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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 13.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 03.02.2026
+
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024, CAV 27/2024, I.A. 1594/2024
(Stay), I.A. 1595/2024 (Ex. From filing complete record of
arbitration proceedings), I.A. 1596/2024 (Delay of 59 days in
re-filing the petition) & I.A. 45151/2024 (Delay of 29 days in
filing petition)
EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION
.....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Geeta Luthra, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Tamim
Qadri, Mr. Rishabh Dahiya and
Ms. Shivani Luthra Lohiya,
Advocates and Mr. Bhaskar
Kumar, SSO, ESIC in person.
versus
M/S MUKESH ASSOCIATES
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. S. Santanam Swaminadhan,
Ms. Abhilasha Shrawat, Ms.
Shivani Choudhary and Ms.
Prerna, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 19961, read with Section 151 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 2 , challenges the Arbitral Award dated
A&C Act
CPC
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
02.06.20233 passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator in Case Ref. No.
DAC/897/03-15.
2.
Before adverting to the merits of the challenge laid under
Section 34 of the A&C Act, this Court deems it appropriate to first
examine the aspect of condonation of delay and the plea of non-est
filing raised in the present proceedings. The determination of these
preliminary issues goes to the very root of the matter and would
decide whether the present petition survives for consideration on
merits.
3.
Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to briefly set
out the necessary and undisputed facts, insofar as they are relevant for
the adjudication of the preliminary issue concerning limitation, which
are delineated hereunder:
(i) The Petitioner is a statutory corporation constituted under the
Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948. The Respondent is a
partnership firm engaged in architectural and engineering
consultancy services. The parties entered into a Contract dated
03.06.2009 for providing consultancy services in relation to the
proposed construction of an ESI Medical College and Hospital
at Bhubaneswar, Odisha.
(ii) Disputes arose between the parties with respect to payments
claimed under various stages of the contract. The Respondent
invoked arbitration, which culminated in the Arbitral Award
passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator, whereby the claims of the
Respondent were partly allowed and the counterclaims of the
Petitioner were dismissed.
Arbitral Award
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
(iii) The Petitioner has sought to assail the aforesaid Arbitral Award
by instituting the present petition under Section 34 of the A&C
Act. Along with the said petition, the Petitioner had initially
filed an application being I.A. No. 1596/2024 under Section
151 of the CPC, seeking condonation of a delay of 59 days in
re-filing the petition.
(iv) Subsequently, upon a request made on behalf of the Petitioner,
this Court granted liberty to file an appropriate application
seeking condonation of delay in the filing of the main petition.
Pursuant thereto, the Petitioner filed an application being I.A.
No. 45151/2024 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 19634
read with Section 151 of the CPC, seeking condonation of a
delay of 29 days in filing the petition. In support thereof, the
Petitioner, inter alia, contended that the signed copy of the
Arbitral Award was received only on 05.09.2023, in accordance
with Section 31(5) of the A&C Act; therefore, the limitation for
filing this petition would begin from that day.
(v) The Respondent opposed the application seeking condonation
of delay as well as the petition under Section 34 of the A&C
Act, contending that the initial filing dated 02.10.2023 was non
est in the eyes of law on account of fundamental defects and
non-compliance with mandatory statutory requirements. It was
further contended that the first valid filing of the petition was
effected only on 20.01.2024, which was beyond the outer limit
prescribed under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act, and
consequently, the present petition is barred by limitation.
Limitation Act
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
4.
Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner
would contend that the delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of
the A & C Act was neither wilful nor deliberate, but occasioned due to
circumstances beyond the control of the Petitioner. It would be
submitted that the limitation period could commence only upon
receipt of a signed copy of the arbitral award in terms of Section 31(5)
of the Act, which, according to the Petitioner, was received for the
first time on 05.09.2023.
5.
It would further be contended that mere receipt of a scanned or
unsigned copy of the arbitral award by the Petitioner’s counsel does
not amount to valid delivery under Section 31(5) of the A & C Act,
and consequently cannot trigger the period of limitation under Section
A & C 34(3) of the Act. In support of this submission, reliance is
placed on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of
India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors 5 , State of
Maharashtra v. ARK Builders Pvt. Ltd. 6 , Benarsi Krishna
Committee v. Karmyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd.7, and Dakshin Haryana
Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Navigant Technologies Pvt. Ltd8.
6.
Learned senior counsel would submit that the delay, if any,
deserves to be condoned as the Petitioner had acted with due diligence
by initiating steps for legal consultation, engagement of counsel, and
procurement of the signed copy of the award from the arbitral
institution immediately upon realising that the same had not been
formally served.
(2005) 4 SCC 239.
