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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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: 27.02.2026
: 22.05.2026
: 22.05.2026
W.P.(C) 11798/2018 & CM. APPL. 45654/2018
DELHI TRANSPORT COPORATION
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Uday N. Tiwary with Mr. Akshat
Tiwary, Advocates.
versus
SH. UDAIVIR SINGH
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Rupesh Kr. Sinha, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI
JUDGMENT
1.
The present writ petition filed by the management challenges the
award dated 10.04.2017 passed by the Labour Court. By the impugned
award, the Labour Court held that there was no illegality in the order
removing the workman (respondent before this Court) from service.
However, in exercise of its powers under Section 11A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the “ID Act”), it directed that
the workman be deemed to have retired on the date of removal; the retiral
and consequential benefits were also directed to be given to him along with
interest @ 9% per annum from the date of passing of the impugned award
till realization. The impugned award came to be passed in the context of the
following reference:
“Whether removal of Sh. Udaivir Singh, S/o Sh. Santosh Singh, from
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W.P.(C) 11798/2018
services by the management vide order no. KJ/AJ(T)/INT-80/01/04/2914
dated 13.08.2004 is illegal and/or unjustified; and if so, to what relief is he
entitled?”
2.
In his statement of claim, the workman stated that he had joined the
management corporation as a conductor. A charge-sheet came to be served
upon him on 27.08.2001 with the charge of unauthorized absence with effect
from 02.05.2001 till the date of filing of the charge-sheet. Although the
workman appeared and asked the management to furnish certain documents,
the same were not supplied to him. In the inquiry proceedings, he furnished
medical documents pertaining to his lung-related illness but the same were
not considered. He was asked to sign on blank papers with an assurance that
no action would be taken against him. He was also not informed by the
management that his leave application had been rejected. He denied that he
ever admitted to the charge before the Inquiry Officer (I.O.). The I.O.
proposed the penalty of removal, on which a show cause notice was issued
to him on 29.01.2003. Though a reply to the proposed penalty was sent on
12.02.2003 the same was not considered by the management and eventually
the workman was removed from service with effect from 13.08.2004.
3.
The management, on the other hand, contested the claim by
contending that the workman had remained absent from his duty
unauthorizedly from 02.05.2001 till the date of notice, i.e., 27.08.2001. It
was also stated that the workman had remained absent unauthorizedly even
on earlier occasions, as under:
Duration
01.01.1988 to
31.11.1988
01.01.1990 to
30.06.1990
Period of absence
68 days
56 days
Management Direction
Next due increment was stopped
without cumulative effect.
Warning was given.
42 days
Brought on initial stage of pay scale.
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W.P.(C) 11798/2018
15.10.1994 to
22.10.1994
1997 (between
January to May)
20.09.1998 to
10.11.1998
4.
8 days
Reprimanded
30 days
Three annual increments were
stopped without cumulative effect.
One increment was stopped without
cumulative effect.
43 days
178 days (leave
without pay)
110 days
184 days
In the backdrop of the aforesaid contentions, the following issues
were framed by the Labour Court:
“1.
2.
5.
Whether the enquiry conducted by the management against the
workman was illegal and in violation of principles of natural
justice? OPW
As per terms of reference”
After considering the inquiry proceedings and the evidence placed on
record, issue no. 1 was answered in favour of the management. However,
while considering issue no. 2, it was noted that the workman had neither
filed any leave application before the Inquiry Officer nor before the Court.
Even during the evidence of the management witness/Praveen Kumar, no
question was put to him in cross-examination to produce the leave
applications or the medical documents filed along with the management.
The Labour Court also took note of the letter dated 26.07.2002 (Ex.
WW1/M2) filed by the workman before the I.O. wherein, in the concluding
statement, he categorically stated that he had not given any application for
leave. The workman had produced two medical documents issued by the
Dispensary of the MCD to justify his absence, i.e., Exhibits WW1/B and
WW1/C dated 02.01.2011 and 02.08.2011 respectively, as well as another
medical paper (Ex. WW2/B dated 02.11.2011).
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6.
On a perusal of the said documents, the Labour Court noted that the
same would show that he was undergoing treatment for pleural effusion.
While referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Delhi Transport
Corporation Vs. Sardar Singh1, the Labour Court held that there was no
illegality in the order of the management vide which the workman was
terminated from service. Having recorded so, the Labour Court found the
punishment disproportionate on the ground that the workman had served the
management for 19 years, and the order of removal was modified to the
extent that the workman shall be deemed to have retired on the date of
removal. As a consequence, all retiral and consequential benefits like
pension (pension to not be given if he had opted for no pension) were
granted.
7.
Pertinently, the workman has not challenged any finding of the
Labour Court. The management has assailed the decision by contending that
despite evident misconduct and holding the termination to be illegal, the
Labour Court erroneously exercised its jurisdiction under Section 11-A of
the ID Act.
8.
