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2026:HHC:39210
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1597 of 2026
Reserved on: 09.09.2026.
Decided on: 15.09.2026
Devender Kumar @ Batta
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P.
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner
:
Ms Kanta Thakur, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 110 of 2026 dated 05.05.2026 registered at
Police Station Sadar, Solan, District Solan, H.P. for the commission
of offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act).
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police had received secret information on 05.05.2026 that the
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:39210
petitioner, co-accused Tej Singh and Shubham Thakur were selling
heroin to the local youth in the vehicle bearing registration No. HP64B-7475. The police searched the vehicle and recovered 7.07
grams of heroin and ₹29,000/-. The police arrested the occupants
of the vehicle and seized the heroin. The petitioner is innocent, and
he was falsely implicated. The police have completed the
investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court. No fruitful
purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The
petitioner is a permanent resident of District Solan. He has roots in
the society, and there is no chance of his absconding. He would
abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose.
Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police had received secret information on
05.05.2026 at about 01:00 p.m. that a vehicle bearing registration
No. HP-64B-7475 was parked in the car parking of Vivanta Mall.
Devender Kumar Batta, the present petitioner, Tej Singh and
Shubham Thakur were selling heroin from the car. A huge quantity
of heroin could be recovered by searching the car. The information
was credible, and the delay in procuring the search warrant would
2026:HHC:39210
have led to the destruction of the heroin. Hence, the information
was reduced to writing, and it was sent to the supervisory officer.
The police joined Mohit Bhanta and Kamal Kant with them and
went to the car parking. A car bearing registration No. HP-64B7475 was found parked in the car park. The driver of the car
revealed his name as Devinder Kumar Batta, the present petitioner
and the persons sitting on the rear seats revealed their names as Tej
Singh and Shubham Thakur. The police checked the car and
recovered one polythene packet and ₹29,000/-. The police checked
the polythene packet and found 9 small packets containing 7.07
grams of heroin. The police seized the heroin and arrested the
occupants of the car. The police interrogated the petitioner, and he
revealed that he had purchased 18 grams of heroin from a person
whom he could identify. He led the police to the person, and the
police apprehended him. The person was found in possession of
5.41 grams of heroin. The police also arrested that person, who
revealed his name as Mandeep. The result of analysis confirmed the
heroin to be diacetylmorphine. The charge sheet was filed before
the Court, and the matter is listed for service on the accused. FIR
No. 171 of 21 and FIR No. 136 of 2023 have been registered against
the petitioner. Hence, the status report.
4.
2026:HHC:39210
I have heard Ms Kanta Thakur, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State.
5.
Ms Kanta Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the
commission of the crime. The quantity of heroin stated to have
been recovered by the police is less than commercial quantity, and
rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present
case. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that
the Court may impose. Hence, she prayed that the present petition
be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. She relied upon
Aman Kumar vs. State of H.P. 2026:HHC:27515 and Vishal Chandel vs.
State of H.P. 2025:HHC:19530 in support of her submissions.
6.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was
found in possession of 7.07 grams of heroin and currency notes of
₹29,000/-, which prima facie corroborate the prosecution version
that the petitioner is a drug peddler. He has criminal antecedents,
2026:HHC:39210
and he would indulge in the commission of the crime if released on
bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314:
2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC
240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on
the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the
context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid
down the key factors that should be considered while
granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244,
paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears
upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
2026:HHC:39210
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is
applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC
280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted
as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court
dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself)
as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused
and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie
evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in
matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
2026:HHC:39210
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While placement of the accused in society, though
it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in
the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be
coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of
bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic
considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is
the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,
though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the
matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although
it is established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an
elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court
is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the
grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind,
rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to
the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be
set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided
the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as
under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally,
interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting
2026:HHC:39210
or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of
this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed
the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of
discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused
is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022)
4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
2026:HHC:39210
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while
considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose
sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an
accused and the facts that have a bearing on the case,
particularly when the accusations may not be false,
frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by
adequate material brought on record so as to enable a
court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While
considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima
facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must
be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the
case brought on record. Due consideration must be given
to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of
punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis
supplied)
9.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10.
The status report mentions that the petitioner was
found in the car from which 7.07 grams of heroin was recovered.
