The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
13. well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
14. being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court within six weeks to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. Learned court below is also directed to release the amount, if any, deposited before it by the accused, on filing appropriate application by the complainant within one week. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. July 28, 2026 (manjit) (Sandeep Sharma), Judge
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.33 of 2026
Date of Decision: 28.7.2026
_____________________________________________________________________
Dinesh Kumar Chauhan
……...Petitioner
Versus
Surinder Kapta
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Kulbhushan Khajuria, Advocate,.
For the Respondent:
Mr. Davinder Singh Nainta, Advocate.
___________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition, lays challenge to judgment
dated 17.10.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohru,
District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No. 66/2024,
affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.08.2024
passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1,
Rohru, District Shimla, H.P., in Criminal Complaint No. 543-3/2021/20,
wherein learned court below while holding petitioner-accused guilty of
having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act, convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of four months and pay compensation to the
tune of Rs.2,50,000/- to respondent/complainant.
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case as emerge from the pleadings as
well as other material adduced on record by respective parties are that
complainant instituted a complaint in competent court of law, alleging
therein that in the month of April 2020, he on the request of the accused,
who was well known to him, lent sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- for his domestic
expenses, who with a view to discharge his liability, issued cheque bearing
No. 730306 dated 23.09.2020 in the sum of Rs.2,00,000/- drawn at Punjab
National Bank, Rohru, in his favour. However, fact remains that cheque in
question was dishonored on its presentation to bank concerned with
remarks 'insufficient funds'. Immediately after receipt of return memo from
bank concerned, complainant served the accused with legal notice calling
upon him to make payment good within the stipulated time, but since
needful was not done, complainant had no option but to institute
proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in competent court of law.
3.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 2.8.2024, held the
petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per
the description given herein above.
4.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with aforesaid judgment,
petitioner filed an appeal in the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Rohru, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, but same was also dismissed.
In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in instant
proceedings, praying therein for acquittal after setting aside judgments of
conviction passed by courts below.
5.
substantive
Vide order dated 09.01.2026, this Court suspended the
sentence
imposed
by
learned
court
below,
subject
to
petitioner’s furnishing bail bonds and depositing 30% of the compensation
amount. Aforesaid order was complied with. Thereafter, matter was
adjourned, enabling the petitioner-accused to deposit the balance amount,
but in vain. Since petitioner has neither settled the matter with
complainant nor deposited the balance amount, this Court has no option
but to decide the petition on its own merits.
6.
Having carefully perused grounds taken in the appeal vis-à-vis
reasoning assigned by the learned Sessions Judge, thereby upholding the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial
Court, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner that courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in
its right perspective, rather this Court finds that both the courts below
have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously and
there is no scope of interference.
7.
Interestingly, in the case at hand, issuance of cheque and
signatures thereupon are not disputed. Accused in his statement recorded
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. denied his having borrowed Rs.2,00,000/- from
the complainant, but admitted issuance of cheque and signatures
thereupon, explaining that he had paid amount to the complainant. He also
admitted factum with regard to receipt of legal notice. Since factum with
regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon never came to
be disputed by the petitioner, no illegality can be said to have been
committed by courts below while invoking statutory presumption under
Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which clearly provide that there shall be a
presumption available in favour of the holder of the cheque that same was
issued in discharge of the lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption
is rebuttable, but for that purpose, accused is/was under obligation to
raise probable defence. Probable defence could be raised by the accused by
referring to the documents as well as evidence adduced on record by the
complainant or by leading some cogent and convincing evidence. However,
in the case at hand, accused, despite sufficient opportunity, failed to raise
probable defence.
8.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:
“23.
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of
Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the
legislative
objective
of
improving
the
credibility of
negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong
criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent
undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further
observed that it must be remembered that the offence made
punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory
offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a
civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of
reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected
to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further
observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to
rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for
doing so is all preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable
defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused
can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to
raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the
accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If
however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a
probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section
139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play
if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by
the complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to
qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to
avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered
by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of
such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the
amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour
constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases,
the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or
liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a
matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the
evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption
that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for
a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial
judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where
there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of
funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed
in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
9.
Complainant, with a view to prove his case, examined himself
as CW1 and tendered evidence by way of affidavit Ex. C-1/CW1, re-iterating
contents of complaint. He also tendered in evidence cheque (Ex. C-2/CW1),
dishonor memo (Ex. C-3/CW1), return memo (Ex. C-4/CW1), statement of
accounts (Ex. C-5/CW1), legal notice (Ex. C-6/CW1), postal receipts (Ex. C7/CW1 & Ext.C-8/CW1) and undelivered registered letter (Ex. C-9/CW1).
Cross-examination conducted upon afore witness nowhere suggests that
accused was able to extract something contrary to what this witness stated
in examination-in-chief.
Though accused attempted to set up a defence
that cheque in question was issued as security, but despite sufficient
opportunity, accused failed to probablise such defence by leading cogent
evidence.
10.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view
of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:-
“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying
itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,
sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting
miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be
equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated
even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would
not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence
and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has
already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge
in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the
High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage
of justice.”
11.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if
any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments,
there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
12.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the
process
or
miscarriage
of
justice
or
to
correct
irregularities/
incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or
illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused
has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts
below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts
below.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as
13.
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts
below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of
evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
14.
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court within six weeks to serve the sentence as
awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction,
if any, stands vacated. Learned court below is also directed to release the
amount, if any, deposited before it by the accused, on filing appropriate
application by the complainant within one week. Pending applications, if
any, also stand disposed of.
July 28, 2026
(manjit)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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