(2011) 4 SCC 616
(2012) 9 SCC 496
(2021) 7 SCC 657
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
7.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would contend that the
statutory requirement under Section 31(5) of the A & C Act mandates
delivery of a signed copy of the arbitral award to the party itself. It
would be submitted that, in the present case, the award was merely
emailed to the Petitioner’s counsel and that the Delhi International
Arbitration Centre9, which was obligated to dispatch and formally
serve the signed copy of the award upon the parties, failed to do so.
8.
It would be further urged that neither the Petitioner was
informed nor was the signed award dispatched to it in accordance with
law, and therefore, mere receipt of a soft copy of the award by the
counsel representing ESIC cannot be treated as valid service so as to
trigger the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Act.
9.
It would also be contended by the learned senior counsel that
the expression “sufficient cause” occurring in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is required to be construed liberally to advance the
cause of justice, particularly where refusal to condone delay would
result in a meritorious challenge being shut out at the threshold. In this
regard, reliance would be placed on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s
judgments in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji10 and
Arun Ganguly v. Amaresh Ganguly11.
10.
On merits of the award, learned senior counsel would contend
that the arbitral award suffers from patent illegality, non-application of
mind, and is contrary to the express terms of the contract. It would
thus be urged that the learned Arbitrator ignored material evidence,
exceeded the scope of reference, and granted claims for stages of work
DIAC
AIR 1987 SC 1353
AIR 1987 SC 1353
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
which were never executed, thereby rendering the award vulnerable to
interference under Section 34 of the A & C Act.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
11.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would
contend that the present petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act, is
hopelessly barred by limitation and is liable to be dismissed in limine.
It would be submitted that the initial filing purportedly made on
02.10.2023 was non-est in the eyes of law, as it suffered from
fundamental and incurable defects, including the absence of a
Statement of Truth, supporting affidavit, signatures on pleadings,
vakalatnama, requisite court fee, and service upon the caveator.
12.
It would further be contended that the first valid filing of the
Petition was effected only on 20.01.2024, which is 107 days beyond
the maximum outer limit of three months and thirty days prescribed
under Section 34(3) of the Act. Consequently, no application for
condonation of delay is maintainable in law, as the Court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain a petition filed beyond the statutory period.
13.
Learned counsel would submit that the Petitioner’s explanation
for delay is wholly vague, perfunctory, and bereft of particulars,
reflecting a casual and lackadaisical approach to a statute which
mandates strict adherence to timelines. It would be urged that
administrative inefficiencies, internal approvals, or change of counsel
do not constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act.
14.
It would be contended that the Petitioner, in its Additional
Affidavit dated 21.08.2024, has categorically admitted receipt of the
soft copy of the arbitral award on 05.06.2023 through its Senior
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
Counsel and that steps were immediately initiated for engaging
counsel to challenge the award. This admission, according to the
Respondent, demolishes the Petitioner’s plea that the limitation
commenced only upon receipt of the signed hard copy on 05.09.2023.
15.
Learned counsel would further argue that the initial filing on
02.10.2023 was a mere “dummy filing”, intended only to create an
illusion of compliance with the limitation and to obstruct the
Respondent’s enforcement proceedings under Section 36 of the A&C
Act. Reliance would be placed on the email dated 23.11.2023 sent by
the Petitioner’s erstwhile counsel, which, according to the
Respondent, clearly evidences that the petition was knowingly filed in
a defective form and was not intended to be prosecuted diligently.
16.
In support of the plea that a defective and incomplete filing
cannot arrest limitation, learned counsel would place reliance on the
judgment of this Court in DDA v. Durga Construction Co.12, wherein
it was held that a filing which lacks essential and foundational
requirements is non-est and meaningless in law. Further reliance
would be placed on the Division Bench’s judgment of this Court in
ONGC v. Planetcast Technologies Ltd.13, which authoritatively holds
that non-filing of a Statement of Truth, absence of signatures, nonfiling of vakalatnama, and substantially altered re-filings render the
initial filing non-est and incapable of saving limitation.
17.
It would also be contended that the Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate “sufficient cause” arising within the period of limitation,
as required in law. In this regard, reliance would be placed on the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh
2013 SCC OnLine Del 4451
2023 SCC OnLine Del 8490
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
v. Ramkumar Choudhary14, which clarifies that sufficient cause must
be traceable to events occurring within the limitation period and not
beyond it.
18.
Learned counsel would further submit that the Petitioner, being
a government body, is not entitled to any special indulgence in matters
governed by the A&C Act and the Commercial Courts statute, where
expedition and finality are the governing principles. It would be urged
that condonation of delay in such cases is an exception and not the
rule.
19.
On these grounds, learned counsel for the Respondent would
contend that the application for condonation of delay as well as the
Section 34 petition are an abuse of the process of law and deserve to
be dismissed at the threshold with exemplary costs.
ANALYSIS
20.
This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length
and, with their able assistance, perused the pleadings, documents
placed on record, and the applicable statutory provisions.
I.A. NO. 45151/2024 (Application for seeking condonation of delay
in filing the petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act)
21.
