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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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: 13.01.2026
: 09.04.2026
: 10.04.2026
FAO 568/2016 & CM APPL. 45479/2016
FARZANA KHAN
Through:
.....Appellant
Mr. Mukesh Kumar, Advocate.
versus
SHRI RAM TRANSPORT FINANCE CO LTD AND ANR
.....Respondent
Through: Nemo
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI
JUDGMENT
1.
The present appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (hereinafter the “Act”) has been preferred against the order dated
13.10.2016 passed by the learned ADJ-01, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts,
in ARB-84179/16.
2.
Vide the impugned order, the objections filed by the appellant under
Section 34 of the Act, assailing the arbitral award dated 15.07.2014 (hereinafter
the “impugned award”) passed by the learned sole arbitrator, i.e., respondent
no. 2 herein, were dismissed.
Digitally Signed
By:NIJAMUDDEEN ANSARI
19:32:28
FAO 568/2016
The impugned award has directed the appellant to pay, inter alia,
Rs.5,71,000/- plus interest @ 18% per annum on the said sum from 19.11.2013
till payment to respondent no. 1.
3.
None appears for the respondents. A perusal of the proceedings shows
that respondent no. 1 could not be served despite various efforts and
consequently, the appellant’s application seeking substituted service came to be
allowed on 24.08.2018. The order dated 15.01.2019 records that proof of
service was duly filed. In view of the continued non-appearance despite
service, respondent no. 1 was proceeded ex-parte on 28.03.2023.
4.
Briefly, the facts of the case as culled out from the record are that the
appellant and her husband had obtained a loan of Rs.2,90,000/- from
respondent no. 1 on 01.07.2011 for purchase of a vehicle, repayable in 28
monthly instalments, with the total payable amount including interest being
Rs.3,97,995/-. After paying a few instalments, the appellant defaulted.
Consequently, respondent no. 1 invoked arbitration, wherein the impugned
award came to be passed. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred a petition
under Section 34 of the Act, which was dismissed vide the impugned order.
5.
In dismissing the Section 34 petition, the Court dealing with the
objections held the appellant’s plea of ignorance to be per se false. The Court
found that the appellant’s own admissions regarding the loan, subsequent
default, and the specific proposal made during the arbitral proceedings to settle
the debt in 10 instalments confirmed her active participation and prior
knowledge of the dispute. Concluding that the objections raised by the
appellant had no merit, the Court refused to interfere with the impugned award.
Digitally Signed
By:NIJAMUDDEEN ANSARI
19:32:28
FAO 568/2016
6.
Learned counsel for the appellant assails the impugned order, contending
that the Court failed to appreciate that the impugned award was passed without
affording the appellant an opportunity of being heard. It is contended that as the
appellant was ready to repay the remaining instalments, no dispute can be said
to have arisen. It is also submitted that the impugned award directs payment of
an unreasonable amount of interest.
7.
The primary issues for consideration are: first, whether the arbitral
proceedings suffered from procedural impropriety to the prejudice of the
appellant; and second, whether the 18% per annum interest awarded on
Rs.5,71,000/- from 19.11.2013 until payment is unreasonable, and if so,
whether the impugned order or award is liable to be set aside on that ground.
8.
At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the relationship between the
parties was governed by the Loan-cum-Hypothecation Agreement dated
01.07.2011 (Ex. CW-1/2), which bears the signatures of the appellant. Clause
15 of the said agreement specifies arbitration as the mode for resolution of
disputes. It is the appellant’s own case that she obtained the loan and paid a few
instalments pursuant to this agreement, before defaulting on the remaining
amount.
9.
Insofar as the first issue is concerned, the impugned order records that
notices dated 28.11.2013, relating to the submission of the statement of claim
and defence, were sent via registered/speed post to the appellant and her
husband at their last known addresses. Following this, the appellant’s son, Sh.
