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2026:HHC:14750
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.839 of 2024
Date of Decision: 5.5.2026
_____________________________________________________________________
Devi Sharan
Versus
Netar Singh and Anr.
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
……...Petitioner
…....Respondents
Ms. Preeti Sharma, Advocate vice Mr. R.S.
Chandel, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. Munish Datwalia and Mr. Ram Kumar,
Advocates, for respondent No.1.
Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional
Advocates General and Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr.
Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for the
State.
___________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition, lays challenge to judgment
dated 6.11.2024, passed by the learned Sessions Judge Mandi, District
Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.82 of 2024, affirming the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 5/7.6.2024, passed by
the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Mandi, District Mandi,
Himachal Pradesh in Complaint No.812-III/18, whereby the learned trial
Court while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in
short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple
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imprisonment for a period of six months and pay compensation to the tune
of Rs.12,00,000 to the complainant.
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that respondent/complainant lodged complaint under Section 138 of the
Act before the competent court of law, stating therein that accused with a
view to discharge his liability issued cheque bearing No.514818 dated
19.7.2018 amounting to Rs. 6,00,000/-, in favour of the complainant,
however same on its presentation to the bank concerned was dishonoured
for want of sufficient funds.
Immediately, after receipt of aforesaid
information, complainant served legal notice dated 27.7.2018 upon the
accused, thereby calling upon him to make the payment good within
stipulated time, but in vain, as such, complainant had no option but to
initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the competent court of
law.
3.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 5/7.6.2024 , held the
petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per
the description given herein above.
4.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of
conviction recorded by the court below, petitioner-accused preferred an
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appeal before the learned first appellate Court, but the same was dismissed
vide judgment dated 6.11.2014. In the aforesaid background, accused has
approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to setaside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the
court below.
5.
Vide order dated 23.12.2024, this Court suspended the
substantive sentence imposed by the court below, subject to petitioner’s
depositing 50% of the compensation amount and furnishing personal
bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with the trial Court, within four weeks,
but fact remains that afore order was never complied with.
Perusal of
previous order reveals that as many as ten opportunities were granted to
the petitioner to comply with afore order, but on one pretext or the other,
he kept on taking time.
Lastly, this court vide order dated 20.3.2026,
granted last opportunity to the petitioner to do the needful, failing which
case at hand shall be decided on merit.
6.
Today, during proceedings of the case, learned counsel for the
petitioner states that since petitioner is not coming forward to impart
instructions, this court may pass appropriate orders, as such, this Court
has no option but to decide the petition on merit.
7.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the judgment
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impugned in the instant proceedings, this Court is not persuaded to agree
with learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that courts below have
failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court
finds that both the courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of
the matter very meticulously and there is no scope of interference. At no
point of time, petitioner-accused denied factum with regard to issuance of
cheque as well as signature on the same, rather he attempted to carve out
a case that cheque in question was issued as security and same was
misused by the complainant, however, such defence never came to be
probablised by leading cogent and convincing evidence. Once factum with
regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon never came to
be disputed, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the courts
below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, which clearly provide that there shall be presumption available in
favour of the holder of the cheque that same was issued in discharge of the
lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but for that
purpose, accused is/was under obligation to raise probable defence.
Probable defence could be raised by the accused by referring to the
documents as well as evidence adduced on record by the complainant or by
leading some cogent and convincing evidence.
However, in the case at
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hand, accused, despite sufficient opportunity, failed to raise probable
defence.
8.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:
“23.
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of
Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the
legislative
objective
of
improving
the
credibility of
negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong
criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent
undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further
observed that it must be remembered that the offence made
punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory
offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a
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civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of
reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected
to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further
observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to
rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for
doing so is all preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable
defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused
can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to
raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the
accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If
however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a
probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section
139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play
if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by
the complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to
qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to
avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered
by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of
such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the
amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour
constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases,
the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or
2026:HHC:14750
liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a
matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the
evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption
that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for
a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial
judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where
there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of
funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed
in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
9.
In the case at hand, complainant while examining himself as
CW1 tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ext.CW1/A, wherein he
reiterated all the contents of the complaint.
Besides above, he also
tendered in evidence cheque Ext.CW1/B, memo Ext.CW1/C, legal notice
Ext.CW1/D and postal receipt Ext.CW1/E.
If the cross-examination
conducted upon afore witness is perused in its entirety, it cannot be said
that accused was able to extract anything contrary to what this witness
stated in examination-in-chief.
10.
In his cross-examination, complainant while admitting that he
is running a Dhaba at Dadour, stated that accused is known to him and
used to come to his Dhaba. He stated that some amount was kept by him
at home and some amount was drawn from the bank. He stated that he
has kept two workers in his Dhaba. He stated that he has drawn Rs. 3.00
lakh from the bank. He further stated that cheque Ext.CW1/B was filled
by the accused. While admitting that he has not mentioned in affidavit
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Ext.CW1/D regarding amount withdrawn by him, complainant denied that
accused had already returned the borrowed money.
He stated that the
accused had borrowed money from him in the year 2018. He admitted that
he received two security cheques from the accused. He also stated that
accused was not running any committee with him.
He denied that he
misused security cheques given to him by the accused.
He denied that he
has returned one cheque to the accused whereas he refused to return the
other cheque on the ground that he has lost the same.
11.
In his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, accused
though denied the factum of his having issued cheque, signature thereupon
and his having received any notice, but explained that cheque in question
was issued blank as security for loan of much less amount that has been
already paid to the complainant. He deposed that cheque has now been
misused by the complainant, however, he was unable to probablise his
afore defence by leading cogent and convincing evidence.
12.
Otherwise also, pattern of cross-examination conducted upon
afore witness clearly establishes factum with regard to issuance of cheque
as well as signature thereupon. Though accused attempt has been made to
carve out a case that he had returned the money, but complainant failed to
return the cheque, but as has been observed herein above, such defence of
him never came to be probablised. Once factum with regard to issuance of
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cheque as well as signature thereupon came to be proved by the
complainant in accordance with law, no illegality or infirmity can be said to
have been committed by the courts below while holding the accused guilty
of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act.
13.
By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued as
security can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State
of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on
28.10.2021, has held as under:
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction
cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every
circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe
and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of
payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the
fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are
bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower
agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a
cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is
not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no
other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the
payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would
mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be
entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and
the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
14.
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Needless to say, expression “Security Cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather
same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on
record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable
Instruments Act
does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a
“security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would
not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the
cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138
of the Act in case of its dishonour.
15.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view
of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying
itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,
sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting
miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be
equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated
even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would
2026:HHC:14750
not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence
and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has
already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge
in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the
High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage
of justice.”
16.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if
any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments,
there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
17.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the process or
miscarriage
of
justice or
to
correct
irregularities/
incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or
illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused
has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts
below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts
below.
2026:HHC:14750
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as
18.
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts
below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of
evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
19.
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court within fifteen days to serve the sentence as
awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction,
if any, stands vacated. Learned court below is also directed to release the
amount, if any, deposited before it by the accused, on filing appropriate
application by the complainant within one week. Pending applications, if
any, also stand disposed of.
May 5, 2026
(manjit)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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