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2026:JHHC:9671-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.650 of 2022
Gajendra Prasad, Aged about 50 years, son of Sri U.N. Sahu,
Resident of Radha Udit Bhawan, Kuwartola, Ward No. 09,
Gangjala, Saharsa, P.O. & P.S. Saharsa, District-Saharsa (At
present residing at G/37, D.V.C Colony, Jharnadih, C.T.P.S.,
P.O. & P.S. Chandrapura, District-Bokaro.) (Currently
residing at Room No. 02, Block-B, Officer's Dormitory, DVC
Township, Post Banjhedih, P.S. Koderma, District-Jharkhand
825421).
…….Appellant
Versus
1. Damodar Valley Corporation through its Chairman, having
office at D.V.C. Towers, V.I.P. Road, P.O. Kankurga, P.S.
Manktala, Kolkata-54.
2. Director (HRD), now redesignated as Executive Director
(H.R) Damodar Valley Corporation, H.R.D. Department
(Now H.R. Department) (5th Floor) D.V.C. Towers, V.I.P.
Road P.O. Kankurga, P.S. Manktala, Kolkata-54.
3. Additional Secretary, Damodar Valley Corporation, Office
of the Director (HRD), D.V.C. Tower, V.I.P. Road, P.O.
Kankurga, P.S. Manktala, Kolkata-54.
4. Chief Engineer, Chandrapura Thermal Power Station,
Damodar Valley Corporation, Chandrapura, P.O. & P.S.
Chandrapura, District-Bokaro.
5. Deputy General Manager (A), Chandrapura Thermal Power
Station, Damodar Valley Corporation, Chandrapura, P.O.
& P.S. Chandrapura, District-Bokaro.
6. Additional Chief Accounts Officer, Chandrapural Thermal
Power Station, Damodar Valley Corporation, Chandrapura,
P.O. & P.S. Chandrapura, District-Bokaro.
7. Enquiry Officer-cum-D.G.M. (Admn.) Damodar Valley
Corporation, Head Quarter Kolkata, P.O. Kankurga, P.S.
Manktala.
……..Respondents
---------
PRESENT
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
---------
For the Appellant
: Mr. Atanu Banerjee, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Srijit Choudhary, Advocate
---------
Dated: 02/04/2026
2026:JHHC:9671-DB
Per: Deepak Roshan, J.:
JUDGMENT
I.A. No. 6048 of 2023
1.
The instant interlocutory application has been filed by
the appellant seeking leave to place on record the Enquiry
Report dated 17.08.2007, which was not produced during the
writ proceedings.
2.
Having regard to the fact that the penalty imposed
upon the appellant is based on the said Enquiry Report, we are
of the considered view that the same is relevant for adjudication
of the present appeal, as such, this interlocutory application
stands allowed.
3.
Accordingly, I.A. No. 6408 of 2023 stands disposed of.
L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022
4.
This intra court appeal is directed against the part of
the order dated 29.06.2022 passed in W.P.(S) No. 2908/2008;
whereby the order of punishment of “withholding of one
increment without cumulative effect for a period of one year”, was
not interfered with by the Ld. Single Judge and the findings with
regard to Article of Charge No. IV was upheld; although the said
punishment order as well as the order of the appellate authority
relating to Charge no.1 held to be perverse and was quashed in
W.P.(S) No. 2908/2008, and, against the part of the order dated
29.06.2022; whereby the order dated 11.06.2018 passed by the
disciplinary authority treating the period of suspension from
25.10.2002 to 01.05.2007 as the period of 'non-duty' was not
interfered with and was thus upheld.
5.
Briefly stated, the appellant was appointed as Assistant
Operator (Electrical) in the respondent–Corporation in the year
1995. During the course of his service, the appellant solemnized
his marriage on 11.07.2000. Subsequently, on account of a
criminal case instituted against him, the appellant was placed
under suspension with effect from 25.10.2002.
2026:JHHC:9671-DB
In the meantime, a memorandum of charges dated
02.06.2004 was issued initiating a departmental proceeding
against the appellant, inter alia, alleging (i) non-disclosure of
marriage to the Corporation, (ii) demand of dowry, (iii) desertion of
his wife, and (iv) leaving headquarters during suspension without
permission.
