Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
1 2026:HHC:9644
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT
SHIMLA
CMPMO No. 781 of 2025
Decided on : 20.3.2026
Decided on: 31.3.2026
Desh Raj Thakur
… Petitioner
Versus
H.P. City Transport & Bus Stand Management &
Development Authority & anr.
…Respondents
_____________________________ ______________
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge
Whether approved for reporting?
___________________________________________________
For the Petitioner:
Mr.
Suneet
Goel,
Senior
Advocate with Mr. Vishwas
Kaushal, Advocate.
For the Respondents :
Mr. Balvinder Singh, Advocate.
Virender Singh, Judge
Petitioner Desh Raj Thakur has filed the present
petition, under Section 227 of the Constitution of India,
against the order dated 6.12.2025, passed by the learned
District Judge, Shimla.
2.
By way of order dated 6.12.2025, learned District
Judge, Shimla, H.P. has allowed the application filed
under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), moved by the
2 2026:HHC:9644
respondents to condone the delay in filing the objections,
against the award dated 4.6.2025.
3.
Parties to the present lis are referred to, in the
same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the
learned District Judge, Shimla.
4.
Brief facts leading to filing the present petition
may be summed up as under:
The petitioners have filed application under
Section 34 (3) of the Act
by pleading that objections,
under Section 34 of the Act, have been preferred before
the learned District Judge. Since, those objections have
been filed after the prescribed period of limitation, as
such, application under Section 34(3) of the Act has
been filed on the ground that copy of the award had
been received on 4.6.2025, and the same was, thereafter,
sent to the Department on 9.6.2025. The file was,
subsequently sent to
the
competent authority
for
approval for filing the objections, against the award and
the approval was received on 28.8.2025. On 3.9.2025, a
letter was written to their counsel. The matter for
depositing the awarded amount before the Court was
3 2026:HHC:9644
sent to the competent authority and the same was
approved on 9.9.2025. The period of 90 days has expired
on 3.9.2025 and the present application has been moved
on 19.9.2025. Delay in filing the objections is stated to
be due to the reason that seeking approval from the
competent authority is a time consuming process. The
delay is also stated to be unintentional. As such, a
prayer has been made to condone the delay.
5.
When, put to notice, the application had been
contested by the respondent, on the ground, that
application is devoid of merit and sufficient grounds
have not been explained for condoning the delay. The
petitioners are stated to be grossly negligent in filing the
objection, against the award dated 4.6.2025.
6.
The prayer, so made in the application, has also
been opposed on the ground that vague averments have
been made in the application and no dates have been
given.
7.
In nut-shell, the prayer made in the application
has been opposed on the ground that each date has to
be explained to the judicial conscience of the Court.
4 2026:HHC:9644
8.
On merit, factual position, as asserted in the
application, has been controverted. However, passing of
the award has not been disputed.
9.
The learned District Judge has considered the
application and allowed the same, vide order dated
6.12.2025, by holding that there appears to be delay of
16/17 days, which has properly been explained.
10.
Another reason, which has been given for
condoning the delay is the fact that in the Government
offices, files move through different channels.
11.
Aggrieved from the said order, the present
petition has been filed before this Court on the ground
that the applicant has miserably failed to explain each
day’s delay to the judicial satisfaction of the learned
District Judge.
12.
The approach adopted by the learned District
Judge is also assailed by way of present petition on the
ground that the petitioners-Department is not entitled to
any special treatment and the case set up by the
petitioners has to be dealt with by the learned District
Judge,
as
an
ordinary
litigant’s
application.
The
5 2026:HHC:9644
impugned order is also stated to be based on surmises
and conjectures.
13.
On the basis of above facts, Mr. Suneet Goel,
Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Vishwas Kaushal,
Advocate has prayed that the present petition may
kindly be allowed by setting aside the order dated
6.12.2025, passed by the learned District Judge.
14.