Learned counsel for the respondent/workman, on the other hand,
defended the impugned award and submitted that the absence was due to
compelling circumstances, and it was not possible for the workman to
perform his duty, and as such, the absence cannot be held to be wilful. It was
rather contended that the absence from duty without any application may
amount to unauthorized absence, but it does not mean wilful absence.
9.
In the absence of any challenge by the workman, the only issue that
2004 (7) SCC 574
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arises for consideration is whether the Labour Court was justified in passing
the impugned award while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the
ID Act.
10.
While exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Section 11A of the
ID Act, the Labour Court has limited jurisdiction to substitute one
punishment with another, however, this interference with the quantum of
punishment is to be exercised only when the punishment is found to be
grossly disproportionate. Furthermore, this exercise of jurisdiction is only
after arriving at a finding that no reasonable person could inflict such
punishment. In V. Ramana Vs. A.P. SRTC2, the Supreme Court opined as
under:
“11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is
that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless
it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to
the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or
moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury case
[Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. V. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948)
1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the Court would not go into the
correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the
Court should not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The
scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making
process and not the decision.
12. To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of
the court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten
litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal
course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would
be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate
Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.”
11.
Later, in Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. Vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate3, the
(2005) 7 SCC 338
(2005) 2 SCC 489
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Supreme Court reiterated its view in the following manner:
“30. Furthermore, it is trite, the Labour Court or the Industrial
Tribunal, as the case may be, in terms of the provisions of the Act, must
act within the four corners thereof. The Industrial Courts would not sit in
appeal over the decision of the employer unless there exists a statutory
provision in this behalf. Although its jurisdiction is wide but the same must
be applied in terms of the provisions of the statute and no other.
31. If the punishment is harsh, albeit a lesser punishment may be
imposed, but such an order cannot be passed on an irrational or
extraneous factor and certainly not on a compassionate ground.
32. In Regional Manager, Rajasthan SRTC v. Sohan Lal [(2004) 8
SCC 218 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1078], it has been held that it is not the
normal jurisdiction of the superior courts to interfere with the quantum of
sentence unless it is wholly disproportionate to the misconduct proved.
Such is not the case herein. In the facts and circumstances of the case and
having regard to the past conduct of the respondent as also his conduct
during the domestic enquiry proceedings, we cannot say that the quantum
of punishment imposed upon the respondent was wholly disproportionate
to his act of misconduct or otherwise arbitrary.”
12.
The aforesaid decisions were reaffirmed in Hombe Gowda
Educational Trust Vs. State of Karnataka4. In Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd.
Vs. N.B. Narawade5, a decision rendered by a Three-Judge Bench of the
Supreme Court, the scope and amount of discretion to be exercised by the
Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of
punishment awarded by the management where the concerned workman is
found guilty of misconduct was reiterated. The Court held as under:
“20. It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11-A in
the Industrial Disputes Act, certain amount of discretion is vested with the
Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of
punishment awarded by the management where the workman concerned is
found guilty of misconduct. The said area of discretion has been very well
defined by the various judgments of this Court referred to hereinabove and
it is certainly not unlimited as has been observed by the Division Bench of
the High Court. The discretion which can be exercised under Section 11A is available only on the existence of certain factors like punishment
(2006) 1 SCC 430
(2005) 3 SCC 134
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being disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct so as to disturb the
conscience of the court, or the existence of any mitigating circumstances
which require the reduction of the sentence, or the past conduct of the
workman which may persuade the Labour Court to reduce the punishment.
In the absence of any such factor existing, the Labour Court cannot by
way of sympathy alone exercise the power under Section 11-A of the Act
and reduce the punishment. As noticed hereinabove at least in two of the
cases cited before us i.e. Orissa Cement Ltd. [(1960) 1 LLJ 518 (SC)]
and New Shorrock Mills [(1996) 6 SCC 590 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1484] this
Court held: “punishment of dismissal for using of abusive language
cannot be held to be disproportionate.” In this case all the forums below
have held that the language used by the workman was filthy. We too are of
the opinion that the language used by the workman is such that it cannot
be tolerated by any civilized society. Use of such abusive language against
a superior officer, that too not once but twice, in the presence of his
subordinates cannot be termed to be an indiscipline calling for lesser
punishment in the absence of any extenuating factor referred to herein
above.”
13.
The terms and conditions of appointment and service were governed
by the applicable service regulations, i.e. the Delhi Road Transport
Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952
(hereinafter
the
“Regulations”).
Learned
counsel
for
the
appellant/management referred to paras 4(i), 4(ii), and 19(h) of the Standing
Orders issued under para 15(1) of the Regulations. The relevant paras of the
Standing Orders read as follows:
“4. Absence without permission:—
(i) An employee shall not absent himself from his duties without having
first obtained the permission from the Authority or the competent
officer except in the case of sudden illness. In the case of sudden
illness he shall send intimation to the office immediately. If the
illness lasts or is expected to last for more than 3 days at a time,
applications for leave should be duly accompanied by a medical
certificate, from a registered medical practitioner or the Medical
Officer of the D.T.S. In no case shall an employee leave station
without prior permission.
