Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - C No. - 43648 of 2026
Dr. Upasana Giri
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. And 4 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
Counsel for Respondent(s)
: Nitin Pant, Satya Prakash Pandey
: Anand Prakash Paul, C.S.C., Shiv Kumar
Pal
Court No. - 5
HON'BLE PRAKASH PADIA, J.
HON'BLE INDRAJEET SHUKLA, J.
1. Counter affidavits filed on behalf of respondent nos. 5 and 6, are taken on
record.
2. Heard Mr. H.R. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Satya
Prakash Pandey, and Nitin Pant, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.
Kartikeya Saran, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Mr.
Dharmendra Prasad, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for
respondent nos. 1 to 4, Mr. Anand Prakash Paul, learned counsel for
respondent no.5 and Mr. Shiv Kumar Pal, learned counsel for respondent
no.6.
3. Present writ petition has been filed inter alia with the prayer to quash the
order dated 03.10.2026 passed by the respondent no.3 namely UpZiladhikari/Sub Divisional Magistrate, Tehsil Sadar, District Prayagraj in
Case No.21410 of 2026 (Computerized Case No.T202602030621410) under
Section 7(1) of the Maintenance and Welfare of Senior Citizens Act, 2007
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 2007').
4. Mr. Kartikeya Saran, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on
behalf of State placed reliance upon as many as 13 judgements delivered by
this Court as well as other High Courts having divergent opinion. He also
placed reliance upon judgement and order dated 23.04.2019 passed by
Division Bench of this Court in case of Akhilesh Kumar and another Vs.
State of U.P. and 3 others passed in Writ C No.11295 of 2019, wherein
the appeal filed by children being aggrieved by order of eviction passed by
WRIC No. 43648 of 2026
Tribunal, has been held to be maintainable. On reproduction relevant
excerpt, reads thus:
"Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that under section 16 of the
Act, 2007 an appeal can only be filed by the senior citizens or parents
who are aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal. He therefore, submits
that no appeal would lie against the impugned order at the behest of the
petitioners. Section 16 of the Act, 2007 reads as under:
"16. Appeals. ?(1) Any senior citizen or a parent, as the case
may be, aggrieved by an order of a Tribunal may, within
sixty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the
Appellate Tribunal:
Provided that on appeal, the children or relative who is
required to pay any amount in terms of such maintenance
order shall continue to pay to such parent the amount so
ordered, in the manner directed by the Appellate Tribunal:
Provided further that the Appellate Tribunal may, entertain
the appeal after the expiry of the said period of sixty days, if
it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from preferring the appeal in time.
(2) On receipt of an appeal, the Appellate Tribunal shall,
cause a notice to be served upon the respondent.
(3)The Appellate Tribunal may call for the record of
proceedings from the Tribunal against whose order the
appeal is preferred.
(4)The Appellate Tribunal may, after examining the appeal
and the records called for either allow or reject the appeal.
(5)The Appellate Tribunal shall, adjudicate and decide upon
the appeal filed against the order of the Tribunal and the
order of the Appellate Tribunal shall be final: Provided that
no appeal shall be rejected unless an opportunity has been
given to both the parties of being heard in person or through
a duly authorised representative.
(6)The Appellate Tribunal shall make an endeavour to
pronounce its order in writing within one month of the
receipt of an appeal.
(7)A copy of every order made under sub-section (5) shall be
WRIC No. 43648 of 2026
sent to both the parties free of cost."
