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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 08.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 20.01.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 20.01.2026
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RFA(OS)(COMM) 34/2025, CM APPL. 70773/2025, CM
APPL. 70774/2025 and CM APPL. 70775/2025
DIRECTORATE OF ESTATES MINISTRY OF HOUSING
AND URBAN AFFAIRS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Syed Abdul Haseeb, CGSC
with Ms. Nasreen Khatoon,
Adv.
versus
RAJIV SARIN & ORS.
Through:
.....Respondents
Mr. Sidhant Kumar, Ms.
Shagun Chopra, Mr. Vinayak
Thakur, Mr. Om Batra, Advs.
for R-1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
1.
The present appeal has been filed assailing the judgment and
decree passed by the Learned Single Judge [hereinafter referred to as
„LSJ‟] on 02.05.2025, whereby the civil suit instituted by the
Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 herein, came to be decreed in their favour
and against the Appellant [hereinafter referred to as „IJ‟].
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2.
For the sake of clarity, consistency and ease of reference, the
parties in the present appeal shall be referred to in accordance with
their respective status before the LSJ.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
3.
In order to comprehend the issues involved in the present case,
the relevant facts in brief are required to be noticed.
4.
The present proceedings trace its genesis to Flat No. 1108,
Ansal Bhawan, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi [hereinafter
referred to as „the suit property‟], which admittedly belongs to the
Plaintiffs, who came to acquire the ownership rights in the suit
property through their mother, Mrs. Veera Sarin, acting as their
constituted attorney, by virtue of Articles of Agreement dated
06.03.1972.
5.
The suit property was leased out to Defendant No.1,
Government authority, and remained under its lawful tenancy
pursuant to various deeds executed from time to time. The possession
of the suit property was handed over to the Defendant No.1 on
01.09.1976, against which the rent was regularly paid to the Plaintiffs
and their predecessor-in-interest upto April 1999.
6.
In the intervening period of 1974 to 1976, proceedings were
initiated against Late Mr. H.K. Sarin, father of the Plaintiffs, under the
Customs Act, 1962. Thereafter, on 12.07.1975, a preventive detention
order was passed against him under the provisions of Conservation of
Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974
[hereinafter referred to as „COFEPOSA‟]. Consequently, on
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29.04.1980, Defendant No.3 issued a Show Cause Notice (SCN)
under Section 6 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators
(Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 [hereinafter referred to as
„SAFEMA‟], calling upon Late Mr. H.K. Sarin to provide an
explanation with respect to the sources of income and acquisition of
various assets, including the suit property.
7.
Following which, on 05.08.1998, Defendant No.3 passed an
order under Section 7 of the SAFEMA [hereinafter referred to as
„Forfeiture Order‟], forfeiting the suit property amongst other
properties belonging to Mr. H.K. Sarin. Consequent upon the
forfeiture, Defendant No.1 admittedly stopped paying rent to the
Plaintiffs w.e.f. 01.05.1999, despite being in a continuous possession
of the suit property. Parallelly, the order dated 05.08.1998 was
challenged by the Plaintiffs before the Appellate Authority, however,
the same was rejected under SAFEMA on 19.12.2001. Thereafter, the
Plaintiffs, along with their mother, Mrs. Veera Sarin, by way of W.P.
(Crl.) No. 1606 of 2008 titled Veera Sarin & Ors. v UOI & Ors.,
challenged the detention order dated 12.07.1975 as well as the
proceedings initiated under the SAFEMA. The Division Bench of this
Court vide judgment dated 01.12.2014 set aside and quashed the
proceedings under SAFEMA on account of lack of jurisdiction by the
government authorities.
8.
Pursuant thereto, the Defendant No. 3, by order dated
28.03.2016, formally closed the proceedings under SAFEMA in
respect of the suit property. Subsequently, upon failure of the
Defendant No.1 to handover the possession of the suit property, the
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Plaintiffs filed W.P. (C) No. 10395/2019 titled Rajiv Sarin v UOI &
Ors., wherein the Court in its Order dated 16.07.2020 recorded that
the possession of the suit property has been handed over to the
Plaintiffs. Whereas vide order dated 28.07.2020, the Court directed the
Defendant No.1 to pay the arrears of rent with effect from 01.05.1999
till 02.07.2020 at the rate of Rs 20,500/- per month. Additionally, the
Court also granted a liberty to the Plaintiffs to pursue appropriate
proceedings for recovery of market rent/mesne profits/compensation
and interest in accordance with law.