The petitioner denied the charges and upon not being
not satisfied with the reply, order was issued to enquire into the
charges (Annexure-6) in a disciplinary proceeding. The Enquiry
Officer had initially submitted an ex-parte enquiry report on
04.06.2005 as the petitioner did not attend the enquiry
proceedings.
Meanwhile, the appellant filed a writ petition being
W.P. (S) No. 7580/2006 challenging his order of suspension. The
writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 23.02.2007 with a
direction that if the enquiry is not completed by 30.04.2007, the
petitioner’s suspension shall stand automatically revoked w.e.f.
01.05.2007. Thereafter, the petitioner appeared on 12.03.2007
in terms of the order passed by this court, the proceedings were
taken up and the suspension order was revoked w.e.f.
01.05.2007
and
thereafter,
another
enquiry
report
was
submitted on 17.08.2007.
After enquiry, the appellant was found guilty of Charge
nos. (i) and (iv), whereas charge no. (ii) was not proved and
charge no. (iii) remained subject to the criminal proceedings.
Thereafter,
the
disciplinary
authority,
vide
order
dated
12.03.2009, imposed a minor penalty of withholding of one
increment without cumulative effect for a period of one year.
The appeal preferred by the appellant was also dismissed vide
order dated 25.02.2010.
The appellant remained under suspension for the
period
from
25.10.2002
to
01.05.2007
and
was
paid
subsistence allowance. The issue regarding treatment of the
suspension
period
was
kept
open
to
be
decided
upon
2026:JHHC:9671-DB
culmination of the criminal case. Subsequently, the criminal
case ended in compromise and, thereafter, the disciplinary
authority during pendency of the writ petition, passed an order
dated 11.06.2018 directing that the entire period of suspension
be treated as “non-duty”.
Being aggrieved, vide WP(S) No. 2908 of 2008, the
appellant approached the writ court challenging the order of
punishment, the appellate order, including the order treating
the
suspension
period
as
non-duty,
and
also
sought
consequential service benefits including promotion, annual
increments and benefits under the U.C.P. Scheme.
The writ Court partly interfered with the findings
relating to one of the charges, however declined to interfere with
the punishment as well as the order treating the suspension
period as non-duty, while relegating the appellant to avail
appropriate remedy before the competent authority with respect
to service benefits.
This LPA is against the part of the order dated
29.06.2022 passed in WP(S) No. 2908 of 2008 whereby the
order of punishment of ‘withholding of one increment without
cumulative effect for a period of one year’; and against the part of
the
order
dated
11.06.2018
passed
by
the
Disciplinary
Authority treating the period of suspension from 25.10.2002 to
01.05.2007 as the period of ‘non-duty’ has not been interfered
with and has been upheld.
6.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that even
though the criminal case pending before the District Court,
Bhagalpur ended on compromise, the appellant was exonerated
from the charges, but still the Respondents issued order dated
11.06.2018 that the period of suspension from 25.10.2002 to
01.05.2007 would be treated as ‘non-duty’ and the appellant
would not be paid anything further other than the subsistence
allowances.
2026:JHHC:9671-DB
7.
Learned counsel further submits that the appellant has
not done any such serious misconduct in terms of Regulation
95(B)(1)
proviso
(ii)
of
the
Damodar
Valley
Corporation
Regulation as whenever the appellant left the Headquarter he
gave proper information to the competent authority and the
suspension of appellant in contemplation of departmental
enquiry was for the reason of the criminal case arising out of
matrimonial dispute and not due to any misconduct in relation
to discharge of duty by the appellant. Moreover, the denial of
full pay to the appellant for the long suspension period for about
more than five years is not justified as the suspension stood
revoked on 01.05.2007 but the departmental enquiry remained
pending up to 12.03.2009 which is certainly attributable to the
Respondents.
8.
Learned counsel lastly submits that the suspension of
the appellant was because of institution of criminal case and
the appellant was finally exonerated in the said criminal case in
view of the compromise made between the parties and as such
there appears to be no valid reason for denying full pay to the
petitioner/appellant in the suspension period. In view the
aforesaid submission he prays that impugned order may be set
aside and the consequential benefit may be extended to the
appellant.