However, learned standing counsel has referred to a decision in Paramjit
Kumar Saroya: Amanpreet and another vs. Union of India and another
(2014 AIR (P&H) 121 wherein the Division Bench of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court has held that a purposive interpretation should be
given to Section 16(1) of the Act, 2007 and the only interpretation is that
the right of appeal is conferred on both sides. The Court was of the view
that it may be a case of an accidental omission and not of conscious
exclusion and in order to give a complete and effective meaning to the
statutory provision, the Court should read the words into it and the
ultimate conclusion being that an appeal from both sides is envisaged
under section 16(1) of the Act, 2007. Paragraph Nos. 19, 20, 23 and 27 of
the said judgment reads as under:
The textual reading of Section 16 of Act, 2007 do not
indicate that appeal on the instance of children being
aggrieved by order of eviction is maintainable but the
Division Bench of this Court having regard to the purposive
interpretation of the Act has held to be maintainable. There is
no second opinion by this Court as yet. The Central
legislature is already contemplating on the issue of
maintainability of appeal giving rise to children but same has
not yet been crystalized as informed by Mr. Pal, learned
counsel representing Union of India. "19. The petitioners
assailed the provisions of sub section (1) of Section 16 of the
said Act on the ground that there cannot be a right to appeal
only to one of the affected parties, as anomalous situation
would be created against the same order with which both the
parties may be aggrieved i.e. where a greater or lesser claim
is made in relation to any property or maintenance, as one
party being the senior citizen or parent would prefer an
appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, while the party which
is liable to Sharma Amodh 2014.05.31 11:40 I attest to the
accuracy and integrity of this document chandigarh CWP12340-2010 (O&M) give maintenance would have to take
recourse to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.
Thus, two parallel proceedings in the different forums qua
the same order would arise. The submission, thus, is that
these provisions should be struck down as ultra-vires, the
intent of the other provisions of the said Act or the
constitutional scheme. In the alternative the provision should
be read down to make it consistent with the other provisions
WRIC No. 43648 of 2026
and, thus, confer a right of appeal even to the other affected
party.
20. We may add at this stage that in order to have assistance
to this Court in view of the complexity in the matter involved,
we considered it appropriate not only for the counsels to
assist us, but to appoint Amicus Curiae to have dispassionate
view of the matter. We, thus, appointed Mr. Puneet Bali,
Senior Advocate as the Amicus Curiae to be assisted by Ms.
Divya Sharma, Advocate. They have done a comprehensive
research on various aspects of the matter and this includes
the Parliamentary debates when the Bill for enactment of the
said Act was introduced. A perusal of these debates reflect
that there has been no debate qua Section 16(1) of the said
Act, nor has any intent been reflected to exclude the right of
appeal to persons other than the senior citizens or parents,
unlike the debate on Section 17 of the said Act where the
right of legal representation has been excluded. It has been
submitted by learned Amicus Curiae that the subject matter
of a right of appeal is not merely confined to the issue of
maintenance upto the amount of ` 10,000/-, but of seriously
affecting the rights of parties even qua immovable properties
as set out in Sharma Amodh 2014.05.31 11:40 I attest to the
accuracy and integrity of this document chandigarh CWP12340-2010 (O&M) Section 23 of the said Act. Thus,
transfers of immovable properties can be declared void. This
power is vested not only qua family members or children of
senior citizens, but qua "every person". Not only that, as
stated aforesaid, the provisions of Sections 15 and 16(1) have
to be read harmoniously. Section 15 nowhere mentions that
the appeal against the order of the Tribunal be confined to a
senior citizen or parent. Similar is the proposition qua the
first proviso to sub section (1) of Section 16 which would
only have been in case of an appeal by the party liable to be
maintained. The right to file an appeal is not excluded
specifically by the provisions of Section 16(1) of the said Act,
but it fails/omits to mention. We may also usefully refer to
sub section (5) of Section 16 which provides finality to the
order of the Tribunal. Such finality can only be achieved
after hearing grievances of both the sides. If the appeal is
confined to only one party, then the finality can only be qua
the rights of that party which has preferred the appeal and
cannot be envisaged qua the opposite party which would
WRIC No. 43648 of 2026
have to take recourse to Article 227 of the Constitution of
India. Thus, another sub section of the same Section gives
credence to the plea that Section 16(1) of the said Act should
be read in a manner as to provide for appeal to both the
parties. The proviso to sub section (5) further stipulates that
an appeal cannot be rejected unless an opportunity has been
given to both the parties of being heard. The reference of
right to both the parties has to be in the context of an appeal
by either of the parties as otherwise it would have envisaged
that no order could be passed without hearing the child or
the other party.