9.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs preferred the CS (Comm) 12/2021
seeking recovery of mesne profits/market rent/compensation and
interest in respect of the period during which the Defendants remained
in the possession of the suit property, i.e., from 01.05.1999 to
02.07.2020. The LSJ by way of the IJ decreed the suit in favour of the
Plaintiffs for a sum of Rs. 1,76,79,550/- along with an interest at the
rate of 6% per annum.
10.
The Defendant No.1 has now approached this Court in Appeal,
seeking to challenge the correctness of the judgment rendered by the
LSJ.
11.
This Court has heard learned counsel representing the parties
and with their able assistance perused the paperbook.
12.
The submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties
pertain to both the procedural aspects including the objection with
respect to the maintainability of the civil suit as well as the substantive
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merits of the case. Therefore, this Court deems it appropriate to
bifurcate the submission under two distinct heads:
(I) Submissions relating to the maintainability of the Civil Suit; and
(II) Submissions concerning the merits of the case.
13.
Before delving into the examination of the arguments raised by
the parties, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant
provisions of SAFEMA and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
[hereinafter referred to as „CC Act‟], which forms a substantial part of
the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties:
“CC ACT
2. Definitions.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,–
–
(c) ―commercial dispute‖ means a dispute arising out of––
(i) ordinary transactions of merchants, bankers, financiers and traders
such as those relating to mercantile documents, including enforcement
and interpretation of such documents;
(ii) export or import of merchandise or services;
(iii) issues relating to admiralty and maritime law;
(iv) transactions relating to aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft
equipment and helicopters, including sales, leasing and financing of
the same;
(v) carriage of goods;
(vi) construction and infrastructure contracts, including tenders;
(vii) agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in
trade or commerce;
(viii) franchising agreements;
(ix) distribution and licensing agreements;
(x) management and consultancy agreements;
(xi) joint venture agreements;
(xii) shareholders agreements;
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(xiii) subscription and investment agreements pertaining to the
services industry including outsourcing services and financial
services;
(xiv) mercantile agency and mercantile usage;
(xv) partnership agreements;
(xvi) technology development agreements;
(xvii) intellectual property rights relating to registered and
unregistered trademarks, copyright, patent, design, domain names,
geographical indications and semiconductor integrated circuits;
(xviii) agreements for sale of goods or provision of services;
(xix) exploitation of oil and gas reserves or other natural resources
including electromagnetic spectrum;
(xx) insurance and re-insurance;
(xxi) contracts of agency relating to any of the above; and
(xxii) such other commercial disputes as may be notified by the
Central Government.
Explanation.––A commercial dispute shall not cease to be a
commercial dispute merely because—
(a) it also involves action for recovery of immovable property or for
realisation of monies out of immovable property given as security or
involves any other relief pertaining to immovable property;
(b) one of the contracting parties is the State or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, or a private body carrying out public functions;
11. Bar of jurisdiction of Commercial Courts and Commercial
Divisions.—Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a
Commercial Court or a Commercial Division shall not entertain or
decide any suit, application or proceedings relating to any commercial
dispute in respect of which the jurisdiction of the civil court is either
expressly or impliedly barred under any other law for the time being in
force.
SAFEMA
7. Forfeiture of property in certain cases.—(1) The competent
authority may, after considering the explanation, if any, to the showcause notice issued under section 6, and the materials available before
it and after giving to the person affected (and in a case where the
person affected holds any property specified in the notice through any
other person, to such other person also) a reasonable opportunity of
being heard, by order, record a finding whether all or any of the
properties in question are illegally acquired properties.
