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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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W.P.(C) 17030/2025 & CM APPL. 11393/2026
DR GOPAL JHA AND OTHERS
Through:
.....Petitioners
Mr. Amar Nath Saini, Dr. Nishesh
Sharma, Mr. Lakshay Aggarwal, Mr.
Aaryan Yadav, Mr. Himanshu
Mishra, Mr. Ajay Lakra and Ms.
Pavitra, Advocates
versus
GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Avnish Ahlawat, SC, GNCTD
with Mr. N. K. Singh, Ms. Palak
Rohmetra, Ms. Aliza Alam and Mr.
Mohnish Sehrawat, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
ORDER
18.02.2026
%
CM APPL. 11392/2026 (seeking disposal of stay application)
1.
The Petitioners rely on order dated 12th January, 2026, passed by the
Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 534/2026, titled Dr. Gopal Jha & Ors. v.
Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr., and seek an early disposal of the interim stay
application.
2.
With the consent of counsel for the parties, the main writ petition is
called on board today itself. Therefore, no separate order on the interim stay
application is considered necessary. Accordingly, the application stands
disposed of.
W.P.(C) 17030/2025
3.
The Petitioners are medical practitioners who have, over different
W.P.(C) 17030/2025
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spells since 2016, been engaged at “Aam Aadmi Mohalla Clinics”
(“AAMCs”). On 30th October, 2025, the Respondents issued notices
terminating their empanelment. The Petitioners challenge that termination
and seek, inter alia, setting aside of the termination notices and a restraint
against the Respondents from discontinuing their engagement.
4.
The pleadings and submissions advanced by the counsel bring the
dispute into a narrow compass. The Petitioners describe the engagement as
contractual or ad-hoc employment and rely upon the continuity of their
engagement over the years and the nature of duties performed by them to
contend that the arrangement is, in substance, one of employment. The
Respondents maintain that this was not employment at all, but empanelment
on agreed terms, remunerated per OPD registration, and expressly
terminable on notice. The Respondents also state that the Mohalla Clinic
framework is being replaced by engagement under PM-ABHIM for
“Ayushman Arogya Mandirs” (“AAMs”), and that the Petitioners have no
enforceable right to insist on continuation of the earlier arrangement.
5.
The Court must test these rival positions against the terms that
governed the relationship. Otherwise, the Court would be substituting its
own arrangement for the one the parties adopted. The empanelment
agreement does not read like an appointment order. It fixes remuneration on
a per-patient basis at INR 40/- for each OPD registration and, to cushion
daily fluctuations, mentions a minimum assured patient count of 75 per day.
It then draws clear lines around what the arrangement is not. It excludes
service benefits such as leave, allowances, EPF/ESI and medical
reimbursement. It states, in terms, that no right accrues to seek regular
appointment. It also permits the empanelled doctor to undertake private
W.P.(C) 17030/2025
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
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work after clinic hours. The latest extended term was from 1st April, 2025 to
31st March, 2026, and it may end earlier if new manpower is appointed for
AAMs. Finally, it reserves to the competent authority the right to terminate
the empanelment, without reasons, by giving one week’s advance notice.
6.
This contractual framework is decisive. It frames the legal character
of the relationship. The Petitioners describe the arrangement as employment.
However, whether the arrangement is closer to a service tenure or a
professional empanelment is not decided by labels. It is to be decided by the
incidents of the engagement, such as the mode of remuneration, entitlement
to leave and service benefits, exclusivity, right to private practice, and the
degree of control.
7.
A ‘contract of service’ carries the marks of a service tenure. It
ordinarily involves salary, service conditions, integration into the
employer’s establishment, and a degree of control that goes beyond setting
outcomes and extends to the manner of working. A ‘contract for services’ is
entirely different. The engager fixes deliverables and standards, but does not
assume the role of an employer in the service law sense.
8.
The Supreme Court, in Shri Chintaman Rao & Anr. v. State of
Madhya Pradesh1, treated piece-rate remuneration and the absence of real
control over the manner of work as inconsistent with an employer-employee
relationship. In Shankar Balaji Waje v. State of Maharashtra2, the Court
again explained that a relationship does not turn into “employment” merely
because work is done in premises or with material provided by the other
side. What matters is whether the engager exercises the kind of control and
1958 SCC OnLine SC 83.
1961 SCC OnLine SC 366.
W.P.(C) 17030/2025
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 23/02/2026 at 12:00:56
supervision that service law recognises as employment.