Sub section (2) of Section 16 once again refers to causing a
notice to be served upon the "respondent" and not the child
or the other party which would be the situation if the right of
appeal was only to a parent or a senior citizen.
23. While cautioning the Courts that the primary rule of
construction is that the intention of the legislation must be
found in the words used by the Legislature itself, it was
observed that statutes should be construed not as theorems of
Euclid and that words are required to be construed with
some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them. A
casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the
case of clear necessity and when the reason for it is found in
the four corners of the statute itself. The objective is to put a
construction on a particular provision so that it makes
consistent enactment of the whole statute. A literal
construction should not be adopted if it leads to a manifestly
absurd or anomalous result which could not have been
intended by the Legislature. It cannot be "an intention to
produce an un-reasonable result". It is this very result, in our
opinion, which would flow if we adopt an interpretation
restricting right of appeal to only one of the parties under
Section 16(1) Sharma Amodh 2014.05.31 11:40 I attest to the
accuracy and integrity of this document chandigarh CWP12340-2010 (O&M) of the said Act. We would in fact have to
strike down the provision and there is no reason to do so
keeping in mind the intent of the Act if a casus omissus can
save the provision.
(c) Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs Essar Power Ltd.
2008(4), SCC 755. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in aid of
WRIC No. 43648 of 2026
interpreting a statute pressed into service the traditional
Mimansa system. These principles are the traditional
principles of interpretation laid down by Jaimini and are
stated to have been used regularly by great jurists who
authored the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga laws. The
principles were created for religious purpose, but they are
stated to be so rational and logical that they began to be used
in law, grammar, logic, philosophy and, thus, became of
universal application. The three ways of dealing with the
conflicts under the Mimansa system have been crystallized as
under:"(1) Where two texts which are apparently conflicting are
capable of being reconciled, then by the principle of
harmonious construction (which is called the samanjasya
principle in Mimansa) they should be reconciled.
(2) The second situation is a conflict where it is impossible to
reconcile the two conflicting texts despite all efforts. In this
situation the Vikalpa principle applies, which says that
whichever law is more in consonance with reason and justice
should be preferred. However, conflict should not be readily
assumed and every effort should be made to reconcile
conflicting texts. It is only when all efforts of reconciliation
fail that the Vikalpa principle is to be resorted to.
(3) There is a third situation of a conflict Sharma Amodh and
this is where there are two conflicting 2014.05.31 11:40 I
attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
chandigarh CWP-12340-2010 (O&M) irreconcilable texts
but one overrides the other because of its greater force. This
is called a Badha in the Mimansa system (similar to the
doctrine of ultra vires)." It is in the aforesaid context that the
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:"52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation
should be followed, and hence the Court should neither add
nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases
this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain
existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the
statute may become absurd.
53. In the chapter on `Exceptional Construction' in his book
on `Interpretation of Statutes' Maxwell writes:
WRIC No. 43648 of 2026
"Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning
and grammatical construction leads to a manifest
contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to
some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice,
presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it
which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the
structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing
from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to
particular words, by altering their collocation, by rejecting
them altogether, or by interpolating other words, under the
influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the
legislature could not possibly have intended what its words
signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere
corrections of careless language and really give the true
meaning."
54. Thus, in Surjit Singh Kalra vs. Union of India 1991(2)
SCC 87, this Court has observed that sometimes courts can
supply words which have been accidentally omitted.
55. In G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretatio'
Ninth Edition, 2004 at pages 71-74 several decisions of this
Court and Sharma Amodh 2014.05.31 11:40 I attest to the
accuracy and integrity of this document chandigarh CWP12340-2010 (O&M) foreign Courts have been referred to
where the Court has added words to a statute (though
cautioning that normally this should not be done)."