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(2) Where the competent authority is satisfied that some of the
properties referred to in the show-cause notice are illegally acquired
properties but is not able to identity specifically such properties, then,
it shall be lawful for the competent authority to specify the properties
which, to the best of its judgment, are illegally acquired properties and
record a finding accordingly under sub-section (1).
(3) Where the competent authority records a finding under this section
to the effect that any property is illegally acquired property, it shall
declare that such property shall, subject to the provisions of this Act,
stand forfeited to the Central Government free from all encumbrances.
(4) Where any shares in a company stand forfeited to the Central
Government under this Act, then, the company shall, notwithstanding
anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or the
articles of association of the company, forthwith register the Central
Government as the transferee of such shares.
14. Bar of jurisdiction.—No order passed or declaration made under
this Act shall be appealable except as provided therein and no civil
court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the
Appellate Tribunal or any competent authority is empowered by or
under this Act to determine, and no injunction shall be granted by any
court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in
pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.
23. Protection of action taken in good faith.—No suit, prosecution or
other proceeding shall lie against the Central Government or any
officer of the Central or State Government for anything which is done,
or intended to be done, in good faith, in pursuance of this Act or the
rules made thereunder.‖
(I) SUBMISSIONS RELATING TO THE MAINTAINABILITY
OF THE CIVIL SUIT
Arguments raised on behalf of the Defendant No.1/Appellant
14.
While challenging the maintainability of the civil suit, it has
been argued that the LSJ lacked the competence and the jurisdiction to
entertain the civil suit, preferred by the Plaintiffs, as a „commercial
dispute‟ within the meaning of Section 11 of the Commercial Courts
Act, 2015 [hereinafter referred to as „CC Act‟]. It has been argued that
the suit property, was not used by the Defendant No.1 for the purposes
of trade or commerce and as such the dispute did not fall within the
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ambit of a commercial suit. On the aforesaid premise, it has been
argued that the IJ is rendered without jurisdiction and is a nullity in
the eyes of law.
15.
Further, reliance has also been placed on Section 14 of
SAFEMA, to argue that the LSJ could not have entertained the civil
suit, and/or granted any consequential relief, since the said provision
bars the institution and adjudication of civil proceedings in respect of
any property dealt under the Act.
16.
Lastly, it is the case of the Defendant No.1 that during the
pendency of the civil suit one of the Plaintiffs, Ms. Radhika Sarin,
passed away, resulting in abatement of the suit of qua the deceased
Plaintiff.
Response to the arguments raised on maintainability on behalf of
the Plaintiffs
17.
Per contra, it has been argued that the LR of the deceased
Plaintiff, Mrs. Veera Sarin, was duly brought on record, thereby
ensuring the continuity of the proceedings and preserving the
maintainability of the suit.
18.
Further, while relying upon Paragraph no.89 of the plaint it has
been argued that the suit property was leased and utilised for
commercial purposes exclusively in terms of Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of
the CC Act. Additionally, reliance has been placed on the judgment
dated 01.12.2014, wherein the Division Bench of this Court quashed
the Forfeiture Order under SAFEMA, to argue that the by virtue of
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such quashing the proprietary interest of the Plaintiffs in the suit
property was recognised.
SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING THE MERITS OF THE CASE
Arguments raised on behalf of the Defendant No.1/Appellant
19.
It has further been argued by learned counsel for the Defendant
No.1 that by virtue of Forfeiture Order passed under Section 7(3) of
SAFEMA, the suit property vested absolutely in the Central
Government, free from all encumbrances. It is his case that during the
subsistence of the Forfeiture Order, the Plaintiffs were not entitled to
any right, title or interest in the suit property and, as a necessary
corollary, were not legally entitled to assert or claim any rent/mesne
profits/compensation or any similar reliefs in respect thereof.
20.
Further reliance has also been placed on Section 23 of
SAFEMA to argue that the Defendant No. 1 is protected from any
civil liability, since the said provision provides a complete statutory
immunity to the Central Government in respect of actions taken in
good faith. It has been argued that the suit property during the relevant
period was referable to statutory authority provided under the
SAFEMA, and therefore no liability could have been imposed upon
the Defendant No.1 for acts performed in discharge of its statutory
functions.
