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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 15.09.2025
+
W.P.(C) 14244/2025, CM APPL. 58414/2025 (Stay) and CM
APPL. 58415/2025 (Ex.)
DR VIVEK SINGH
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Joy Dip Bhattachary and
Ms. Satyaarth Balaji Sinha,
Advocates.
versus
SHRIRAM FINANCE LTD AND ORS
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Rishi Sehgal, Mr. Midhun
Aggarwal and Ms. Ritu
Dhingra, Advocates for R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
J U D G M E N T (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Writ Petition has been filed under Articles 226/227
of the Constitution of India1, challenging the Order dated 07.04.2025
passed by the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Delhi2, in I.A.
No. 368/2025 in S.A. No. 361/2024, as well as the earlier order dated
12.12.2024 passed in S.A. No. 361/2024. The Petitioner, by way of
this writ petition, seeks the following substantive reliefs:
Constitution
DRT
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:08:06
W.P.(C) 14244/2025
“i. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus
thereby directing the Ld. CMM, Saket to issue necessary
orders to Respondent No 1 & 2 to restore possession of the i.e.,
First and Second Floor of property no- 47-B, Kalu Sarai, New
Delhi -110016 to the Petitioner.
ii. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus
thereby directing the Respondent No 4 to conduct an enquiry
into the affairs of the Respondent No 1 qua it’s wrongful and
illegal possession of property no 47B, Kalu Sarai, New Delhi110016.
iii. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari
thereby calling for records and quash the impugned order
dated 07.04.2025 passed by the Ld. DRT in IA No. 368/2025
arising out of SA/361/2024 (Annexure-P1).
iv. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari
thereby calling for records and quash the impugned order
dated 12.12.2024 passed by the Ld. DRT in SA/361/2024
(Annexure-P2).
v. Pass any other order this Hon'ble Court this deems fit in the
interest of Justice.”
2.
S.A. No. 361/2024 had originally been filed by the Petitioner
before the Learned DRT-II pursuant to the order dated 28.05.2024
passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, South
District, Saket Courts Complex, New Delhi3, in C.T. Case No.
1111/2024 titled as “Shriram Finance Ltd. vs. Gurjeet Singh Cheema
and Ors.”. The said case was instituted by the secured creditor, i.e.,
Respondent No. 1 herein, under Section 14 of the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 20024, pursuant to which possession of property bearing
No. 47-B, Kalu Sarai, New Delhi-110016, was taken by the learned
Receiver.
3.
At the very outset, this Court posed a query to learned counsel
for the Petitioner as to how the present petition would be maintainable
CMM
SARFAESI Act
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:08:06
W.P.(C) 14244/2025
given the fact that there is an alternative efficacious remedy in the
form of an Appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, against an
order passed under Section 17 of the said Act.
4.
Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act reads as follows:
“18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal. - (1) Any person aggrieved, by
any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17,
may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to
the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of
the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal.
Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by
the borrower or by the person other than the borrower:
Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the
borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. of
the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured
creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever
is less:
Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be
recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five
per cent. of debt referred to in the second proviso.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal
shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the
provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder.”
5.
The aforesaid statutory provision has been duly read out and
brought to the notice of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioner.
6.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner would, however, state that
the present petition is necessitated due to the fact that the Petitioner
had mistakenly filed an application under Section 17 of the
SARFAESI Act, which, according to him, was not maintainable
before the learned DRT.
7.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner would further submit that
although an error may have been committed, the same ought not to
preclude this Court from exercising its jurisdiction. He would contend
that, apart from the fact that the application moved by the Petitioner
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:08:06
W.P.(C) 14244/2025
was not maintainable before the Learned DRT, there also exists a
graver concern, namely that the property belonging to the Petitioner,
one which, according to him, clearly falls outside the scope of the
proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, has been “deliberately,
knowingly, maliciously and illegally” proceeded against, resulting in
possession being taken thereof.
8.
He would then urge that the said illegality, being fundamental
in nature, would by itself warrant interference by this Court in the
exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
9.
During the course of submissions, learned counsel for the
Petitioner proceeded to make certain uncharitable and unwarranted
remarks against the learned Receiver appointed by the learned CMM.
10.