Per contra, the prayer, so made, has been
opposed by Mr. Balwinder Singh, Advocate, appearing
for the respondent, on the ground that it is no longer
res-integra that while deciding the application for
condonation of delay, a liberal approach has to be
adopted by the Court, as, according to learned counsel
for the respondent, the matter should be decided on
merits, and not on the basis of technical grounds, such
as limitation etc.
15.
In addition to this, it has also been argued by
learned counsel for the respondents herein that the
delay has already been explained before the learned
District Judge to the judicial satisfaction of the said
6 2026:HHC:9644
Court. As such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the
present petition.
16.
Copy of the application for condonation of delay
has been annexed with the petition. As per the stand
taken in the application, copy of the award was received
on 4.6.2025, and the same was submitted to the office of
the petitioners on 9.10.2025. Thereafter, the matter was
dealt with, at various stages, till the same has been filed
before the Court. The application has duly been
supported by the affidavit of Dy. Divisional Manager
(Legal) HRTC, Shimla.
17.
Admittedly, the matter has to be dealt with, at
various
stages,
before
filing
the
application
for
condonation of delay, before the learned District Judge.
Although, no special treatment is legally required to be
given to the petitioners, but considering the length of
delay, which, as per the application, is only 16-17 days,
this Court is of the view that when, the inaction has not
been attributed to
in
the
authorities of the petitioners,
that eventuality, approach of the learned District
Judge,
cannot
be
faulted
with,
that
too,
7 2026:HHC:9644
under Article 227 of the constitution of India, as primary
purpose of this Court, under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, is to prevent only manifest
injustice, and the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for
the petitioner herein could not satisfy the judicial
conscience of this Court, as to how injustice has been
caused to the petitioner, in allowing the application for
condonation of delay, as the result of allowing the
application for condonation of delay, is nothing, but
admitting the case to be heard on merit. In the limited
jurisdiction, under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, this Court can only interfere, if manifest injustice
has been caused to the petitioner by allowing the
application for condonation of delay.
18.
It is no longer res-integra that the Court should
adopt a liberal approach while deciding the application,
as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag & anr. versus Mst. Katiji & others,
reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1353. Relevant
paragraph-3 of the judgment is reproduced as under:
“3.The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay
by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963
in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to
8 2026:HHC:9644
parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression
"sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately
elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being
the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts.
It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a
justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this
Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated
down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a
liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized
that:"Any appeal or any application, other than an
application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. may be admitted
after the prescribed period if the appellant or the
applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient
cause for not preferring the appeal or making the
application within such period."
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging
an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious
matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of
justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be
decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that
a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's
delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in
a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are
pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and
is expected to do so.
9 2026:HHC:9644
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective,
there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the
institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State'
which was seeking condonation and not a private party was
altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law
demands that all litigants, including the State as a liti- gant,
are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for
according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the
applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinary (no
one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the
judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the notemak- ing, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos,
delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more
diffi- cult to approve. In any event, the State which
represents the collective cause of the community, does not
deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore
have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the
provision in the course of the interpretation of the
expression "suffi- cient cause". So also the same approach
has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand
with the end in view to do even handed justice on mertis in
preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on
merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the
present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists
for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the
appeal before it as time barred, is therefore. set aside. Delay
is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court.
The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits
after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the
sides.”
18.
As stated above, in the absence of the motive,
which the petitioners (respondents herein) are going to
achieve in not filing the objections, within the prescribed
period of limitation, had they were not prevented to do
so, for the reasons, as mentioned in the application, the
10 2026:HHC:9644
relief which has been granted to them by the learned
District Judge, cannot be faulted with.
19.
In view of above, this Court cannot interfere with
the well reasoned order, passed by the learned District
Judge, Shimla. Consequently, the present petition is
dismissed.
20.
The pending application(s), if any, are also
disposed of.
31.3.2026
Kalpana
(Virender Singh)
Judge
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review