Response on behalf of the plaintiffs
21.
Per contra, learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs has placed
reliance on order dated 28.07.2020 in W.P. (C) 10395/2019, to argue
that the Court recorded that, pursuant to its order dated 16.07.2020,
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the rights of the Plaintiffs, including the right to claim mesne profits,
compensation and interest were expressly reserved to be adjudicated
by the competent court. Further reliance is placed on paragraph nos.3
and 4 of the aforesaid order, to argue that the Defendant No. 1, by way
of affidavit before the Writ Court, had itself reflected arrears of rent
payable from 01.05.1999 to 02.07.2020 at the rate of Rs. 20,500/- per
month, and that no objection was raised by it at that stage.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS:
22.
Having heard the rival submissions advanced by the learned
counsel for the parties and upon careful consideration of the record,
this Court deems it appropriate to deal with the dispute at hand under
four primary issues:
A.
Whether the civil suit was maintainable as a „commercial
dispute‟ and within the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court?
B.
Whether the suit was barred by SAFEMA, and to what extent
does Sections 14 and 23 of SAFEMA limit civil remedies
against the government?
C.
Whether the suit was procedurally maintainable in light of the
death of one of the Plaintiffs?
D.
Whether the Defendant No.1 is liable to pay rent/mesne
profits/compensation
for
the
period
of
01.05.1999
to
02.07.2020?
A.
Whether the civil suit was maintainable as a ‘commercial
dispute’ and within the jurisdiction of the Commercial
Court?
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23.
In order to examine the present issue, reference is made to
Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the CC Act, which specifically includes within
its ambit „agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively
in trade or commerce‟. Additionally, reference is also made to the
explanation to Section 2(1)(c) of the CC Act, which further clarifies
that a dispute does not cease to be a commercial dispute merely
because one of the parties thereto is the State or its instrumentalities,
or because the relief sought pertains to the recovery of, or rights in
relation to, immovable property.
24.
In the present case at hand, undisputedly the civil suit arose out
of a lease deed in respect of the suit property, whereas the Plaintiffs
sought
monetary
relief
by
way
of
mesne
profits/market
rent/compensation etc for the period during which the Defendant No.1
continued to be in the possession thereof. In this regard, reference is
made to Paragraph no.89 of the Plaint and the written statement filed
by the Defendant No.1 in the civil suit. The relevant paragraphs are
produced hereinbelow:
Plaint
“89.
The present cause of action is a ‗commercial dispute‘ as the
Property is meant for commercial use exclusively in terms of Section
2(c)(vii), Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The present Suit is therefore a
commercial suit in terms of the aforesaid Act and the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 as applicable to commercial disputes.”
Written Statement filed by the Defendant No.1
“40.
That the contents of paragraph 86 to 89 of the plaint are
denied. It is stated that the flat was in possession with the Defendant
No.2. There was no lease agreement during seizure period. In absence
of lease as well as direction from Seizure Deptt, the monthly rent was
not paid. Obeying the Court's decision, Defendant No.1 has already
paid rent an amount of Rs. 52,08,323 as rent. So the question of
interest payment is not arises.”
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25.
A perusal of Paragraph no.89 of the Plaint shows that the
Plaintiffs have clearly established their cause of action, while
contending that their case falls under the ambit of a commercial
dispute, since the suit property is used exclusively for a commercial
purpose. However, the Defendant No.1 in its written statement, has
merely issued a bald and evasive denial of the contents of the
aforesaid paragraph of the plaint, without controverting the specific
plea taken by the Plaintiff as to the nature of the use of the suit
property.
26.
Additionally, in this regard, reliance is also placed on the 19
lease deeds pertaining to the properties situated in Ansal Bhawan, 16
Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi, produced before the LSJ by
PW2/Mr. Shankar Singh, Sub-Registrar. Upon perusal of these lease
deeds, it is evident that the properties situated in Ansal Bhawan, are
used exclusively for commercial purposes. Therefore, the consistent
pattern of usage of properties situated in Ansal Bhawan from the year
2005 to 2020, conclusively establishes that the suit property, being
similarly situated, was also used for commercial purposes.
