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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 23.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 30.09.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 30.09.2026
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CNR No. DLHC011020552024
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FAO (COMM) 23/2025 & CM APPL. 4055/2025
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Tarun Johri and Mr.
Vishwajeet Tyagi, Advs.
versus
SH. PANKAJ (SINCE DECEASED) THR LRS.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Shashwat Dixit, Mr. Amit
Mishra, Mr. Sajal Dutt Dixit,
Ms. Gauri Dixit and Mr.
Kushagr Tyagi, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BHARAT PARASHAR
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
1.
The present Appeal under Section 371 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 19962, assails the judgment dated 23.10.20243
passed by the learned District Judge-04, Patiala House Courts, New
Delhi in ARBTN No.7418/2017, whereby the Petition4 under Section
345 of the A&C Act preferred by the Respondent was allowed and the
Arbitral Award dated 21.07.20176 passed by the learned Sole
Arbitrator was set aside. The learned District Judge proceeded
Hereinafter referred to as „Section 37‟
Hereinafter referred to as „A&C Act‟
Hereinafter referred to as „Impugned Judgment‟
Hereinafter referred to as „Section 34 Petition‟
Hereinafter referred to as „Section 34‟
Hereinafter referred to as „Award‟
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principally on the ground that the appointment of the learned Sole
Arbitrator, who was an employee of the Appellant, was contrary to
Section 12(5) of the A&C Act7, as introduced by the Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 20158.
2.
The principal controversy which arises for consideration in the
present Appeal is whether the provisions introduced by the 2015
Amendment Act, particularly Section 12(5) read with the Seventh
Schedule of the A&C Act9, could be invoked to invalidate the
appointment of the learned Sole Arbitrator where the arbitration clause
had been invoked on 03.06.2014 and the learned Sole Arbitrator had
been appointed on 24.03.2015, both dates being prior to the coming
into force of the 2015 Amendment Act on 23.10.2015. A further
question which arises for consideration is whether, in the facts of the
present case, the appointment of the learned Sole Arbitrator was
otherwise contrary to the arbitration agreement or the law governing
such appointment at the time when it was made.
FACTUAL MATRIX:
3.
The relevant facts, necessary for adjudication of the present
Appeal, may be briefly noticed.
4.
The
Appellant-Delhi
Metro
Rail
Corporation
Limited
(„DMRC‟) is engaged in the development and implementation of the
Mass Rapid Transit System in the National Capital Territory of Delhi.
The Respondent, M/s Pankaj Associates, is a proprietorship concern.
Hereinafter referred to as „Section 12(5)‟
Hereinafter referred to as „2015 Amendment Act‟
Hereinafter referred to as „Seventh Schedule‟
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The Respondent was declared the successful bidder for parking sites at
Dwarka Sector-21 and Dwarka Sector-11 Metro Stations and was
awarded the licence at a monthly licence fee of Rs.5,00,000/- for a
period of three (03) years.
5.
A Letter of Acceptance dated 28.06.2013 was issued by the
Appellant in favour of the Respondent. Possession of the parking sites
was thereafter handed over on 16.07.2013. At the Dwarka Sector-21
Metro Station, however, only 3652 sq. mtrs. of the area was initially
handed over to the Respondent as against the stipulated area of 6965
sq. mtrs., with the remaining area being under development. Disputes
thereafter arose between the parties in relation to the area handed over,
collection of parking fee by the previous contractor and the alleged
absence of certain infrastructure facilities at the parking sites.
6.
The Respondent, vide letter dated 03.06.2014, invoked Clause
45 of the Agreement10 and sought reference of the disputes to
arbitration. The said clause is reproduced hereinbelow for ready
reference:
“45. Conciliation and Arbitration
In the event of any dispute, difference of opinion or dispute or claim
arising out of/or relating to this agreement or breach, termination or
the invalidity thereof, shall firstly be attempted to be settled by
conciliation.
All disputes relating to this agreement or on any issue whether arising
during the progress of the services or after the completion or
abandonment thereof or any matter directly or indirectly connected
with this service agreement shall in the first place be referred to a sole
conciliator appointed/nominated by GM/Civil on receipt of such
requests from either parties.
The conciliator shall make the settlement agreement after the parties
Hereinafter referred to as „Clause 45‟ or „Arbitration Clause‟
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reach agreement and shall give an authenticated copy thereof to each
of the parties.
The settlement agreement shall be final and binding on the parties.
The settlement agreement shall have the same status and effect of an
arbitration award. The views expressed or the suggestions made or the
admissions made by either party in the course of conciliation
proceedings shall not be introduced as evidence in any arbitration
proceedings.
Any dispute that cannot be settled through conciliation procedure
shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the procedure given
in Para given below.
The parties agree to comply with the awards resulting from arbitration
and waive their rights to any form of appeal insofar as such waiver
can validly be made.
Arbitration Procedure
If the efforts to resolve all or any of the disputes through conciliation
fail, then such disputes shall be referred within 30 days to a sole
arbitrator who would be nominated by DMRC Ltd. The venue of such
arbitration shall be at Delhi/New Delhi. The award of the sole
arbitrator shall be binding on all parties. The cost of Arbitration shall
be borne by respective parties. There will be no objection if
conciliator/or sole arbitrator nominated/appointed is an employee of
DMRC.
Rules governing Arbitration Proceedings
The Arbitration Proceedings shall be governed by Indian Arbitration
and Conciliation Act 1996 as amended from time to time including
provisions in force at the time the reference is made.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
7.
As is evident, Clause 45 contemplated that disputes which could
not be resolved through conciliation would be referred to a Sole
Arbitrator nominated by the DMRC. The clause further provided that
there would be no objection if the conciliator or Sole Arbitrator
nominated or appointed was an employee of the DMRC. The
arbitration proceedings were to be governed by the A&C Act “as
amended from time to time including provisions in force at the time
the reference is made.”
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8.
On 31.07.2014, the Appellant issued a notice terminating the
License Agreement on account of non-payment of outstanding licence
fee and other charges. The Respondent thereafter handed over the
charge of the parking site to the Appellant.
9.
On 24.03.2015, the Appellant appointed Shri Ashu Sharma,
Senior Additional General Manager/Financial with the Appellant, as
the Sole Arbitrator. The learned Sole Arbitrator thereafter entered
upon the reference and commenced the arbitral proceedings.
10.
On 27.05.2015, the learned Sole Arbitrator held the first and
preliminary meeting and furnished the declaration contemplated under
Section 12(i) of the A&C Act, stating that he had no personal interest
in the outcome of the proceedings and that there were no
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his
independence or impartiality. The Respondent thereafter filed its
Statement of Claim seeking an amount of Rs.71,53,025/-, while the
Appellant filed its Reply and subsequently raised a Counter Claim of
Rs.40,15,083/-. The pleadings were completed and issues were framed
on 16.08.2016.
11.
The 2015 Amendment Act came into force on 23.10.2015,
whereby, inter alia, Section 12(5) and the Seventh Schedule were
introduced into the A&C Act. The arbitral proceedings, which had
commenced pursuant to the invocation dated 03.06.2014 and the
appointment dated 24.03.2015, continued thereafter. On 21.07.2017,
the learned Sole Arbitrator passed the Award, rejecting the claims of
the Respondent and allowing the Counter Claim of the Appellant for
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Rs.40,15,831/- along with interest.
12.
Aggrieved by the Arbitral Award, the Respondent instituted
proceedings under Section 34. Before the learned District Judge, the
Respondent ultimately confined its challenge to the appointment of
the learned Sole Arbitrator. It was contended that the Sole Arbitrator
was a serving employee of the Appellant and had been unilaterally
appointed by the Appellant and that such appointment was hit by
Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule. The Respondent relied,
inter alia, upon the judgments in OM 360 Degrees Advertising &
Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.11;
Vineet Dujodwala v. Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd.12; and Ellora Paper
Mills Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh13. It was further contended that
the arbitration clause itself contemplated that the proceedings would
be governed by the A&C Act “as amended from time to time” and that
the parties had thereby agreed to the applicability of subsequent
amendments to the Act.
13.
On the other hand, the Appellant contended that the arbitration
proceedings had commenced prior to 23.10.2015 and that the 2015
Amendment Act could not retrospectively be applied to invalidate an
appointment which was validly made under the law then prevailing.
Reliance was placed upon Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act14
and the judgments of the Supreme Court in S.P. Singla Constructions
Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh& Anr.15; BCCI v. Kochi
2023:DHC:6364
2024 SCC OnLine Del 5940
(2022) 3 SCC 1
Hereinafter referred to as „Section 26‟
(2019) 2 SCC 488
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Cricket Pvt. Ltd.16; Union of India v. Parmar Construction Co.17; and
Aravali Power Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Era Infra Engineering Ltd.18. It
was further contended that the judgment in Ellora Paper Mills
(supra)was distinguishable on facts and that the clause providing for
the applicability of the A&C Act “as amended from time to time”
could not retrospectively invalidate an appointment already made
prior to 23.10.2015.
14.
The learned District Judge, vide the Impugned Judgment dated
23.10.2024, accepted the challenge to the constitution of the Arbitral
Tribunal and set aside the Award. The present Appeal has
consequently been preferred by the Appellant.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
15.
Heard learned counsel representing the parties and with their
able assistance, perused the record.
16.
Learned counsel representing the Appellant has made the
following submissions:
i.