9.
Per contra,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondents
submits that delay in conclusion of Disciplinary Proceedings is
solely attributable to the appellant as he did not cooperate in
the proceedings and did not attend the enquiry proceedings due
to which the Enquiry Officer had to submit an ex-parte enquiry
report on 06.01.2005 and the suspension was revoked w.e.f.
01.05.2007
following
which
another
enquiry
report
was
submitted on 17.08.2007.
10.
Learned counsel further submitted that on perusal of
the order of the competent authority, dated 12.03.2009 under
regulation 96 of DVC Service Regulation, 1957 and order in
2026:JHHC:9671-DB
appeal, dated 25.02.2010, under Regulation 105 of DVC Service
Regulation, 1957, it clearly shows that the competent authority
has neither completely exonerated the appellant nor held the
suspension to be wholly unreasonable, as required under the
Regulation 100 of
DVC Service Regulation, 1957, for the
appellant to be allowed to receive the difference between the full
pay with allowances and the subsistence grant. Hence, he
submits, that the appellant is only eligible to receive such
proportion of pay or allowance as the competent authority may
direct and he is not eligible for receiving the difference between
full pay and subsistence allowance paid to him for the said
period of suspension. In view of the aforesaid submission, he
submits that no relief should be granted to the appellant.
11.
Having heard Ld. Counsels for the rival parties and
after going through the materials on record, it transpires that
the appellant, who was appointed as Assistant Operator
(Electrical) under the respondent–Corporation in the year 1995,
was placed under suspension w.e.f. 25.10.2002 on account of
pendency of a criminal case. A departmental proceeding was
initiated against the appellant vide memorandum of charges
dated 02.06.2004 and upon conclusion thereof, the appellant
was inflicted with a minor penalty of withholding of one
increment without cumulative effect. The appellant remained
under suspension for the period from 25.10.2002 to 01.05.2007
and was paid subsistence allowance during the said period.
12.
The question regarding treatment of the suspension
period was kept open till the final verdict of the judicial Case No.
876/2001 and, upon culmination of the criminal case in
compromise,
the
disciplinary
authority,
vide
order
dated
11.06.2018, directed that the entire period of suspension be
treated as “non-duty”.
13.
The learned Single Judge in WP(S) No. 2908 of 2008,
while partly interfering with the findings in the departmental
proceeding, declined to interfere with the aforesaid order dated
2026:JHHC:9671-DB
11.06.2018. Thus, the limited issues which fall for consideration
in the present appeal is firstly as to whether the order of
punishment of ‘withholding of one increment without cumulative
effect for a period of one year’ is justified or not. Secondly,
whether the action of the respondents in treating the period of
suspension as “non-duty”, as affirmed by the learned Single
Judge, calls for interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
14.
The Court deems it appropriate to refer to the findings
recorded in the enquiry report dated 17.08.2007 with regard to
Article of Charge No. IV, which pertains to the allegation that
the appellant, during the period of suspension, had left his
headquarters without obtaining permission from the competent
authority.
15.
On perusal of the enquiry report, it reflects that the
Enquiry Officer has, at the very outset, noticed certain
infirmities in the framing of the charge, inasmuch as, no specific
dates of absence were indicated therein. However, upon
appreciation of the materials on record, the relevant period was
considered between 20.12.2002 and 02.06.2004, it having been
admitted that the appellant remained at headquarters till
19.12.2002.
16.
The Enquiry Officer further took note of the defense of
the appellant that he had, on each occasion of leaving the
headquarters, submitted leave applications, though sent by post
on account of alleged non-acceptance by the Sectional Head.
However, the Enquiry Officer ultimately returned a finding that
there was no material on record to establish that the appellant
had obtained prior permission or sanction from the competent
authority before leaving the headquarters. Consequently, while
accepting the explanation of the appellant to the extent that he
had made applications, the Enquiry Officer held that the
requirement of obtaining prior permission was not satisfied.
17.