27. What is crucial is that the task of interpretation of a
statutory enactment cannot be a mechanical task, nor can it
be the own thoughts and words of the Judge. However, there
is no perfect solution as in the words of Lord Denning it
would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be
drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. It is here
that the role of the Court comes in. Now coming to the
conspectus of the discussion aforesaid, we have no doubt in
our mind that we would be faced with the serious
consequences of quashing such a provision which deprives
the right of one party to the appeal remedy, while conferring
it on the other especially in the context of the other
provisions of the same Section as well as of the said Act. We
have to avoid this. The only way to avoid it is to press into
service both the principles of purposive interpretation and
WRIC No. 43648 of 2026
casus omissus. The Parliamentary discussions on the other
provisions of the said Act do not convey any intent by which
there is Sharma Amodh 2014.05.31 11:40 I attest to the
accuracy and integrity of this document chandigarh CWP12340-2010 (O&M) any intent of the Parliament to create
such a differentiation. There is no point in repeating what we
have said, but suffice to say that if nothing else, at least to
give a meaning to the first proviso of Section 16(1) of the
said Act, the only interpretation can be that the right of
appeal is conferred on both the sides. It is a case of an
accidental omission and not of conscious exclusion. Thus, in
order to give a complete effective meaning to the statutory
provision, we have to read the words into it, the course of
action even suggested in N. Kannadasan's case (supra) in
para 55. How can otherwise the proviso to sub section (1) be
reconciled with sub section itself. In fact, there would be no
need of the proviso which would be made otiose and
redundant. It is salutary role of construction of the statute
that no provision should be made superfluous. There is no
negative provision in the Act denying the right of appeal to
the other parties. The other provisions of the Act and various
sub sections discussed aforesaid would show that on the
contrary an appeal from both sides is envisaged. Only
exception to this course of action is the initial words of sub
section (1) of Section 16 of the said Act which need to be
supplanted to give a meaning to the intent of the Act, other
provisions of the said Act as also other sub sections of the
same Section of the said Act. In fact, in Board of Muslim
Wakfs Rajasthan's case (supra), even while cautioning supply
of casus omissus, it has been stressed in para 29 that the
construction which tends to make any part of the statute
meaningless or ineffective must always be avoided and the
construction which Sharma Amodh 2014.05.31 11:40 I attest
to the accuracy and integrity of this document chandigarh
CWP-12340-2010 (O&M) advances the remedy intended by
the statute should be accepted. This is the only way we can
have a consistent enactment in the form of whole statute.
We are thus of the view that Section 16(1) of the said Act is
valid, but must be read to provide for the right of appeal to
any of the affected parties."
In a similar controversy the Madras High Court in Balamurugan vs.
WRIC No. 43648 of 2026
Rukmani (C.R.P.(PD)(MD)No. 437 of 2015 & M.P.(MD)Nos. 1 & 2 of
2015 decided on, 29 April 2015) (Manu/TN/2190/2015) in agreement
with the view taken in Paramjit Kumar Saroya (supra) has held that an
appeal under section 16 of the Act, 2007 would be maintainable at the
behest of both the parties, i.e. at the instance of the aggrieved party for
the reason that where the Tribunal decides a case in favour of the senior
citizens or parents, the children or dependent or relatives against whom
the order is passed and against whom it can be enforced under section 11
of the Act, 2007 would be the aggrieved person and have a right to file an
appeal.
We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Paramjit Kumar Saroya (supra)
and Balamurugan (supra) because if the right of appeal is denied to the
aggrieved party, namely, child or children or relatives the appeal clause
under the Act, 2007 would be frustrated and tantamount to denying them
the similar right of appeal as provided to another party who is the senior
citizens or parents.
The Supreme Court in Surjit Singh Kalra vs. Union of India (1991) 2 SCC
87) in paragraph no.19 has held as under:
"19. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute
which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between
either supplying by implication words which appear to have
been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which
deprives certain existing words of all meanings, it is
permissible to supply the words" (Craies Statute Law, 7th
Edition, p. 109). Similar are the observations in Hameedia
Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, [ 1988] 2 SCC
513 at 524-25 where it was observed that the court
construing a provision should not easily read into it words
which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to
the context in which a provision appears and the object of the
statute in which the said provision is enacted the court
should construe it in a harmonious way to make it
meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile
the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by
the statute. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan & Ors. v. The Sunni
Central Board of Waqf, [ 1959] SCR 1287 at 1299)"
We, therefore, dismiss the writ petition with liberty to the petitioners to
file an appeal before the appellate authority under section 16 of the Act,
2007 afresh or they may move an application for recall of the order dated
WRIC No. 43648 of 2026
21.1.2019. In either case, the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar,
respondent no.1 shall entertain the appeal of the petitioners, as the case
may be, and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law after
giving all the parties concerned, an opportunity of being heard.
