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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 13th JANUARY, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+
ARB.P. 1677/2025
DEEPALI KHANNA
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Samiron Borkataky and Ms.
Madhupreeta Nayak, Advocates
versus
GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR IMPROVED NUTRITION GAIN
THROUGH ITS LIAISON OFFICE, INDIA
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Surya Kapoor, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
1.
This Petition has been filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking appointment of an Arbitrator to adjudicate
upon the disputes which have arisen between the parties under the
Employment Contract dated 15.03.2017.
2.
It is stated that the Petitioner herein joined the Respondent on
15.03.2017 as a Finance and Accounts Officer under a renewable
Employment Contract. It is stated that over the years, her contract was
periodically renewed through addendums dated 07.02.2019, 05.03.2020,
28.05.2021, 01.06.2022, and 30.06.2023, and she rose to the position of
Finance and Administration Manager, handling significant financial
responsibilities and supervising a substantial portion of the India office
workforce. It is stated that on 04.03.2024/.05.03.2024, the Petitioner?s
Reporting Manager (RM) requested her credentials and documents for
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processing her promotion, confirming that she was eligible for advancement.
It is stated that in compliance with the requirements, the Petitioner
completed a Professional Development Plan (PDP) and received a certificate
of completion on 25.03.2024, indicating her qualification for promotion. It is
stated that on 02.04.2024, the RM communicated that the Petitioner?s
promotion would be submitted to the Performance Review Committee,
indicating that the promotion process had progressed substantially. It is
stated that on the same date, the Respondent herein circulated a humane
layoff and redundancy policy prescribing notice periods, severance benefits,
and transition support for affected employees. It is stated that around the
third week of April 2024, the Petitioner informed the RM and another senior
member of the Respondent Organisation about her pregnancy during a
Microsoft Teams call. Subsequently, on 06.05.2024, the RM raised concerns
regarding the Petitioner?s leave history via email. It is stated that on
09.05.2024, the RM unilaterally withdrew the Petitioner?s promotion in a
meeting, without prior discussion or formal justification. It is stated that the
Petitioner sought clarification and reconsideration by email dated
14.05.2024, but received no response. It is stated that on 20.05.2024, the
Petitioner formally informed the Respondent/Organisation of her pregnancy
and her intention to commence maternity leave from 29.07.2024. It is stated
that the Respondent/Organisation issued a Maternity Leave Letter dated
27.05.2024, confirming maternity leave from 29.07.2024 to 12.02.2025. It is
stated that the Petitioner remained on maternity leave 29.07.2024 to
21.02.2025.
3.
It is stated that in November 2024, during the subsistence of
Petitioner?s employment, the Respondent engaged a finance and accounting
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consultant whose responsibilities overlapped with those of the Petitioner,
despite claims of there being financial constraints in the Respondent. It is
stated that in February 2025, shortly before re-joining, the Petitioner herein
sent e-mails to the RM requesting for a phased re-entry and hybrid working
arrangement. It is stated that the RM was unavailable to discuss the same,
and the Petitioner was allegedly pressured to mark working hours as leave.
4.
It is stated that on 11 March 2025, the Petitioner received a renewal
addendum for extension of her employment contract from the Respondent?s
HR representative and she was asked to submit supporting documents. It is
stated that the Petitioner duly executed and submitted the documents.
However, the RM did not process or sign the renewal, and repeated
reminders sent on 07.05.2025 and 08.05.2025 went unanswered.
5.
It is stated that on 23.05.2025, the Respondent abruptly terminated the
Petitioner?s employment, citing <funding issues= and characterising the
action as a layoff. It is stated that the Petitioner submitted a detailed
Objection to Termination Letter on 25.05.2025, disputing the grounds of
termination. Vide reply dated 26.05.2025 the Respondent upheld the
termination without providing substantive justification. On 27.05.2025, the
Petitioner escalated her grievance to senior officials, alleging discrimination,
harassment, and unfair treatment. It is stated that on 02.06.2025, the RM
issued a communication confirming the end of the Petitioner?s contract and
outlining settlement terms purportedly in accordance with the employment
contract
6.