At the outset, this Court is required to examine whether the
Petitioner has made out any “sufficient cause” for condonation of
delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act, and
whether the initial filing made by the Petitioner can be treated as a
valid filing in the eyes of law or is liable to be regarded as non-est.
These issues are foundational and would determine the very
maintainability of the present petition.
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
22.
For the sake of convenience, the relevant chronology from the
date of passing of the arbitral award till the date of the listing of the
Petition before this Court is set out hereunder:
Date
02.06.2023
05.06.2023
05.09.2023
05.10.2023
02.10.2023
03.10.2023
09.10.2023
30.10.2023
08.01.2024
19.01.2024
20.01.2024
23.
Event
Statutory / Legal
Consequence
Arbitral Award passed
Award made
Copy of the Award received by Limitation commences
Petitioner through its Senior
Counsel (as admitted in the
affidavit dated 21.08.2024 filed by
the Petitioner)
Completion of three (3) months Limitation
under
period
Section 34(3) expires
Completion of a further 30-day The outer limit under
period
the proviso to Section
34(3) expires
Petition initially filed
Defective filing
Registry defects notified
Foundational defects
First re-filing
Defects not cured
Second re-filing
Major
objections
remain
Third re-filing
Major objections still
remain
Fourth re-filing
Still defective
Petition validly re-filed and Total Delay = 107
registered
Days beyond 3 months
and 30 days
At this juncture, this Court finds it apposite to reproduce the
bare provision of Section 34 of the A&C Act, as the same is necessary
for the proper adjudication of the present case:
“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. *****
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three
months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that
application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been
made under section 33, from the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within
the said period of three months it may entertain the application
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
24.
….”
A plain reading of Section 34(3) of the A & C Act makes it
abundantly clear that the period prescribed therein is mandatory and
inflexible. An application for setting aside an arbitral award must be
filed within three months from the date of receipt of the award,
extendable by a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. The
law in this regard has been succinctly laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Chintels India Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders Pvt.
Ltd.15, which reads as follows:
“10. Sections 34(2) and (2-A) then sets out the grounds on which
an arbitral award may be set aside. Section 34(3), which again is
material for decision of the question raised in this appeal, reads as
follows:
“34. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made
after three months have elapsed from the date on which
the party making that application had received the arbitral
award or, if a request had been made under Section 33,
from the date on which that request had been disposed of
by the Arbitral Tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant
was prevented by sufficient cause from making the
application within the said period of three months it may
entertain the application within a further period of thirty
days, but not thereafter.”
11. A reading of Section 34(1) would make it clear that an
application made to set aside an award has to be in accordance with
both sub-sections (2) and (3). This would mean that such
application would not only have to be within the limitation period
prescribed by sub-section (3), but would then have to set out
grounds under sub-sections (2) and/or (2-A) for setting aside such
award. What follows from this is that the application itself must be
within time, and if not within a period of three months, must be
accompanied with an application for condonation of delay,
provided it is within a further period of 30 days, this Court having
made it clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not
2021 SCC Online SC 80
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
apply and that any delay beyond 120 days cannot be condoned —
see State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers at para 5.”
(emphasis added)
25.
The statutory timeline prescribed under Section 34 of the A & C
Act has also been succinctly elucidated by the Gujarat High Court in
Manbhupinder Singh Atwal v. Neeraj Kumarpal Shah16, wherein it
has been held as under:
“30. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the High Court of Delhi
in Delhi
Development
Authority v. Durga
Construction
Co. and Union of India v. Bharat Biotech International Ltd. to
argue that in both the matters, the Delhi High Court has taken note
of the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in dealing with the
question as to whether the High Court have jurisdiction to condone
the delay under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 after a
period of 3 months plus 30 days. It was placed before us that the
purpose of specifying an inelastic period of limitation under
Section 34(3) of the Act would have to be borne in mind, which
means that no application under Section 34 can be permitted to be
instituted beyond 3 months plus a further period of 30 days, which
extension is permissible subject to showing sufficient cause.
31. It was further submitted that the question before the Delhi High
Court in Durga Construction was for condonation of delay of 166
days in re-filing the application under Section 34 of the Act' 1996.
In the said case, on the application filed under Section 34 on
24.07.2009, initially with the delay of 17 days, the registry of the
Court raised certain objections and papers were returned under
objections on the same date. The said application under Section 34
was then refiled on 24.08.2009 when it was again returned due to
certain objections. Upon re-filing, on 22.12.2009 again, the registry
raised certain office objections and returned the same. Ultimately,
the application under Section 34 was finally re-filed on 06.01.2010
after removing all office objections. Thus, the question of
condonation of the period of 166 days in re-filing of the application
under Section 34 was the subject matter of consideration before the
Delhi High Court, which was beyond the inelastic limitation period
prescribed in Section 34(3) of the Act' 1996.