The arbitration clause was invoked on 03.06.2014 and the
Sole Arbitrator was appointed on 24.03.2015, much prior to the
coming into force of the 2015 Amendment Act on 23.10.2015. It
is, therefore, submitted that the constitution of the Arbitral
Tribunal is required to be examined with reference to the law
applicable at the time when the arbitral proceedings commenced
(2018) 6 SCC 287
(2019) 15 SCC 682
(2017) 15 SCC 32
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and the arbitrator was appointed. Reliance is placed upon Section
26 and the judgments of the Supreme Court in S.P. Singla
(supra), Kochi Cricket (supra) and Parmar Construction
(supra).
ii.
The judgment in Ellora Paper Mills (supra) is
distinguishable
on
account
of
the
peculiar
facts
and
circumstances in which that case arose and cannot be understood
as laying down a general proposition that Section 12(5) operates
retrospectively so as to invalidate appointments made prior to
23.10.2015.
iii.
Reliance is also placed upon the judgment of the
Supreme
Court
in
Central
Organisation
for
Railway
Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV) A Joint Venture
Company19 („CORE‟) to contend that the said judgment was
rendered in the context of the constitution of a three-member
Arbitral Tribunal and, therefore, does not govern the present case
concerning appointment of a Sole Arbitrator under a contractual
mechanism which was exercised prior to 23.10.2015.
iv.
Further reliance is placed upon D.V. Anand v. Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Ltd.20 and Avneet Soni v. Kavita
Agrawal21 in support of the submission that the validity of the
constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal has to be tested with
reference to the statutory and contractual regime applicable at the
(2025) 4 SCC 641
2026 SCC OnLine Del 4903
2026 SCC OnLine Del 3236
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relevant time and that a subsequent statutory amendment cannot
be retrospectively applied so as to invalidate an appointment
which was otherwise valid when made.
v.
The stipulation in Clause 45 that the arbitral proceedings
would be governed by the A&C Act “as amended from time to
time including provisions in force at the time the reference is
made” does not amount to an agreement to retrospectively apply
Section 12(5) and the Seventh Schedule to an arbitration which
had already commenced and in which the Arbitrator had already
been appointed before 23.10.2015. It is submitted that the clause
has to be read as a whole and, in particular, in conjunction with
the reference therein to the provisions in force at the time the
reference is made.
vi.
In any event, the appointment of the Sole Arbitrator was
expressly authorised by Clause 45, which contemplated
nomination of the Sole Arbitrator by DMRC and further provided
that no objection would be raised merely on the ground that the
person so nominated or appointed was an employee of DMRC.
The appointment was, therefore, in conformity with the agreed
contractual mechanism and cannot be invalidated merely by
applying the post-2015 statutory regime retrospectively.
17.
Per contra, learned counsel representing the Respondent has
made the following submission:
i.
The appointment of the Sole Arbitrator was invalid as the
Arbitrator was a serving employee of the Appellant and had been
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unilaterally appointed by the Appellant itself. It is submitted that
independence and impartiality are fundamental requirements of
an Arbitral Tribunal and that an Arbitrator who is de jure
ineligible to act cannot validly constitute or continue as the
Arbitral Tribunal. Reliance is placed upon Paragraph Nos.60 to
63, 67 to 69, 89 to 91, 109 to 113 and 123 of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v.
Airports Authority of India22.
ii.
The Respondent, relying upon the decision in Jagdish
Chand Gupta v. Union of India23, submits that Section 26
permits the parties to agree to the application of the amended
regime even where the arbitral proceedings commenced prior to
23.10.2015. It is contended that where the arbitration agreement
itself refers to the Act and its statutory modifications, such
language evidences an intention to be governed by subsequent
amendments to the Act. It is further contended that, where such
contractual language is coupled with the conduct of the parties
indicating adoption of the amended Act, Section 12(5) would
apply notwithstanding the date on which the arbitration
commenced.
iii.
Reliance is placed upon the judgment in Hanson Agro
Ltd. v. GAIL (India) Ltd.24 and other connected matters, to
submit that the present case falls within the third category
identified therein, namely, cases where the arbitration agreement
2026 INSC 6
2025 SCC OnLine Del 7278
2026 SCC OnLine Del 6894
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itself contains a stipulation contemplating statutory amendments
or modifications. It is contended that, once the present case is
placed within that category, the subsequent amendment to the
A&C Act is applicable to the arbitration and the appointment of
the serving employee of DMRC consequently stood invalidated
by operation of Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule.
iv.
The Respondent‟s further contention, relying upon
Paragraph No.23 of State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. v. R.K.
Pandey & Anr.25, is that independence and impartiality of the
Arbitral Tribunal are integral to the arbitral process. It is
submitted that the requirement of equality and fairness operates
even at the stage of constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, and that
unilateral appointment has a direct bearing on the conduct and
fairness of the arbitral proceedings. The Respondent therefore
submits
that
an
appointment
which
compromises
the
independence and impartiality of the Arbitrator cannot be
sustained.
v.
Reliance is placed upon the judgments in OM 360
Degrees (supra), Vineet Dujodwala (supra) and Ellora Paper
Mills (supra) to submit that the amended law relating to the
eligibility and independence of an arbitrator can be invoked even
where the arbitral proceedings had commenced prior to
23.10.2015.
18.
No other submissions have been made by learned counsel
2025 SCC OnLine SC 52
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representing the respective parties.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:
19.
We have heard the learned counsel representing the parties and
perused the material on record. At the cost of repetition, the principal
question which arises for consideration is whether the appointment of
the Sole Arbitrator by the Appellant/DMRC, vide communication
dated 24.03.2015, was rendered invalid on account of the subsequent
insertion of Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule by the 2015
Amendment Act. The answer to this question requires the legal
position concerning appointment of Arbitrators to be considered in its
historical sequence, since the legal consequences attached to unilateral
appointment underwent a significant change with effect from
23.10.2015.
I.
The position after the 2015 Amendment:
20.
Prior to the 2015 Amendment Act, the A&C Act did not contain
Section 12(5) or the Fifth and Seventh Schedules. However, Section
11(2) of the unamended A&C Act expressly recognised the freedom
of parties to agree upon a procedure for appointment of the
arbitrator(s). Further, Section 12 of the unamended A&C Act required
disclosure of circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as
to independence or impartiality, while Section 18 of the Act required
the arbitrator to treat the parties equally and give each party a full
opportunity of presenting its case. Thus, independence and
impartiality were undoubtedly recognised principles of the arbitral
process even under the unamended Act. Pertinently, what was absent
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was a statutory list of relationships which, by operation of law,
rendered an individual categorically ineligible to act as an arbitrator.
21.
The 2015 Amendment Act introduced a materially different
statutory regime. Section 12(5), as introduced by the 2015
Amendment Act, is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:
“12. Grounds for challenge…
(5) Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any person
whose relationship, with the parties or counsel or the subject-matter of
the dispute, falls under any of the categories specified in the Seventh
Schedule shall be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator:
Provided that parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen
between them, waive the applicability of this sub-section by an express
agreement in writing.”
22.
From the bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it becomes
evident that the said provision, notwithstanding any prior agreement to
the contrary, provides that a person whose relationship with the
parties, counsel or the subject matter of the dispute falls within any of
the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to
be appointed as an arbitrator. The proviso permits the parties, after
disputes have arisen, to waive the applicability of Section 12(5), but
only by an express agreement in writing. Thus, the amendment did not
merely elaborate upon the existing standard of impartiality. It attached
a specific statutory consequence, namely, ineligibility to act as an
arbitrator, to the relationships enumerated in the Seventh Schedule.
23.
The distinction between the pre-amendment requirement of
impartiality and the post-amendment statutory consequence of
ineligibility is important. The Supreme Court in Indian Oil
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Corporation Ltd. v. Raja Transport (P) Ltd.26, while dealing with the
unamended Act, held that the fact that the named arbitrator was an
employee of a State instrumentality was not, by itself, sufficient to
presume bias or lack of independence. The Court observed:
“2. Under an agreement dated 28-2-2005, the appellant appointed
the respondent as its dealer for retail sale of petroleum products.
Clause 69 of the said agreement provided for settlement of disputes by
arbitration. The said clause reads thus:
“69. Any dispute or a difference of any nature whatsoever or
regarding any right, liability, act, omission or account of any of the
parties hereto arising out of or in relation to this agreement shall
be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director, Marketing of
the Corporation or of some officer of the Corporation who may
be nominated by the Director, Marketing. The dealer will not be
entitled to raise any objection to any such arbitrator on the ground
that the arbitrator is an officer of the contract relates or that in the
course of his duties or differences (sic). In the event of the
arbitrator to whom the matter is originally referred being
transferred or vacating his office or being unable to act for any
reason the Director, Marketing as aforesaid at the time of such
transfer, vacation of office or inability to act, shall designate
another person to act as the arbitrator in accordance with the
terms of the agreement. Such person shall be entitled to proceed
with the reference from the point at which it was left by his
predecessor. It is also a term of this contract that no person other
than the Director, Marketing or a person nominated by such
Director, Marketing of the Corporation as aforesaid shall act as
arbitrator hereunder. The award of the arbitrator so appointed
shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to the
agreement, subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 or
any statutory modification of re-enactment thereof and the Rules
made thereunder and for the time being in force shall apply to the
arbitration proceedings under this clause.”
(emphasis supplied)
***
31. Section 12(1) requires an arbitrator, when approached in
connection with his possible appointment, to disclose in writing any
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his
independence or impartiality. Section 12(3) enables the arbitrator
being challenged if
(2009) 8 SCC 520
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(i) the circumstances give rise to justifiable doubts as to his
independence or impartiality, or
(ii) he does not possess the qualifications agreed to by the
parties.