5. The aforesaid view of holding appeal on behest of children being
aggrieved by order of eviction maintainable, was followed by the
Chhattisgarh High Court in Smt. Rita Roy Vs. Maintenance Tribunal and
Sub Divisional Officer (revenue), District Durg (C.G.) and others passed
in WA No. 188 of 2022 on 18.08.2022.
6. A textual reading of Section 16 of Act, 2007, does not indicate that an
appeal at the instance of children, being aggrieved by an order of eviction is
maintainable but the Division Bench of this Court having regard to the
purposive interpretation of the Act to rule out flagrant discrimination
between senior citizen/parents and children by giving right of appeal to one
set and denying to other, has held it to be maintainable on behalf of children
too. There is no second opinion by this Court as yet. The Central legislature
is already contemplating on the issue of maintainability of appeal giving
right to children, but same has not yet been crystalized as informed by Mr.
Pal, learned counsel representing Union of India.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner as well as counsel for respondent no.5
could not dispute the legal position that Division Bench of this Court in case
of Akhilesh Kumar (supra) has held the appeal to be maintainable. Thus,
petitioner is willing and ready to approach the appellate jurisdiction of the
District Magistrate. The only apprehension expressed that appellate authority
may take long time in adjudication of appeal in utter disregard to statutory
mandate contained in the act for disposal of appeal with promptness.
8. If District Magistrate being appellate authority is mandated to decide the
appeal within the time bound manner by thrashing out the factual matrix and
the law applicable on the point of eviction of children. The petitioner's
grievance could be redressed in effective manner.
9. It is fundamental doctrine reflected from latin maxim stare decisis that
requires Courts to follow previous judicial precedents. Thus, while sitting in
Division Bench, we in order to maintain consistency follow the judgment of
our own Court rendered in Akhilesh Kumar (supra).
10. In view of the legal position as thrashed out in Akhilesh Kumar (supra),
WRIC No. 43648 of 2026
we relegate the writ petitioner to the jurisdiction of Appellate
Authority/District Magistrate, Prayagraj-respondent no.2.
11. At this stage, an undertaking has been extended by Mr. Anand Prakash
Paul, learned counsel for respondent no.5 having instruction in the matter
that respondent no.5 will not take recourse/press for eviction until appellate
authority decides application for interim relief.
12. Thus, in view of undertaking as aforesaid, there is no occasion for us to
grant any indulgence/protection.
13. Respondent no.2/District Magistrate, Prayagraj is further directed to
decide the entire appeal filed by the petitioner after providing opportunity of
hearing to all the parties, within a period of 30 days from the date of
institution of Appeal as mandated by statute itself under Section 16(6) of the
Act, 2007.
14. It is needless to mention that this Court has not adjudicated the challenge
to the order impugned on its merits thus, the appellate authority shall
marshell the factual matrix on its own in the light of applicability of law
enshrined under the statute/ the Act, 2007 as well as various pronouncements
of this Court as well as Hon'ble Supreme Court and would pass orders
accordingly.
15. In this view of the matter and with the consent of the learned counsel for
the parties, without interfering in the order dated 03.10.2026 passed by
respondent no.3, we permit the petitioner to prefer an appeal along with
application for interim relief before the respondent no.2/District Magistrate,
Prayagraj/Appellate Authority within a period of three days, if needful is
done in aforesaid period, the respondent no.2 will pass appropriate order on
the application for interim relief, positively on or before 16th November,
2026.
16. The writ petition is disposed of.
17. Let this order be communicated to the respondent no.2/District
Magistrate, Prayagraj by Registrar (Compliance) through Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Prayagraj, forthwith.
November 2, 2026
Mohit
(Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Prakash Padia,J.)
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review