32. The Delhi High Court upon reading of the Delhi High Court
Rules has opined that in absence of any specific statute, although
the courts would have the jurisdiction to condone the delay, but the
2025 SCC OnLine Guj 2200
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
approach in exercising such jurisdiction cannot be liberal and the
conduct of the applicant will have to be tested on the anvil of
whether the applicant acted with due diligence and dispatch. The
applicant would have to show that the delay was on account of the
reasons beyond the control of the applicant and could not be
avoided despite all possible efforts by the applicant. It was opined
that though the Court would have jurisdiction to condone the delay
in refiling, even if the period extends beyond the time specified in
sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act, however, this jurisdiction
is not to be exercised liberally considering the object of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act’ 1996 to ensure that the
arbitration proceedings are concluded expeditiously. The delay
caused in re-filing cannot be permitted to frustrate the object of
the Arbitration Act, 1996. In any case, the applicant/petitioner
would have to satisfy the Court that it had persuaded the matter
diligently and the delays were beyond his control and were
unavoidable.
33. In another decision in Bharat Biotech International Ltd., the
question before the Delhi High Court was of condonation of delay
in re-filing the applications under Sections 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996. In the preliminary objections raised by
the respondents therein, it was contended that the application when
originally filed within the statutory period of limitation was merely
a bunch of papers and could not be treated as being valid institution
in the eyes of law. A complete and valid application under Section
34 was filed only beyond the date when the limitation period of 3
months and 30 days as prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act
had already expired. The Delhi High Court while considering the
rigours of the proviso to Section 34(3) and the decision of the Apex
Court in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., wherein it
has been held that the Court cannot entertain an application to set
aside an arbitral award beyond the extended period under the
proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act, has concluded that the
application for condonation of delay in re-filing the application
under Section 34 beyond the time prescribed under Section 34(3)
of the Act has to be considered in light of the object and purpose of
the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3).
34. Considering its previous decision in Durga Construction of the
Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, it was noted therein
that though the Court is empowered to condone the delay beyond
the extended period of limitation of 3 months and 30 days, while
considering the delay condonation application in re-filing an
application under Section 34, but it is required for the party seeking
the condonation to show that despite his diligence, the rectification
of defects and re-filing could not be carried out within the
limitation period, for the bonafide reasons beyond his control. It
was noted that it is important for the Court to bear in mind the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
legislative intent for prescribing the statutory period of limitation
under Section 34(3) of the Act ensuring expeditious disposal of the
arbitration proceedings and preventing delay in implementation of
the arbitral award by parties who would malafidely challenge the
same. It was observed that a liberal approach while dealing with an
application for condonation of delay in challenging the arbitral
award would only endanger and frustrate the purpose for which the
Arbitration Act was enacted. It was noted by the Delhi High Court
that since the applicant therein had demonstrated alarmingly
lackadaisical approach in complying with general filing practice
and the statutory requirements under Section 34 of the Act' 1996,
the delay in re-filing the petition under Section 34 could not be
condoned being vague, unsubstantiated, insufficient and contrary
to the records.”
26.
In the present case, the Petitioner has, in its Additional
Affidavit dated 21.08.2024, expressly admitted that a copy of the
Arbitral award was received through its Senior Counsel on 05.06.2023
and that steps were initiated thereafter for engaging counsel to
challenge the award. This admission leaves no manner of doubt that
the Petitioner had knowledge of and access to the award on the said
date. The relevant portions of the Affidavit are reproduced
hereinunder for reference:
“4. That the impugned award dated 02.06.2023 was passed on
02.06.2023 and the same was sent to the counsel for the petitioner
as well as the senior counsel who was appearing for the petitioner
through e-mail on 02.06.2023. The e-mail dated 02.06.2023 sent to
the counsels specifically mentioned that three signed hard copies of
the award will be sent to DIAC, one for DIAC and one for each
party.
5. That the Ld. Sr. Counsel who was appearing before the Ld.
Arbitrator sent a legal opinion to the petitioner on 05.06.2023
along with the soft copy of the award as received by the Ld.
Arbitrator.
6. That the petitioner after receiving the mail from the Ld. Sr.
Counsel started the process of appointing a lawyer to handle the
case and start the process. The file was sent to various departments
for approval of the lawyer to be engaged to look into the matter. In
the meanwhile, there were many transfers and work allocation
which took place in the petitioner’s organization.”
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
(emphasis added)
27.
This Court is unable to accept the contention that the limitation
would commence only upon receipt of a signed hard copy of the
award by the Petitioner. Delivery of the award to the authorised
counsel of a party constitutes valid receipt for the purposes of Section
34(3), particularly when the party acts upon such receipt. The
Petitioner, having admittedly acted upon the award received through
counsel, cannot now contend that such delivery was inconsequential.
The law in regard with the service of the award has been extensively
laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Kristal Vision
Projects Private Limited v. Union of India17, which reads as follow:
“29. Section 31(5) of the Act clearly requires that the Arbitral
Tribunal shall deliver, a signed copy‟ of the award to each party.
