Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.45 of 2026
Date of Decision: 21.04.2026
_________________________________________________________________________
Dalip Singh
……...Petitioner
Versus
Manoj Kumar
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
Mr. K.B. Khajuria, Advocate.
For the Respondent:
Mr. Ajay Kumar Lahota, Advocate.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Sections 438 and
442 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays challenge to
judgment dated 31.05.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Rohru, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal
No.63 of 2024, affirming the judgment of conviction dated 24.07.2024 and
order of sentence dated 29.07.2024, passed by the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P. in criminal
case No.139 of 2021, whereby the learned Court below, while holding the
petitioner-accused (in short the "accused") guilty of having committed
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in
short the "Act”), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of four months and pay compensation to the
tune of Rs.2,50,000/- to the respondent-complainant (in short the
"complainant").
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as
well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties are that
complainant instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Act before the
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Rohru, District
Shimla, H.P., alleging therein that complainant is having his apple orchard
at Village Jakhi, Tehsil Chirgaon. Since the accused was engaged in the
business of sale and purchase of apples and he was well known to the
complainant, in the month of September, 2019, accused approached the
complainant to purchase his 173 A-grade apple boxes/cases @ Rs.1450/per box, amounting to a total sum of Rs.2,50,000/-. With a view to
discharge his liability, accused had issued cheque bearing No.200090
dated
28.10.2020
amounting
to
Rs.2,50,000/-
in
favour
of
the
complainant, but aforesaid cheque on its presentation was dishonoured on
account of insufficient funds in the bank account of the accused. Since
accused failed to make the payment good within the stipulated period
despite his having received legal notice dated 04.02.2021, complainant had
no option, but to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the
competent Court of law.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
3.
by
the
respective
parties,
vide
judgment/order
dated
24.07.2024/29.07.2024, held the accused guilty of his having committed
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted
and sentenced him as per the description given herein above.
4.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of
conviction recorded by the learned Court below, accused preferred an
appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohru, District
Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, but same was dismissed vide judgment dated
31.05.2025.
In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this
Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for his acquittal after
setting-aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by
the learned Court below.
5.
Vide order dated 30.12.2025, this Court suspended the
substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below subject to
accused depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing
personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like
amount within a period of eight weeks, however, fact remains that aforesaid
order was never complied with. Repeatedly matter came to be adjourned,
enabling the accused to comply with aforesaid order, but fact remains that
order dated 30.12.2025 was not complied with. On 07.04.2026, this Court,
on the vehement request of learned counsel for the petitioner, adjourned
the matter, enabling the petitioner to comply with afore order passed by
this Court in this case, but in vain. Today neither the petitioner has come
present in Court nor he has imparted instructions, as has been stated by
learned counsel for the accused, as such, this Court has no option, but to
decide the case on its own merits.
6.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohru, District
Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, whereby judgment of conviction and order of
sentence recorded by the learned trial Court came to be upheld, this Court
is not persuaded to agree with Mr. K.B. Khajuria, learned counsel for the
accused, that learned Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence
in its right perspective, rather this Court finds that both the Courts below
have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and there
is no scope left for this Court to interfere.
7.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:
“23.
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of
Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the
legislative
objective
of
improving
the
credibility
of
negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable
presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in
the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it
must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section
138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing
of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is
usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial
transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should
guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and
the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly
high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled
position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption
under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all
preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence
which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt
or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a
defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the
accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable
defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI
Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is
not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the
complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to
qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to
avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by
the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a
notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the
time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the
said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence,
hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not
there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof
the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have
to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in
view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is
presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this
the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct
the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment
despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a
sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
8.
In the case at hand, complainant, with a view to prove his case,
examined himself as CW-1, who by way of tendering affidavit Ext. C1/CW1,
reiterated the facts as averred in the complaint. He also tendered in
evidence the cheque Ext. C2/CW1, dishonour memo Ext. C3/CW1, legal
notice Ext. C4/CW1, postal receipt Ext.C5/CW1 and acknowledgment card
as Ext.C6/CW1. If the cross-examination conducted upon this witness is
perused in its entirety, it can be safely concluded that opposite party was
unable to extract anything contrary to what this witness stated in his
examination-in-chief. In his cross-examination, he stated that he did not
remember the details of boxes. He stated that the boxes were got filled in
Sakta Forwarding Agency. He stated that that he had filled approximately
1000-1200 boxes in Sakta Forwarding Agency whose Proprietor is Prem
Parkash Sakta. He stated that Sakta Forwarding Agency had prepared
challan and builty of 173 boxes belonging to him. He stated that he had not
placed the relevant challan and builty on the case file. He stated that the
Sakta Forwarding Agency has kept record to this effect. He stated that the
owner Prem Parkash and clerk of Sakta Forwarding Agency were present on
the spot when accused purchased said boxes from him. He further stated
that he was not aware of vehicle in which accused carried apple boxes. He
stated that builty and challan of said vehicle were prepared and record in
this respect was lying with Sakta Forwarding Agency. He further stated that
the accused had given cheque Ext.C2/CW1 to him, after filling the same, in
September, 2020 at Rohru. He specifically denied the suggestion put to him
that accused had not purchased any apple boxes from him. He denied that
he had not sent any notice to the accused. While admitting that he is not
owner of land, he self stated that his father is the owner. He specifically
denied suggestion put to him that he had taken the said cheque as unfilled
from the partner of accused. He further denied that he filled the relevant
cheque himself and misused the same. If the pattern of cross-examination
conducted upon afore witness is perused in its entirety, it can be safely
concluded that accused attempted to carve out a case that cheque in
question was issued as a security cheque, but same was misused. He also
attempted to carve out a case that though he had no liability towards the
complainant and his blank signed cheque had been obtained by the
complainant from his partner, but interestingly, aforesaid defence never
came to be probabilized by the accused by leading cogent and convincing
evidence. Neither partner of the accused firm, from whom the cheque was
allegedly obtained was examined nor was any other cogent and convincing
evidence led on record by the accused to refute the claim with regard to
purchase of apple boxes. Since factum of issuance of cheque as well as
signatures thereupon stand duly established, no illegality an be said to
have been committed by courts below, while invoking Sections 118 and 139
of the Act, which talk about presumption in favour of holder of cheque that
cheque in question was issued towards discharge of lawful liability.
9.
No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut
such presumption person seeking to rebut such presumption is expected to
raise probable defence.
10.
By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued as
security can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State
of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on
28.10.2021, has held as under:
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper
under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state
of being safe and the security given for a loan is something
given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to
make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties
to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is
advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a
specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure
such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other
form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or
agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount,
the cheque which is issued as security would mature for
presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to
present the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138
and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
Needless to say, expression “Security cheque” is not a
11.
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather
same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on
record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable
Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a
“security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would
not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the
cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138
of the Act in case of its dishonour.
Having scanned pleadings as well as evidence adduced on
12.
record
by
the
complainant,
this
court
finds
that
complainant
successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act.
Similarly, factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by
the accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established
on record.
13.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in
view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the Courts
below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by
Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath
Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein
it has been held as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine
the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order.
In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But
the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an
appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the
High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal,
unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court
which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”
14.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/
incorrectness committed by inferior criminal Court in its judicial process or
illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused
has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the Courts
below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the Courts
below.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as
15.
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the
Courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper
appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
16.
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court within fifteen days to serve the sentence as
awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction,
if any, stands vacated. Bail bonds, if any, are discharged. Pending
applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
April 21, 2026
(sunil)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review