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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment pronounced on: 18.02.2026
+
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 and CM APPLs.58570/2025, 58572/2025
DELHI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Milanka Chaudhary, Ms. Swet
Shikha and Ms. Shreya, Advocates.
versus
CAMBATA AVIATION WORKERS ASSOCIATION THROUGH
MR RAMESH GUPTA & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Vikrant N. Goyal, Ms. Priyanka
S. Aneja and Mr. Yash Basoya,
Advocates for R/UOI.
+
W.P.(C) 15908/2025 and CM APPLs.65021/2025, 65023/2025
DELHI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Milanka Chaudhary, Ms. Swet
Shikha and Ms. Shreya, Advocates.
versus
CAMBATA AVIATION WORKERS ASSOCIATION & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Vikrant N. Goyal, Ms. Priyanka
S. Aneja and Mr. Yash Basoya,
Advocates for R/UOI.
+
W.P.(C) 15923/2025 and CM APPLs.65134/2025, 65136/2025
DELHI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Milanka Chaudhary, Ms. Swet
Shikha and Ms. Shreya, Advocates.
versus
CAMBATA AVIATION WORKERS ASSOCIATION & ORS.
.....Respondents
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
Through:
Mr. Vikrant N. Goyal, Ms. Priyanka
S. Aneja and Mr. Yash Basoya,
Advocates for R/UOI.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA
JUDGMENT
1.
The present petitions have been filed by the Petitioner, Delhi
International Airport Limited (“DIAL”), under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, assailing
References dated 04.08.2017,
24.08.2018 and 01.04.2019 (“Impugned References”) in W.P.(C) Nos.
14304/2025, 15908/2025 and 15923/2025 respectively, issued by the
Central Government under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (“ID Act”), whereby the industrial dispute raised by the
Respondent No.1 Association/ Cambata Aviation Workers Association
has been entertained and directions have been issued for consideration
of reinstatement and continuity of service. Vide the consequential order
dated 04.06.2025 (“Impugned Order”) passed by the learned Central
Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court No. II, New Delhi
(“CGIT”), the Petitioner’s application/s seeking amendment of its
written statement before the learned CGIT, had been dismissed. The
aforesaid Impugned References and Impugned Order have been assailed
by way of the present petitions.
2.
The core grievance of the Petitioner is that the workmen of the
Respondent No.1 Association were never employed by DIAL, but by
the Respondent No. 3/ Cambata Aviation Private Limited (“CAPL”), a
Digitally Signed
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19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
ground-handling service provider, and therefore, no industrial dispute
could exist between DIAL and the said workmen. The Petitioner
contends that the Impugned References itself are fundamentally
misconceived, and the continuation of proceedings before the CGIT
amounts to an abuse of process.
3.
The Petitioner is further aggrieved by the Impugned Order passed
by the learned CGIT, rejecting the Petitioner’s application for
amendment of its written statement under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. It is
the Petitioner’s case that the proposed amendment was necessary for
effective adjudication of the dispute, and for placing on record its
foundational objection regarding the non-maintainability of the
Respondent No.1’s claim before the said forum. The Petitioner
challenges the said order on the ground that the refusal to permit the
amendment has caused serious prejudice and vitiates the continuation of
the proceedings before the learned CGIT.
4.
The Respondent No.1 Association, on the other hand, contends
that the arrangement between DIAL and the Respondent workmen was
in the nature of a contractual engagement through an intermediary, and
that, in reality, the work performed by them was under the control and
supervision of DIAL and was an integral part of its operations. It is their
case that DIAL was the principal employer of their services and that the
dispute raised by them raises substantial questions relating to their
employment and termination. According to the Respondent No.1
Association, the Impugned References made by the appropriate
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W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
Government are based on the existence of a genuine industrial dispute
and therefore calls for an adjudication on merits.
FACTUAL MATRIX
5.