This is a mandatory obligation on the Arbitral Tribunal to comply
with as the same impacts the period of limitation for filing the
application under Section 34 of the Act.
30. As per Section 34(3) of the Act, the period for filing the
application challenging the award shall commence from the date of
the delivery of a signed copy of the award to the party by the
Arbitral Tribunal in compliance with Section 31(5) of the Act.
31. In Ramesh Pratap Singh (Dead) v. Vimala Singh w/o
Bhalendra Kumar Singh, 2004 (2) Arb. LR 147 (MP), the learned
Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has interpreted
Section 31(5) and Section 34(3) of the Act to take a view that
photocopy of the award delivered by the arbitrator did not fulfil the
requirement of Section 31(5) of the Act.
32. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Union of
India v. Radha Krishna Seth, 2006 (2) Arb. LR 441 (All.) (DB)
has interpreted the expression “signed copy‟ in Section 31(5) of
the Act as an authenticated copy duly signed to certify the
genuineness of the document or in other words, it may be called as
the certified copy”.
33. In Tecco Trichy Engineers (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in paragraph 8 has held that the delivery of an award under
Section 31(5) of the Act is not a matter of mere formality but a
2025:DHC:4245-DB
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:20:22
O.M.P. (COMM) 46/2024
matter of substance. The delivery of the award can only be
effective when the party to arbitration has received the same. The
importance of a valid delivery of the award cannot be undermined
as it has the effect of conferring certain rights on the party, while
also setting in motion the period of limitation which on its expiry,
would bring to an end the right to exercise such rights.
34. In Continental Telepower Industries Ltd. v. Union of India,
2009 SCC OnLine Del 1859, the learned Single Judge of this
Court has held that there is no requirement in Section 31(5) of the
Act to deliver an ink signed copy of the award. Section 34 of the
Act does not require the filing of any ink signed copy of the award
along with petition, though the award would definitely be required
by the Court to appreciate the contentions with respect thereto. It
was further held that the photocopy of the signed award along with
cover letter bearing signature in original of the arbitrator was
sufficient authentication of the photocopy of the award enclosed. It
was observed that Section 31(5) of the Act uses the expression
“signed copy”. Copy is generally understood as something
different from the original. Legislature did not use the expression
“signed award”. Thus, the Arbitrator is not required to deliver to
the parties award signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal,
as mentioned in Section 31(1) of the Act, but merely a “copy”
thereof. The purpose of qualifying the word “copy” with “signed”
is that there must be some authentication of the “copy”. If it were
to be held that the “copy” must be “ink signed” by the arbitrators,
then it will not be a “copy” but be the award signed by the
arbitrators. That is the only possible meaning of the words
“signed” and “copy” used in conjunction.
35. In ARK Builders (supra) following Tecco Trichy Engineers
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the period of
limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act would start
running only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered
to/received by the party making the application for setting it aside
under Section 34(1) of the Act. Section 31(1) of the Act obliges the
members of the Arbitral Tribunal to make the award in writing and
sign it. The legal requirement under Section 31(5) of the Act is the
delivery of a copy of the award signed by the members of the
Arbitral Tribunal/Arbitrator, and not any copy of the award. On a
harmonious construction of Section 31(5) read with Section 34(3)
of the Act, the period of limitation prescribed for filing objections
would commence only from the date when the signed copy of the
award is delivered to the party making the application for setting
aside the award. If the law prescribes that a copy of the award is to
be communicated, delivered, despatched, forwarded, rendered, or
sent to the parties concerned in a particular way, and since the law
sets a period of limitation for challenging the award in question by
the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation can only
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commence from the date on which the award was received by the
party concerned in the manner prescribed by law.
36. In Benarsi Krishna (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that mere delivery of the award to the Counsel of a party does not
amount to delivery to the party itself, as contemplated under
Section 31(5) of the Act. The statutory scheme envisages that each
party must be provided with a signed copy of the award directly,
and such service must be effected upon the party itself. Delivery to
a party’s counsel cannot be deemed to be sufficient compliance
with the requirement of Section 31(5) of the Act.
37. In Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai
Patel, (2018) 15 SCC 178, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court while
placing its reliance on Tecco Trichy (supra) and ARK Builders
(supra), held that by a cumulative reading of Section 31(5) and
Section 34(3) of the Act, it is clear that the limitation period
prescribed for under Section 34(3) of the Act would only
commence on the date when the signed copy of the award is
delivered to the party that makes the application for setting aside of
th award under Section 34 of the Act.
38. In Ministry of Health & Family Welfare v. Hosmac Projects
Division of Hosmac India (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8296, a
Coordinate Bench of this Court while relying on Benarsi Krishna
(supra) and Tecco Trichy (supra), held that a conjoint reading of
Section 2(1)(h) and Section 31(5) of the Act makes it clear that the
term “party” only means the party itself and not their agent or
advocate. Therefore, only service on the party itself would
constitute proper compliance of the requirement of delivery of the
arbitral award.