It is stated that the Petitioner sent a Legal Notice dated 19.06.2025 to
the Respondent seeking compensation, transparency regarding the alleged
redundancy, and redressal of her grievances. Vide reply dated 04.07.2025,
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the Respondent denied all the claims of the Petitioner.
7.
A Notice Invoking Arbitration under Clause 19 of the employment
contract was issued by the Petitioner on 12.08.2025, nominating a sole
arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes arising from her termination and alleged
discrimination. The Respondent, by reply dated 09.09.2025, refused to
consent to arbitration. Thereafter, the Petitioner has approached this Court
by filing the present Petition.
8.
At the outset it is pertinent to reproduce Clause 19 of the Employment
Contract which contains the Arbitration Clause and the same reads as under:
<19. Dispute Resolution and Governing Law
19.1 All disputes or differences whatsoever arising
shall be first mutually resolved.
19.2 Differences which cannot be mutually resolved
shall be referred to Arbitration. Arbitration shall be
conducted in accordance with the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 to be conducted in English
language at New Delhi, India.
19.3 Any disputes under this contract shall subject to
the laws of India and exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts at New Delhi.=
9.
Notice in the present Petition was issued on 13.10.2025.
10.
Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent has stated that the
Respondent is an Independent Non-Profit Foundation headquartered in
Switzerland. It is the case of the Respondent that the Respondent Foundation
is established under Article 80 of the Swiss Civil Code to reduce
malnutrition by supporting food fortification and other sustainable nutrition
strategies in order to save lives and improve healthier productivity and
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cognitive function. It is the case of the Respondent that since the Respondent
is not an Indian entity and, therefore, the arbitration becomes an
>International Arbitration? and this Court does not have the jurisdiction to
entertain the present Petition under Section 11 (9) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. It is further stated by the learned Counsel for the
Respondent that the claims raised by the Petitioner are not arbitrable as the
Petitioner seeks to enforce a contract of employment and, therefore, the
claim of the Petitioner is barred by law. Learned Counsel for the Respondent
has placed reliance on Section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to
contend that the present Petition is not maintainable as the Petitioner is
seeking extra-contractual relief after she has received her contractual
entitlements and, therefore, the present Petition is an abuse of the process of
law. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent further contends that the
Respondent/Foundation is working in India since 2003 and the Respondent
is only a liason office of the Foundation and therefore, it does not have a
separate legal identity. He further states that the Respondent is not a proper
party for the present dispute as the Respondent, being a liason office, does
not have the signing powers on behalf of the Head Office except than those
required for normal functioning of the office. He states that the Employment
Contract and the job description does not form a part of the activities
contemplated as normal functioning of the office and, therefore, the present
Petition is not maintainable. He states that the contract in question was in
fact a contract for providing consultancy services and, therefore, the dispute
between the Petitioner and the Respondent is of commercial in nature and
only Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to entertain such a dispute. To
substantiate his argument, learned Counsel for the Respondent places
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reliance on the Judgment of the Apex Court in Comed Chemicals Ltd. v.
C.N. Ramchand, (2009) 1 SCC 91 and Dushyant Janbandhu v. Hyundai
Autoever India Pvt. Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3691.
11.
Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner contends that
the Contract for employment cannot be termed as commercial and,
therefore, Section 2(1)(f) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, has no
application to the present case. To buttress his argument, he places reliance
on the Judgment of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in ARM Digital Media
(P) Ltd. v. Ritesh Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8719.
12.
The Employment Contract was entered into between the Petitioner
and the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition Liaison Office, D-2,
Commercial Tower, The Edenpark Hotel (Qutab Hotel), Qutab Institutional
Area, Shaheed Jeet Singh Marg, New Delhi 110016, India. The Employment
Contract contains an Arbitration Clause and the seat of Arbitration is given
as New Delhi. As per the Employment Contract dated 14.02.2017, the
Petitioner herein joined the Respondent as a Finance and Accounts Officer.