Thus, Article of Charge No. IV stood proved on the
ground that the appellant had left his headquarters without
2026:JHHC:9671-DB
prior approval of the competent authority. As such, with regard
to the order of punishment of ‘withholding of one increment
without cumulative effect for a period of one year’, we, are of the
opinion that it is not very harsh and the learned Single Judge
has rightly declined to interfere with the finding of the
disciplinary authority on this point.
18.
The writ Court considered the issue with regard to the
period of suspension from 25.10.2002 to 01.05.2007 as the
period of ‘non-duty’ and gave its finding that the respondent
DVC was deprived from taking the services from the petitioner
as the petitioner was put under suspension. The writ Court held
that the impugned order before it clearly reflected that the
petitioner was put under suspension for the causes directly
attributable to him which ultimately prevented the corporations
from utilizing his services for the period from 25.10.2002 to
01.05.2007. The Court of learned Single Judge was of the
considered view that the respondents were within their right to
treat the period of suspension as ‘non-duty’ vide impugned
order dated 11th June, 2018 and accordingly the same did not
call for any interference.
19.
Even otherwise, at this stage, it would be appropriate
to refer to Regulation 100 of the D.V.C. Service Regulations,
1957, which governs the consequences of reinstatement after
suspension. The said Regulation postulates that an employee,
who has been suspended and is subsequently reinstated, would
be entitled to the difference between full pay and allowances
and the subsistence allowance already paid, only in a situation
where the competent authority records a finding that the
employee has been fully exonerated or that the suspension was
wholly unjustified. In all other cases, the Regulation vests
discretion in the competent authority to grant such proportion
of pay and allowances as it may deem fit. For brevity, the
Regulation 100 of the D.V.C. Service Regulations, 1957 has
been quoted herein-below:
2026:JHHC:9671-DB
“Regulation 100 - When an employee who
has been dismissed, removed or suspended
is reinstated he shall be allowed the
difference between the full pay with
allowances and the subsistence grant, if
the
authority
competent
to
order
reinstatement or to revoke the suspension
order holds that the employee has been
fully exonerated or, in the case of
suspension, that it was wholly unjustified.
In such a case the period of absence from
duty shall be treated as a period spent on
duty for all purposes. In other cases, the
employee shall be given such proportion of
such pay and allowances as the competent
authority may direct.”
20.
Thus, we do not think that there is any error on the
part of the Respondents for governing the Appellant under such
Regulation. In the present case, upon perusal of the order of
punishment dated 12.03.2009 passed under the relevant
Regulations, as also the appellate order dated 25.02.2010, it is
evident that the appellant was not fully exonerated of the
charges. On the contrary, he was found guilty of certain charges
in the departmental proceeding and was visited with a minor
penalty. It is further not the case of the appellant that the
competent authority, at any stage, has held that the order of
suspension was wholly unjustified.
21.
In such circumstances, the case of the appellant would
clearly fall within the Regulation 100, wherein the competent
authority is empowered to determine the extent of pay and
allowances admissible for the period of suspension.
22.
It further transpires that, in exercise of such power,
the competent authority, vide order dated 11.06.2018, has
specifically
directed that
the
period
of
suspension
from
25.10.2002 to 01.05.2007 shall be treated as “non-duty”.
23.
In view of the aforesaid statutory position, we are of the
considered view that the appellant, not having been fully
exonerated; nor the suspension having been held to be wholly
unjustified, cannot claim, as a matter of right, the difference
2026:JHHC:9671-DB
between full pay and subsistence allowance for the period in
question. The appellant would only be entitled to such
proportion of pay and allowances as determined by the
competent authority. As such, learned Single Judge has rightly
dealt with these issues.
24.
Accordingly, no illegality or infirmity can be attributed
to the order dated 11.06.2018 treating the period of suspension
as “non-duty”, and the same does not warrant interference in
the present appeal.
25.
As such, we are of the opinion that the instant LPA is
devoid of any merit and as such it stands dismissed. Pending
I.A., if any, also stands disposed of.
(Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J.)
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
Dated the 2nd of April, 2026.
Amardeep/
N.A.F.R.
Uploaded on
07.04.2026
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