The Petitioner/ DIAL is a company incorporated under the laws
of India, which came into existence by the way of the Policy of the
Government of India for a Public Private Partnership Model, which
thereafter entered into an Operation Management Development
Agreement (“OMDA”) with the Airports Authority of India. As per the
said Agreement, DIAL has been awarded an exclusive concession to
develop, finance, design, construct, modernize, operate and regulate the
use of the Indira Gandhi International Airport, Delhi (“Airport”) by
third parties.
6.
The Respondent No.1 Association is a group of employees who
were engaged in ground handling and allied operational services at the
Airport. The nature of the services performed by the Respondent
workmen pertained to day-to-day airport operations and were carried
out within the Airport premises.
7.
The Respondent No.3/ CAPL is a company incorporated under
the laws of India, which entered into a concession agreement with
DIAL in order to execute ground handling operations at the Airport.
These operations include the services necessary for the aircraft’s arrival
at, and departure from an airport other than air traffic control. The
Respondent workmen engaged through CAPL were deployed at the
Digitally Signed
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W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
Airport for the performance of the said services during the relevant
period i.e., since April 2010.
8.
On 27.04.2010, DIAL entered into a Concession Agreement with
CAPL, in terms of which, the CAPL had been awarded concession to
undertake, execute and implement the ground handling services at the
Airport. The said services inter-alia include the services of ramp
handling and traffic handling activities, as mentioned in Schedules I and
II of Airport Authority of India (Ground Handling Services)
Regulations, 2018.
9.
Pursuant thereto, CAPL deployed the Respondent workmen for
the provision of the aforesaid services at the Airport. The said workmen
had been working with CAPL for the last couple of years before CAPL
entered into the Concession Agreement with DIAL. It is not in dispute
that (i) the work was performed entirely within the airport premises; (ii)
the work was continuous and perennial in nature; (iii) any substitution
of a workman by the CAPL had to be first approved by DIAL; and (iv)
the training program specifying the manner in which CAPL proposes to
induct and train its employees had to be approved by DIAL.
10.
CAPL provided ground handling services to various airlines at
the Airport, till August 2016. Subsequently, vide letter dated
16.08.2016, CAPL informed DIAL that since all the airlines had
stopped availing the ground handling services of CAPL, it would not be
able to adhere to its obligations under the aforesaid Concession
Agreement.
Digitally Signed
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W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
11.
Vide letter dated 27.09.2016, the Respondent No.1 Association
wrote to CAPL and DIAL, wherein it stated that CAPL has withheld the
wages of its workmen since April 2016 and has suspended their work
arbitrarily from 18.08.2016. It alleged that DIAL, being a principal
employer was duty bound to ensure that CAPL complies with labour
laws, failing which, DIAL is also vicariously liable for the said illegal
termination.
12.
In the above context, the Impugned References came to be issued
by the Respondent No.2/ Central Government, whereby it formulated
an opinion that an industrial dispute exists between DIAL/ CAPL and
the Respondent No.1’s workmen, and therefore, it is desirable for the
same to be referred for adjudication before the CGIT under Section 10
of the ID Act.
13.
Pursuant to such References being made, the Respondent No.1
Association submitted its Claim Petitions/ Statement of Claims
(“SOCs”) before the concerned CGIT wherein it is stated that CAPL
was their Contractor, and DIAL was their Principal Employer, and that
the two companies were acting in collusion with each other. It is further
averred in the said SOCs that CAPL stopped its services at the Airport
in an arbitrary manner, which resulted in termination of the employment
of all the workmen of the Respondent No.1 Association, without any
notice. It is submitted that the said workmen have been out of their jobs
since the day of the illegal termination i.e. 18.08.2016. The said
Association sought for a direction to the CAPL to reinstate its workmen
back on duty with full back wages or direct the DIAL to reinstate them
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
either on its own roll or through any other ground handling agency
appointed by DIAL which has taken over the work of CAPL. The
reliefs sought before the learned CGIT are reproduced hereunder:
“1) Pass an award in favour of the workmen and against the
managements thereby directing the management of M/s. Cambata
Aviation Pvt. Ltd to reinstate the workmen back on duty along with full
back wages and consequential benefits.
