Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Judgment reserved on: 26.02.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 11.03.2026
+
O.M.P. (COMM) 463/2023
GALAXY INFRA AND ENGINEERING PVT
LTD.
Through:
.....Petitioner
Ms. Minakshi Jyoti, Mr. Anmol
Jain, Ms. Shakshi Raj & Ms.
Shruti Jain, Advs.
versus
PRAVIN ELECTRICALS PVT LTD
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Gaurav Mitra, Mr. Saswat
Pattnaik, Ms. Lavanya Pathak
& Mr. Akshay Sinha, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN
JUDGMENT
1.
This petition is filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter „the Act‟) against the award dated
07.08.2023.
Brief Facts
2.
The petitioner is in the business of providing consultancy
services for promotion of electrical supplies and installation, electric
design and build, electrical testing and commissioning, power transfer
and distribution project, EPC and turnkey projects. The respondent
operates in key industrial, commercial and retail sectors. On
26.05.2014, an online tender was invited by the Chief Engineer, South
Bihar Power Distribution Company Ltd. (for short „SBPD‟) for
appointment of implementing agency for execution of R-APDRP
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
(Part-B) Scheme on turnkey basis, for strengthening, improvement
and augmentation of distribution system capacity of 20 towns in
Patna. The last date for online submission of tender was extended to
08.07.2014.
2.1
The case pleaded is that the respondent approached the
petitioner in June 2014 for availing consultancy services for
submitting the bid. After availing consultancy services, the respondent
submitted technical and financial bid and the tender was awarded. The
parties agreed that the project was to be executed by M/s Process
Construction & Technical Services Pvt. Ltd. (for short „PCTS‟). Due
to non-payment of final invoice dated 01.07.2017 the dispute arose
between the parties to the lis. The petitioner on 26.04.2018 issued
notice under Section 21 of the Act seeking appointment of an
arbitrator in terms of consultancy agreement dated 07.07.2014 (for
short „CA‟). The petition filed by the petitioner under Section 11(6) of
the Act was allowed on 12.05.2020. The decision of this court was
challenged by the respondent. The Supreme Court in Civil Appeal
No. 825 of 2021 decided on 08.03.2021, upheld the appointment of
the arbitrator but set aside the judgment to the extent it conclusively
recorded finding that an arbitration agreement existed between the
parties. The concluding paragraph is as follows:“27. The facts of this case remind one of Alice in
Wonderland. In Chapter II of Lewis Caroll‟s classic,
after little Alice had gone down the Rabbit hole, she
exclaims “Curiouser and curiouser!” and Lewis Caroll
states “(she was so much surprised, that for the
moment she quite forgot how to speak good English)”.
This is a case which eminently cries for the truth to out
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
between the parties through documentary evidence and
cross-examination. Large pieces of the jigsaw puzzle
that forms the documentary evidence between the
parties in this case remained unfilled. The emails dated
22nd July, 2014 and 25th July, 2014 produced here for
the first time as well as certain correspondence
between SBPDCL and the Respondent do show that
there is some dealing between the Appellant and the
Respondent qua a tender floated by SBPDCL, but that
is not sufficient to conclude that there is a concluded
contract between the parties, which contains an
arbitration clause. Given the inconclusive nature of the
finding by CFSL together with the signing of the
agreement in Haryana by parties whose registered
offices are at Bombay and Bihar qua works to be
executed in Bihar; given the fact that the Notary who
signed the agreement was not authorised to do so and
various other conundrums that arise on the facts of this
case, it is unsafe to conclude, one way or the other, that
an arbitration agreement exists between the parties.
The prima facie review spoken of in Vidya Dhrolia
(supra) can lead to only one conclusion on the facts of
this case - that a deeper consideration of whether an
arbitration agreement exists between the parties must
be left to an Arbitrator who is to examine the
documentary evidence produced before him in detail
after witnesses are cross-examined on the same. For all
these reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of
the Delhi High Court in so far as it conclusively finds
that there is an Arbitration Agreement between the
parties. However, we uphold the ultimate order
appointing Justice G.S. Sistani, a retired Delhi High
Court Judge as a Sole Arbitrator. The learned Judge
will first determine as a preliminary issue as to whether
an Arbitration Agreement exists between the parties,
and go on to decide the merits of the case only if it is
first found that such an agreement exists. It is clarified
that all issues will be decided without being influenced
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
by the observations made by this court which are only
prima facie in nature. The appeal is allowed in the
aforesaid terms.”
