any other relief in addition to or incidental to
the reliefs prayed for hereinabove;
(e)
pass any other order which this Hon’ble Court may
deem fit and proper in the fact situation of the case at hand;
and
(f)
allow the present petition, in the interest of justice.”
12.
Counter-affidavit and rejoinder have been filed.
13.
We have heard Mr. Mohit Paul for the petitioner and Ms.
Beenashaw N. Soni for the High Court, at length. Written submissions
have also been filed by Mr. Paul.
14.
Mr. Paul submits that the use of the word “continue” by the
Supreme Court in its order dated 15 February 2022 leaves no manner
of doubt that the petitioner is entitled to continuity of service from the
date of his initial joining in 2013. The Supreme Court, he submits, has
not wiped out the earlier service rendered by the petitioner. Nor is
there any direction, by the Supreme Court, to the effect that the
petitioner’s appointment, consequent to the order of the Supreme
Court, would be treated as a fresh appointment. The setting aside of
the judgment of this Court, whereby the petitioner’s termination was
upheld, had necessarily resulted in restoration of the status quo, and
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reinstatement of the petitioner from the date when he was terminated
with continuity of service as a consequence. The direction to place the
petitioner on probation for a period of two years, submits Mr. Paul,
cannot be interpreted as meaning that the petitioner’s service would
start afresh. The direction for keeping the petitioner on probation was
only to assess suitability, and did not eviscerate the petitioner’s past
service. Mr. Paul submits that, by treating the petitioner’s appointment
as a fresh appointment, this Court has rewritten the order of the
Supreme Court.
15.
The simpliciter withdrawal, by the petitioner, of MA 1401-
1402/2023, submits Mr. Paul, cannot be regarded as a bar to grant of
relief to the petitioner in these proceedings.
16.
Mr. Paul reiterates that the interpretation placed by this Court
on the order dated 15 February 2022 passed by the Supreme Court
would result in wiping out the words “continue the services”, as
employed by the Supreme Court.
17.
Ms. Soni submits that, in the absence of any direction, from the
Supreme Court, to the effect that the petitioner would be entitled to
continuity of service, no fault can be found with the High Court in
rejecting the petitioner’s request to that effect. She submits, further,
that, having moved the Supreme Court by way of MA 14011402/2023, seeking the same relief, and having withdrawn the MA
unconditionally, the petitioner cannot re-agitate the issue before this
Court.
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18.
Having heard learned Counsel, we are of the opinion that the
petition is entitled to succeed, but only in part.
19.
We may state, at the outset, that the unconditional withdrawal
of MA 1401-1402/2023, from the Supreme Court, cannot, to our
mind, operate as a fetter to the present writ petition. The petitioner’s
right to ventilate his grievance on merits has not been foreclosed by
the Supreme Court. Withdrawal of a Miscellaneous Application,
which sought additional directions in an SLP which already stood
disposed of cannot, to our mind, bar the petitioner from moving a
substantive petition seeking the said relief.
20.
We also note that the petitioner has been forthright in disclosing
the fact that, for the relief sought in this writ petition, the petitioner
had initially moved MA 1401-1402/2023 before the Supreme Court,
and had withdrawn the MAs.
The petitioner has been candid in
placing, before this Court, the order passed by the Supreme Court on
10 July 2023, allowing the petitioner to withdraw the MAs.
21.
We, therefore, are not in agreement with Ms. Soni in her
submission that the petitioner ought not to be allowed to agitate the
present writ petition, having withdrawn MA 1401-1402/2023
unconditionally from the Supreme Court.
22.
We hold that the writ petition is entitled to succeed in part, in
that the petitioner’s prayer for being granted salary, arrears,
emoluments and promotions, during the period between his
termination and rejoining, cannot be allowed. Arrears of salary are not
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an inevitable or inexorable consequence to an order of reinstatement
in service, consequent on setting aside termination.1 We cannot,
therefore, direct the High Court to grant arrears of salary to the
petitioner for the period after his termination on 4 March 2016 till his
reinstatement on 14 March 2022. Any such relief could have been
granted only by the Supreme Court and, as the Supreme Court has not
chosen to do so, we cannot allow the prayer.
23.
Besides, a reading of the order dated 15 February 2022 of the
Supreme Court reveals that the Supreme Court has not held, either
expressly or by necessary implication, that the termination of the
petitioner’s services on 4 March 2016 was illegal. Mr. Paul’s
contention that the setting aside of the judgment dated 13 August
2018, passed by this Court, whereby WP (C) 2115/2018 was
dismissed, results, ipso facto, in restoring the status quo ante and
amounts to a declaration that the petitioner’s termination was
unjustified, cannot be accepted. In fact, a reading of the order dated 15
February 2022 passed by the Supreme Court indicates to the contrary.