The initial period of employment was two years and the place of
employment was in Delhi and the Petitioner was to receive a gross salary of
Rs.8,04,300/- which was to be paid in 12 monthly instalments to the
Petitioner and the applicable income tax was to be deducted at source as per
the local law. Under the Contract, the Respondent was to contribute 10% of
the Petitioner?s salary towards retirement benefits. Under Clause 9 of the
Contract, the Petitioner was entitled to take Annual leave of 20 working
days per year, Public holidays of 12 working days per year, Casual leave of
10 working days per year and Medical leave of 12 days per year. Under
Clause 10 of the Contract, the Petitioner was entitled to maternity leave of
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up to six months after the birth of the child. The said clause also provides for
the remuneration to be paid under the maternity leave. Clause 19 of the
Contract provides for Dispute Resolution and Clause 19.2 is the arbitration
clause.
13.
A reading of the Contract dated 14.02.2017, which is termed as a
contract for employment, shows that the Petitioner is an employee of the
Respondent.
14.
In order to appreciate whether the present dispute is an international
commercial arbitration or not, it is necessary to reproduce Section 2(1)(f) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which defines international
commercial arbitration.
15.
Section 2(1)(f) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 reads as
under:
<Section 2. Definitions
(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise
requires,4
…..
(f) "international commercial arbitration" means an
arbitration relating to disputes arising out of legal
relationships, whether contractual or not, considered
as commercial under the law in force in India and
where at least one of the parties is4
(i) an individual who is a national of, or habitually
resident in, any country other than India; or
(ii) a body corporate which is incorporated in any
country other than India; or
(iii) *** an association or a body of individuals whose
central management and control is exercised in any
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country other than India; or
(iv) the Government of a foreign country;=
16.
Commercial dispute has now been defined under Section 2(c) of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Section 2(c)(xviii) provides that dispute
arising out of agreements for sale of goods or provision of services would
fall under commercial dispute. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel
for the Petitioner, whether an employment contract constitutes commercial
dispute or not has been crystallized by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
ARM Digital Media (supra) where it has been held as under:
<12. Section 2(1)(c) of the CC Act, defines the
expression <commercial dispute= comprehensively.
Section 2(1)(c) of the CC Act, inter alia, reads as
under:4
<2. Definitions.4(1) In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,4
…..
…..
(c)-commercial dispute= means a dispute arising
out of4
(i) ordinary transactions of merchants, bankers,
financiers and traders such as those relating to
mercantile documents, including enforcement and
interpretation of such documents;
(ii) export or import of merchandise or services;
(iii) issues relating to admiralty and maritime
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law;
(iv) transactions relating to aircraft, aircraft
engines, aircraft equipment and helicopters,
including sales, leasing and financing of the
same;
(v) carriage of goods;
(vi) construction and infrastructure contracts,
including tenders;
(vii) agreements relating to immovable property
used exclusively in trade or commerce;
(viii) franchising agreements;
(ix) distribution and licensing agreements;
(x) management and consultancy agreements;
(xi) joint venture agreements;
(xii) shareholders agreements;
(xiii) subscription and investment agreements
pertaining to the services industry including
outsourcing services and financial services;
(xiv) mercantile agency and mercantile usage;
(xv) partnership agreements;
(xvi) technology development agreements;
(xvii) intellectual property rights relating to
registered
and
unregistered
trademarks,
copyright, patent, design, domain names,
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geographical indications
integrated circuits;
and
semiconductor
(xviii) agreements for sale of goods or provision
of services;
(xix) exploitation of oil and gas reserves or other
natural resources including electromagnetic
spectrum;
(xx) insurance and re-insurance;
(xxi) contracts of agency relating to any of the
above; and
(xxii) such other commercial disputes as may be
notified by the Central Government.