(Emphasis supplied)
2.2
The arbitrator decided the preliminary issue “whether an
arbitration agreement exists between the parties ?”. It was held that the
petitioner failed to prove execution of the CA and the signatures on
behalf of the respondent on CA were forged. The second plea of the
petitioner that pursuant to correspondence exchanged subsequent to
07.07.2014 there was a concluded arbitration agreement between the
parties was held to be inconsistent with the main plea. The arbitrator
after holding that the alternative plea was inconsistent and not
maintainable dealt with it on merits. The conclusion was that the
correspondence showed no concluded agreement between the parties.
Hence, the present petition.
Submissions of the Petitioner
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that filing of the CA
prima facie proves execution of the agreement between the parties.
The submission is that the finding recorded by the arbitrator that the
signatures of Mr. M.G. Stephen on the agreement were forged, is not
backed by evidence and the onus to prove forgery is upon the
respondent. Reliance is placed on the cross examination of Mr. M.G.
Stephen (RW-1) to contend that there was an admission that the CA
was executed. The grievance is that while deciding the alternative plea
the arbitrator confused the issue of execution of the CA with whether
the correspondence between the parties after 07.07.2014 proved a
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
concluded independent agreement and the directions of the Supreme
Court were violated by the arbitrator.
3.1
It is canvassed that the correspondence between the parties
dated 15.07.2014, 22.07.2014 and 25.07.2014 proved that the CA was
executed between the parties and the arbitrator ignored the relevant
evidence. The contention is that the invoices dated 27.09.2014 and
24.04.2016 were raised on PCTS on instructions of the respondent and
the arbitrator erred in ignoring that the parties had agreed that the
invoices shall be raised against sub contractor PCTS.
3.2
Lastly, it is argued that the vital evidence on record and that
since filing of petition under Section 11(6) of the Act the alternative
argument of concluded agreement between the parties on the basis of
subsequent correspondence being raised by the petitioner was not
considered.
Submissions of the Respondent
4.
Per contra the CA was not executed between the parties. The
arbitrator dealt the issue in detail and recorded reasons to support the
conclusion. It is submitted that the second plea before arbitrator was
contrary to the first plea taken and was rightly held to be not
maintainable. It is stated that the arbitration proceedings were initiated
in terms of the CA and at a later stage in the same arbitration
proceedings the petitioner cannot place reliance upon any other
agreement. The contention that the communication between the parties
subsequent to 07.07.2014 proved that there was a concluded
agreement between the parties is refuted. The emphasis is that there
was no correspondence between the parties indicating a concluded
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
agreement. Submission is that the scope of interference under Section
34 of the Act is limited and there cannot be re-appreciation of
evidence.
5.
Heard learned counsel for the parties in detail. No other issue
than those noted above was pressed.
Analysis
6.
It would be relevant to note that the Supreme Court upheld the
appointment of the arbitrator by this court. However, the conclusive
finding that there existed an arbitration agreement between the parties
was set aside and this issue was left to be decided by the arbitrator. It
was clarified that the issue of the existence of a concluded arbitration
agreement between the parties shall be decided by the arbitrator
without being influenced by the observations made by the Apex
Court.
7.
The arbitrator dealt with the preliminary issue in three parts: (i)
whether the CA was executed between the parties; (ii) whether the
communication exchanged between the parties proved a concluded
arbitration agreement; and (iii) whether an independent agreement
came into existence by correspondence exchanged between the parties
subsequent to 07.07.2014.
8.
The arbitrator held that the CA was not executed between the
parties and signatures thereupon of Mr. M.G. Stephen were forged. It
was considered that: (a) the parties to the agreement belonged to Bihar
and Mumbai, whereas the CA was notarised in Faridabad; (b) the
Managing Director of the petitioner while deposing as CW-1 admitted
that none of the parties had business place in Faridabad and no
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
negotiation took place there; (c) the CA was notarised by Mr. Vinay
Kumbta who as per the testimony of CW-1 was a business partner
residing in Faridabad but in cross-examination it was stated that he
was an employee and had only the role of accessing emails received;
(d) the license of the notary notarising the CA had expired; (e) the
petitioner failed to examine the witnesses to the CA or the notary; and
(f) by email dated 15.07.2014 that is eight days after the date on which
the petitioner claimed execution of the CA, a draft of the agreement
was circulated.
9.
In the absence of challenge to the finding recorded by the
arbitrator, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that
production of the CA was a prima facie proof of execution of
agreement deserves rejection. The petitioner failed to discharge the
onus to prove the execution of the CA. The reliance on question no.65
posed to Mr. M.G. Stephen in cross-examination to substantiate an
admission of execution of the CA is of no avail. There is no admission
by RW-1 of the execution of the CA.