9.
This case has its own texture because the Petitioners are doctors, and
a public clinic cannot run without timings, protocols, and minimum
standards. The presence of such stipulations does not, by itself, convert
empanelment into service tenure. A hospital may insist on duty hours,
discipline, and ethical rules, but that is compatible with a professional
engagement too. Here, the features cumulatively speak in one direction:
payment is linked to patient footfall, not a fixed monthly wage; the
agreement excludes the usual service incidents; the Petitioners are permitted
to practise privately after clinic hours; and the document expressly shuts the
door on any claim to regular appointment. Taken together, the arrangement
operates as a time-bound professional engagement to provide services, not
as appointment to a civil post with protected tenure.
10.
The Petitioners, in substance, seek a continuing mandamus that would
compel the Respondents to keep the arrangement alive. In State of U.P. &
Ors. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd.3, the Supreme Court cautioned
against using writ proceedings to enforce contractual claims. In State of
Bihar & Ors. v. Jain Plastics & Chemicals Ltd.4, the Court reiterated that
when the dispute is rooted in contract, the parties must ordinarily pursue
remedies in the manner the law provides, and writ jurisdiction is not used as
a parallel forum for contractual enforcement.
11.
Thus, Courts ordinarily do not specifically enforce contracts of
personal service, except in recognised categories where statutory protection
or constitutional safeguards attach to a public post. Where those features are
(1996) 6 SCC 22.
(2002) 1 SCC 216.
W.P.(C) 17030/2025
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 23/02/2026 at 12:00:56
absent, the Court does not convert a contractual arrangement into an
enforceable tenure. That is not a matter of discretion alone. It reflects the
settled boundary between public law remedies and private law enforcement.
12.
Petitioners also cannot invoke Article 14 review to rewrite the
bargain. This provision is meant to check arbitrariness and misuse of power,
not to convert a time-bound or terminable arrangement into a protected
tenure. Where the governing instrument permits termination on notice, the
Petitioners must therefore show something more than hardship or long
association.
13.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that even in contractual
matters, State action does not stand outside constitutional scrutiny. The
inquiry under Article 14, however, remains a confined one, limited to
examining whether the exercise of contractual power is vitiated by
arbitrariness or was exercised for an improper purpose, in a discriminatory
manner, or in defiance of a binding policy or statutory constraint.
14.
Tested on that touchstone, the challenge cannot succeed. The
agreement itself contemplates severance if new manpower is appointed for
the AAMs, and also contains a termination clause permitting disengagement
on one week’s advance notice. The Respondents state that the termination
was necessitated by a shift in the healthcare delivery model. Courts do not
sit as selecting authorities or administrative planners for such restructuring.
Judicial review intervenes only where the decision is shown to be vitiated by
mala fides, discrimination, or breach of a statutory mandate.
15.
The Petitioners rely heavily on long association and the public value
of the work performed. That explains hardship, but it does not, without
more, establish that the termination was colourable, punitive in disguise, or
W.P.(C) 17030/2025
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 23/02/2026 at 12:00:56
targeted. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that long continuation on
ad-hoc or temporary arrangements does not, by itself, ripen into a right to be
continued or regularised.5 Administrative convenience may explain repeated
extensions, but the law does not allow a court to create tenure where the
governing terms deny it.
16.
The prayer for a blanket restraint against discontinuation cannot be
granted. It would, in substance, compel continuation of an arrangement
which the parties themselves framed as time-bound and terminable on
notice. It would also draw the Court into day-to-day staffing choices at a
moment of policy transition.
17.
For the reasons discussed above, the writ petition is dismissed, along
with any pending application(s).
18.
The date already fixed i.e. 22nd April, 2026 stands cancelled.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
FEBRUARY 18, 2026/hc
See: Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi (3) & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 1.
W.P.(C) 17030/2025
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 23/02/2026 at 12:00:56
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