Ashu Khan, appeared before the learned arbitrator on 18.12.2013 and signed the
border of the order sheet. Subsequently, on 06.02.2014, the appellant’s
Digitally Signed
By:NIJAMUDDEEN ANSARI
19:32:28
FAO 568/2016
daughter, Smt. Nazia Khan, appeared along with counsel, as evidenced by their
signatures recorded in the arbitral proceedings. It is significant that the
underlying Section 34 petition was preferred through the very same counsel
whose presence was recorded before the arbitrator as early as 06.02.2014. As
noted in the impugned order, the appellant initially sent her son, and later her
daughter with counsel, before the learned arbitrator, only to later feign
ignorance of the proceedings.
10.
This plea of ignorance is further belied by the appellant’s own
admissions in her objections, wherein she admitted to paying only a few
instalments and being in default of the remainder. Crucially, the impugned
order notes an averment by the appellant that she had, through her daughter,
submitted before the learned arbitrator that she was ready to pay the entire
principal amount in 10 instalments. This specific proposal to settle the
outstanding debt during the hearings confirms her active participation in the
arbitral process and knowledge of the dispute. Having chosen to refrain from
joining the proceedings on 24.04.2014 and subsequent dates despite having
entered appearance earlier, the appellant cannot now claim a violation of
principles of natural justice. The plea of non-awareness of the proceedings
cannot be sustained. On the touchstone of Section 37 of the Act, the challenge
to the finding rendered in the impugned order on this aspect is meritless and
rejected.
11.
Before evaluating the second contention, it is necessary to refer to
Section 31(7) of the Act, as it existed at the relevant time, i.e., prior to the
enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015:
Digitally Signed
By:NIJAMUDDEEN ANSARI
19:32:28
FAO 568/2016
“(7)(a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and in so far
as an arbitral award is for the payment of money, the arbitral tribunal
may include in the sum for which the award is made interest, at such rate
as it deems reasonable, on the whole or any part of the money, for the
whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of
action arose and the date on which the award is made.
(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the
award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of eighteen per centum
per annum from the date of the award to the date of payment.”
12.
In the present case, the learned arbitrator awarded interest @ 18% per
annum from 19.11.2013 until realization. This date, which follows the issuance
of the demand notice, marks the commencement of the period for which
respondent no. 1 had claimed interest. Under Section 31(7)(a), an arbitrator has
wide discretion to determine the rate of interest for the period prior to the
award. As for the post-award period, the Supreme Court has clarified in Larsen
Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company Vs. Union of India1 that, for
arbitrations governed by the unamended Section 31(7)(b) of the Act, the
statutory rate of 18% per annum is the default standard. In the said case, the
Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had interfered with and
reduced the 18% interest rate awarded by the arbitrator. The relevant extract is
reproduced hereunder:“13. In the present case, given that the arbitration commenced in
1997 i.e. after the 1996 Act came into force on 22-8-1996, the arbitrator,
and the award passed by them, would be subject to this statute. Under the
enactment i.e. Section 31(7), the statutory rate of interest itself is
contemplated at 18% p.a. Of course, this is in the event the award does
not contain any direction towards the rate of interest. Therefore, there is
little to no reason, for the High Court to have interfered with the
arbitrator’s finding on interest accrued and payable. ...”
(2023) 15 SCC 472
Digitally Signed
By:NIJAMUDDEEN ANSARI
19:32:28
FAO 568/2016
13.
The arbitrator’s power to grant post-award interest is a statutory
discretion intended to ensure the award-holder is compensated for the delay in
payment. This power is not strictly fettered by the terms of the contract but is
guided by what the arbitrator deems reasonable in the facts of the case.
The learned arbitrator exercised this discretion to award interest @ 18% per
annum, which is significantly lower than the 36% per annum claimed by
respondent no. 1. In the considered opinion of this Court, the awarded rate is
neither unconscionable nor perverse. Rather, it reflects a balanced exercise of
discretion that aligns with the statutory scheme and the legislative intent to
deter award-debtors from delaying the fruits of the award.
14.
Given the narrow scope of appellate scrutiny permissible under Section
37 of the Act, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned order
or the impugned award. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.
15.
The present appeal, along with the pending application, is disposed of in
the above terms.
(MANOJ KUMAR OHRI)
JUDGE
APRIL 09, 2026
nb
Digitally Signed
By:NIJAMUDDEEN ANSARI
19:32:28
FAO 568/2016
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