32. Section 18 requires the arbitrator to treat the parties with
equality (that is to say without bias) and give each party full
opportunity to present his case. Nothing in Sections 11, 12, 18 or other
provisions of the Act suggests that any provision in an arbitration
agreement, naming the arbitrator will be invalid if such named
arbitrator is an employee of one of the parties to the arbitration
agreement.
33. Sub-section (2) of Section 11 provides that parties are free to
agree upon a procedure for appointment of arbitrator(s). Sub-section
(6) provides that where a party fails to act, as required under the
procedure prescribed, the Chief Justice or his designate can take
necessary measures. Sub-section (8) gives the discretion to the Chief
Justice/his designate to choose an arbitrator suited to meet the
requirements of a particular case. The said power is in no way
intended to nullify a specific term of arbitration agreement naming a
particular person as arbitrator. The power under sub-section (8) is
intended to be used keeping in view the terms of the arbitration
agreement.
34.The fact that the named arbitrator is an employee of one of
the parties is not ipso facto a ground to raise a presumption of bias
or partiality or lack of independence on his part. There can however
be a justifiable apprehension about the independence or impartiality
of an employee arbitrator, if such person was the controlling or
dealing authority in regard to the subject contract or if he is a direct
subordinate (as contrasted from an officer of an inferior rank in some
other Department) to the officer whose decision is the subject-matter
of the dispute.
35.Where however the named arbitrator though a senior officer
of the Government/statutory body/government company, had nothing
to do with the execution of the subject contract, there can be no
justification for anyone doubting his independence or impartiality, in
the absence of any specific evidence. Therefore, senior officer(s)
(usually
Heads
of
Department
or
equivalent) of
a
Government/statutory corporation/public sector undertaking, not
associated with the contract, are considered to be independent and
impartial and are not barred from functioning as arbitrators merely
because their employer is a party to the contract.
36. The position may be different where the person named as the
arbitrator is an employee of a company or body or individual other
than the State and its instrumentalities. For example, if the Director of
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a private company (which is a party to the arbitration agreement), is
named as the arbitrator, there may be a valid and reasonable
apprehension of bias in view of his position and interest, and he may
be unsuitable to act as an arbitrator in an arbitration involving his
company. If any circumstance exists to create a reasonable
apprehension about the impartiality or independence of the agreed
or named arbitrator, then the court has the discretion not to appoint
such a person.
37. Subject to the said clarifications, we hold that a person being
an employee of one of the parties (which is the State or its
instrumentality) cannot per se be a bar to his acting as an arbitrator.
Accordingly, the answer to the first question is that the learned Chief
Justice was not justified in his assumption of bias.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
24.
As is evident, the Supreme Court, in the aforementioned
decision in Indian Oil (supra), nevertheless recognised that the
circumstances surrounding the appointment could give rise to a
justifiable apprehension regarding independence or impartiality. In
particular, the Court drew a distinction where the employee-arbitrator
was the controlling or dealing authority in relation to the contract or
was directly subordinate to the officer whose decision was under
challenge. Conversely, where a senior officer of a Government
Department, statutory corporation or public sector undertaking had no
association with the execution of the contract, his employment by the
contracting entity, in itself, was not regarded as sufficient to disqualify
him.
25.
The 2015 Amendment Act consequently brought about a
substantial change in this position. In TRF Ltd. v. Energo
Engineering Projects Ltd.27, the Supreme Court considered Section
12(5) and the Seventh Schedule and held that the statutory ineligibility
(2017) 8 SCC 377
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of the person designated as arbitrator also affected his ability to
nominate another arbitrator. The Court also emphasised that the
proviso to Section 12(5) contemplated three cumulative requirements:
26.
i.
the waiver must be after disputes have arisen;
ii.
it must be an agreement between the parties; and
iii.
it must be express and in writing.
TRF (supra) was further followed and developed in Perkins
Eastman Architects DPC& Anr. v. HSCC (India) Ltd.28. There, the
arbitration clause vested the Chairman and Managing Director of
HSCC with an additional power to appoint the Sole Arbitrator. The
Supreme Court reasoned that where one party has an exclusive power
to appoint the Sole Arbitrator, the party interested in the outcome of
the dispute cannot retain such power under the post-amendment
regime. The Court described the principle emerging from TRF as the
logical consequence of the statutory ineligibility created by the 2015
Amendment Act. The relevant extracts from Perkins (supra) is
reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:
“18. The issue was discussed and decided by this Court as under :
(TRF case [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377
: (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] , SCC pp. 403-04, paras 50-54)
“50. First, we shall deal with clause (d). There is no quarrel
that by virtue of Section 12(5) of the Act, if any person who falls
under any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule shall
be ineligible to be appointed as the arbitrator. There is no doubt
and cannot be, for the language employed in the Seventh Schedule,
the Managing Director of the Corporation has become ineligible
by operation of law. It is the stand of the learned Senior Counsel
for the appellant that once the Managing Director becomes
(2020) 20 SCC 760
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ineligible, he also becomes ineligible to nominate. Refuting the
said stand, it is canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent that the ineligibility cannot extend to a nominee if he is
not from the Corporation and more so when there is apposite and
requisite disclosure. We think it appropriate to make it clear that in
the case at hand we are neither concerned with the disclosure nor
objectivity nor impartiality nor any such other circumstance. We
are singularly concerned with the issue, whether the Managing
Director, after becoming ineligible by operation of law, is he still
eligible to nominate an arbitrator. At the cost of repetition, we may
state that when there are two parties, one may nominate an
arbitrator and the other may appoint another. That is altogether a
different situation. If there is a clause requiring the parties to
nominate their respective arbitrator, their authority to nominate
cannot be questioned. What really in that circumstance can be
called in question is the procedural compliance and the eligibility
of their arbitrator depending upon the norms provided under the
Act and the Schedules appended thereto. But, here is a case where
the Managing Director is the “named sole arbitrator” and he has
also been conferred with the power to nominate one who can be
the arbitrator in his place. Thus, there is subtle distinction. In this
regard, our attention has been drawn to a two-Judge Bench
decision in State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records &
Settlement [State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records &
Settlement, (1998) 7 SCC 162] . In the said case, the question
arose, can the Board of Revenue revise the order passed by its
delegate. Dwelling upon the said proposition, the Court held :
(SCC p. 173, para 25)
„25. We have to note that the Commissioner when he
exercises power of the Board delegated to him under Section 33
of the Settlement Act, 1958, the order passed by him is to be
treated as an order of the Board of Revenue and not as that of
the Commissioner in his capacity as Commissioner. This
position is clear from two rulings of this Court to which we shall
presently refer. The first of the said rulings is the one decided by
the Constitution Bench of this Court in Roop Chand v. State of
Punjab [Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1503] . In
that case, it was held by the majority that where the State
Government had, under Section 41(1) of the East Punjab
Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act,
1948, delegated its appellate powers vested in it under Section
21(4) to an “officer”, an order passed by such an officer was an
order passed by the State Government itself and “not an order
passed by any officer under this Act” within Section 42 and was
not revisable by the State Government. It was pointed out that
for the purpose of exercise of powers of revision by the State
under Section 42 of that Act, the order sought to be revised must
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be an order passed by an officer in his own right and not as a
delegate of the State. The State Government was, therefore, not
entitled under Section 42 to call for the records of the case
which was disposed of by an officer acting as its delegate.‟
(emphasis in original)
51. Be it noted in the said case, reference was made to Behari
Kunj Sahkari Awas Samiti v. State of U.P. [Behari Kunj Sahkari
Awas Samiti v. State of U.P., (1997) 7 SCC 37] , which followed
the decision in Roop Chand v. State of Punjab [Roop Chand v.
State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1503] . It is seemly to note here that
the said principle has been followed in Indore Vikas Pradhikaran
[Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals
Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 705] .
52. Mr Sundaram has strongly relied on Pratapchand Nopaji
[Pratapchand Nopaji v. Kotrike Venkata Setty & Sons, (1975) 2
SCC 208] . In the said case, the three-Judge Bench applied the
maxim “qui facit per alium facit per se”. We may profitably
reproduce the passage : (SCC p. 214, para 9)
„9. … The principle which would apply, if the objects are
struck by Section 23 of the Contract Act, is embodied in the
maxim:“qui facit per alium facit per se” (what one does through
another is done by oneself). To put it in another form, that which
cannot be done directly may not be done indirectly by engaging
another outside the prohibited area to do the illegal act within
the prohibited area. It is immaterial whether, for the doing of
such an illegal act, the agent employed is given the wider
powers or authority of the “pucca adatia”, or, as the High
Court had held, he is clothed with the powers of an ordinary
commission agent only.‟
53. The aforesaid authorities have been commended to us to
establish the proposition that if the nomination of an arbitrator by
an ineligible arbitrator is allowed, it would tantamount to carrying
on the proceeding of arbitration by himself. According to the
learned counsel for the appellant, ineligibility strikes at the root of
his power to arbitrate or get it arbitrated upon by a nominee.
54. In such a context, the fulcrum of the controversy would be,
can an ineligible arbitrator, like the Managing Director, nominate
an arbitrator, who may be otherwise eligible and a respectable
person. As stated earlier, we are neither concerned with the
objectivity nor the individual respectability. We are only concerned
with the authority or the power of the Managing Director. By our
analysis, we are obligated to arrive at the conclusion that once the
arbitrator has become ineligible by operation of law, he cannot
nominate another as an arbitrator. The arbitrator becomes
ineligible as per prescription contained in Section 12(5) of the Act.
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It is inconceivable in law that person who is statutorily ineligible
can nominate a person. Needless to say, once the infrastructure
collapses, the superstructure is bound to collapse. One cannot have
a building without the plinth. Or to put it differently, once the
identity of the Managing Director as the sole arbitrator is lost, the
power to nominate someone else as an arbitrator is obliterated.