Explanation.4A commercial dispute shall not
cease to be a commercial dispute merely
because4
(a) it also involves action for recovery of
immovable property or for realisation of monies
out of immovable property given as security or
involves any other relief pertaining to immovable
property;
(b) one of the contracting parties is the State or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities, or a
private body carrying out public functions.=
13. This Court in Meena Vohra, undertook a detailed
and nuanced reading of Section 2(1)(c) of the CC
Act. While the text of Section 2(1)(c) is inclusive and
wide, the Court emphasized that the category of
<commercial disputes= is not without boundaries. It
covers matters arising out of commercial documents,
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joint ventures, business cooperation, mercantile
transactions, trade, and financial arrangements. The
Court applied the principle of ejusdem generis,
holding that the catch-all phrase <all other forms of
business cooperation= must be interpreted in line with
the preceding words, all of which relate to business,
commerce,
trade,
industry,
or
commercial
cooperation. Therefore, the expression does not
expand to include every agreement touching upon a
company or its internal governance; it must relate to
a relationship that is primarily commercial in
character.
14. However, even though the statutory definition is
expansive, its breadth is not unrestrained. The
structure of Section 2(1)(c) of CC Act reveals that
every category listed shares a common commercial
thread each pertains to transactions involving trade,
business operations, commercial obligations, or
mercantile dealings. Thus, when interpreting whether
a particular dispute fits within the provision, the
inquiry must focus on whether the relationship at
issue arises from a commercial or business-oriented
engagement, rather than merely from the fact that
one of the parties is a commercial entity. This
distinction becomes particularly significant when
examining whether contracts rooted in personal
service, such as employment agreements, possess the
commercial character necessary to be brought within
the ambit of a <commercial dispute.=
15. In this backdrop, the mere presence of ancillary
business-related clauses such as confidentiality,
intellectual property assignment, or non-compete
obligations does not metamorphose an employment
contract, which is fundamentally a contract of personal
service, into a commercial arrangement. This position
has been affirmed by various High Courts. In Ekanek
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Networks Pvt. Ltd., this Court considered whether
breaches of an employment agreement containing
detailed terms on remuneration, non-compete, nonsolicitation, confidentiality, IP assignment, and
termination could be treated as a <commercial
dispute= under Section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the CC Act.
The Court held that the expression <provision of
services= in the said clause must be accorded a strictly
commercial connotation, and cannot be conflated with
a contract of service, which is inherently a personal
service relationship governed by the employer's
control, supervision, and disciplinary authority.
Relying on Bar of Indian Lawyers v. D.K. Gandhi14
and Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S.
Infraspace LLP15, the Court underscored that the
Commercial Courts Act is intended to streamline
adjudication of genuine mercantile and commercial
disputes, and that importing ordinary employeremployee disputes into this framework would subvert
the very objective of the statute.
16. Moreover, in Elior India Food Services LLP, the
Karnataka High Court emphatically rejected the
attempt to give an employment contract the colour of a
commercial dispute. The Court held that a claim for
incentives arising from an agreement that was merely
an offshoot of the Employment Agreement remained, in
substance, a money claim rooted in an employeremployee relationship. The long-term incentive plan,
though containing detailed terms and performancelinked conditions, was inseparably grounded in the
underlying contract of employment. Crucially, the
Court noted that Section 2(1)(c)(xviii) of the CC Act,
covering agreements for sale of goods or provision of
services cannot be stretched to include pure contracts
of personal service, which are categorically distinct
from commercial agreements. It reiterated that an
employment contract <cannot be given a colour of a
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commercial dispute by dressing it to be a provision of
services,= and warned that allowing such recharacterisation would open the floodgates, clogging
commercial courts and undermining the very purpose
for which they were constituted. This reasoning
squarely negates attempts to artificially situate
employment disputes within commercial court
jurisdiction.
17. A similar attempt to recharacterize an employmentrelated arrangement as a commercial dispute was
expressly rejected by this Court in Rachit Malhotra. In
that case, a party sought to portray an ESOP Scheme
as akin to a shareholders' agreement so as to invoke
Section 2(1)(c)(xii) of the CC Act. The Court
unequivocally refused this contention, holding that an
ESOP, even though it may incidentally relate to
shareholding, remains fundamentally an incident of
employment and cannot be elevated to the status of a
shareholders' agreement for the purpose of attracting
commercial jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that
such artificial recasting of essentially employmentlinked rights into the mould of commercial disputes
would impermissibly dilute the statutory scheme of the
CC Act and distort the jurisdictional boundaries
carefully drawn by the legislature. This reasoning
further reinforces the principle that employmentderived benefits whether styled as ESOPs, incentives,
or long-term plans cannot be treated as commercial
agreements within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c).
