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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 07.10.2026
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CNR No. DLHC010623792024
FAO (COMM) 186/2024, CM APPL. 54505/2024 & CM
APPL. 54507/2024
FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA & ANR.
.....Appellants
Through: Mr. Om Prakash, Sr. Adv. with
Mrs. Samridhi Prakash, Mr.
Rajeev Ranjan Pathak, Mrs.
Rasmi Prakash, Advs.
versus
VIKAS CHAWLA AND ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Mrityunjai Singh, Adv. for
R1 to 4.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH BHATT
AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. (ORAL)
1.
This appeal is filed assailing the judgment dated 28.03.2024
passed by the learned District Judge, Patiala House District Court
(hereinafter ‘Commercial Court’) accepting the objection petition filed
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for
short ‘the Act’).
2.
The facts in brief are that the Food Corporation of India
(FCI)/appellant floated a tender on 27.01.1999 for appointment of an
ad-hoc Road Transport Contractor for transportation of food grains
from Gharsana to Bikaner, for a period of three months extendable
upto three months. Shri Chimanlal (hereinafter ‘the deceased’), was
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the successful bidder and was appointed the ad-hoc Road Transport
Contractor with effect from 15.03.1999. The terms of the tender were
accepted by the deceased vide letter dated 08.03.1999. On failure of
the deceased to commence the work from 15.03.1999, FCI cancelled
the contract on 19.04.1999 and awarded the work to the next lowest
bidder.
2.1
Dispute arose between parties to the lis, FCI invoked arbitration
and the Indian Council of Arbitration (ICA) appointed the sole
arbitrator. The FCI raised a claim of Rs.3,09,602/- towards additional
cost and storage charges besides interest and costs. The deceased was
proceeded against ex-parte. The proceeding culminated in the award
dated 09.03.2004, awarding Rs.4,82,795/- to FCI. The awarded
amount comprised of Rs.1,11,437/- towards additional cost,
Rs.1,98,165/- for storage charges, interest of Rs.1,10,693/- and cost of
Rs.62,500/-.
2.2
A copy of the award was sent by ICA to the deceased by
registered post on 02.04.2004. The deceased on 05.03.2005 filed
objections under Section 34 of the Act (hereinafter ‘the objections’)
before the District Court, Bikaner (‘Bikaner Court’). During the
pendency of the objections, the deceased passed away and the legal
representatives (LRs) were brought on record. The Bikaner Court
returned the objection on 26.11.2018 for want of territorial
jurisdiction, with liberty to approach the competent court.
2.3
The LRs filed the objections bearing OMP (COMM.)
No.14/2019 in the Commercial Court on 15.01.2019. The application
seeking condonation of delay was filed on 05.03.2024.
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2.4
The Commercial Court vide judgment dated 28.03.2024,
allowed the objections and set aside the award being violative of
principles of natural justice. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment,
FCI is in appeal.
3.
Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the award was
sent by the Registrar, ICA on 02.04.2004 and it is presumed to be
served upon the deceased. The objections before the Bikaner Court
were filed beyond 120 days and the delay beyond the thirty days
cannot be condoned. It is argued that the objections returned by the
Bikaner Court on 26.11.2018 were not re-filed but fresh objections
raising additional grounds were filed. The application for condonation
of delay was filed subsequently and not alongwith the objections.
3.1
Reliance is on Section 3 of the Act to contend that service of the
notices and the award is to be presumed. The ex-parte proceedings are
defended by relying upon Section 25 of the Act, contending that the
deceased failed to appear despite notice.
3.2
It is submitted that the Commercial Court, having set aside the
award on the ground for violation of principles of natural justice,
ought not to have examined the merits of the award.
3.3
Reliance is on the decision of MMTC Limited v. Vedanta
Limited, (2019) 4 SCC 163, Ssangyong Engineering and
Construction Company Limited v. National Highways Authority of
India (NHAI), (2019) 15 SCC 131 to contend that a plausible view
taken by the arbitrator does not call for interference under Section 34
of the Act.
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3.4
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India v.
Popular
Constructions,
(2001)
SCC
and
Simplex
Infrastructure Limited v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 455 is relied
upon to contend that, in view of the language of Section 34 of the Act,
the applicability of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (for
short ‘the Limitation Act’) is ousted.
3.5
To buttress the argument that limitation commences from
receipt of the award State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. ARK Builders
Private Limited, (2011) 4 SCC 616 is cited.
Reliance is on the
decision of the Supreme Court in Basawaraj v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 to contend that there must be a
reasonable explanation for condoning the delay. The decision of CC
Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed and Anr., (2007) 6 SCC 555 is
pressed into service to fortify the contention that refusal of notice is
considered as service.
3.6
The decision of this Court in Lovely Benefit Chit Fund and
Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. Puran Dutt Sood & Ors., 1983 SCC OnLine Del
22 relied upon while deciding the objections, is stated to have been
distinguished by this Court in latter decisions.
4.
