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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.43 of 2026
Date of Decision: 10.08.2026
_________________________________________________________________________
Deepna
……...Petitioner
Versus
The Manager, HP State Agricuture and Rural Development Bank
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
For the Respondent:
Mr. Pritam Singh Chandel, Advocate.
Mr. Hamender Singh Chandel, Advocate.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 442 read
with Section 442 Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays challenge
to judgment dated 09.09.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Rohru, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.384 of 2024
affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
02.07.2024, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Court No.1, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P. in Criminal Complaint No.90-30 of
2020, whereby the learned Court below, while holding the petitioneraccused (hereinafter "accused") guilty of having committed offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short
the "Act”), convicted and sentenced her to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of four months and pay compensation to the tune of
Rs.78,846/- to the respondent-complainant (hereinafter "complainant").
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as
well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties are that
complainant-bank instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Act in
the competent Court of law, alleging therein that it advanced loan to the
tune of Rs.3,00,000/- to the accused on her request on 21-07-2019 against
Loan Account No. MULD-378 for land development. The said loan was to be
repaid in half-yearly installments along with interest, but the accused failed
to make payment of the stipulated instalments, as a result thereof, loan
account became irregular. Subsequently, with a view to regularize her loan
account and discharge her lawful liability, accused issued cheque bearing
No. 504015 dated 08.06.2020 amounting to Rs.78,846/- of HP State Cooperative Bank, Rohru, in favour of the complainant. However, aforesaid
cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned was dishonored on
12.06.2020 with the remarks "Funds Insufficient”. Immediately after receipt
of the aforesaid return memo, complainant served the accused with legal
notice dated 08.07.2020, thereby calling upon her to make the payment
good within the stipulated time, but since needful was not done within the
stipulated time, complainant had no option, but to institute proceedings
under Section 138 of the Act in the competent court of law.
3.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
by the respective parties, vide judgment/ order 02.07.2024, held the
accused guilty of her having committed offence punishable under Section
138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced her as per the
description given herein above.
4.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of
conviction recorded by the learned Court below, accused preferred an
appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohru, Himachal
Pradesh, but same was dismissed vide judgment dated 09.9.2025. In the
aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant
proceedings, praying therein for her acquittal after setting aside the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the learned Court
below.
5.
Vide order dated 02.01.2026, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below
subject to accused depositing 30% of the compensation amount and
furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the
like amount within a period of six weeks. Though aforesaid order was
complied with, but thereafter matter was repeatedly adjourned on one
pretext or the other, enabling the accused to settle the matter with the
complainant or to deposit the amount in the trial court, but in vain. Hence,
this Court has no option but to decide the case on its own merits.
6.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohru,
Himachal Pradesh, whereby judgment of conviction and order of sentence
recorded by the learned trial Court came to be upheld, this Court is not
persuaded to agree with Mr. Pritam Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the
accused, that learned Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence
in its right perspective, rather this Court finds that both the Courts below
have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and there
is no scope left for this Court to interfere. Interestingly, in the case at hand,
accused, in her statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, admitted
factum of her having availed loan from the complainant-bank as well as
issuance of cheque and signatures thereupon. However, she feigned
ignorance with regard to the dishonour of the cheque in question, despite
her having been served with legal notice. Despite sufficient opportunities,
the accused failed to lead any evidence in defence. Since factum with
regard to issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon never came to
be refuted, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the courts
below, while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which talk about
presumption in favour of holder of cheque that cheque in question was
issued
towards
discharge
of
lawful
liability.
No
doubt,
aforesaid
presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption person seeking
to rebut such presumption is expected to raise probable defence.
7.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor is able to contest existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under
Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the
offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras
No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein:
“23.
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of
Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the
legislative
objective
of
improving
the
credibility
of
negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable
presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in
the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it
must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section
138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing
of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is
usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial
transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should
guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and
the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly
high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled
position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption
under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all
preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence
which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt
or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a
defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the
accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable
defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI
Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is
not rebutted
with
regard
to
the materials
submitted
by
the
complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to
qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to
avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by
the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a
notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the
time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the
said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence,
hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not
there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof
the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have
to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in
view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is
presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this
the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct
the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment
despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a
sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
8.
Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated aforesaid law in SANJABIJ
TARI Vs. KISHORE S.BORCAR & ANR., Criminal Appeal No.1755 of
2010,
Triyambak
S.
Hegde
Vs.
Sripad.,
(2022)
SCC
742,
Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418, APS FOREX
SERVICES PVT. LTD. Vs. SHAKTI INTERNATIONAL FASHION LINKERS
& ORS., (2020) 12 SCC 724, Rohitbhai J Patel Vs. The State Of
Gujarat & Anr., (2019) 18 SCC 106, Rajesh Jain Vs. Ajay Singh, SLP
(Crl.) No.12802 of 2022.
9.
To the contrary, complainant, with a view to prove its case,
examined Manager of the complainant bank, namely, Sh. Murat Singh
Rukta as CW-1, who tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ext. C1/CW1, reiterating therein the contents of the complaint. Besides above, he also
tendered in evidence cheque Ext. C2/CW-1 dishonor memo Ext. C3/CW-1,
legal notice Ext.C4/CW-1, postal receipt Ext. C5/CW-1, acknowledgment
card Ext. C6/CW-1, and authorization letter Ext. C7/CW-1. If the crossexamination conducted upon this witness is perused in its entirety, it can
be safely concluded that opposite party was unable to extract anything
contrary to what this witness stated in his examination-in-chief. In his
cross-examination, aforesaid witness, while admitting that no document
with regard to advancement of loan and sanction of loan was attached with
the complaint, specifically denied that accused had issued a blank cheque
as a security cheque at the time of advancement of the loan and she had no
liability towards the complainant.
10.
Though accused attempted to carve out a case that she had
issued blank cheque as a security cheque, but such defence of her never
came to be proved by leading cogent and convincing evidence. Though an
attempt has been made by the accused to prove that before initiation of
proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, complainant had not issued legal
notice, but complainant successfully proved on record that before initiation
of proceedings, it had issued the legal notice calling upon accused to make
the payment good. Though notice was duly served, but yet accused neither
replied to same nor repaid the amount, as such, no illegality can be said to
have been committed by Court below, while holding the accused guilty of
having committed offence under Section 138 of the Act.
11.
By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued as
security can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State
of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on
28.10.2021, has held as under:
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper
under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state
of being safe and the security given for a loan is something
given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to
make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties
to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is
advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a
specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure
such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other
form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or
agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount,
the cheque which is issued as security would mature for
presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to
present the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138
and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
12.
Needless to say, expression “Security cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather
same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on
record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable
Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a
“security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would
not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the
cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138
of the Act in case of its dishonour.
Having scanned pleadings as well as evidence adduced on
13.
record
by
the
complainant,
this
court
finds
that
complainant
successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act.
Similarly, factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by
the accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established
on record.
14.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in
view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the Courts
below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by
Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath
Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein
it has been held as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine
the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order.
In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But
the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an
appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the
High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal,
unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court
which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”
15.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/
incorrectness committed by inferior criminal Court in its judicial process or
illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused
has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the Courts
below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no
reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgments passed by the Courts
below.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as
16.
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgments recorded by the
Courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper
appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
17.
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court within six weeks to serve the sentence as
awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction,
if any, stands vacated. Bail bonds, if any, are cancelled. Pending
applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
Amount, if any, deposited by the accused with the learned trial
18.
Court is ordered to be released in favour of complainant by remitting the
same in its saving bank account, detail whereof, shall be furnished within a
period of one week.
August 10, 2026
(sunil)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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