2) Or in alternatively direct the management of M/s. Delhi International
Airport Ltd to reinstate the workmen either on its own roll or through any
ground handling agency appointed by DIAL which has taken over the
work of M/s. Camabata Aviation Pvt. Ltd. at IGI Airport, Delhi.
3) And pass any other order in favour of the workmen which this Hon'ble
Court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice of justice.”
14.
Thereafter, DIAL submitted its reply to the SOC, refuting all the
allegations levelled upon it therein and seeking its deletion from the
array of parties. It is averred in the reply that DIAL is not a proper or
necessary party to the dispute since it is not the principal employer of
the Respondent workmen, as has been alleged in SOCs. It is further
stated that CAPL does not provide any services to DIAL, but provides
services to the respective airlines under independent contractual
arrangements, and hence, there is no relationship between DIAL and the
Respondent workmen.
15.
Thereafter, DIAL filed an application under Order I Rule 10 of
the CPC thereby seeking its deletion from the array of parties on similar
grounds as averred in its reply, as aforementioned. However, vide order
dated 08.08.2018 (in one of the matters before the CGIT), the learned
CGIT dismissed the aforesaid deletion application, inter-alia on the
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W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
basis that there are specific allegations against DIAL in the SOCs, and
as such, the deletion application ought to be dismissed.
16.
Thereafter, the proceedings continued and trial commenced
before the learned CGIT. In the meantime, DIAL filed applications
under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC seeking amendment in its written
statement submitted before the CGIT. By way of the said applications,
DIAL sought to add certain additional legal objections with regard to
the maintainability of the claim raised by the Respondent workmen
before the learned CGIT. The said objections are reproduced hereunder:
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
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W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
17.
On 04.06.2025, the Impugned order was passed by the CGIT,
whereby, the learned CGIT dismissed the said application observing as
under:
“It is settled that once the trial has commenced, the court doesn’t usually
allow any amendment, unless the party seeking amendment satisfies the
court that, despite their due diligence, the issue could not have been
raised prior to the commencement of trial. Here, it is a matter of fact that
the trial had commenced already. The workmen's evidence was closed,
and the matter was subsequently listed for management's evidence. There
is nothing on record to indicate that management-2 was unable to seek
an amendment earlier despite due diligence. Moreover, the proposed
amendments are not necessary to determine the real controversy between
the parties, since the parties have already taken their pleas in their
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
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W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
respective statements. In these circumstances, I don’t find any merit in the
application. Accordingly, the same stands dismissed.”
18.
In September/ October 2025, the present petitions came to be
filed by DIAL seeking the quashing and setting aside of the Impugned
References and Impugned Order, along with a stay application seeking
stay of the same.
19.
Vide order dated 16.09.2025 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No.
14304/2025 and vide order dated 15.10.2025 passed by this Court in
W.P. (C) No. 15908/ 2025 and W.P. (C) No. 15923/2025, notice was
issued in the present petitions, and the proceedings before the learned
CGIT were stayed.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
20.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Impugned
References issued by the Central Government inadvertently uses the
name of the Petitioner and the Respondent No.3 interchangeably, when
the two are distinct entities carrying on distinct businesses. It is
submitted that the employment and termination of the Respondent
workmen was admittedly done by CAPL and that the Impugned
References could not have presumed that the termination was done by
the DIAL.
21.
It is further submitted that by omitting the name of CAPL in the
second part of the Impugned Reference, CAPL has been let off the
hook, and it is assumed that it is the sole liability of DIAL to reinstate
Digitally Signed
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19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
the Respondent workmen either on its own rolls or any other ground
handling agency.
22.
