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2026:HHC:7533
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 3007 of 2025
Reserved on: 10.03.2026
Date of Decision: 18.03.2026.
Dimpal alias Dimple Dhiman
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner
:
M/s Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary
and
Panku
Chaudhary,
Advocates.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr
Ajit
Sharma,
Advocate General.
Deputy
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition
for
seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 07 of 2025, dated 07.01.2025,
registered at Police Station Rajgarh, District Sirmaur, H.P., for
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘NDPS
Act’)
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:7533
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police were on patrolling duty on 07.01.2025. They received
secret information at around 6:00 p.m. at near Koti Deedag that
the accused was transporting Charas. A huge quantity of charas
could be recovered by his search. The information was credible.
It was reduced to writing and was sent to Sub Divisional Police
Officer (SDPO), Rajgarh The police associated Dheeraj Kumar and
found the petitioner on the roadside with a carry bag. The police
recovered 1.119 kg of charas from the carry bag. The petitioner
had ealrier filed Cr.MP(M) No. 281 of 2025, which was withdrawn
on 22.09.2025, and Cr.MP(M) No.1323 of 2025, which was
dismissed on 23.07.2025. The petitioner has been behind bars for
more than one year, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is
being violated. The petitioner’s Aadhar card was found in the bag
from which recovery was made. This is suspicious because no
person would keep his Aadhar Card with the contraband. The
grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and
his arrest is illegal. The petitioner would abide by all the terms
and conditions which the Court may impose; hence, it was
prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
2026:HHC:7533
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 07.01.2025.
They received secret information at about 06:00 pm near Koti
Deedag that the accused was transporting charas, and a huge
quantity of charas could be recovered during his search. The
information was credible, and it was reduced to writing. The
information was sent to SDPO Rajgarh. The police associated
Dheeraj Kunar and proceeded further. The police found the
petitioner standing on the roadside with a carry bag and
recovered 1.119 Kg of charas from the carry bag. The Police
arrested the petitioner, seized the charas and sent it to the FSL
for analysis. The analyst found it to be an extract of cannabis and
a sample of charas. The charge sheet has been filed before the
Court on 13.03.2025. Statements of seven witnesses have been
recorded, and the matter is listed on 17.04.2024 for recording the
statements of the prosecution’s witnesses.
Hence, the status
report.
4.
I have heard M/s Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary and
Panku Chaudhary, Advocates, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Mr Ajit Sharma, learend Deputy Advocate General, for the
respondent/State.
2026:HHC:7533
5.
Mr Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was
falsely implicated. The petitioner’s Aadhar card was found in the
carry bag containing the contraband, which is suspicious
because no person would keep his identification document with
the contraband. The police have failed to complete the evidence,
and the petitioner’s right to
speedy trial is being violated;
therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon Akshay Kuamr vs.
State of H.P.2021:HHC:15755, Ravinder Kumar vs. State of H.P.,
2022:HHC:1519,
and
Ankit
Ashok
Nisar
vs.
State
of
H.P.,
2022:HHC:5040 in support of his submissions.
6.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General,
for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had
earlier filed a bail petition, which was dismissed by this Court. A
subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the
circumstances, the petitioner has failed to show any change in
the circumstances, and the present petition is not maintainable;
hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
2026:HHC:7533
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
It has been specifically asserted in para 3 of the bail
petition that the petitioner had earlier filed bail petitions, which
were registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1323 of 2025, and Cr.MP(M) No.
2281 of 2025, and were dismissed on 23.07.2025 and 22.09.2025
respectively. It was held in State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain
Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail
application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can
only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was
observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of
granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the
earlier decision without there being a change in the fact
situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a
substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier
decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little
or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap
of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these
two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the
release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline,
propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order
should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders,
including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of
days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the
fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with
restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court
is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain
ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one
2026:HHC:7533
judge or selected another to secure an order which had
hitherto eluded him.
9.
Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an
earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to
consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then
consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed.
It was held:
“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to
consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by
noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications
have been rejected and after such consideration, if the
court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the
said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of
such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application
should be granted.”
10.
A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,
(2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had
denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that
order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate
forum, without there being any major change of
circumstances, another fresh application should not have
been dealt with within a short span of time unless there
were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of
course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to
bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail
applications without there being any change of
circumstances would lead to bad precedents.
2026:HHC:7533
11.
This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit
v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was
observed:
30. Before concluding, we must note that though an
accused has a right to make successive applications for the
grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail
applications has a duty to consider the reasons and
grounds on which the earlier bail applications were
rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record
the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view
different from the one taken in the earlier applications.
12.
It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of
Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail
application can be filed if there is a material change in the
circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It
was observed:
7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail
applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence
of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non
for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change
in circumstances. A material change in circumstances
settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which
requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the
earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in
circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of
judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to
be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at
the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the
power of a judge to consider the application and a person's
right based on a material change in circumstances. A
material change in circumstance creates in a person
2026:HHC:7533
accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail
application. But the power to decide such a subsequent
application operates in a completely different sphere,
unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based
on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that
if successive bail applications on the same subject are
permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there
would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be
pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking
resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence
of the other side being put in issue and there would be
wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline
requires that such matter must be placed before the same
Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of
material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated
by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application.
Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether
there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the
applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail
application.”
13.
Therefore, the present bail petition can only be
considered based on the change in the circumstances, and it is
not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.
14.
highly
It was submitted that the prosecution's version is
suspicious
because
no
person
would
keep
his
identification document with the contraband. This submission is
not acceptable because there can be no presumption that a
person would not keep the identification document with the
contraband, and the prosecution's case cannot be doubted
because of this fact.
2026:HHC:7533
15.
In any case, this Court does not sit in review over the
order passed by this Court earlier while deciding the earlier bail
petition; therefore, it is impermissible to hold that the
prosecution's
case
is
suspicious
because
the
petitioner’s
identification document was found with the contraband. It was
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Kajad,
(2001) 7 SCC 673: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1520: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1070
that it is impermissible to review the earlier order of bail in the
subsequent bail petition, and the Court can only consider the
change in circumstances. It was observed on page 676:
8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the
rejection of his earlier bail application bearing
Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not
been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive
bail applications are permissible under the changed
circumstances. But without the change in the
circumstances, the second application would be deemed to
be seeking review of the earlier judgment, which is not
permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this
Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001)
1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments.
16.
Therefore, it is impermissible to review the earlier
order passed by the Court.
17.
It was submitted that the prosecution has not
completed the evidence, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy
2026:HHC:7533
trial is being violated; however, this submission cannot be
accepted.
The status report shows that the statements of seven
witnesses have been recorded, and the matter is now listed for
the recording of statements of prosecution witnesses on
17.04.2026. The charge sheet was filed on 13.03.2025, and the
recording of statements of seven witnesses within one year does
not show any delay in the progress of the trial. The petitioner has
not placed on record copies of order-sheets to demonstrate the
delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner cannot be
held entitled to bail.
18.
The
petitioner
was
found
in
possession of
a
commercial quantity of charas, and the rigours of Section 37 of
the NDPS Act apply to the present case; therefore, he cannot be
released on bail unless he satisfies the twin conditions laid down
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The material on record, prima
facie, shows the petitioner’s involvement in the commission of a
crime, and there is no material to show that the petitioner would
not commit the offence if released on bail; thus he has not
satisfied the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of NDPS.
2026:HHC:7533
19.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316 that bail cannot
be granted on the ground of prolonged incarceration without
satisfying the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act. It was observed: “17. The High Court then, on the strength of those
premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the
alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and
likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is
not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold
under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the
discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest
on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion
of this nature, if returned without addressing the
prosecution’s assertions of operative control and
antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the
appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of
the trial court at first instance.
18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion
exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of
bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity
of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing.
Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail
and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin
requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary
tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to
the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated
22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation
regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days
2026:HHC:7533
prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the
present complaint, nor do they engage with the
prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in
arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the
consignments. The omission to consider these factors
bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by
Section 37(1)(b).”
20.
A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo
Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025,
wherein it was observed:
“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four
months, and charges have not been framed, yet the
allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is the
recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but
the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities
ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the
contraband.
12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the
Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an
organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing
with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act is made out in the present matter.”
21.
Therefore, it is impermissible to grant bail on the
ground of delay alone when the petitioner has not satisfied the
requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
22.
It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not
communicated to the petitioner, and his arrest is illegal. This
submission is not acceptable. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in
2026:HHC:7533
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
2356 that the communication of the grounds of the arrests in all
the offences would apply prospectively from the date of the
pronouncement of the judgment. It was observed:
“58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or
binding
requirement
mandating
the
written
communication of the grounds of arrest for all the
offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure
implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an
arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution
of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation
would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal
justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore,
demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern
arrests henceforth.” (Emphasis supplied)
23.
This judgment was followed by a Co-Ordinate Bench
of this Court in Kabir Khan vs State 2025:HHC:39246, wherein it
was observed:
“7. In light of the fact that in the said judgment, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has been pleased to clearly hold that as
previously there existed no consistent or binding
requirements mandating written communication of the
grounds of arrest for all the offences, the ends of fairness
and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this
procedure as affirmed shall govern arrests henceforth,
this means that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been
pleased to make directions issued therein prospective.”
24.
This Court held in Arvind Kumar @Chahna vs State of
HP CrMP (M) no. 2329 of 2025, decided on 13.11.2025, that the
2026:HHC:7533
requirement of providing the grounds of arrests is prospective.
This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed in Arvind Kumar
@Chahna vs State of HP SLP (Criminal) no. 797 of 2026. Therefore,
the petitioner cannot get bail because the grounds of arrest were
not communicated to him.
25.
In Ravinder Kumar (supra) and Akshay Kumar (supra),
the recovery was not effected from the bail petitioner; and these
judgments do not apply to the present case. In Ankit Ashok Nisar
(supra), the prosecution's case was found to be suspect, which is
a matter of trial in the present case. Therefore, this judgment
does not apply to the present case.
26.
No other point was urged.
27.
In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to
bail; hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.
28.
The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
18th March, 2026.
(ravinder)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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