At the very outset, we strongly deprecate the manner in which
allegations have been levelled not only in the pleadings but also
reiterated during oral arguments against the said Receiver. It is
pertinent to note that, by an express order of the learned DRT dated
12.12.2024, the learned Receiver’s name was directed to be deleted
from the array of parties
as
Respondent
No. 2
therein.
Notwithstanding this categorical direction, attempts have been made
to attribute mala fides and bias to the learned Receiver, thereby
unjustifiably casting aspersions on the conduct of an officer of the
Court.
11.
Further, despite his removal of the array of parties, the
Petitioner has impleaded the learned Receiver in the present petition
as Respondent No. 2.
12.
Turning to the focal issue, it is pertinent to note that Section 18
of the SARFAESI Act unequivocally provides that “Any person
aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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W.P.(C) 14244/2025
Section 17, may prefer an appeal …”. The language of the provision
leaves no scope for ambiguity and clearly makes the maintainability of
an appeal contingent upon the existence of an order passed under
Section 17 of the Act.
13.
We also take note of the observations made by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) (P) Ltd.
&Ors5, which read as under:
“97. This Court has time and again, reminded the High Courts that
they should not entertain petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved
person under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. This Court in
United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110
made the following observations: (SCC pp. 123 & 128, paras 43-45
& 55)
“43. Unfortunately, the High Court [Satyawati
Tondon v. State of U.P., 2009 SCC OnLine All 2608]
overlooked the settled law that the High Court will
ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the
aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater
rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees,
other types of public money and the dues of banks and
other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with
the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for
recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep
in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and
State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code
unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain
comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also
envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal
of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all
such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing
remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person
must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant
statute.
44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious
that the powers conferred upon the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government,
directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative
writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by
(2024) 2 SCC 1
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:08:06
W.P.(C) 14244/2025
Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is
no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the
same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of selfimposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High
Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative
remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion,
but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court
should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that
the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by
filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular
legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of
his grievance.
***
55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated
pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to
ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the
DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction
under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious
adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial
institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in
future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in
such matters with greater caution, care and
circumspection.”
100. In Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu, (2023) 2 SCC
168, it was held as under: (SCC p. 183, para 36)
“36. In the instant case, although the respondent borrowers
initially approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal by filing
an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act,
2002, but the order of the Tribunal indeed was appealable
under Section 18 of the Act subject to the compliance of
condition of pre-deposit and without exhausting the
statutory remedy of appeal, the respondent borrowers
approached the High Court by filing the writ application
under Article 226 of the Constitution. We deprecate such
practice of entertaining the writ application by the High
Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution without exhausting the alternative statutory
remedy available under the law. This circuitous route
appears to have been adopted to avoid the condition of
pre-deposit contemplated under the second proviso to
Section 18 of the 2002 Act.”
101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed serious
concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard to the High
Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under
the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise of jurisdiction
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:08:06
W.P.(C) 14244/2025
under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even after, the decision of
this Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8
SCC 110, it appears that the High Courts have continued to
exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the
statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act.”
14.
In light of the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the
contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioner, that the foundational
application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act having been
mistakenly filed would, by necessary implication, render an appeal
under Section 18 non-maintainable, is wholly untenable. Such a
submission deserves outright rejection, particularly when it is borne in
mind that the proceedings under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act
filed by the Petitioner are still pending adjudication before the learned
DRT.
15.
The remaining argument in respect of the alleged action being
pursued against the Petitioner’s property being proceeded against
illegally, the same is a contention which the Petitioner is not precluded
from canvassing before the learned Debts Recovery Appellate
Tribunal6.
16.
In view of the aforementioned, we are of the view that the
present Petition is misconceived and the Petitioner is relegated to the
alternative efficacious remedy available in the form of an Appeal
before the learned DRAT.
17.
We would like to caveat our direction with the observation that
we have not examined the merits of the matter and the learned DRAT
may consider the contentions of the Petitioner without being
influenced by any of the observations herein.
18.
With these observations, the present Writ Petition, along with
DRAT
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:08:06
W.P.(C) 14244/2025
pending applications, if any, is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
HARISHVAIDYANATHANSHANKAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 15, 2025/nd/sm/va
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:08:06
W.P.(C) 14244/2025
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