Per contra, the scope of interference under Section 37 of the
Act is narrow and circumscribed. The appellate court cannot sit in
appeal over the factual findings recorded by the Court and cannot
undertake re-appreciation of the evidence. The contention is that the
appellate court has to restrict consideration to whether the objections
were decided within the parameters of Section 34 of the Act.
4.1
The submission is that there was no proof of notice having been
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served upon the deceased. The contention regarding filing of the
objections before the Bikaner Court beyond 120 days is refuted
contending that this issue was not raised before the Commercial
Court.
5.
Heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Though written
submissions have been filed by the learned counsel for the parties but
only the issues noted above were pressed during the course of
arguments.
6.
Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to note that it is
an undisputed position that the records of arbitration and of ICA were
not available.
7.
The case set-up by the deceased was that on gaining knowledge
of the award on 03.02.2005, a certified copy was applied and
objections were filed before the Bikaner Court. The deceased expired
on 21.04.2012. The objections were returned on 26.11.2018 by
Bikaner Court for want of territorial jurisdiction and fresh objections
were filed before the Commercial Court on 15.01.2019 i.e. within
forty six days of return of objections by the Bikaner Court. The
Commercial Court considered the period spent before the Bikaner
Court for exclusion under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The
objection that the application for condonation of delay was not filed
alongwith the objections and that an application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act was filed instead of Section 14 of the Limitation Act
was rejected. Rightly the view taken was that where substantial justice
and technical considerations come into conflict, substantial justice
should prevail.
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8.
The contention that the initial objections filed before the
Bikaner Court were beyond 120 days from the receipt of the award
was not an issue pressed while arguing the objections, as is evident
from the impugned order. It is not the case of the appellant in appeal
that such a plea was raised but was not dealt by the Court while
deciding the objections under Section 34 of the Act.
9.
For invoking the presumption of service under Section 27 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 (for brevity ‘GC Act’) the reliance is
placed by the appellant on the letter dated 02.04.2004 of the Registrar,
ICA stating that the award was sent to the parties. The pre-requisites
for deemed service under Section 27 of the GC Act are that the
document must be properly addressed, postage prepaid and sent by
registered post in a letter containing the document. In the present case,
the postal receipt is not produced meaning thereby the proof of
sending award by registered post is missing and the presumption of
deemed service cannot be invoked. Reference in this regard is made to
the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Raja Kumari v. P.
Subbarama Naidu, (2004) 8 SCC 774 held as under:
“13…….In this connection a reference to Section 27 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 will be useful. The section
reads thus:
“27. Meaning of service by post.—Where any
Central Act or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act authorises or requires
any document to be served by post, whether the
expression ‘serve’ or either of the expressions
‘give’ or ‘send’ or any other expression is used,
then, unless a different intention appears, the
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service shall be deemed to be effected by properly
addressing, prepaying and posting by registered
post, a letter containing the document, and unless
the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the
time at which the letter would be delivered in the
ordinary course of post.”
14. No doubt Section 138 of the Act does not require that
the notice should be given only by ‘post’. Nonetheless the
principle incorporated in Section 27 (quoted above) can
profitably be imported in a case where the sender has
despatched the notice by post with the correct address
written on it. Then it can be deemed to have been served
on the sendee unless he proves that it was not really served
and that he was not responsible for such non-service. Any
other interpretation can lead to a very tenuous position as
the drawer of the cheque who is liable to pay the amount
would resort to the strategy of subterfuge by successfully
avoiding the notice.”
(emphasis supplied)
10.
Reliance placed by the appellant on Section 3 of the Act for
deemed service would not apply for the reasons already recorded, as
the requirement under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act would be mailing the
award by registered letter or other means.
11.
The law is settled that limitation runs from the receipt of the
award, as held in ARK Builders Private Limited (supra). In the case in
hand, there is no evidence of service of the award.
12.
The fact that fresh objections were filed instead of re-filing the
objections returned by the Bikaner Court was also not raised in the
objections. Moreover, the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act does not depend upon re-filing the returned objections. The time
spent in bona fide pursuing a remedy before a Court not having
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jurisdiction is to be excluded and has been rightly done by the
Commercial Court.
13.
There is no quarrel with the proposition laid down in Popular
Constructions (supra) and Simplex Infrastructure Limited (supra)
that in view of the language used in Section 34 of the Act, the
applicability of the Section 5 of the Limitation Act is ousted but
exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act still applies.
14.
The decision of Basawaraj (supra), to the effect that there
should be reasonable explanation for condoning the delay, is not
applicable to the facts of the case. The present case concerns exclusion
of limitation under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and not
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or the
proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act.
15.