27.
Notably, it also holds importance that the statutory touchstone,
for a dispute to be classified as commercial in nature, is the exclusive
use of the immovable property in trade or commerce. In absence of
any pleading or any material contrary to the said plea raised by the
Plaintiffs, particularly, taking into consideration the 19 lease deeds
and in view of the fact that no such objection was raised before the
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LSJ, Defendant No.1 cannot be granted a benefit of doubt at the
appellate stage.
28.
Moreover, upon a holistic consideration of the pleadings, the
nature of the reliefs sought and the governing statutory scheme, this
Court is of the view that the gravamen of the present dispute lies in
the liability of a lessee/Defendant No.1 to pay rent and mesne profits
in respect of a premises forming part of commercial usage. Whereas,
the underlying transaction itself pertains to the leasing of an
immovable property for commercial usage. Therefore, this Court,
finds that the dispute at hand falls well within the description of a
commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the CC Act and as
such falls well within the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court.
B.
WHETHER THE SUIT WAS BARRED BY SAFEMA,
AND TO WHAT EXTENT DOES SECTIONS 14 AND 23
OF SAFEMA LIMIT CIVIL REMEDIES AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT?
29.
Section 14 of SAFEMA provides that no civil court shall have
jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Appellate Tribunal or
any competent authority is empowered by or under this Act to
determine, and no injunction shall be granted, in respect of any action
taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under
this Act. In this regard, it has been argued by the learned counsel for
the Defendant No. 1 that, once the suit property stood forfeited under
Section 7(3) of the SAFEMA by the Forfeiture Order, any civil
proceedings in respect of the suit property or consequential reliefs
stood excluded by virtue of Section 14 of the SAFEMA.
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30.
In the opinion of this Court, the contention raised by the
Defendant No.1 not only overlooks the subject matter and the reliefs
actually sought in the civil suit but also turns a blind eye towards the
subsequent developments that undertook with respect to the Forfeiture
Order. It is pertinent to note that the civil suit does not impugn the
validity of the Forfeiture Order nor does it seek any declaration or
injunction directed against the proceedings initiated under SAFEMA.
Rather, the claim of the Plaintiffs is purely with respect to a money
decree against the continued unauthorised possession of the suit
property.
31.
Further, the SAFEMA proceedings already stands quashed by
the Division Bench of this Court for lack of jurisdiction, therefore, the
vesting of property in the Central Government by virtue of Section
7(3) of the SAFEMA, stood negated and the proprietary rights of the
Plaintiffs revived and were recognised. Against the aforesaid, the bar
as stipulated under Section 14 of the SAFEMA, cannot be read widely
so as to preclude independent civil remedies for compensation of
mesne profits accruing between the parties from use and occupation of
the property, particularly since the proceedings have been annulled.
The said provision does not create a blanket immunity against all civil
suits that may have similar factual nexus with a property once
subjected to SAFEMA proceedings.
32.
It is trite law that the jurisdiction of civil courts is plenary and
can be excluded only by express words of necessary implications,
however, Section 14 of SAFEMA, does not expressly bar, nor does it
impliedly exclude, the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of claims
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for mesne profits or damages arising out of an unauthorised
occupation, particularly where the foundational proceedings under a
special statute have already been set aside. The scope of Section 14
must be construed strictly and narrowly, consistent with the wellestablished rule that the provisions excluding civil jurisdiction are
exceptions to the general rule, and therefore, admit of no expansive
interpretation. In this regard, any ambiguity must necessarily operate
in favour of the continuance of civil court jurisdiction, rather its
exclusion.
33.
In the present case, by the time the civil suit was instituted, (i)
the Forfeiture Order and SAFEMA proceedings had been quashed by
this Court, (ii) the competent authority had closed the proceedings,
and (iii) the Writ Court, in W.P. (C) 10395/2019, had noted
restoration of possession to the Plaintiffs and directed Defendant No.1
to pay arrears of rent for the entire disputed period, while reserving
the liberty to the Plaintiffs to pursue mesne profits, compensation and
interest. Thus, the monetary claim arises in the post-quashing legal
regime, founded on the Plaintiffs restored title. Therefore, there is, no
matter pending or determinable under SAFEMA which could attract
the bar of Section 14. Accordingly, the objection of the Defendant
No.1 based on Section 14 must accordingly be rejected.