18. Furthermore, taking the analysis a step further the
foreign jurisprudence also reflects a similar approach
in delineating the scope of commercial matters. The
Alberta Court in Borrowski v. Heinrich Fiedler
Perforiertechnik GmbH16 held categorically that an
employment contract is not a commercial legal
relationship, even if the employer is engaged in
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international trade. The House of Lords in Johnson v.
Unisys Ltd.17. reiterated that employment contracts
create personal service obligations that are not
commercial agreements. Similarly, the Ontario
Supreme Court in Ross v. Christian & Timbers Inc18
held that labour and employment contracts are not
intended to fall within the scope of commercial
agreements.
19. Thus, any dispute relating to an employment
agreement cannot be treated to be a commercial
dispute within the purview of Section 2(1)(c) of the
CC Act.=
(Emphasis Supplied)
17.
Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the material on
record.
18.
This Court is in agreement with the decision taken by the co-ordinate
Bench in ARM Digital Media (supra).
19.
All the characteristics of employment are present in the Contract. In
view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that the disputes between the
parties is not a commercial dispute under Indian law.
20.
Judgments relied on by the learned Counsel for the Respondent in
Comed Chemicals (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case
for the reason that in Comed Chemicals (supra) on the facts of that case, the
Court was of the opinion that the services rendered by the Respondent
therein was in the nature of consultancy services as what was agreed
between the parties in that case was to provide technical knowhow and
expertise for which the Respondent therein was paid fees unlike the present
case where remuneration of Rs.8,04,300/- which was to be paid to the
Petitioner herein by the Respondent herien in 12 monthly instalments and
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the Respondent was also to contribute 10% of the Petitioner?s salary towards
her retirement benefits. Under Clause 9 of the Contract, the Petitioner was
also entitled to take leaves of different kinds and under Clause 10 of the
Contract, the Petitioner was also entitled to maternity leave of up to six
months after the birth of the child. All these are the characteristics of
employment. Moreover, the Contract does not involve any business or trade
and there is no element of commercial activity. Further, in any event, the
Judgment in Comed Chemicals (supra) was pronounced before the
enactment of Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
21.
The contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent that the
disputes are not arbitrable, cannot be accepted by this Court in view of the
settled law that the referral Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996, has to only examine the prima facie existence of an
arbitration agreement and the determination of the substantive rights,
maintainability of claims, and the issue of limitation etc., should be left to
the Arbitral Tribunal. The Apex Court in Interplay Between Arbitration
Agreements under Arbitration, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6
SCC 1, has observed as under:<165. The legislature confined the scope of reference
under Section 11(6-A) to the examination of the
existence of an arbitration agreement. The use of the
term <examination= in itself connotes that the scope of
the power is limited to a prima facie determination.
Since the Arbitration Act is a self-contained code, the
requirement of <existence= of an arbitration
agreement draws effect from Section 7 of the
Arbitration Act. In Duro Felguera [Duro Felguera,
S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729 :
(2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 764] , this Court held that the
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Referral Courts only need to consider one aspect to
determine the existence of an arbitration agreement 4
whether the underlying contract contains an
arbitration agreement which provides for arbitration
pertaining to the disputes which have arisen between
the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the scope of
examination under Section 11(6-A) should be
confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement
on the basis of Section 7. Similarly, the validity of an
arbitration agreement, in view of Section 7, should be
restricted to the requirement of formal validity such
as the requirement that the agreement be in writing.
This interpretation also gives true effect to the
doctrine of competence-competence by leaving the
issue of substantive existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement to be decided by Arbitral
Tribunal under Section 16. We accordingly clarify
the position of law laid down in Vidya Drolia [Vidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 549] in the context of Section 8
and Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.