10.
The submission that the respondent had failed to discharge onus
and arbitrator erred in holding that the signatures of Mr. M.G. Stephen
on the CA were forged, is ill-founded. The arbitrator rightly concluded
that initial onus of proving execution of the CA was on the petitioner
and the petitioner failed to do so. It was noted that case of both the
parties was known to each other. The respondent had denied execution
of the CA as well as the signatures thereon. RW-1, while deposing
reiterated that the signatures were forged and the stand taken was
corroborated from the fact that the parties even after 07.07.2014 were
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
still at negotiating stage. The report of CSFL for comparison of
signatures of Mr. M.G. Stephen was inconclusive. The provisions of
Order VII Rule 2 and Rule 4 CPC were considered that the
requirement of the pleadings thereunder is in the case of a fraud and
not of forgery.
11.
The reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner on an
email dated 27.10.2014 to prove the execution of the CA and that it
was signed by Mr. M.G. Stephen was rightly rejected by the arbitrator.
The email calling upon the petitioner to complete the agreement
cannot be construed as an admission of execution of the CA.
12.
Issue no.2 that the execution of the CA was proved by the
correspondence subsequent to 07.07.2014 was rejected in view of the
findings recorded for issue no.1. The findings on issue no.1 have been
upheld and issue no.2 need not be further dilated upon.
13.
The issue no.3 that consequent to the correspondence
exchanged between the parties after 07.07.2014 an independent
arbitration agreement came into existence was held to be inconsistent
with issue no.1 and rejected. On one hand the petitioner insisted that
the CA was executed on 07.07.2014 but at the same time relied upon
the correspondence between the parties revealing that till 25.07.2014
the draft of the agreement was being exchanged.
14.
The challenge to this issue by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is only on the ground that the arbitrator mixed two issues
and violated the directions of the Supreme Court. Suffice to say that
the arbitrator dealt with the second issue in detail and further
bifurcated it for clarity. Moreover, the Supreme Court had only
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
recorded prima facie findings with regard to the issue of a concluded
arbitration agreement between the parties. It was left for the arbitrator
to determine the preliminary issue of existence of an arbitration
agreement between the parties. It was clarified that the issue shall be
decided without being influenced by the observations of the Supreme
Court.
15.
The arbitrator after holding that the second plea was
inconsistent with the first plea and could not be raised, proceeded to
examine the second plea on merits.
16.
Learned counsel for the respondent at this stage submits that the
decision of the arbitrator not permitting the petitioner to raise the
second issue, rendered merits of issue redundant.
17.
The contention is refuted by the learned counsel for the
petitioner by stating that in spite the observation that the petitioner
was not permitted to raise the issue, the arbitrator chose to go into the
merits and that part of the award has not been challenged by the
respondent.
18.
There is merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel
for the respondent that once the arbitrator held that the petitioner was
not permitted to raise the second contention, the outcome on the
merits of the issue was academic. This position shall not be altered by
the respondent not challenging the part of the award whereby
arbitrator chose to go into the merits of the issue.
19.
Be that as it may since the arbitrator examined the issue on
merits, it is agitated before this court and is being considered. The
financial bid was submitted by the respondent on 10.07.2014 but
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
email between the parties to the lis were exchanged from 25.06.2014.
After the last date of submission of bid, the respondent by email dated
15.07.2014 shared a draft agreement but the financial terms of the
agreement were not accepted by the petitioner. Albeit, email dated
15.07.2014 referred to an agreement „which you sent earlier‟ but it
does not come to the rescue of the petitioner for the reasons that the
draft agreements were being exchanged thereafter as well.
20.
The correspondence dated 15.07.2014 and 22.07.2014 was not
to the effect that the final consultancy agreement was concluded
between the parties. Rather with email dated 25.07.2014, there was an
attachment titled „final consultancy agreement‟ but it was along with
an inquiry as to whether the final consultancy agreement was in order.
This inquiry dented the case of the petitioner that an independent
agreement was concluded, it showed that the matter was still to be
approved. The arbitrator rightly held that the parties were in
negotiation on crucial aspect and there was no concluded agreement.
21.