Further, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the
Petitioner that the Impugned Order passed by the learned CGIT is
erroneous inasmuch as the Petitioner’s amendment application for
amendment of its written statement had been dismissed. Learned
counsel for the Petitioner submits that as per the said application, the
Petitioner raised additional grounds objecting to the locus standi of the
Respondent No.1 Association to raise the said industrial dispute in the
first place.
23.
It is further submitted that due to the dismissal of the said
amendments being brought on record, the additional plea of the
Petitioner regarding the absence of any principal employer relationship
with the Respondent No.1 Association could not be brought before the
learned CGIT.
24.
The Petitioner controverts existence of any relationship with the
Respondent Workmen since the Petitioner’s relationship with CAPL is
governed solely by the Concession Agreement and the License
Agreement dated 27.04.2010, on a principal-to-principal basis, and
CAPL was appointed by the Petitioner though a bidding process. It is
further submitted that the CAPL does not provide any services to the
Petitioner but only to the airlines with which CAPL enters into separate
contracts, thus raising no question of it being the principal employer of
the Respondent workmen.
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NOS. 1 & 2
25.
It is contended by the said Respondents that the management of
CAPL is their Contractor as defined under Section 2 (1) (c) of the
Contractor Labour (R & A) Act 1970 (“CLRA Act”) whereas the
management of DIAL is their Principal Employer as defined under
Section 2 (1) (g) of the CLRA Act. The said provisions are reproduced
hereunder:
“Section 2. - Definitions. — (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires—
(c) “contractor”, in relation to an establishment, means a person who
undertakes to produce a given result for the establishment, other than a
mere supply of goods of articles of manufacture to such establishment,
through contract labour or who supplies contract labour for any work of
the establishment and includes a sub-contractor.
(g) “principal employer” means—
(i) in relation to any office or department of the Government or a local
authority, the head of that office or department or such other officer as
the Government or the local authority, as the case may be, may specify in
this behalf,
(ii) in a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory and where a person
has been named as the manager of the factory under the Factories Act,
1948 (63 of 1948), the person so named,
(iii) in a mine, the owner or agent of the mine and where a person has
been named as the manager of the mine, the person so named,
(iv) in any other establishment, any person responsible for the
supervision and control of the establishment.”
26.
It is further contended that the management of CAPL had been
indulging in unfair labour practice since the year 2016, by withholding
the earned wages of the Respondent workmen since April 2016 and
thereafter completely stopping their operations at the Airport w.e.f.
18.08.2016 without any notice to the Respondent workmen. It is
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W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
submitted that, DIAL being the principal employer, should have
ensured that CAPL does not engage in such unfair labour practices.
27.
It is further submitted that such act on the part of CAPL, without
even tendering retrenchment compensation under section 25F of the ID
Act amounts to illegal termination and is void ab initio. It is submitted
that both, DIAL and CAPL were acting in collusion with each other.
28.
It is contended that such act on the part of DIAL, being the
principal employer, amounts to an unfair labour practice and illegal
termination of service, inasmuch as the work continued to exist and was
carried on through another agency, while the Respondent workmen
were arbitrarily denied continuity of employment.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Validity of the Impugned References dated 04.08.2017, 24.08.2018
and 01.04.2019 issued by the Respondent No.2
29.
At the outset, it is necessary to note that the jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with an
order of reference made under Section 10 of the ID Act is extremely
limited. The appropriate Government, at the stage of making a
reference, is not required to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute or
finally determine the rights of the parties. Its satisfaction is only prima
facie in nature as to whether an industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended.
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
30.