Therefore, the view [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., 2016
SCC OnLine Del 2532] expressed by the High Court is not
sustainable and we say so.”
19.It was thus held that as the Managing Director became
ineligible by operation of law to act as an arbitrator, he could not
nominate another person to act as an arbitrator and that once the
identity of the Managing Director as the sole arbitrator was lost, the
power to nominate someone else as an arbitrator was also
obliterated. The relevant clause in said case had nominated the
Managing Director himself to be the sole arbitrator and also
empowered said Managing Director to nominate another person to act
as an arbitrator. The Managing Director thus had two capacities
under said clause, the first as an arbitrator and the second as an
appointing authority. In the present case we are concerned with only
one capacity of the Chairman and Managing Director and that is as
an appointing authority.
20. We thus have two categories of cases. The first, similar to the
one dealt with in TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd.,
(2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] where the Managing
Director himself is named as an arbitrator with an additional power to
appoint any other person as an arbitrator. In the second category, the
Managing Director is not to act as an arbitrator himself but is
empowered or authorised to appoint any other person of his choice
or discretion as an arbitrator. If, in the first category of cases, the
Managing Director was found incompetent, it was because of the
interest that he would be said to be having in the outcome or result of
the dispute. The element of invalidity would thus be directly relatable
to and arise from the interest that he would be having in such
outcome or decision. If that be the test, similar invalidity would
always arise and spring even in the second category of cases. If the
interest that he has in the outcome of the dispute, is taken to be the
basis for the possibility of bias, it will always be present irrespective
of whether the matter stands under the first or second category of
cases. We are conscious that if such deduction is drawn from the
decision of this Court in TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects
Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] , all cases having
clauses similar to that with which we are presently concerned, a party
to the agreement would be disentitled to make any appointment of an
arbitrator on its own and it would always be available to argue that a
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party or an official or an authority having interest in the dispute would
be disentitled to make appointment of an arbitrator.
21. But, in our view that has to be the logical deduction from TRF
Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 :
(2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] Para 50 of the decision shows that this Court
was concerned with the issue, “whether the Managing Director, after
becoming ineligible by operation of law, is he still eligible to nominate
an arbitrator” The ineligibility referred to therein, was as a result of
operation of law, in that a person having an interest in the dispute or
in the outcome or decision thereof, must not only be ineligible to act as
an arbitrator but must also not be eligible to appoint anyone else as an
arbitrator and that such person cannot and should not have any role in
charting out any course to the dispute resolution by having the power
to appoint an arbitrator. The next sentences in the paragraph, further
show that cases where both the parties could nominate respective
arbitrators of their choice were found to be completely a different
situation. The reason is clear that whatever advantage a party may
derive by nominating an arbitrator of its choice would get counterbalanced by equal power with the other party. But, in a case where
only one party has a right to appoint a sole arbitrator, its choice will
always have an element of exclusivity in determining or charting the
course for dispute resolution. Naturally, the person who has an
interest in the outcome or decision of the dispute must not have the
power to appoint a sole arbitrator. That has to be taken as the
essence of the amendments brought in by the Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (3 of 2016) and recognised by
the decision of this Court in TRF Ltd. [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg.
Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72].”
(Emphasis supplied.)
27.
The development of the law must also be understood in the
context of Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. Delhi Metro Rail
Corporation Ltd.29. The Supreme Court recognised that independence
and impartiality are fundamental attributes of an Arbitral Tribunal and
that the principle of party autonomy cannot be stretched to a point
where it compromises these requirements. In the context of the panel
mechanism then under consideration, the Court therefore required the
panel maintained by DMRC to be sufficiently broad-based so as to
(2017) 4 SCC 665
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ensure that the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal did not give rise to
an apprehension that the choice of the arbitrator was, in substance,
controlled by one of the parties. The same principle was subsequently
reiterated in Perkins (supra), where the Court, referring to the Law
Commission‟s Report No.246 and Voestalpine (supra), emphasised
that minimum standards of independence and impartiality cannot be
dispensed with merely on the basis of party autonomy.
28.
These principles, however, do not by themselves answer the
separate question of the temporal applicability of the statutory
disqualifications introduced by the 2015 Amendment Act. Voestalpine
(supra) was decided in the context of the amended statutory regime
and a panel-based appointment mechanism. It cannot, therefore, be
treated as creating, retrospectively, a statutory disqualification in
respect of an appointment validly made prior to 23.10.2015. The
distinction between the substantive requirement of independence and
impartiality, on the one hand, and the statutory ineligibility introduced
by the amended Section 12(5), on the other, is therefore material.
29.
The Constitution Bench decision in CORE (supra), further
considered the relationship between party autonomy, equal treatment,
independence and impartiality in the constitution of an Arbitral
Tribunal. The Constitution Bench held that the principle of equal
treatment under Section 18 of the A&C Act operates at the stage of
appointment as well. It also approved the principles in TRF (supra)
and Perkins (supra) concerning sole Arbitrators, while separately
considering the legality of a curated panel mechanism for a threemember Tribunal. The Court ultimately directed that the law laid
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down in that reference would operate prospectively in respect of
appointments to three-member Tribunals. The relevant paragraphs of
the same are extracted hereunder:
“169. In the present reference, we have upheld the decisions of this
Court in TRF [TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC
377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 72] and Perkins [Perkins Eastman
Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd., (2020) 20 SCC 760] which dealt
with situations dealing with sole arbitrators. Thus, TRF [TRF Ltd. v.
Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ)
72] and Perkins [Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India)
Ltd., (2020) 20 SCC 760] have held the field for years now. However,
we have disagreed with Voestalpine [Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v.
DMRC Ltd., (2017) 4 SCC 665 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 607] and CORE
[Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMOMCML (JV), (2020) 14 SCC 712] which dealt with the appointment of
a three-member Arbitral Tribunal. We are aware of the fact that
giving retrospective effect to the law laid down in the present case
may possibly lead to the nullification of innumerable completed and
ongoing arbitration proceedings involving three-member tribunals.
This will disturb the commercial bargains entered into by both the
government and private entities. Therefore, we hold that the law laid
down in the present reference will apply prospectively to arbitrator
appointments to be made after the date of this judgment. This
direction only applies to three-member tribunals.
J. Conclusion
170. In view of the above discussion, we conclude that:
170.1. The principle of equal treatment of parties applies at all
stages of arbitration proceedings, including the stage of appointment
of arbitrators;
170.2. The Arbitration Act does not prohibit PSUs from
empanelling potential arbitrators. However, an arbitration clause
cannot mandate the other party to select its arbitrator from the panel
curated by PSUs;
170.3. A clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole
arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and
impartiality of the arbitrator. Further, such a unilateral clause is
exclusive and hinders equal participation of the other party in the
appointment process of arbitrators;
170.4.In the appointment of a three-member panel, mandating
the other party to select its arbitrator from a curated panel of
potential arbitrators is against the principle of equal treatment of
parties. In this situation, there is no effective counterbalance
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because parties do not participate equally in the process of
appointing arbitrators. The process of appointing arbitrators in
CORE [Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECISPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), (2020) 14 SCC 712] is unequal and
prejudiced in favour of the Railways;
170.5. Unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts
are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution;
170.6. The principle of express waiver contained under the proviso
to Section 12(5) also applies to situations where the parties seek to
waive the allegation of bias against an arbitrator appointed
unilaterally by one of the parties. After the disputes have arisen, the
parties can determine whether there is a necessity to waive the nemo
judex rule; and
170.7.The law laid down in the present reference will apply
prospectively to arbitrator appointments to be made after the date of
this judgment. This direction applies to three-member tribunals.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
30.
The
prospective
direction
in
CORE
(supra)
assumes
significance in the present case. The Constitution Bench did not
declare that every appointment made before 23.10.2015, which would
subsequently fall within a category contemplated by the Seventh
Schedule, stood retrospectively invalidated. Indeed, the Court was
conscious of the consequences of disturbing completed and ongoing
arbitrations and expressly confined the prospective direction to
appointments to three-member Tribunals. The fact that CORE
considered the larger principles of neutrality, equality, nemo judex and
party autonomy does not, therefore, permit the post-2015 statutory
regime to be retrospectively superimposed upon an arbitration
commenced and a Sole Arbitrator appointed before 23.10.2015.
31.
The position was subsequently considered by the Supreme
Court in Bhadra International (supra). In that case, the arbitration
clause empowered the Chairman of the Airports Authority of India to
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appoint the Sole Arbitrator. The arbitration was invoked on
27.11.2015, i.e. after the 2015 Amendment had come into force. The
Supreme Court held that, once Section 12(5) applied, the Chairman,
being himself ineligible, could not exercise the power to appoint
another Arbitrator. The Court further held that the objection concerned
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and could be raised at a later stage. The
relevant extracts are reproduced hereinbelow:
“60. It is apposite to understand that Section 12(5) does not prohibit
unilateral appointment of an arbitrator. It provides that whenever an
appointment of an arbitrator is hit by the bar under Section 12(5), the
arbitrator would be ineligible to act, irrespective of whether the
appointment was unilateral or with consent of both parties. In such
circumstances, the parties may, in the manner provided under the
proviso, waive the ineligibility. We shall discuss the scope and
application of the proviso in more detail in the latter part of this
judgment.
d. De Jure inability of the arbitrator to perform his functions
61. In the aforesaid context, it would be apposite to briefly explain
what constitutes as de jure ineligibility under Section 12(5). The
expression de jure denotes a condition rooted in strict compliance with
the requirements of law. De jure inability refers to a situation in which
an arbitrator is legally incapable of performing his functions and is,
by operation of law, barred from continuing in office. Such inability
strikes at the very root of the arbitrator's authority to act, thereby
affecting his inherent capacity to discharge his functions as an
arbitrator. It is this legal incapacity, arising from statutory
disqualifications, that results in the termination of the “mandate of an
arbitrator” under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, 1996.