34.
With respect to the other grounds raised by the learned counsel
for the Defendant no.1, stating that no action can be initiated against
the Central Government, since they are exempted for any liability as
per Section 23 of the SAFEMA on account of acting in good faith.
This contention, in the opinion of this Court, is devoid of merit, to the
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extent that the entire dispute and any/every consequential proceedings
that has undergone between the parties, including the writ petition,
was an offshoot of the Detention Order passed under COPEFESA and
subsequent Forfeiture Order issued by the Defendant No.3, which
ultimately came to be quashed by the Division Bench of this Court,
vide judgment dated 01.12.2014 in W.P. (Crl.) No. 1606 of 2008
(Supra). Additionally, the LSJ has dealt with each and every aspect
surrounding the contention raised with respect to Section 23 of the
SAFEMA in detail, and this Court concurs with the findings rendered
by the LSJ in paragraph nos. 30 to 41 of the IJ.
35.
The LSJ has rightly held that the continued occupation of the
suit property by the Defendants without payment of rent, even after
the quashing of the SAFEMA proceedings, and in absence of any
bona fide explanation provided for the occupation of the suit property
for a period of seven years, does not exhibit any bona fide conduct or
good faith on their part. As highlighted in the preceeding paragraph,
this Court finds no infirmity with the finding of the LSJ.
C.
WHETHER
THE
SUIT
WAS
PROCEDURALLY
MAINTAINABLE IN LIGHT OF THE DEATH OF ONE
OF THE PLAINTIFFS?
36.
It has been argued by the learned counsel for the Defendant that
death of the Plaintiff, Ms. Radhika Sarin, resulted in abatement of suit
qua her, however, in view of this Court, the said contention is devoid
of merit to the extent that as per Order XXII of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, a suit can be said to be abated only when the right to
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sue does not survive and no legal representative of the deceased
Plaintiff is brought on record within the prescribed period, rendering
the continuation of proceedings legally untenable. However, in the
present case, the civil suit has been filed in respect of the suit property
jointly owned by the Plaintiffs, who are the brother and sister of the
deceased Plaintiff No.3. As far as the share of the deceased Plaintiff
No.3 is concerned, it has been apprised by the learned counsel for the
Plaintiffs that, her legal representative, Mrs. Veera Sarin, the mother,
is on record and entitled to prosecute the said share. In these
circumstances, the plea of abatement is more technical than
substantive and does not vitiate the maintainability of the suit.
D.
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT NO.1 IS LIABLE TO
PAY RENT/MESNE PROFITS/COMPENSATION FOR
THE PERIOD OF 01.05.1999 TO 02.07.2020?
37.
Now turning to the issue with respect to the time period for
which the decree of mesne profit is to be granted, this Court
consciously highlights that the aforesaid issue has not been argued by
learned counsel for the Defendants, however, during the course of
argument the said question was posed to the learned counsel for the
Plaintiffs and due assistance was provided thereof. Even if objection
with regard to the limitation has not been taken by the Defendant, still
it is the duty of the Court to examine whether the rent/mesne profit is
time-barred or not.
38.
A suit for recovery of mesne profit is governed by Article 51 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 [hereinafter referred to as „Limitation Act‟]
which prescribes a limitation of three years, commencing from the
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date when the profits are received. Ordinarily, a suit instituted in the
year 2021 would permit the recovery of mesne profit only from the
year 2018 onwards. However, such general rule is subject to statutory
exclusions, notably, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
39.
Before delving into the controversy pertaining to Section 14, it
is pertinent to appreciate the nature of the cause of action being
triggered in the present factual matrix. The Supreme Court in
Rushibhai
Jagdishbhai
Pathak
v.