It is a settled principle of law that once the appropriate
Government forms an opinion that an industrial dispute exists between
the parties and refers the same for adjudication, this Court ought not to
interfere unless the reference is patently without jurisdiction, actuated
by mala fides, or relates to a dispute which is ex facie not an industrial
dispute at all. The sufficiency or correctness of the material forming the
basis of the reference cannot be examined in writ jurisdiction. In this
regard, reference is apposite to a judgment of the Constitution Bench of
the Supreme Court in “State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy” (1952) 2 SCC
606, wherein it has been observed as under:
“14. This is, however, not to say that the Government will be justified in
making a reference under Section 10(1) without satisfying itself on the
facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute
exists or is apprehended in relation to an establishment or a definite
group of establishments engaged in a particular industry, and it is also
desirable that the Government should, wherever possible, indicate the
nature of the dispute in the order of reference. But, it must be
remembered that in making a reference under Section 10(1) the
Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form
an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a
preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any less
administrative in character. The Court cannot, therefore, canvass the
order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the
Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasijudicial determination. No doubt, it will be open to a party seeking to
impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the
Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act,
and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award.
But if the dispute was an industrial dispute as defined in the Act, its
factual existence and the expediency of making a reference in the
circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for the
Government to decide upon, and it will not be competent for the Court to
hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction
merely because there was, in its opinion, no material before the
Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on
those matters. The observations in some of the decisions in Madras do
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W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
not appear to have kept this distinction in view.
15. Moreover, it may not always be possible for the Government, on the
material placed before it, to particularise the dispute in its order of
reference, for situations might conceivably arise where public interest
requires that a strike or a lockout either existing or imminent should be
ended or averted without delay, which, under the scheme of the Act,
could be done only after the dispute giving rise to it has been referred to
a Board or a Tribunal [vide Sections 10(3) and 23]. In such cases the
Government must have the power, in order to maintain industrial peace
and production, to set in motion the machinery of settlement with its
sanctions and prohibitions without stopping to enquire what specific
points the contending parties are quarrelling about, and it would
seriously, detract from the usefulness of the statutory machinery to
construe Section 10(1) as denying such power to the Government. We
find nothing in the language of that provision to compel such
construction. The Government must, of course, have sufficient knowledge
of the nature of the dispute to be satisfied that it is an industrial dispute
within the meaning of the Act, as, for instance, that it relates to
retrenchment or reinstatement. But, beyond this no obligation can be
held to lie on the Government to ascertain particulars of the disputes
before making a reference under Section 10(1) or to specify them in the
order.”
31.
In the present case, the impugned references record that a dispute
exists regarding termination, reinstatement, and continuity of service of
the Respondent workmen. The dispute raised is clearly one falling
within the definition of an “industrial dispute” under the ID Act.
Whether DIAL is, in fact, the principal employer, and whether CAPL
was a genuine contractor or a mere intermediary, are matters which
necessarily require appreciation of evidence and cannot be conclusively
determined at the threshold.
32.
In view of the aforesaid legal position and the facts of the present
case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the challenge laid by
the Petitioner to the Impugned References cannot be sustained. The
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W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
existence of an industrial dispute, as raised by the Respondent
workmen, cannot be said to be illusory or non-existent at this stage, and
the questions sought to be raised by the Petitioner touch upon disputed
issues of fact which are required to be adjudicated by the learned CGIT.
33.
Consequently, the Impugned References dated 04.08.2017,
24.08.2018 and 01.04.2019 do not warrant interference in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and the
challenge thereto is hereby rejected.
Validity of the Impugned Order dated 04.06.2025 passed by the CGIT
34.
The Petitioner also assails the Impugned Order dated 04.06.2025
passed by the learned CGIT, inter-alia rejecting the amendment
application filed by the Petitioner under Order VI Rule 17 CPC.
35.
It is not in dispute that by the time the said application was filed,
the proceedings before the learned CGIT had substantially progressed.
The evidence of the Respondent workmen had already been concluded,
and the matter was at the stage of the Petitioner’s evidence.
36.