62.De jure inability referred to under Section 14(1)(a) may arise from
the provisions of the Act, 1996, or from any other existing law that
renders an arbitrator legally incapable of performing his functions. As
regards de jure ineligibility, it flows from sub-section (5) of Section 12
read with the Seventh Schedule, which disqualifies certain persons
from being appointed or continuing as arbitrators.
63. In other words, the ineligibility under Section 12(5) precedes de
jure inability under Section 14(1)(a). In other words, de jure
ineligibility is the specie and de jure inability is the genus. To put this
in context, de jure inability is determined when an aggrieved party is
able to indicate that the circumstances under the Seventh Schedule
have been met.
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***
67. From the above exposition of law, the Chairman of the respondent
was wholly ineligible to appoint an arbitrator. The Items 1, 2, 5, 12,
and 13 of the Seventh Schedule respectively, clearly attach to the
Chairman of the respondent. Once the Chairman is rendered ineligible
by operation of law, he cannot nominate or appoint another person as
an arbitrator. To illustrate, one who cannot sit on a chair himself
cannot authorise another to sit on it either.
68. We are in complete agreement that the present case is squarely
covered by the decisions of this Court in Perkins Eastman (supra) and
Bharat Broadband (supra) respectively. The unilateral appointment of
a sole arbitrator is void ab initio, and the sole arbitrator so appointed
is de jure ineligible to act as an arbitrator in terms of Section 12(5)
read with the Seventh Schedule of the Act, 1996.
69. Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that its High Court, in the
impugned judgment, committed an error in holding that the
appointment was not unilateral merely because the respondent
proceeded to appoint the sole arbitrator pursuant to notice invoking
arbitration.
***
123. A conspectus of the aforesaid detailed discussion on the position
of law as regards Section 12 of the Act, 1996, is as follows:—
i.The principle of equal treatment of parties provided in Section 18 of
the Act, 1996, applies not only to the arbitral proceedings but also to
the procedure for appointment of arbitrators. Equal treatment of the
parties entails that the parties must have an equal say in the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
ii.Sub-section (5) of Section 12 provides that any person whose
relationship with the parties or counsel, or the dispute, whether
direct or indirect, falls within any of the categories specified in the
Seventh Schedule would be ineligible to be appointed as an
arbitrator. Since, the ineligibility stems from the operation of law, not
only is a person having an interest in the dispute or its outcome
ineligible to act as an arbitrator, but appointment by such a person
would be ex facie invalid.
iii.The words “an express agreement in writing” in the proviso to
Section 12(5) means that the right to object to the appointment of an
ineligible arbitrator cannot be taken away by mere implication. The
agreement referred to in the proviso must be a clear, unequivocal
written agreement.
iv.When an arbitrator is found to be ineligible by virtue of Section
12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, his mandate is automatically
terminated. In such circumstance, an aggrieved party may approach
the court under Section 14 read with Section 15 for appointment of a
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substitute arbitrator. Whereas, when an award has been passed by
such an arbitrator, an aggrieved party may approach the court under
Section 34 for setting aside the award.
v. In arbitration, the parties vest jurisdiction in the tribunal by
exercising their consent in furtherance of a valid arbitration
agreement. An arbitrator who lacks jurisdiction cannot make an
award on the merits. Hence, an objection to the inherent lack of
jurisdiction can be taken at any stage of the proceedings.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
32.
Bhadra International (supra) also makes clear the significance
of the proviso to Section 12(5). Mere participation in the arbitration,
filing of pleadings, or the absence of an objection at the initial stage
does not, by itself, constitute the “express agreement in writing”
contemplated by the proviso. The decision does not, however, answer
the anterior question in the present case, namely, whether Section
12(5) was applicable at all to an arbitration which had already
commenced in 2014 and in which the Arbitrator had been appointed in
March 2015.
II.
The position prior to 23.10.2015:
33.
Prior to 23.10.2015, the A&C Act accorded considerable weight
to party autonomy in matters relating to the constitution of the Arbitral
Tribunal. Section 11(2) of the A&C Act expressly recognised the
parties‟ freedom to agree upon a procedure for the appointment of
arbitrators. At that stage, the Act did not contain the statutory
prohibition subsequently introduced by Section 12(5), read with the
Seventh Schedule. Consequently, the mere fact that one party was
contractually entrusted with a role in the appointment of the arbitrator
did not, by itself, render such appointment statutorily impermissible
under the law then in force.
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34.
This does not mean that every unilateral appointment was valid
under the pre-2015 regime. The distinction is between a unilateral
appointment which was not authorised by the arbitration agreement
and a unilateral appointment which was expressly contemplated by the
arbitration agreement but is subsequently challenged merely because
the appointee was an employee of one of the parties.
35.
The first situation is governed by the principle stated in
Dharma Prathishthanam v. Madhok Construction (P) Ltd.30. The
Supreme Court emphasised that where the arbitration agreement
prescribes the manner in which the Arbitrator is to be appointed, the
parties are bound by that agreed procedure. A party cannot, therefore,
unilaterally constitute the Arbitral Tribunal in a manner which is not
contemplated by the arbitration agreement. The defect in such a case
lies in the absence of contractual authority for the appointment and
reference, and not in any statutory disqualification of the Arbitrator on
account of his relationship with either party. The latter concept, in its
present statutory form, was introduced only subsequently through
Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule. It is pertinent to refer to
the relevant extracts of the said decision, which are as under:
“11. In the background of the abovesaid provisions, the question
which arises for consideration is whether, in the light of a general
provision as in clause 35, the respondent could have unilaterally
appointed an arbitrator without the consent of the appellant and could
have made a reference to such arbitrator again without the reference
of disputes having been consented to by the appellant.
12. On a plain reading of the several provisions referred to
hereinabove, we are clearly of the opinion that the procedure followed
and the methodology adopted by the respondent is wholly unknown to
law and the appointment of the sole arbitrator Shri Swami Dayal, the
(2005) 9 SCC 686
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reference of disputes to such arbitrator and the ex parte proceedings
and award given by the arbitrator are all void ab initio and hence
nullity, liable to be ignored. In case of arbitration without the
intervention of the court, the parties must rigorously stick to the
agreement entered into between the two. If the arbitration clause
names an arbitrator as the one already agreed upon, the
appointment of an arbitrator poses no difficulty. If the arbitration
clause does not name an arbitrator but provides for the manner in
which the arbitrator is to be chosen and appointed, then the parties
are bound to act accordingly. If the parties do not agree then arises
the complication which has to be resolved by reference to the
provisions of the Act. One party cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the
court and proceed to act unilaterally. A unilateral appointment and a
unilateral reference — both will be illegal. It may make a difference if
in respect of a unilateral appointment and reference the other party
submits to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and waives its rights which
it has under the agreement, then the arbitrator may proceed with the
reference and the party submitting to his jurisdiction and participating
in the proceedings before him may later on be precluded and estopped
from raising any objection in that regard. According to Russell
(Arbitration, 20th Edn., p. 104)—
“An arbitrator is neither more nor less than a private judge of
a private court (called an Arbitral Tribunal) who gives a private
judgment (called an award). He is a judge in that a dispute is
submitted to him; … He is private insofar as (1) he is chosen and
paid by the disputants, (2) he does not sit in public, (3) he acts in
accordance with privately chosen procedure so far as that is not
repugnant to public policy, (4) so far as the law allows he is set up
to the exclusion of the State courts, (5) his authority and powers
are only whatsoever he is given by the disputants' agreement, (6)
the effectiveness of his powers derives wholly from the private law
of contract and accordingly the nature and exercise of these
powers must not be contrary to the proper law of the contract or
the public policy of England, bearing in mind that the paramount
public policy is that freedom of contract is not lightly to be
interfered with.”
***
31. Three types of situations may emerge between the parties and
then before the court. Firstly, an arbitration agreement, under
examination from the point of view of its enforceability, may be one
which expresses the parties' intention to have their disputes settled by
arbitration by using clear and unambiguous language, then the parties
and the court have no other choice but to treat the contract as binding
and enforce it. Or, there may be an agreement suffering from such
vagueness or uncertainty as is not capable of being construed at all by
culling out the intention of the parties with certainty, even by reference
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to the provisions of the Arbitration Act, then it shall have to be held
that there was no agreement between the parties in the eye of the law
and the question of appointing an arbitrator or making a reference or
disputes by reference to Sections 8, 9 and 20 shall not arise. Secondly,
there may be an arbitrator or arbitrators named, or the authority
may be named who shall appoint an arbitrator, then the parties have
already been ad idem on the real identity of the arbitrator as
appointed by them beforehand; the consent is already spelled out and
binds the parties and the court. All that may remain to be done in the
event of an occasion arising for the purpose, is to have the
agreement filed in the court and seek an order of reference to the
arbitrator appointed by the parties. Thirdly, if the arbitrator is not
named and the authority who would appoint the arbitrator is also not
specified, the appointment and reference shall be to a sole arbitrator
unless a different intention is expressly spelt out. The appointment and
reference — both shall be by the consent of the parties. Where the
parties do not agree, the court steps in and assumes jurisdiction to
make an appointment, also to make a reference, subject to the
jurisdiction of the court being invoked in that regard. We hasten to
add that mere inaction by a party called upon by the other one to act
does not lead to an inference as to implied consent or acquiescence
being drawn. The appellant not responding to the respondent's
proposal for joining in the appointment of a sole arbitrator named by
him could not be construed as consent and the only option open to the
respondent was to have invoked the jurisdiction of court for
appointment of an arbitrator and an order of reference of disputes to
him. It is the court which only could have compelled the appellant to
join in the proceedings.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
36.