166. The burden of proving the existence of arbitration
agreement generally lies on the party seeking to rely
on such agreement. In jurisdictions such as India,
which accept the doctrine of competence-competence,
only prima facie proof of the existence of an
arbitration agreement must be adduced before the
Referral Court. The Referral Court is not the
appropriate forum to conduct a mini-trial by allowing
the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to the
existence or validity of an arbitration agreement. The
determination of the existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement on the basis of evidence ought
to be left to the Arbitral Tribunal. This position of law
can also be gauged from the plain language of the
statute.
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167. Section 11(6-A) uses the expression <examination
of the existence of an arbitration agreement=. The
purport of using the word <examination= connotes
that the legislature intends that the Referral Court
has to inspect or scrutinise the dealings between the
parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement.
Moreover, the expression <examination= does not
connote or imply a laborious or contested inquiry. [
P. Ramanatha Aiyar, The Law Lexicon (2nd Edn.,
1997) 666.] On the other hand, Section 16 provides
that the Arbitral Tribunal can <rule= on its
jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement. A <ruling= connotes
adjudication of disputes after admitting evidence from
the parties. Therefore, it is evident that the Referral
Court is only required to examine the existence of
arbitration agreements, whereas the Arbitral Tribunal
ought to rule on its jurisdiction, including the issues
pertaining to the existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement. A similar view was adopted by
this Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh
Optifibre Ltd. [Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh
Optifibre Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 234]=
(emphasis supplied)
22.
Similarly, the Apex Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish
Spinning, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754, has observed as under:<122. Once an arbitration agreement exists between
parties, then the option of approaching the civil court
becomes unavailable to them. In such a scenario, if the
parties seek to raise a dispute, they necessarily have to
do so before the arbitral tribunal. The arbitral
tribunal, in turn, can only be constituted as per the
procedure agreed upon between the parties. However,
if there is a failure of the agreed upon procedure, then
the duty of appointing the arbitral tribunal falls upon
the referral court under Section 11 of the Act, 1996. If
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the referral court, at this stage, goes beyond the scope
of enquiry as provided under the section and examines
the issue of <accord and satisfaction=, then it would
amount to usurpation of the power which the parties
had intended to be exercisable by the arbitral tribunal
alone and not by the national courts. Such a scenario
would impeach arbitral autonomy and would not fit
well with the scheme of the Act, 1996.
*****
125. We are also of the view that ex-facie frivolity and
dishonesty in litigation is an aspect which the arbitral
tribunal is equally, if not more, capable to decide upon
the appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
parties. We say so because the arbitral tribunal has the
benefit of going through all the relevant evidence and
pleadings in much more detail than the referral court.
If the referral court is able to see the frivolity in the
litigation on the basis of bare minimum pleadings, then
it would be incorrect to doubt that the arbitral tribunal
would not be able to arrive at the same inference, most
likely in the first few hearings itself, with the benefit of
extensive pleadings and evidentiary material.=
23.
Since it is well-settled that referral courts should normally follow the
policy of >when in doubt, refer? and in view of the fact that disputes have
certainly arisen between the parties, this Court is inclined to appoint an
Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes between the parties.
24.
Since disputes have arisen between the parties and there is an
Arbitration Clause in the Contract, this Court appoints, Ms. Arundhati Katju,
Senior Advocate (Mob. No: 9910049248) as the Sole Arbitrator to
adjudicate upon the disputes between the parties.
25.
The arbitration would take place under the aegis of the Delhi
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International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) and would abide by its rules and
regulations. The learned Arbitrator shall be entitled to fees as per the
Schedule of Fees maintained by the DIAC.
26.
The learned Arbitrator is also requested to file the requisite disclosure
under Section 12(2) of the 1996 Act within two weeks of entering on
reference.
27.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned Arbitrator
on their merits, in accordance with law.
28.
It is made clear that nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of this Court on the merits of the contentions of the parties.
29.
It is further made clear that the observations made in this Order are
squarely limited to the appointment of an Arbitrator. Needless to say, it is
open for the Respondent to urge its contention regarding arbitrability etc.
before the Arbitrator.
30.
The petition stands disposed of in the above terms, along with
pending application(s), if any.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
JANUARY 13, 2026
Rahul
Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
17:39:31
ARB.P. 1677/2025
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