The petitioner made a disclosure statement; the police arrested
Mandeep and recovered 5.41 grams of heroin from him. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mehboob Ali v. State of
Rajasthan, (2016) 14 SCC 640: (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 412: 2015 SCC OnLine
SC 1043, that the information given by the accused, leading to the
discovery of another accused from whom forged currency notes
2026:HHC:39210
were recovered, is admissible under Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act. It was observed at page 646: “15. It is apparent that on the basis of the information
furnished by accused Mehboob Ali and Firoz, and other
accused, Anju Ali was arrested. The fact that Anju Ali was
dealing with forged currency notes was not known to the
police. The statements of both the accused have led to the
discovery of the fact and arrest of the co-accused, not known
to the police. They identified him, and ultimately, the
statements have led to unearthing the racket of the use of
fake currency notes. Thus, the information furnished by the
aforesaid accused persons vide information memos is clearly
admissible, which has led to the identification and arrest of
accused Anju Ali, and as already stated, possession of Anju
Ali's fake currency notes had been recovered. As per
information furnished by the accused Mehboob and Firoz
vide memos Exts. P-41 and P-42, the fact has been
discovered by the police as to the involvement of the accused
Anju Ali, which was not known to the knowledge of the
police. The police were not aware of the accused Anju Ali, as
well as the fact that he was dealing with fake currency notes,
which were recovered from him. Thus, the statement of the
aforesaid accused Mehboob and Firoz is clearly saved by
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The embargo put by Section
27 of the Evidence Act was clearly lifted in the instant case.
The statement of the accused persons has led to the
discovery of facts proving the complicity of the other accused
persons, and the entire chain of circumstances clearly makes
out that the accused acted in conspiracy, as found by the trial
court as well as the High Court.
xxxxxxx
20. Considering the aforesaid dicta, it is apparent that there
was a discovery of a fact as per the statement of Mehmood
Ali and Mohd. Firoz. The co-accused was nabbed on the basis
of an identification made by the accused Mehboob and Firoz.
That he was dealing with fake currency notes came to the
2026:HHC:39210
knowledge of the police through them. Recovery of forged
currency notes was also made from Anju Ali. Thus, the
aforesaid accused had knowledge about co-accused Anju Ali,
who was nabbed at their instance and based on their
identification. These facts were not to the knowledge of the
police; hence the statements of the accused persons leading
to the discovery of the fact are clearly admissible as per the
provisions contained in Section 27 of the Evidence Act, which
carves out an exception to the general provisions about
inadmissibility of confession made under police custody
contained in Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.”
11.
Therefore, the statement made by the petitioner leading
to the discovery of Mandeep and recovery of heroin would prima
facie connect him to the commission of the crime.
12.
It was submitted that the quantity of heroin stated to
have been recovered from the possession of the petitioner is less
than commercial quantity and the petitioner is entitled to bail as a
matter of right. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid
down by this Court in Khushi Ram Gupta v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC
OnLine HP 3779, that the menace of drug addiction has seriously
eroded into the fabric of society, and the release of an accused on
bail in NDPS Act cases will send a negative signal to society. It was
observed:
“8. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents
and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society,
putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future
nation-building into serious peril.
2026:HHC:39210
9. It is not a case where the investigating agency is clueless in
respect of evidence against the petitioner. Though allegations
against the petitioner are yet to be proved in accordance with
the law, it cannot be taken singly as a factor to grant bail to the
petitioner. Nothing has been placed on record on behalf of the
petitioner to divulge as to how and in what manner he came in
contact with the persons who were residents of the State of
Himachal Pradesh. Thus, there is sufficient prima facie
material to infer the implication of the petitioner in the crime.
In such circumstances, the release of the petitioner on bail will
send a negative signal in society, which will definitely be
detrimental to its interests.
10. The prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the
dangerous trade of contraband cannot be ignored merely on
account of the fact that he has no past criminal history. It
cannot be guaranteed that there will be re-indulgence by the
petitioner in similar activities, in case he is released on bail.”
13.
Similarly, it was held in Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P., 2022
SCC OnLine HP 4996, that bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right
even though the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply
to a case. Each case has to be adjudged on its own facts. It was
observed:
“6. The quantity involved in the case is 89.89 grams of
heroin and 3.90 grams of MDMA. Such quantity may not
technically fall under the category of commercial quantity;
nevertheless, such quantity cannot be termed to be less by
any stretch of the imagination. The evident nature of
commercial transactions and dealing with the contraband
aggravates the situation for the petitioner. In a case where
Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not applicable, bail cannot be
claimed as a matter of right. The fate depends on the facts of
each and every case.
2026:HHC:39210
7. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents
and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society,
putting the future generation as well as the prospects of
future nation-building into serious peril.”
14.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union
of India v. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on
07.11.2025, that there is a concerning increase in drug abuse
amongst the youth. It was observed: 8. This Court is of the view that the issue of substance abuse
has emerged as a global public health crisis in the twentyfirst century, affecting every country worldwide, as drug
trafficking and addiction have become pervasive. The United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in its
2025 World Drug Report that “As at 2023, some 316 million
people worldwide had used drugs in the past year,
representing an increase over the past decade that outpaces
population growth, which indicates a higher prevalence of
drug use.”