39. In Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Navigant
Technologies (P) Ltd. (2021) 7 SCC 657, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that that Section 31(5) of the Act enjoins upon the
Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal to provide the signed copy of the
arbitral award to the parties. The receipt of a signed copy of the
award is the date from which the period of limitation for filing
objections under Section 34 of the Act would commence. There is
only one date recognised by law i.e., the date on which a signed
copy of the final award is received by the parties, from which the
period of limitation for filing objections would start ticking. There
can be no finality in the award, except after it is signed, because
signing of the award gives legal effect and finality to the award.
The date on which the signed award is provided to the parties is a
crucial date in arbitration proceedings under the Act.
40. In National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation
of Indian Ltd. v. R. Piyarelall Import and Export Ltd. AIR 2016
Cal 160, a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta upheld
the decision of the Single Judge rejecting the petition under Section
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34 of the Act for setting aside an award on the ground of limitation,
where the award was duly signed by all the three arbitrators and a
certified copy of the award was forwarded to each of the parties by
the Registrar of the Indian Council of Arbitration, but the
photocopy of the signed award was not signed in original by the
arbitrators.
41. In Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board v. Lakhvinder
Singh 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9810, the Division Bench of this
Court has held that the expression „signed copy‟ in Section 31(5)
of the Act indicates the legislative intent that a copy authenticated
by the Arbitrator is served on each party. It was held that
authenticity of correspondence in the technologically advanced
times of today does not necessarily pertain to only signatures in
writing, and it would be adverse to read the expression „signed
copy‟ of the award/order in a restrictive manner so as to connote a
copy bearing the original signatures of the Arbitrator in
handwriting.
42. In Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports v. Ernst & Young (P)
Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5182, the Single Judge Bench of this
Court held that the limitation period for filing a petition under
Section 34 of the Act commenced when a scanned signed copy of
the award was received via email and that the same would
constitute a valid delivery under Section 31(5) of the Act. This
Court held that a subsequent physical collection of the signed copy
would not extend the limitation period. This Court emphasized that
technological advancements allow for authenticated digital copies
to be considered valid for all legal purposes.
43. In Dwarika Projects Limited v. Director of Civil Aviation &
Anr., FAO(OS)(COMM) 103/2024, the Division Bench of this
Court has held that the delivery of a scanned signed copy of the
award via e-mail would constitute a valid delivery under Section
31(5) of the Act and the limitation period for filing a petition under
Section 34 of the Act would commence when the same is received
by the concerned party. It was held that a copy of the award can
also be delivered electronically and there was no justification to
hold or declare that the only mode or manner in which the Act
contemplates the delivery of award is in the physical format.
Technological advancements allow for authenticated digital copies
to be considered valid for all legal purposes.
44. In view of the above, the law on the mode and manner of
“delivery” of the “signed copy” of the award under Section 31(5)
of the Act is summarized as under:
a) Mandatory Requirement: Section 31(5) of the Act requires a
signed copy to be delivered to the party and the same has to be
strictly complied with as the period of limitation to file
application under Section 34 of the Act shall commence only
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upon delivery of the signed copy of the award to the parties.
b) Signed Copy: The term “signed copy‟ means either copy of
the award bearing original signature or a duly
authenticated/certified copy of the signed copy of the award by
the Arbitral Tribunal or the Arbitral Institution administering
the arbitration.
c) Delivery of the Award: It is the obligation of the Arbitral
Tribunal to ensure delivery of the signed copy to the parties. In
case the Arbitral Tribunal has pronounced the award at a
virtual hearing and directed the parties to collect the award, it
is the responsibility of the Arbitral Tribunal to dispatch the
signed copy of the award, if any party fails to collect the same.
d) Delivery to the Parties: The Arbitral Tribunal has to ensure
that the signed copy of the award is delivered to the parties. A
delivery of the signed copy of the award to the counsel of the
parties will constitute a valid delivery in cases where the
parties have duly authorized the counsel to collect or provided
the address of the counsel for service of communication to
parties.
e) Electronic Delivery: A signed copy of the award can be
delivered electronically in accordance with Section 31(5) of
the Act provided that the signed copy of the award attached to
the electronic communication is duly authenticated by the
Arbitral Tribunal or Arbitral Institution.
f) Delivery by Arbitral Institution: Delivery of the signed copy
of the award by Arbitral Institution on behalf of the Tribunal to
the parties and / or their authorized counsel shall be a valid
service under Section 31(5) of the Act in Institutional
Arbitrations.
*****
50. It is clear from the factors mentioned above that a valid
delivery of the signed copy of the Award was made to the
Authorized Representative of the Appellant, which is
acknowledged by way of an e-mail addressed to the Arbitral
Tribunal and copied to the Managing Director of the Appellant.