The legal position governing amendment of pleadings at such a
belated stage is well settled. Such amendment can be permitted only if
the party seeking amendment demonstrates that, despite due diligence,
the matter sought to be raised could not have been pleaded earlier. The
burden to establish due diligence squarely lies on the party seeking
amendment. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the Division Bench
judgment of the Supreme Court in M. Revanna v. Anjanamma, (2019)
4 SCC 332, wherein it has been observed as under:
Digitally Signed
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W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
“7. Leave to amend may be refused if it introduces a totally different,
new and inconsistent case, or challenges the fundamental character of
the suit. The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC virtually prevents an
application for amendment of pleadings from being allowed after the
trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in
spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before
the commencement of the trial. The proviso, to an extent, curtails
absolute discretion to allow amendment at any stage. Therefore, the
burden is on the person who seeks an amendment after commencement of
the trial to show that in spite of due diligence, such an amendment could
not have been sought earlier. There cannot be any dispute that an
amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, and under all
circumstances. Though normally amendments are allowed in the
pleadings to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the court needs to take into
consideration whether the application for amendment is bona fide or
mala fide and whether the amendment causes such prejudice to the other
side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money.”
37.
It is also pertinent to note that in the present case, by way of the
proposed amendments, the Petitioner sought to introduce additional
legal objections relating to maintainability of the claim petitions before
the CGIT and elaborated upon the aspect of the alleged absence of any
principal employer- employee relationship with the Respondent
workmen. These objections, in substance, already formed part of the
Petitioner’s defence as taken in its original written statement and in its
application seeking deletion from the array of parties, which was also
dismissed by the learned CGIT. The Petitioner is, in any event, not
precluded from raising the legal objection/s referred to in its application
and the same does not afford any justification for the belated filing and
disrupting the progress of the matter, at an advanced stage.
38.
In Greater Mohali Area Development Authority v. Manju Jain,
(2010) 9 SCC 157, the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
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W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
26. Respondent 1 raised the plea of non-receipt of the letter of allotment
first time before the High Court. Even if it is assumed that it is correct,
the question does arise as to whether such a new plea on facts could be
agitated before the writ court. It is settled legal proposition that pure
question of law can be raised at any time of the proceedings but a
question of fact which requires investigation and inquiry, and for which
no factual foundation has been laid by a party before the court or
tribunal below, cannot be allowed to be agitated in the writ petition. If
the writ court for some compelling circumstances desires to entertain a
new factual plea the court must give due opportunity to the opposite
party to controvert the same and adduce the evidence to substantiate its
pleadings. Thus, it is not permissible for the High Court to consider a
new case on facts or mixed question of fact and law which was not the
case of the parties before the court or tribunal below. [Vide State of
U.P. v. Dr. Anupam Gupta [1993 Supp (1) SCC 594 : AIR 1992 SC 932]
, Ram Kumar Agarwal v. Thawar Das [(1999) 7 SCC 303] , Vasantha
Viswanathan v. V.K. Elayalwar [(2001) 8 SCC 133] , Anup Kumar
Kundu v. SudipCharan Chakraborty [(2006) 6 SCC 666 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 1521] , Tirupati Jute Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. [(2009)
14 SCC 406 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 338] and Sanghvi Reconditioners (P)
Ltd. v. Union of India [(2010) 2 SCC 733] .]
39.
In J. Jermons v. Aliammal, (1999) 7 SCC 382, the Supreme Court has
held as follows:31. It may be noted here that there is a fundamental difference between a
case of raising additional ground based on the pleadings and the
material available on record and a case of taking a new plea not borne
out by the pleadings. In the former case no amendment of pleadings is
required whereas in the latter it is necessary to amend the pleadings. The
court/Rent Controller in its discretion, with a view to do complete justice
between the parties, may allow a party either to raise additional ground
or take a new plea, as the case may be, if the circumstances so justify like
a plea based on subsequent events. Whereas in the former situation, the
case can be disposed of on the material on record but in the latter case
the pleadings will have to be amended and for that reason the parties
have to be given reasonable opportunity to file further pleadings and
adduce necessary evidence.”
40.