The present case, however, stands on a materially different
footing from Dharma Prathishthanam (supra). Clause 45 did not
merely provide for arbitration in the event of disputes. It specifically
contemplated reference to a Sole Arbitrator nominated by DMRC.
More significantly, the clause expressly stipulated that no objection
would be raised if the Conciliator or Sole Arbitrator so nominated or
appointed was an employee of DMRC. The appointment of a DMRC
employee was, therefore, not an act undertaken contrary to the agreed
contractual mechanism. It was an eventuality expressly contemplated
and accepted by the parties when they entered into the agreement.
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37.
The second situation is more directly addressed by Indian Oil
(supra). Under the law as it stood prior to the 2015 Amendment, the
Supreme Court did not treat the employment of an Arbitrator by a
State instrumentality as, by itself, a bar to his appointment. The Court
recognised the freedom of parties under Section 11(2) of the A&C Act
to agree upon the procedure for appointment and held that the mere
fact that the named Arbitrator was an employee of one of the parties
did not, ipso facto, establish bias or render the appointment invalid.
38.
This, however, does not mean that Indian Oil (supra) treated
contractual authorisation as conclusive in every case. The Court
recognised that circumstances surrounding an appointment could
nevertheless give rise to a justifiable apprehension regarding the
independence or impartiality of the Arbitrator. The pre-2015 position
was thus not that an interested person could invariably act as an
Arbitrator, but that the mere fact of his employment by one of the
parties did not, without more, constitute a statutory bar. The enquiry
was consequently directed to the terms of the arbitration agreement
and the circumstances of the particular appointment, including
whether those circumstances gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of
bias or lack of independence.
39.
The distinction between the two statutory regimes is, therefore,
material. Under the law prevailing prior to 23.10.2015, the
employment of an Arbitrator with one of the parties, including a State
instrumentality,
did
not,
by
itself,
constitute
a
statutory
disqualification. The post-2015 regime, however, introduced an
express statutory bar through Section 12(5), read with the Seventh
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Schedule. That statutory consequence cannot be retrospectively
imported into an appointment made under the earlier regime merely
because the factual circumstance which now attracts statutory
ineligibility was already present at the time of such appointment. The
validity of the appointment in the present case must, therefore, be
examined in accordance with the legal framework applicable when the
arbitration was commenced and the Arbitrator was appointed, subject
to the specific provision contained in Section 26.
III. Section 26 and the temporal applicability of the 2015
Amendment:
40.
At this stage, it is also pertinent to refer to Section 26. The same
is reproduced hereinbelow:
“26. Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral
proceedings commenced, in accordance with the provisions of section
21 of the principal Act, before the commencement of this Act unless the
parties otherwise agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral
proceedings commenced on or after the date of commencement of this
Act.”
41.
The aforesaid provision provides that the 2015 Amendment Act
shall not apply to Arbitral proceedings commenced, in accordance
with Section 21 of the A&C Act, before the commencement of the
2015 Amendment Act, unless the parties otherwise agree. The second
part of Section 26 separately provides for application of the 2015
Amendment Act to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after its
commencement.
42.
The Supreme Court in Kochi Cricket (supra) examined the
temporal operation of Section 26 and held that the first part of the
provision operates with reference to arbitral proceedings commenced
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before the coming into force of the 2015 Amendment Act, while the
amended provisions may apply to proceedings before the Court
commenced after the Amendment Act came into force, in accordance
with the statutory scheme. For the present controversy, the material
aspect of the decision is that the applicability of the amended
provisions to arbitral proceedings is determined with reference to the
date of commencement of such proceedings under Section 21 of the
A&C Act, subject to the qualification contained in Section 26 itself
that the parties may otherwise agree. This principle was subsequently
reiterated by the Supreme Court in S.P. Singla (supra).
43.
In S.P. Singla (supra), the Supreme Court considered whether a
general contractual stipulation providing for the application of
statutory modifications and re-enactments could, by itself, constitute
an agreement within the meaning of Section 26 so as to attract the
amended provisions. While the Delhi High Court in Ratna
Infrastructure Projects (P) Ltd. v. Meja Urja Nigam (P) Ltd.31 had
taken the view that such a clause was sufficient to satisfy Section 26,
the Supreme Court, without expressing any opinion on the correctness
of that decision, held that the clause relied upon in the case before it
could not be treated as an agreement between the parties for applying
the amended Act. Since the arbitral proceedings had commenced in
2013, the Court held that the amended provisions could not be
invoked. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are
reproduced hereunder:
“15. Drawing our attention to the wordings in Clause (65) „that
the agreement is subject to any statutory modification or re31
2017 SCC OnLine Del 7808
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enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder and for the time
being shall apply to the arbitration proceeding under this clause‟ the
learned Senior Counsel contended that these words would certainly
attract Section 12(5) of the Act as amended with effect from 23-102015. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon
the Delhi High Court judgment in Ratna Infrastructure Projects (P)
Ltd. v. Meja Urja Nigam (P) Ltd. [Ratna Infrastructure Projects (P)
Ltd. v. Meja Urja Nigam (P) Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7808]
wherein interpreting the similar words in a contract, the Delhi High
Court held that those words satisfy the requirement of Section 26
(amended Act of 2015) of there being an agreement between the
parties that the Act as amended with effect from 23-10-2015 will apply
and held as under : (SCC OnLine Del paras 22-23)
“22. … The words „any statutory modification or reenactment thereof and the rules made thereunder and for the
time being in force shall apply to the arbitration…‟ satisfies the
requirement of Section 26 of there being an agreement between
the parties that the Act as amended with effect from 23-10-2015
will apply. The Court is not prepared to draw the fine distinction
between „agree‟ and „agreed‟. Once the amendment to the clause
clearly stated that all statutory modifications and re-enactments
would apply, then there is no need for further agreement in that
respect after 23-10-2015. The plea of the respondent in this regard
is rejected.
23. The net result is that Section 12(5) as amended with effect
from 23-10-2015 would apply. Section 12(5) clearly prohibits the
employee of one of the parties from being an arbitrator. This would
straightway disqualify Mr Kher who happens to be a serving GM
of the respondent. Therefore, it is to no avail that the respondent
has by its letter dated 21-8-2016 appointed Mr Kher as an
arbitrator to adjudicate Arbitration Cases Nos. 1 of 2013 and 1 of
2014. His mandate stands terminated.”
16. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case,
we are not inclined to go into the merits of this contention of the
appellant nor examine the correctness or otherwise of the above view
taken by the Delhi High Court in Ratna Infrastructure Projects case
[Ratna Infrastructure Projects (P) Ltd. v. Meja Urja Nigam (P) Ltd.,
2017 SCC OnLine Del 7808] ; suffice it to note that as per Section 26
of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, the
provisions of the amended 2015 Act shall not apply to the arbitral
proceedings commenced in accordance with the provisions of
Section 21 of the principal Act before the commencement of the
Amendment Act unless the parties otherwise agree. In the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the proviso in Clause (65) of the
general conditions of the contract cannot be taken to be the
agreement between the parties so as to apply the provisions of the
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amended Act. As per Section 26 of the Act, the provisions of the
Amendment Act, 2015 shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings
commenced on or after the date of commencement of the
Amendment Act, 2015 (w.e.f. 23-10-2015). In the present case,
arbitration proceedings commenced way back in 2013, much prior to
coming into force of the amended Act and therefore, provisions of
the amended Act cannot be invoked.
(Emphasis supplied.)
44.
Section 26 thus assumes significance in determining the
statutory framework against which the constitution of the Arbitral
Tribunal is to be examined. Where the arbitral proceedings had
commenced before 23.10.2015, the amended provisions cannot be
applied merely on the ground that the circumstances attracting those
provisions continued thereafter. Such proceedings remain governed by
the pre-amendment regime unless the parties have otherwise agreed to
the application of the amended Act within the meaning of Section
26.In the present case, therefore, the legality of the appointment made
in March 2015 has to be examined under the law then in force. The
statutory disqualification introduced by Section 12(5), read with the
Seventh Schedule, cannot be retrospectively applied to that
appointment in the absence of such an agreement.
IV.
Hanson Agro and the three categories:
45.
Learned counsel representing the Respondent has placed a
reliance upon the recent judgment of this Court in Hanson Agro
(supra), decided on 01.09.2026, which provides for a comprehensive
framework for addressing precisely this transitional question. The
petitions before the Court were classified into three categories
depending upon the dates of commencement of arbitration,
constitution of the Tribunal, the Award and the subsequent Section 34
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proceedings.
i.
Category A consisted of arbitrations commenced and
Awards rendered before 23.10.2015, with Section 34 proceedings
instituted thereafter.
ii.
Category B consisted of arbitrations commenced before
23.10.2015, but where the Awards and Section 34 proceedings
took place after the 2015 Amendment.
iii.
Category C concerned cases where the arbitration
agreement itself contained a stipulation contemplating subsequent
statutory modification or re-enactment of the arbitration law.
46.
Hanson Agro (supra) makes the central proposition clear: in
Categories A and B, the fact that the Award or the Section 34
proceedings occurred after 23.10.2015 does not retrospectively subject
the constitution of the Tribunal to Section 12(5) and the Seventh
Schedule. The legality of the constitution of the Tribunal is to be
examined with reference to the legal regime applicable when the
Arbitral proceedings commenced and the Tribunal was constituted.