9. In India, there has been a concerning increase in drug
abuse among the youth. Substance abuse not only affects
individuals, families, and communities but also undermines
various aspects of health, including physical, social,
political, and cultural foundations, and mental well-being.
(See: “Bhattacharya S, Menon GS, Garg S, Grover A, Saleem
SM, Kushwaha P. The lingering menace of drug abuse among
the Indian youth–it’s time for action. Indian J Community
Med 2025;50:S9-12, published on 17th April, 2025”)
10. According to many news reports, India faces a clear
dilemma between tackling the narcotics crisis systematically
or sacrificing its most valuable resource, i.e. its young
people. The extent of the menace of drug abuse has also been
highlighted by this Court in the case of Ankush Vipan Kapoor
v. National Investigation Agency, (2025) 5 SCC 155, wherein
this Court has observed as under:
2026:HHC:39210
“9.1 The ills of drug abuse seem to be shadowing the
length and breadth of our country, with the Central
and every State Government fighting against the
menace of substance abuse. The debilitating impact of
the drug trade and drug abuse is an immediate and
serious concern for India. As the globe grapples with
the menace of escalating Substance Use Disorders
(“SUD”) and an ever accessible drug market, the
consequences leave a generational Page 75 of 84
imprint on public health and even national security.
Article 47 of the Constitution makes it a duty of the
State to regard the raising of the level of nutrition and
the standard of living of its people and the
improvement of public health as among its primary
duties, and in particular, the State shall endeavour to
bring about the prohibition of the consumption except
for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of
drugs which are injurious to health. The State has a
responsibility to address the root causes of this
predicament and develop effective intervention
strategies to ensure that India’s younger population,
which is particularly vulnerable to substance abuse, is
protected and saved from such a menace. This is
particularly because substance abuse is linked to social
problems and can contribute to child maltreatment,
spousal violence, and even property crime in a family.”
15.
Hence, the petitioner cannot be released on bail simply
because the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to
his case.
16.
The status report mentions that FIR No. 171 of 2021 and
FIR No. 136 of 2023 have been registered against the petitioner.
Therefore, the petitioner has criminal antecedents. This Court dealt
with the relevance of criminal antecedents while granting bail in
2026:HHC:39210
Champa vs. State of H.P.: 2025:HHC:28899 and held that the criminal
antecedents would disentitle an accused from the concession of
bail. This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in SLP(Criminal) 19120 of 2025 titled Champa Devi vs
State of H.P., decided on 27.11.2025. Therefore, the relevance of
criminal antecedents cannot be ignored.
17.
It was submitted that the co-accused has been released
on bail and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of
parity. This submission cannot be accepted. The principle of parity
demands that the circumstances between the petitioner and the coaccused should be similar. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana,
(2021) 6 SCC 230; (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 722; 2021 SCC OnLine SC 335 that
while determining the parity, the role of the accused has to be
considered. It was observed at page 246
“Parity, while granting bail, must focus upon the role of the
accused. Merely observing that another accused who was
granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not
sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail
based on parity has been established. In deciding the aspect
of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in
relation to the incident, and the victims is of utmost
importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of
parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which
again cannot pass muster under the law.”
18.
This position was reiterated in
2026:HHC:39210
Tarun Kumar v.
Enforcement Directorate, AIR 2024 SC 169: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486,
wherein it was observed:
“18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr Luthra to grant
bail to the appellant on the ground that the other coaccused, who were similarly situated as the appellant, have
been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted
that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of
parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached
to the accused whose application is under consideration.”
19.
The petitioner has criminal antecedents, and it is not
shown that the co-accused had also criminal antecedents.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim parity with the co-accused,
and he cannot be held entitled to bail on the principle of parity.
20.
It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of
trial and the petitioner is entitled to bail. This submission cannot be
accepted. The status report mentions that the police have filed the
charge sheet before the Court. The petitioner was arrested on
05.05.2026, and the status report does not demonstrate any delay.
21.
The judgment of Vishal Chandel (supra) cannot be
followed in view of the judgment of this Court in Champa Devi
(supra), which has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
There was no material to prima facie connect the petitioner to the
2026:HHC:39210
commission of the crime in Aman Kumar (supra). Hence, he was
held entitled to bail. In the present case, the police have collected
sufficient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of
the crime; hence, the cited judgment does not apply to the present
case.
22.
No other point was urged.
23.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and is
dismissed.
24.
The
observation
made
hereinbefore
shall
remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
15th September, 2026
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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