Bhavnagar
Municipal
Corporation (2022) 18 SCC 144, has defined the principles of
continuing wrongs and recurring/successive wrongs, while continuing
wrong was referred to as a single wrongful act which causes a
continuing injury, recurring/successive wrongs were classified as such
wrongs that occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct
and separate cause of action. Whereas the co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in RSA 110/2013 titled Sant Kirpal Singh v. Sobha Singh and
Sons Pvt. Ltd., observed that in cases of continuing trespass or
unlawful occupation, limitation does not run rigidly from a single
historical date, and a fresh suit filed promptly after the crystallization
of rights is maintainable.
40.
The above cited judgments bear importance in view of the
peculiar facts and circumstances that have unfolded in the present
dispute at hand. Admittedly, the Forfeiture Order stood quashed on
01.12.2014. Consequently, the Defendant No.3 on 28.03.2016,
formally nullified the said forfeiture. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs
continuously pursued the restoration and settlement of dues through
various correspondences spanning from 2017 to 2019. Following
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which and upon failure of the Defendant to handover the possession,
W.P. (C) No. 10395/2019, was filed by the Plaintiff No.1, inter alia
seeking restoration of the suit property. The Writ Court vide Order
dated 16.07.2020 recorded that the possession of the suit property was
restored, whereas vide Order dated 28.07.2020, the Defendants were
directed to pay the arrears of rent w.e.f. 01.05.1999 to 02.07.2020
being the date on which the Defendant No.1 removed its good from
the suit premise.
41.
Notably, the Court by way of Orders dated 16.07.2020 and
28.07.2020 reserved the rights of the Plaintiffs with respect to the
claims of mesne profits, compensation and interest, declining to
adjudicate the said issue under the writ jurisdiction on account of
disputed questions of fact. Consequently, the Plaintiffs filed the civil
suit.
42.
It is pertinent to note that while the wrongful occupation
subsisted since the date of quashing of the Forfeiture Order, the right
of the Plaintiff to pursue mesne profits before the civil court
crystalised immediately. Against this backdrop, the prolonged and
unauthorised possession of the suit property by Defendant No.1,
despite quashing of Forfeiture Order, constitutes a continuing wrong,
and each day of such unauthorised occupation of the suit property,
deprived the Plaintiffs right to possession, use and lawful income from
the suit property but right to recover mesne profits is to be treated as a
recurring cause of action, accruing month after month or day after
day. The law of limitation cannot be applied in a mechanical or rigid
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manner so as to penalise a litigant who was bona fide pursuing
possession and consequential relief before a constitutional court.
43. Accordingly, the question that now falls for consideration of this
Court is whether the proceedings instituted before the Writ Court is
subject to exclusion as per Section 14 of the Limitation Act, for the
purpose of calculation of time period for which the Plaintiffs is
entitled to the claim of mesne profits. Before proceeding to examine
the aforestated, the said provision is reproduced hereinbelow:
“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without
jurisdiction.—(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit
the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due
diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance
or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded,
where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is
prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction
or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time
during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence
another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of
appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be
excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a
court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature,
is unable to entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of subsection (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on
permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where
such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail
by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of
a like nature.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was
pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day
on which it ended shall both be counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to
be prosecuting a proceeding;
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(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a
cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.‖
44.
Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, in principle, mandates the
exclusion of time spent in pursuing a prior civil proceeding, while
computing the period of limitation in case of filing of any suit, provide
that: (i) the prior and subsequent proceedings relate to the same matter
in issue or arise of the same cause of action; (ii) the prior proceeding
was prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith by the party
instituting the suit, (iii) the prior proceeding was pursued before a
court which, owing to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like
nature, was unable to entertain it.
45.
The Supreme Court in Deena (dead) through LRs v Bharat
Singh (dead) thr LRs & Ors., (2002) 6 SCC 336, held that the
expression „other cause of a like nature‟ must be construed ejusdem
generis with „defect of jurisdiction‟, meaning thereby it covers any
other legal or technical bars which prevent the court from entertaining
the matter on the merits.
46.