The Court specifically observed that the subsequent insertion of
Section 12(5) cannot, by itself, convert an appointment which was
legally permissible when made into one which was statutorily
prohibited.
47.
Hanson Agro (supra) also considered and distinguished the
argument founded upon Bhadra International (supra). The Court
recognised that Bhadra International (supra) affirms the fundamental
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requirements of independence, impartiality and fairness and treats a
Section 12(5) ineligibility objection as going to the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal. However, Bhadra International (supra) did not decide that
every Tribunal constituted prior to 23.10.2015, which would
subsequently fall within the Seventh Schedule, stood retrospectively
invalidated. As Hanson Agro (supra) explains, the statutory
consequence introduced by Section 12(5) cannot be retrospectively
substituted for the legal position which prevailed when the
appointment was made.
48.
The present case, however, requires a further inquiry because
Clause 45 contains the words that the arbitration proceedings shall be
governed by the A&C Act “as amended from time to time including
provisions in force at the time the reference is made”. The case,
therefore, cannot be disposed of merely by placing it within Category
B. It raises the precise question addressed by Hanson Agro (supra)
under Category C, namely whether the parties had otherwise agreed,
through the arbitration agreement, to subject an arbitration
commenced before 23.10.2015 to subsequent amendments in the
arbitration law.
V.
Clause 45 and the Category C inquiry:
49.
The mere presence of a contractual reference to statutory
amendments does not, by itself, resolve the question of applicability of
the amended regime. The contractual language has to be examined in
its entirety to ascertain the intention of the parties, having regard to the
nature and scope of the reference to future statutory changes. The
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subsequent conduct of the parties may also be relevant where it sheds
light on whether they, in fact, proceeded on the basis that the amended
statutory regime governed their arbitration.
50.
In this context, Hanson Agro (supra) considers the decisions in
Ratnam Sudesh Iyer v. Jackie Shroff32 and Jagdish Chand Gupta
(supra). In Ratnam Sudesh Iyer (supra), the reference to the A&C
Act “or any amendment thereto” was not regarded, by itself, as
sufficient to establish an agreement under Section 26 to apply the
2015 Amendment Act to an arbitration which had already
commenced. On the other hand, Jagdish Chand Gupta (supra)
involved contractual language referring to “statutory modification”,
coupled with subsequent conduct which was considered relevant in
determining the parties‟ understanding of the applicable regime. The
significance of these decisions, as explained in Hanson Agro (supra),
lies in examining the particular contractual language and the
surrounding conduct, rather than treating every reference to future
amendments as having the same legal effect.
51.
Clause 45 must, therefore, be examined as a whole. It does
contain the expression “as amended from time to time”, which lends
some support to the Respondent‟s submission that the parties
contemplated that subsequent amendments to the A&C Act could
govern their arbitration. The Respondent can accordingly contend that
the clause was intended to keep the contractual reference to the A&C
Act aligned with subsequent statutory amendments, including Section
12(5) when it was introduced.
2021 SCC OnLine SC 1032
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52.
At the same time, Clause 45 contains a further stipulation
referring to the “provisions in force at the time the reference is made”.
That stipulation cannot be disregarded while determining the temporal
operation of the clause. In the present case, the reference was made on
03.06.2014,
and
the
arbitral
proceedings
had
consequently
commenced before the 2015 Amendment came into force. At that
point, Section 12(5) and the Seventh Schedule did not form part of the
A&C Act.
53.
The two expressions in Clause 45 therefore have to be read
together. The words “as amended from time to time” indicate that the
parties did not intend their contractual reference to be confined
permanently to the text of the A&C Act as it stood on the date of
execution of the agreement. However, the reference to the “provisions
in force at the time the reference is made” provides a specific
temporal reference for determining the provisions applicable to the
arbitration. The clause can accordingly not be read as an unqualified
agreement that every subsequent amendment to the A&C Act would
automatically govern an arbitration which had already commenced.
54.
This reading also accords with the scheme of Section 26. The
statutory position is that the 2015 Amendment does not apply to
arbitral proceedings commenced before 23.10.2015, unless the parties
otherwise agree. Where reliance is placed upon a contractual provision
as constituting such an agreement, the intention to depart from the
statutory rule must emerge from the terms of that provision read in
their proper context. A clause which, on a fair reading, also identifies
the applicable provisions by reference to the law in force when the
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reference is made cannot readily be construed as an unequivocal
agreement to subject an already commenced arbitration to a
subsequent substantive disqualification.
55.
The distinction drawn in Hanson Agro (supra) between the
contractual language considered in Ratnam Sudesh Iyer (supra) and
that considered in Jagdish Chand Gupta (supra) is therefore relevant,
but not determinative by the mere use of particular words. What has to
be ascertained is whether, on a reading of the particular clause and the
conduct of the parties, there is a sufficiently clear indication that the
parties intended the amended statutory regime to govern an arbitration
which had already commenced. The inquiry is thus one of contractual
intention in the context of Section 26, rather than an automatic
consequence flowing from the words “as amended from time to time”.
56.
In the present case, the subsequent conduct of the parties does
not materially alter the position emerging from the language of Clause
45. The Arbitrator was appointed on 24.03.2015 and the
first/preliminary meeting was held on 27.05.2015. The proceedings
thereafter continued, pleadings were filed, issues were framed on
16.08.2016 and the arbitration ultimately culminated in the Award
dated 21.07.2017. However, no material has been brought to the
notice of this Court showing that, after 23.10.2015, the parties
expressly treated the 2015 Amendment as applicable to the
constitution of the Tribunal or otherwise proceeded on the basis that
Section 12(5) governed the Arbitrator‟s eligibility.
57.
The mere continuation of proceedings after 23.10.2015 cannot,
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without more, be regarded as an agreement to apply the amended Act.
Such an approach would result in the amended regime becoming
applicable to every arbitration which commenced before 23.10.2015
but continued thereafter, notwithstanding the express qualification
contained in Section 26. Continuation of an arbitration is, therefore,
not by itself sufficient to establish the requisite agreement. There must
be some material indicating that the parties intended to subject the
pending arbitration to the amended statutory regime.
58.
The present case also does not involve any subsequent written
agreement by which the parties expressly adopted the amended Act,
nor is there any material indicating that, after 23.10.2015, the parties
invoked Section 12(5) or otherwise sought to alter the constitution of
the Tribunal on the basis of the amended provisions. The subsequent
conduct, therefore, does not provide any independent basis for reading
Clause 45 as an agreement under Section 26 to apply the 2015
Amendment to the present arbitration.
59.
The reliance placed by the Respondent on S.P. Singla (supra)
must also be considered in this context. The Supreme Court in that
case approached the question by reference to Section 26 and declined
to treat the contractual provision relied upon before it as sufficient to
apply the amended Act to an arbitration commenced prior to
23.10.2015. Clause 45 in the present case is undoubtedly more
elaborate and contains the additional expression “as amended from
time to time”. That expression cannot, however, be considered in
isolation. When the clause is read as a whole, including its reference
to the “provisions in force at the time the reference is made”, and in
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the absence of subsequent conduct demonstrating that the parties
intended to adopt the amended regime, it does not, in the view of this
Court, evince a sufficiently clear agreement to displace the rule
contained in Section 26 and retrospectively subject the present
arbitration to the statutory disqualification introduced by Section
12(5).
60.
The reliance placed by the Appellant upon D.V. Anand (supra)
and Avneet Soni (supra) also has to be understood in the context of
the question of temporal applicability of the 2015 Amendment Act.
Those decisions recognise that the validity of the constitution of an
Arbitral Tribunal has to be examined with reference to the statutory
regime governing the arbitration and the circumstances in which the
Tribunal came to be constituted. They do not, however, dispense with
the requirement of examining the terms of the particular arbitration
agreement where Section 26 permits the parties to agree to the
application of the amended regime.
61.
In the present case, that inquiry has already been undertaken in
the context of Clause 45. The clause does not, when read as a whole,
furnish a sufficiently clear basis for concluding that the parties
intended to subject an arbitration already commenced in 2014, and a
Tribunal constituted in March 2015, to the statutory disqualification
subsequently introduced by Section 12(5). These authorities,
therefore, do not alter the conclusion reached above on the
applicability of the amended provisions.
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VI. Whether the appointment was nevertheless invalid under
the pre-2015 law:
62.
Having held that Section 12(5) and the Seventh Schedule
cannot be retrospectively applied to the present arbitration, the inquiry
does not end. The Respondent‟s challenge must still be examined
under the law which governed the arbitration at the relevant time.
63.
As noticed hereinabove, Dharma Pratishthanam (supra)
establishes that a party cannot depart from the appointment
mechanism prescribed by the arbitration agreement. That principle,
however, assists the Respondent only if the appointment made by
DMRC was outside the authority conferred by Clause 45. In the
present case, the contractual position is to the contrary. Clause 45
specifically contemplated that unresolved disputes would be referred
to a Sole Arbitrator nominated by DMRC. The contractual mechanism
thus expressly conferred upon DMRC the power which it
subsequently exercised.
64.
The Respondent may contend that, notwithstanding the
contractual language, a party interested in the outcome of a dispute
could not appoint the person who was to adjudicate that dispute. Such
an argument derives considerable force from the subsequent
jurisprudence in TRF (supra), Perkins (supra), CORE (supra) and
Bhadra (supra). However, those authorities operate within, and give
effect to, the statutory and jurisprudential developments which
culminated in the post-2015 regime. They cannot be used to
retrospectively supply a statutory prohibition which did not exist on
24.03.2015.