The learned CGIT has returned a categorical finding that the
Petitioner failed to demonstrate due diligence inasmuch as the
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
amendments/ objections could not be raised earlier; and that the
proposed amendments were not necessary for determination of the real
controversy between the parties. This Court finds no perversity,
illegality, or jurisdictional error in the said finding.
41.
It is also well settled that rejection of an amendment application
does not result in denial of opportunity to lead evidence in support of
the existing pleadings. The Petitioner continues to retain the right to
substantiate its defence, including its plea regarding the nature of
relationship with the Respondent workmen, by leading evidence before
the learned CGIT.
42.
The impugned order dated 04.06.2025 merely deals with an
application seeking amendment of the written statement and does not
determine, either expressly or by necessary implication, the substantive
rights of the parties. It neither adjudicates upon the question of
employer-employee relationship nor decides the entitlement of the
Respondent workmen to reinstatement, continuity of service, or any
other consequential relief. Such issues continue to remain open for
consideration before the learned CGIT.
43.
It is well settled that interlocutory orders passed in the course of
industrial adjudication ought not to be interfered with in exercise of writ
jurisdiction unless they are shown to suffer from patent illegality,
perversity, or lack of jurisdiction. The object of such restraint is to
ensure that statutory adjudicatory mechanisms are not rendered
nugatory by piecemeal interference. Reliance in this regard may be
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
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W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of D.P.
Maheshwari v. Delhi Admn., (1983) 4 SCC 293, which holds as under:
“1. ….We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted
with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to
misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in
dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary
issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a tribunal so that
a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction
of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those
who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to
wait by dragging the latter from court to court for adjudication of
peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article
226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of
workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and courts who are requested to
decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such
threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not
lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like Industrial
Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes
and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of
preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. It is also
worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Article
226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Article 136 is
primarily supervisory but the court may exercise all necessary appellate
powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction
neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to
interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special tribunals at
interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues.”
44.
The principal ground urged by the Petitioner is that rejection of
the amendment application has caused grave prejudice to its defence.
This Court is unable to accept the said contention. As noted, a perusal
of the written statement already filed by the Petitioner demonstrates that
its fundamental defence namely, the denial of any employer–employee
relationship with the Respondent workmen, and the plea of nonmaintainability, has been pleaded.
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
45.
The proposed amendments sought to elaborate or supplement the
said defence by raising additional legal objections. However, as noted
above, the absence of such elaboration does not preclude the Petitioner
from substantiating its defence on the basis of evidence or from
advancing legal submissions at the appropriate stage of adjudication.
46.
The argument that the Petitioner was compelled to seek
amendment only after Respondent No.3 was proceeded ex parte also
does not carry much weight. The burden to establish its own defence
does not shift merely because another party chooses not to contest the
proceedings. The Petitioner remains fully entitled to lead evidence and
cross-examine witnesses in accordance with law.
47.
It is also relevant to observe that industrial adjudication is
governed by principles of fairness and expeditious resolution.
Permitting amendments at a belated stage, after completion of
workmen’s evidence, would inevitably result in reopening of
proceedings and further delay, to the detriment of the workmen who
have already been out of employment for a considerable period of time.
48.
The learned CGIT, while rejecting the amendment application,
has taken into consideration the stage of the proceedings, the absence of
due diligence on the part of the Petitioner, and the fact that the
controversy between the parties was already adequately delineated by
the existing pleadings. The exercise of discretion by the learned CGIT
cannot be said to be arbitrary or perverse.
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
49.
In the circumstances, this Court finds no merit in the present
petitions. The same are, accordingly, dismissed. Pending applications
also stand disposed of.
50.
The learned CGIT is requested to proceed and conclude the
proceedings before it expeditiously, preferably within a period of eight
months from today.
SACHIN DATTA, J
FEBRUARY 18, 2026/ka
Digitally Signed
By:ABHISHEK THAKUR
19:00:20
W.P.(C) 14304/2025 & Connected Matters
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