The order has obviously been passed ex debito justitiae, and not by
way of setting aside, on merits, of the order dated 13 August 2018
passed by this Court. This is clear from the use of the word “hence” in
the judgment of the Supreme Court. Having recorded the undertaking
submitted by the petitioner in terms of the earlier order dated 7
January 2022 of the Supreme Court, that he would perform his duties
diligently thereafter and not for any reason for complaint, the Supreme
Court has observed that “hence”, the order dated 13 August 2018 of
this Court was set aside. Clearly, the Supreme Court has been
1 U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479
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magnanimous and granted one more opportunity to the petitioner to
improve his performance.
24.
The order is ex facie incompatible with a direction to grant
arrears of salary or promotion, to the petitioner, during the period
between his termination and his reinstatement.
25.
At the same time, we cannot ignore the use of the words
“continue the services of the appellants”, employed by the Supreme
Court in the penultimate paragraph of its order dated 15 February
2022. The words “continue the services” admit of only one
interpretation, which is the interpretation which Mr. Paul advances.
Continuity of service has, therefore, been expressly directed by the
Supreme Court. If the High Court had any doubt in that regard, it was
for the High Court to approach the Supreme Court and seek a
clarification. It has not done so.
26.
The order dated 15 February 2022, of the Supreme Court has,
therefore, to be read as it stands. As it stands, the order grants, to the
petitioner – and other appellants before the Supreme Court –
continuity of service.
27.
Continuity of service would, however, only imply that the
probation period of the petitioner would be deemed to continue till the
expiry of two years from the date of the petitioner’s rejoining,
consequent to the order passed by the Supreme Court. This would not,
however, entitle the petitioner to arrears of salary or any other benefits
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or to emoluments for the period when the petitioner remained out of
service.
28.
Insofar as pay fixation is concerned, two Division Benches of
this Court, in Mahabir Prasad v. Delhi Transport Corporation2 and
Jagdish Chander v. Delhi Transport Corporation3, have held that a
direction for reinstatement with continuity in service would entitle the
employee to have his pay fixed, on his reinstatement, as though he had
continued in service during the period following his termination,
which would include grant of notional increments and the like, but
would not entitle him to any arrears of salary on that count. In the case
of the petitioner, therefore, he would be entitled to have his pay
refixed, treating him as having continued in service with effect from
14 June 2013. In case there are other chauffeurs who had been
selected with the petitioner and had joined from the same date, the
petitioner would be entitled to have his pay fixed to be at par with
them.
29.
Needless to say, there is no question of the petitioner being
entitled to any promotion during the period when he joined on 14 June
2013 till the completion of his probation two years from the date of
his rejoining after the order passed by the Supreme Court.
30.
Insofar as seniority is concerned, no cause of action in that
regard has arisen till date. We do not wish to return an opinion on
whether the petitioner would be entitled to count the period of his
2 212 (2014) DLT 503 (DB)
3 2020 LLR 754
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probation, from 14 June 2013, for the purposes of seniority. We leave
that issue open, to be adjudicated as and when occasion may arise, if it
does.
31.
We, therefore, dispose of this writ petition in the following
terms:
(i)
The petitioner’s prayer for continuity of his service as
Chauffeur succeeds. In other words, the petitioner would be
deemed to have joined as chauffeur on 14 June 2013 but would
be treated as having continued on probation till the expiry of
two years from 14 March 2022, when the petitioner rejoined
service as Chauffeur pursuant to the order dated 15 February
2022 of the Supreme Court.
(ii)
The petitioner would be entitled to have his pay,
consequent on his rejoining duty as Chauffeur with this Court
with effect from 14 March 2022, refixed treating him as having
remained on probation after 4 March 2013 till the expiry of two
years after 14 March 2022. Any arrears of salary to which the
petitioner would become entitled as a consequence, would be
disbursed to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from
uploading of this judgment on the website of this Court.
(iii)
The petitioner would not, however, be entitled to any
arrears of salary for the period between his termination from
service on 4 March 2016 and his rejoining service on 14 March
2022.
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(iv)
The prayers for grant of promotions can obviously not be
granted, as the petitioner continued to remain on probation.
(v)
We have not expressed any opinion on the prayer for
grant of seniority, leaving that issue to be decided as and when
occasion may arise to do so.
32.
The writ petition stands accordingly allowed in part, with no
orders as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
JULY 01, 2026/aky/yg
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