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65.
The pre-2015 position stated in Indian Oil (supra) is directly
relevant on this aspect. The Supreme Court was conscious of the fact
that the Arbitrator could be an employee of the State or a statutory
corporation which was itself a party to the contract. Yet it held that
such employment did not, by itself, establish bias or lack of
independence. The Court instead required examination of the
circumstances of the particular appointment.
66.
In the present case, the contractual provision goes even further.
It expressly records that there would be no objection to the Conciliator
or Sole Arbitrator being an employee of DMRC. Thus, this is not a
case where an employee was selected contrary to an agreed
qualification or appointment mechanism. The parties, at the time of
entering into the agreement, consciously contemplated the possibility
of appointment of a DMRC employee.
67.
This aspect also distinguishes the present case from Dharma
Pratishthanam (supra). In Dharma Pratishthanam (supra), the
unilateral appointment was challenged because the contractual
mechanism did not authorise the manner in which the Arbitrator had
been appointed. Here, the authority to nominate the Sole Arbitrator is
expressly found in the contract. Consequently, the principle that
parties must adhere to the agreed procedure does not invalidate the
appointment, rather, it supports the appointment made in conformity
with that procedure.
68.
The Respondent may nevertheless rely upon the principle of
nemo judex in causa sua and submit that the requirements of
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independence and impartiality, as reflected in Section 12 and Section
18 of the A&C Act, existed even prior to the 2015 Amendment. There
can be no dispute with the broader proposition that an Arbitrator was
required to act independently and impartially under the unamended
Act as well. The significance of the 2015 Amendment Act, however,
was that it attached a specific statutory consequence of ineligibility to
the relationships enumerated in the Seventh Schedule.
69.
The distinction, therefore, is not between a pre-2015 regime in
which independence and impartiality were irrelevant and a post-2015
regime in which they became relevant. The distinction is between the
general requirement of independence and impartiality which existed
under the unamended Act and the specific statutory disqualification
subsequently introduced by Section 12(5), read with the Seventh
Schedule.
Consequently,
if
the
Respondent
had
established
circumstances demonstrating actual bias or giving rise to justifiable
doubts as to the independence or impartiality of the particular
Arbitrator, such a challenge could have been examined under the preamendment law. The mere fact, however, that the Arbitrator was an
employee of DMRC did not, by itself, constitute such a statutory bar
under the law then prevailing.
70.
There is also no material before this Court demonstrating that
the learned Sole Arbitrator was the officer who had taken the decision
which was the subject matter of the arbitration, that he had himself
dealt with the underlying contractual dispute in a manner giving rise to
a reasonable apprehension of bias, or that he was the direct
subordinate of an officer whose decision was under challenge. The
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declaration furnished by the learned Sole Arbitrator at the
commencement of the proceedings, stating that he had no personal
interest in the outcome and that there were no circumstances giving
rise to justifiable doubts regarding his independence or impartiality, is
also a relevant circumstance, though not by itself determinative of the
question.
71.
The Respondent‟s challenge, as advanced before the learned
District Judge and before this Court, is principally founded upon the
proposition that a serving employee of DMRC was statutorily
ineligible to act as an Arbitrator. That proposition is correct for an
arbitration to which Section 12(5) applies. It does not, however,
establish that the same appointment was prohibited under the law
applicable on 24.03.2015.
VII. Effect of the subsequent judgments relied upon by the
Respondent:
72.
The reliance placed by the Respondent upon TRF (supra),
Perkins (supra), Voestalpine (supra), CORE (supra) and Bhadra
International (supra) must consequently be understood in the proper
temporal context. TRF (supra) and Perkins (supra) establish the
consequences of Section 12(5) in the post-2015 regime. Voestalpine
(supra) deals with the requirements of independence and impartiality
under the amended Act in the context of a panel mechanism. CORE
(supra) considers equality at the appointment stage and the
constitutional dimensions of unilateral appointment, while Bhadra
International (supra) concerns an appointment made in 2016, when
Section 12(5) was already in force.
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73.
None of these decisions holds that Section 12(5) operates
retrospectively so as to invalidate every appointment made before
23.10.2015. On the contrary, Hanson Agro (supra), after considering
this entire line of authority, has expressly held that a post-amendment
statutory disqualification cannot retrospectively be substituted for the
law applicable when the Tribunal was constituted.
74.
The reliance upon Bhadra International (supra) does not
advance the Respondent‟s case on the question of the temporal
applicability of Section 12(5). In Bhadra International (supra), the
arbitration was invoked on 27.11.2015, after Section 12(5) had come
into force. The Supreme Court accordingly examined the appointment
within the statutory regime introduced by the 2015 Amendment Act
and held that the Chairman, being ineligible under Section 12(5) read
with the Seventh Schedule, could not exercise the contractual power
of appointment. The temporal foundation of that decision is materially
different from the present case, where the arbitration had commenced
in 2014 and the Sole Arbitrator was appointed in March 2015.
75.
The reliance placed by the Respondent upon Ellora Paper Mills
(supra) also has to be considered in the factual and statutory context
of that decision. Although the Arbitral Tribunal in that case had been
constituted in 2001, the Supreme Court examined whether the arbitral
proceedings could, in law, be said to have commenced before the
coming into force of the 2015 Amendment Act, having regard to the
fact that no further steps had been taken in the arbitration after the
constitution of the Tribunal. The decision thus turned upon the
question of commencement of the arbitral proceedings within the
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meaning of Section 21 and Section 26. It cannot be read as laying
down a general rule that an arbitration which had actually commenced
before 23.10.2015 would nevertheless become subject to Section
12(5) merely because the Award was rendered thereafter.
76.
The present case stands on a materially different footing. Here,
the Respondent invoked arbitration on 03.06.2014, the Sole Arbitrator
was appointed on 24.03.2015, he entered upon the reference and held
the first and preliminary meeting on 27.05.2015, and the parties
thereafter filed their respective pleadings before the 2015 Amendment
came into force. The arbitral proceedings had thus commenced and
were being conducted prior to 23.10.2015. Ellora Paper Mills
(supra), therefore, does not displace the application of Section 26 to
the present arbitration.
77.
The reliance placed by the Respondent upon R.K. Pandey
(supra) is likewise distinguishable. In R.K. Pandey (supra), the
Supreme Court was dealing with a fundamentally different factual and
jurisdictional situation. The Court found that the very existence of the
arbitration agreement was not established, that Respondent No. 1 was
not a signatory to the purported agreement, and, importantly, that the
unilateral appointment of the arbitrators was contrary to the
appointment mechanism contained in the alleged arbitration
agreement. The observations in Paragraph No.23 regarding equality,
independence, impartiality and the effect of unilateral appointment
were made in that factual context and with reference to the absence of
a valid contractual foundation for the arbitration itself. The Supreme
Court ultimately held that the awards suffered from a fundamental
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lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and were null and unenforceable.
78.
CORE (supra) also does not govern the validity of the present
appointment. The Constitution Bench reaffirmed the principles laid
down in TRF (supra) and Perkins (supra) in relation to sole
Arbitrators, while separately considering the validity of panel-based
appointment
mechanisms
for
three-member
Tribunals.
The
prospective direction issued by the Constitution Bench was expressly
confined to appointments to three-member Tribunals. In the present
case, however, the Arbitrator was appointed as a Sole Arbitrator in
March 2015, prior to the coming into force of Section 12(5). The
question here is consequently not whether the post-2015 principles
governing sole Arbitrators are legally correct, but whether those
principles can be applied to retrospectively invalidate an appointment
made under the pre-amendment regime.
VIII. Effect of the Respondent’s participation in the arbitration:
79.
The Respondent‟s participation in the arbitral proceedings also
does not require separate consideration as constituting a waiver of
Section 12(5). The present conclusion does not rest upon any waiver
of a statutory disqualification. Since Section 12(5) is not applicable to
the appointment in question by virtue of Section 26, the requirements
governing a post-dispute written waiver under the proviso to Section
12(5) do not arise. The participation of the Respondent in the
proceedings may, at most, be relevant to any independent objection
founded upon the pre-amendment law relating to bias or impartiality.
No such objection has been established on the material before this
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Court.
CONCLUSION:
80.
For the foregoing reasons, the appointment of the Sole
Arbitrator on 24.03.2015 cannot be invalidated by retrospectively
applying Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule. The
arbitration proceedings had commenced prior to 23.10.2015 and the
parties have not otherwise agreed, within the meaning of Section 26,
to subject the present arbitration to the amended statutory regime. The
appointment was, moreover, expressly authorised by Clause 45 and
the mere fact that the person appointed was an employee of DMRC
did not, under the law then prevailing, constitute a statutory bar to his
appointment. No separate circumstance demonstrating actual bias or
giving rise to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality
has been established.
81.
The learned District Judge, having proceeded on the basis that
the appointment of the Sole Arbitrator was rendered impermissible by
Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, therefore erred in
applying the post-2015 statutory regime to an arbitration which had
commenced and in which the Arbitral Tribunal had been constituted
prior to 23.10.2015.
82.
The Impugned Judgment dated 23.10.2024 is, accordingly, set
aside insofar as it sets aside the Arbitral Award dated 21.07.2017 on
the aforesaid ground. The challenge to the constitution of the Arbitral
Tribunal is rejected.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
FAO(COMM) 23/2025
15:04:24
83.
The present Appeal is allowed in the above terms. The pending
application stands closed.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
BHARAT PARASHAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 30, 2026
jai/shah
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
FAO(COMM) 23/2025
15:04:24
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