Therefore, the Award was delivered to the Appellant as envisaged
under Section 31(5) of the Act.”
(emphasis added)
28.
It is an undisputed position on record that the petition came to
be validly re-filed and registered only on 20.01.2024. By that date, not
only had the initial statutory period of three months prescribed under
Section 34(3) of the A & C Act expired, but even the additional period
of thirty days, contemplated by the proviso thereto, had elapsed on
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05.10.2023. The timeline is inexorable and admits of no ambiguity.
Once the outer boundary of limitation stood crossed, the jurisdiction
of this Court to entertain the challenge stood completely extinguished.
The legislative command contained in the phrase “but not thereafter”
is absolute, categorical, and admits of no judicial discretion.
29.
The record further reveals that what was presented before this
Court on 02.10.2023 was not a petition in the eye of the law, but a
skeletal and fundamentally defective set of papers, bereft of the basic
and indispensable attributes of a valid institution. The initial filing was
marred by the absence of a Statement of Truth, supporting affidavits,
signatures on pleadings, vakalatnama, proper court fee, and proof of
service upon the caveator. These defects were not cosmetic or
procedural irregularities capable of routine cure; rather, they went to
the very root of the institution and rendered the filing non-est, devoid
of legal existence.
30.
The repeated re-filings, without curing foundational defects,
further compound the inference that there was no bona fide attempt at
instituting a legally cognizable challenge within the limitation. The
legal position governing non-est filings on account of the absence of
material and foundational particulars in the petition has been
succinctly enunciated by the Division Bench of this Court in ONGC v.
Planetcast Technologies Ltd.18, wherein it has been held as follows:
“Non filing of Statement of Truth:
……………………………………..
46. Suffice is it to say, without the Statement of Truth, the filing of
the petitions under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 by the petitioners
becomes non-est and is reduced to a sheer futile attempt to pause
the limitation period from running out. The appellant cannot claim
2023 SCC OnLine Del 8490
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the benefit of a non-est filing though made within the period of
limitation, when the proper filing of the petition was only made
after the expiry of the stipulated period of three months and thirty
days.
Pleadings filed without signatures:
………………………………………
51. Thus, the significance of the petitioner affixing their signature
in the pleadings cannot be over emphasised as without it, the filing
would not hold the character of a petition which has been
bonafidely filed on behalf of the petitioner. This defect in the
Petition of the appellant, again reflect that the initial filing was
non-est.
Non-filing of Vakalatnama:
………………………………
53. In Sravanthi Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. Greens Power Equipment
(China) Co. Ltd., it was held that defects such as not filing the
Vakalatnama or Affidavit are fatal defects and a filing without
these documents cannot be considered as a valid filing.
Number of pages filed:
………………………..
55. …. Such exponential increase in number of pages leads to only
one conclusion that the subsequent Petition which was filed was
not only signed but had been substantially changed.
56. It is the only irresistible conclusion that can be drawn is that the
initial Petition had lacked all the requisites of being a valid Petition
to be considered by the Court and therefore, it has to be held that
the first filing was non-est.”
31.
The chronology of re-filings on 09.10.2023, 30.10.2023,
08.01.2024, and 19.01.2024 demonstrates a pattern of persistent noncompliance rather than prosecutorial diligence. Significantly, even
after the expiry of the maximum condonable period under Section
34(3), the Petitioner continued to re-file without rectifying essential
defects, thereby reinforcing the conclusion that the initial filing was a
mere illusory filing, incapable of stopping the clock of limitation. It is
only on 20.01.2024, long after the Court had become functus officio,
that a petition conforming to statutory and procedural requirements
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was placed on record.
32.
This Court is of the considered view that the reliance placed by
the Petitioner on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Benarsi Krishna Committee (supra), Tecco Trichy Engineers
(supra), and the allied line of authorities, is wholly misplaced and
proceeds on an erroneous application of principle divorced from
context.
33.
In each of the aforesaid decisions, the arbitral award had been
delivered to an officer or person who was either peripheral to the
arbitral proceedings or wholly unconnected therewith, and who
neither possessed the requisite knowledge of the arbitration
proceedings nor the authority to take a considered decision on further
legal recourse. It was in that limited factual milieu that the Hon’ble
Supreme Court underscored the requirement that service of the award
must be effected upon a person competent to appreciate its import and
act thereon.
34.
The present case stands on a fundamentally different footing.
Here, the arbitral award was admittedly received by the Petitioner
through its authorised counsel, who had actively represented the
Petitioner throughout the arbitral proceedings, was fully seized of the
factual matrix, and was legally equipped to comprehend the
consequences flowing from the award. Indeed, the receipt of the
award by such counsel was not an empty formality but was
immediately acted upon, as evidenced by the steps initiated by the
Petitioner to assail the award.