Thus, the provision codifies an equitable principle that a party
should not be prejudiced by the bar of limitation where it has bona
fide pursued a remedy before a forum which, for jurisdictional or
similar reasons, was unable to adjudicate the dispute. The Supreme
Court has consistently characterised Section 14 as a remedial
provision, warranting a liberal construction to advance the cause of
justice rather than defeating it in a pedantic or technical manner.
47.
Adverting now to the fact that, whether the writ remedy pursued
by the Plaintiffs is subject to exclusion as per Section 14 of the
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Limitation Act. Reference in this regard is placed on the judgment of
Supreme Court in Shakti Tubes Limited Through Director v. State of
Bihar and Others, (2009) 1 SCC 786, wherein the Court, while
relying on the liberal interpretation of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act, excluded the time spent in pursuing the writ remedy, while
reckoning the limitation period.
48.
Similarly, the Kerala High Court in Kerala State Civil
Supplies Corporation v M.G.M. Transports, (2005) 1 KLJ 211, held
that the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
falls within the definition of a civil proceeding.
49.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, the entire
period beginning from the date of institution of the writ petition till
the date on which possession was restored, i.e., 02.07.2020, is liable to
be excluded while computing limitation for grant of mesne profits.
However, once such exclusion is granted the Plaintiffs are entitled to
reach back three years prior to the institution of the writ petition.
Consequently, the Plaintiffs are merely entitled to the claim of mesne
profits for the period commencing from 23.09.2016 to 02.07.2020.
Their claim with respect to the period before 23.09.2016 has become
time-barred.
50.
In consideration of the aforestated, this Court would now
proceed to examine the computation of the mesne profit undertaken by
the LSJ in paragraph no.68 of the IJ. The LSJ assessed the notional
lease value by applying the prevailing rate per sq. ft. to the area of 820
sq. ft. for each year from 2005 to 2020, on the basis of lease deeds
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produced for the corresponding years, noting the annual fluctuation in
rates. This Court finds no infirmity in the methodology adopted by the
LSJ, accordingly, while relying upon the said lease deeds, the mesne
profits payable are recalculated for the period commencing from
23.09.2016, on the basis of lease deeds produced for the year 2016,
2017, 2019, 2019 and 2020. The computation is set out in the tabular
format hereinbelow:
S.
Year of Lease Price per sq. Area of the Notional rent of
No. Deed
ft.
(Rs.) suit property
the suit property
(rounded of)
1.
8 February 2016
1956/-
Rs. 16,03,920/-
2.
13 January 2017
1749/-
Rs. 14,34,180/-
3.
February 1824/-
Rs. 14,95,680/-
February 1660/-
Rs. 13,61,200/-
February 2123/-
Rs. 17,40,860/-
4.
5.
Total- Rs. 76,35,840/-
51.
Therefore, the total amount of mesne profit for unauthorised use
and occupation of suit property, calculated by applying the applicable
rate per sq. ft. to the area admeasuring 820 sq. ft. for each year from
2016 to 2020, amounts to Rs. 76,35,840/-. Since some amount
towards rent from 01.05.1999 to 22.09.2016 stands paid by the
Defendants under the order of writ court. This amount cannot be
adjusted because it has already been paid, even if its recovery has now
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become time barred because limitation bars the remedy but does not
destroy the right.
52.
Consequently, the amount of rent payable for the period from
23.09.2016 to 02.07.2020, amounting to Rs. 9,22,500/- for a duration
of 45 months at the rate of Rs. 20,500/- per month, having already
been paid by the Defendants, is liable to be deducted by way of setoff. Resultantly, the Plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profits amounting
to Rs. 67,13,340/- along with an interest at the rate of 6% per annum,
as rightly awarded by the LSJ, to be calculated for the period from
23.09.2016 to 02.07.2020.
CONCLUSION:
53.
In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the
considered view that the impugned judgment warrants no interference.
54.
Accordingly, having found merit, the present Appeal, along
with pending applications, stands partially allowed. The impugned
judgement and decree is modified to the limited extent that the
Plaintiffs shall be entitled to mesne profits only for the period
commencing from 23.09.2016 upto 02.07.2020.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
JANUARY 20, 2026/sp/hr
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NARAYAN
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