(ii) Habitual absence without permission or sanction of leave and any
continuous absence without such leave for more than 10 days shall
render the employee liable to be treated as an absconder resulting in
the termination of his service with the Organisation.
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19.
General Provisions:- Without prejudice to the provisions of the
foregoing Standing Orders, the following acts of commission and
omission shall be treated as mis-conduct:xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
(h) Habitual negligence of duties and lack of interest in the Authority’s
work.”
Clause 15 of the Regulations, insofar as relevant to our
purposes, is reproduced hereunder:
“2. Discipline:—The following penalties may, for misconduct or for a
good and sufficient reason be imposed upon an employee of the Delhi
Road Transport Authority:xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
(vi)
Removal from the service of the Delhi Road Transport Authority.
(vii) Dismissal from the service of the Delhi Road Transport Authority.”
14.
In Sardar Singh (supra), it was emphasised that the habitual absence
of an employee for a very long time shows a lack of interest in the
Authority’s work. The relevant observations are as under:
“9. When an employee absents himself from duty, even without
sanctioned leave for a very long period, it prima facie shows lack of
interest in work. Para 19(h) of the Standing Orders as quoted above,
relates to habitual negligence of duties and lack of interest in the
authority’s work. When an employee absents himself from duty without
sanctioned leave, the authority can, on the basis of the record, come to a
conclusion about the employee being habitually negligent in duties and an
exhibited lack of interest in the employer's work. Ample material was
produced before the Tribunal in each case to show as to how the
employees concerned were remaining absent for long periods which
affects the work of the employer and the employee concerned was required
at least to bring some material on record to show as to how his absence
was on the basis of sanctioned leave and as to how there was no
negligence. Habitual absence is a factor which establishes lack of interest
in work. There cannot be any sweeping generalization. But at the same
time some telltale features can be noticed and pressed into service to
arrive at conclusions in the departmental proceedings.
10. Great emphasis was laid by learned counsel for the respondent
employee on the absence being treated as leave without pay. As was
observed by this Court in State of M.P. v. Harihar Gopal [(1969) (3) SLR
274 (SC)] by a three-Judge Bench of this Court, even when an order is
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passed for treating absence as leave without pay after passing an order of
termination, that is, for the purpose of maintaining correct record of
service. The charge in that case was, as in the present case, absence
without obtaining leave in advance. The conduct of the employees in this
case is nothing but irresponsible in the extreme and can hardly be
justified. The charge in this case was misconduct by absence. In view of
the governing Standing Orders unauthorized leave can be treated as
misconduct.
11. Conclusions regarding negligence and lack of interest can be
arrived at by looking into the period of absence, more particularly, when
same is unauthorized. Burden is on the employee who claims that there
was no negligence and/or lack of interest to establish it by placing
relevant materials. Clause (ii) of para 4 of the Standing Orders shows the
seriousness attached to habitual absence. In clause (i) thereof, there is
requirement of prior permission. Only exception made is in case of sudden
illness. There also conditions are stipulated, non-observance of which
renders the absence unauthorized.
12. The Tribunal proceeded in all these cases on the basis as if the
leave was sanctioned because of the noted leave without pay. Treating as
leave without pay is not same as sanctioned or approved leave.”
15.
A Division Bench of this Court in Delhi Transport Corporation Vs.
Rajender Kumar6 also considered the case of a workman who absented
himself without leave and, while referring to the decision in Sardar Singh
(supra), came to a similar conclusion and upheld the order of removal.
16.
The respondent/workman’s reliance on the decision of the Supreme
Court in Union of India and Others Vs. Ex. Constable Ram Karan7 to defend
the impugned award is misplaced. The Supreme Court observed that even in
cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found
to be shocking to the conscience of the Court, normally the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the
question of imposing penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum
of punishment is available, but with a limited scope. It is only in rare and
2016 SCC OnLine Del 5422
(2022) 1 SCC 373
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exceptional cases, where the Court might, in order to shorten the litigation,
think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place
of the punishment awarded by the competent authority, and that too after
assigning cogent reasons. A similar reliance is placed on the decision of the
Supreme Court in Brijesh Chandra Dwivedi Vs. Sanya Sahayak and Ors.8,
which is also misplaced as the said decision was rendered in the peculiar
facts of that case.
17.
Coming back to the facts of the present case, the workman had
absented himself without permission, for which, from time to time,
punishments were awarded. Clause 15 of the Regulations provides that the
appropriate punishment for such misconduct is removal and discontinuation
from service.
18.
In this backdrop of facts, it cannot be said that the exercise of
discretion by the Labour Court was proper. The case is covered on all four
corners by the decision in Sardar Singh (supra).
19.
Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed. The impugned
award, to the extent it granted retiral and consequential benefits to the
workman, is set aside. The petitioner’s removal from service is upheld.
20.
The present petition, along with the pending application, is disposed
of in the above terms.
(MANOJ KUMAR OHRI)
JUDGE
MAY 22, 2026
pmc
(2022) 4 SCC 189
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