35.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the ideal mode of delivery
contemplated under Section 31(5) of the A&C Act is service upon the
party itself, the undeniable fact remains that the knowledge of the
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award stood effectively communicated to the Petitioner through its
counsel, thereby achieving the very object which the law seeks to
secure.
36.
The jurisprudence in Benarsi Krishna Committee (supra) and
Tecco Trichy Engineers (supra) does not elevate form over
substance, nor does it sanctify ignorance where knowledge is
demonstrably established. To extend the ratio of those decisions to a
case where the party has admittedly acquired full knowledge of the
award through its authorised legal representative would be to stretch
the doctrine beyond its legitimate contours. Consequently, the
precedents relied upon by the Petitioner do not come to its aid, and the
receipt of the arbitral award through authorised counsel must be held
to constitute valid delivery for the purposes of computing limitation
under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act.
37.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner has also laid considerable
emphasis on the absence of delivery of a signed hard copy of the
arbitral award. This submission, however, cannot be accepted.
38.
The law is now well settled that with the advent of
technological advancement and the increasing digitisation of judicial
and quasi-judicial processes, the concept of “delivery” is no longer
confined to physical transmission alone. Electronic communication,
when effected in a manner that ensures authenticity, accessibility, and
actual knowledge of the award, constitutes valid delivery in the eyes
of the law.
39.
To insist upon a rigid, antiquated insistence on physical service,
even where the party has demonstrably acquired full knowledge of the
award and acted thereupon, would be to ignore the contemporary
realities of dispute resolution and undermine the objective of
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expeditious finality that underpins the A&C Act. The law in this
regard has been succinctly laid by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
in Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, Dept. of Ports, Govt. of
India v. Ernst and Young Pvt. Ltd (Now Known As Ernst And
Young LLP) and Anr.19, which reads as follows:
47. ………….The law has to keep its pace in tandem with the
developing technology. When service by email is an accepted
mode of service, then sending scanned signed copy of the
award/order of the Arbitral Tribunal to the parties would be a valid
delivery as envisaged under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act.
40.
The explanation advanced by the Petitioner for the delay -
namely,
internal
administrative
approvals,
inter-departmental
correspondence, and successive change of counsel - cannot, by any
stretch of judicial reasoning, be elevated to the status of “sufficient
cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is no
longer res integra that administrative inefficiencies and bureaucratic
indecision are not legally cognizable grounds to dilute a statute that is
designed to ensure finality, expedition, and certainty in arbitral
proceedings. To accept such explanations would be to reintroduce,
through the backdoor, the very delays and uncertainties that the A&C
Act was enacted to eradicate.
41.
This Court is conscious that refusal to condone delay may, in a
given case, result in the foreclosure of a challenge on merits.
However, in matters governed by Section 34 of the A&C Act, the
Court does not sit as a court of equity, but as a court of limited
statutory jurisdiction. The balance between fairness and finality has
already been struck by the legislature. Once the statutory outer limit is
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crossed, considerations of hardship or perceived injustice cannot
confer jurisdiction where none exists. Judicial sympathy cannot be
permitted to supplant legislative mandate.
42.
Permitting a petition, which is ex facie barred by limitation and
founded upon a non-est filing, to be entertained would not only run
contrary to the express language of Section 34(3) but would also
undermine the sanctity of arbitral finality and open the floodgates to
speculative and dilatory challenges. Such an approach would erode
discipline in commercial litigation and defeat the very object of the
Commercial Courts regime, which places a premium on procedural
rigour and temporal certainty.
43.
This Court, therefore, holds that once the statutory period of
three months and thirty days prescribed under Section 34(3) of the
A&C Act expired on 05.10.2023, the Petitioner’s right to question the
Arbitral Award stood irrevocably extinguished.
44.
In the present case, the delay in filing the petition beyond the
outer limit is 107 days. Even otherwise, assuming arguendo that the
initial filing was defective and not non-est, the Petitioner, in terms of
Chapter IV, Rule 3 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, was
granted thirty days by the Registry to cure the defects, which period
expired on 02.11.2023. The defects, however, remained uncured and
the petition was validly re-filed and registered only on 20.01.2024,
resulting in a further delay of 80 days in re-filing. Any filing beyond
the statutory outer limit is legally inconsequential. The petition,
therefore, having been instituted beyond the period prescribed in law,
is barred by limitation and liable to be dismissed at the threshold.
CONCLUSION
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45.
In view of the foregoing discussion and findings, this Court
holds that the present petition challenging the Arbitral award dated
02.06.2023, is barred by limitation and is founded upon a non-est
filing incapable of saving limitation under Section 34(3) of the A&C
Act.
46.
The application seeking condonation of delay, being I.A. No.
45151 of 2024 is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.
Accordingly, the petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act stands
dismissed.
47.
All pending applications, if any, are disposed of accordingly.
48.
No Order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 03, 2026/kr
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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