Another angle considered by the arbitrator was that the notice
was served under Section 21 of the Act relying upon the CA and
issuance of notice is mandatory. The arbitrator noted the legal position
that wrong mentioning of provision shall not prove fatal to notice
issued under Section 21 of the Act. Whereas the arbitrator was
appointed in terms of arbitration clause contained in CA and the plea
was not of wrong mentioning of provision but that there was a
subsequent independent agreement between the parties pursuant to the
correspondence exchanged after 07.07.2014. In other words, after
having held that there was no arbitral agreement between the parties,
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
the arbitrator had to go to the extent to find that if there is some other
agreement providing for dispute resolution through arbitration. The
principle of Kompetenz - Kompetenz was to be stretched for making
roving inquiries by the arbitrator to find jurisdiction to adjudicate the
matter, especially when the foundation of the appointment of the
arbitrator is itself eroded after holding that the CA was not executed
between the parties.
22.
The petitioner raised first and second invoice against PCTS and
it was proved from the bank statement produced that the payments
were made by PCTS. The second invoice specifically referred to an
agreement between the petitioner and PCTS and there was no
reference of an agreement executed between the parties to the lis. The
final invoice dated 01.07.2007 was raised referring to the CA and this
invoice was for Marketing Consultancy Fee which was not within the
scope of work of the petitioner.
23.
The scope of interference under Section 34 of the Act is well
defined. An award cannot be interfered for every factual or legal error
unless suffering from patent illegality or transversing beyond the
terms of the contract or being against the public policy or the
conclusion arrived at is perverse. Reference in this regard be made to
the following decisions of the Supreme Court:
23.1 In Ramesh Kumar Jain v. Bharat Aluminium Company
limited (balco) 2025 INSC 1457 it was held as follows:
“28. The bare perusal of section 34 mandates a narrow
lens of supervisory jurisdiction to set aside the arbitral
award strictly on the grounds and parameters
enumerated in sub-section (2) & (3) thereof. The
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
interference is permitted where the award is found to be
in contravention to public policy of India; is contrary to
the fundamental policy of Indian Law; or offends the
most basic notions of morality or justice. Hence, a plain
and purposive reading of the section 34 makes it
abundantly clear that the scope of interference by a
judicial body is extremely narrow. It is a settled
proposition of law as has been constantly observed by
this court and we reiterate, the courts exercising
jurisdiction under section 34 do not sit in appeal over the
arbitral award hence they are not expected to examine
the legality, reasonableness or correctness of findings on
facts or law unless they come under any of grounds
mandated in the said provision. In ONGC Limited. v.
Saw Pipes Limited this court held that an award can be
set aside under Section 34 on the following grounds:
“(a) contravention of fundamental policy of Indian law;
or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality, or
(d) in addition, if it is patently illegal.”
23.2 In Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited Vs.
Software Technology Parks of India (2025) 7 SCC 757 it was held
as under:
“46. Scope of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is now well
crystallized by a plethora of judgments of this Court.
Section 34 is not in the nature of an appellate
provision. It provides for setting aside an arbitral award
that too only on very limited grounds i.e. as those
contained in Sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 34.
It is the only remedy for setting aside an arbitral award.
An arbitral award is not liable to be interfered with
only on the ground that the award is illegal or is
erroneous in law which would require re-appraisal of
the evidence adduced before the arbitral tribunal. If
two views are possible, there is no scope for the court
to re-appraise the evidence and to take the view other
than the one taken by the arbitrator. The view taken by
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
the arbitral tribunal is ordinarily to be accepted and
allowed to prevail. Thus, the scope of interference in
arbitral matters is only confined to the extent envisaged
Under Section 34 of the Act. The court exercising
powers Under Section 34 has perforce to limit its
jurisdiction within the four corners of Section 34. It
cannot travel beyond Section 34. Thus, proceedings
Under Section 34 are summary in nature and not like a
full-fledged civil suit or a civil appeal. The award as
such cannot be touched unless it is contrary to the
substantive provisions of law or Section 34 of the 1996
Act or the terms of the agreement.”
23.3 In The Supreme Court in Sepco Electric Power Construction
Corporation Vs. GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd. 2025 INSC 1171
held:
“97……..Therefore, it appears that even if the
arbitrator‟s legal or factual reasoning is faulty, the
courts ought to ideally refrain from interfering with an
award until an error of law is evident from the award
itself or in a document that forms an integral
component thereof.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
24.
The impugned award is not vitiated by patent illegality,
perversity or being against the public policy and the conclusion
arrived at is plausible. No case is made out for interference under
Section 34 of the Act.
25.
The petition is dismissed.
AVNEESH JHINGAN, J.
MARCH 11, 2026
Ch
Reportable:- Yes
Signed By:HONEY
ARORA
O.M.P.(COMM) 463/2023
15:59:24
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review