The deceased was proceeded ex-parte by the arbitrator. The
Commercial Court considered the facts and the material available on
record. On 21.11.2003, at the first hearing before the arbitrator, none
appeared on behalf of the deceased despite registered notices having
been sent and the matter was adjourned to 08.01.2004. On next date of
hearing the claimant amended the claim petition. The amendment was
allowed and a fresh notice was issued for amended claim. The next
date of hearing fixed was 03.02.2004, on this date the arbitrator
recorded that the notice sent by registered A.D. was returned back by
the postal authorities with the remark ‘refused’ and proceeded exparte against the deceased. While allowing the objections, it was held
that the arbitrator had not recorded the status of notices sent in
compliance to order dated 08.01.2004. The refusal remark on the
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registered envelope was having a stamp dated 09.11.2003, which is
prior to the first hearing dated 21.11.2003. The copy of the fresh
notice issued after the amendment of the claim petition was neither on
record nor were the postal receipts available. The inference drawn by
the arbitrator on 03.02.2004, relying upon the refusal mark was
erroneous and that as per law there was no service of notice on
deceased. Further reliance on CC Alavi Haji (supra) to contend that
refusal by addressee is service, does not enhance the case of the
appellant, it was not considered by the arbitrator that refusal was by
whom. Moreover, the finding that the arbitrator erred in proceeding
ex-parte falls within the ambit of Section 34 of the Act and calls for
no interference under Section 37 of the Act merely for another
possible view.
16.
The scope of interference under Section 37 of the Act is limited
and circumscribed. Reference in this regard be made to the following
decisions of the Supreme Court.
16.1 In Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Samir
Narain Bhojwani, (2024) 7 SCC 218 it was held:
“23. We need not dwell on the limited scope of interference in
the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. That
position is very well settled. However, as far as the appeal
under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act is concerned, in
MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.,
(2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293] , in para 14, this
Court held thus : (SCC p. 167)
“14. As far as interference with an order made under
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Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be
disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot
travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section
34. In other words, the court cannot undertake an
independent assessment of the merits of the award, and
must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the
court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of
the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral
award has been confirmed by the court under Section
34 and by the court in an appeal under Section 37, this
Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb
such concurrent findings.”
24. In another decision of this Court in UHL Power Co. Ltd. v.
State of H.P. [UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P., (2022) 4
SCC 116 : (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 401] , in para 16, it was held
thus : (SCC pp. 124-25)
“16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when
it comes to the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of
the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an appellate
court in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to
set aside an award, is all the more circumscribed. In
MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta
Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293] , the
reasons for vesting such a limited jurisdiction on the
High Court in exercise of powers under Section 34 of
the Arbitration Act have been explained in the
following words : (SCC pp. 166-67, para 11)
***
26. The jurisdiction of the appellate court dealing with an
appeal under Section 37 against the judgment in a petition
under Section 34 is more constrained than the jurisdiction of the
Court dealing with a petition under Section 34. It is the duty of
the appellate court to consider whether Section 34 Court has
remained confined to the grounds of challenge that are available
in a petition under Section 34. The ultimate function of the
appellate court under Section 37 is to decide whether the
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jurisdiction under Section 34 has been exercised rightly or
wrongly. While doing so, the appellate court can exercise the
same power and jurisdiction that Section 34 Court possesses
with the same constraints.”
(emphasis supplied)
17.
The reliance of learned counsel for the appellant on Section 25
of the Act to defend ex-parte proceedings lacks merit. Under Section
25 of the Act there has to be failure of the party to appear for hearing.
In the present case, the non-appearance was clouded by the nonservice of the notice. The fresh notice issued pursuant to the
amendment of the claim petition was not shown to have been served
and the arbitrator had failed to take cognizance of status of service of
the notice.
18.
The Supreme Court in Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v.
Crompton Greaves Ltd. (2019) 20 SCC 1, is pressed into service to
canvas that Commercial Court erred in holding that award was nonspeaking and that the reasons emanating from a reading of the award
as a whole is sufficient compliance of Section 31(3) of the Act. In the
impugned order, specific finding is recorded that for allowing the
claims no reason is recorded in the award and this conclusion calls for
no inference under Section 37 of the Act.
19.
The contention that after having held that the award was in
violation of the principles of natural justice, the merits ought not to
have been considered is noted to be rejected. There cannot be an
absolute bar that after setting aside award for violation of the
principles of natural justice, the Court must refrain from dealing with
the merits. The reasons for not dealing with the merits in such
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circumstances is that the matter is generally remanded and any
observation on the merits may affect the proceedings pursuant thereto.
Whereas under Section 34 of the Act there is no power of remand and
the objections raised by the appellant that there was no service of
notice and award is non speaking were dealt in accordance with law
while passing the impugned order.
20.
The decisions of the Supreme Court MMTC Limited (supra)
and Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited
(supra) does not enhance the case of the appellant. The issues of
violation of natural justice and service of notice were neither
considered nor decided by the arbitrator. The question of a plausible
view being taken by the arbitrator warranting restraint under Section
34 of the Act, therefore does not arise.
21.
The impugned order does not suffer from factual or legal error,
much less perversity. The appeal has not merit and is dismissed.
AVNEESH JHINGAN, J
DINESH BHATT, J
OCTOBER 7, 2026
‘JK’
Reportable: Yes
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