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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 25.04.2026
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ARB.P. 2073/2025
CONCEPT CAPITAL INFRA PROJECTS PVT. LTD.
.....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Cherry Gupta and Mr.
Asim Naeem, Advocates.
versus
BALVINDER SINGH GURAYA HUF
.....Respondent
Through: Respondent in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
1.
In view of Notification No. 64/G-4/Genl.-I/DHC dated
27.02.2026, the present matter which was previously listed on
03.03.2026, has been listed today.
2.
The present Petition has been filed under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, seeking appointment of a
Sole Arbitrator for adjudication of disputes inter se the parties arising
out of the Memorandum of Understanding dated 15.03.20162.
3.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner would
seek to rely upon Clause 16 of the MoU, which reads as under:
4.
The dispute resolution Clause is stated to be Clause 16 of the
MOU, which reads as follows:“16.
That any dispute or differences between the Parties hereto
relating to or arising out of this MOU shall be resolved by
A&C Act
MoU
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ARB.P. 2073/2025
11:57:49
the parties by amicable negotiation and if no mutual
settlement can be arrived at on any dispute in the
interpretation of any clause of this MOU or right and/or
duties of the parties to this MOU, the same shall be referred
to the arbitration be a Sole Arbitrator to be appointed
and nominated by "CCIPPL" in accordance with provisions
of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and whose
decision shall be final and binding on both the Parties and
the place of arbitration shall be New Delhi.”
5.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the statutory
mandate of Notice under Section 21 of the A&C Act, stands duly
complied with, vide Legal Notice dated 17.09.2025.
6.
Learned counsel for the Respondent, who appears in person,
raises a preliminary objection to the present Petition on the ground
that since the cause of action herein is of considerable vintage, arising
in the year 2018, the claims which are sought to be pressed are clearly
barred by time.
7.
Learned counsel for the Respondent further submits that the
disputes sought to be agitated herein do not survive, inasmuch as
proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 had already been initiated, in which the Respondent has
succeeded.
8.
In pursuance thereof, he submits that the present Petition has
been instituted merely to harass the Respondent, who is a senior
citizen aged about 85 years and is constrained in his ability to travel to
Delhi.
9.
This Court has heard the submissions of learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Parties, and with their able assistance
perused the material placed on record.
10.
At this juncture, it is apposite to note that the legal position
governing the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section
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11(6) of the Act is no longer res integra. A three-Judge Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish
Spinning3,
after
taking
into
consideration
the
authoritative
pronouncement of the seven-Judge Bench in Interplay Between
Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp
Act, 1899, In re4, comprehensively delineated the contours of judicial
intervention at the stage of Section 11 of the Act. The excerpt of Krish
Spg (supra) reads as under:“(c) Judicial interference under the 1996 Act
110. The parties have been conferred with the power to decide and
agree on the procedure to be adopted for appointing arbitrators. In
cases where the agreed upon procedure fails, the courts have been
vested with the power to appoint arbitrators upon the request of a
party, to resolve the deadlock between the parties in appointing the
arbitrators.
111. Section 11 of the 1996 Act is provided to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties to settle their disputes by arbitration
in situations where the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator(s). The
parameters of judicial review laid down for Section 8 differ from
those prescribed for Section 11. The view taken in SBP &
Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 and affirmed in Vidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 that Sections 8
and 11, respectively, of the 1996 Act are complementary in nature
was legislatively overruled by the introduction of Section 11(6-A)
in 2015. Thus, although both these provisions intend to compel
parties to abide by their mutual intention to arbitrate, yet the scope
of powers conferred upon the courts under both the sections are
different.
112. The difference between Sections 8 and 11, respectively, of the
1996 Act is also evident from the scope of these provisions. Some
of these differences are:
112.1. While Section 8 empowers any “judicial authority” to refer
the parties to arbitration, under Section 11, the power to refer has
been exclusively conferred upon the High Court and the Supreme
Court.
112.2. Under Section 37, an appeal lies against the refusal of the
judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration, whereas no such
provision for appeal exists for a refusal under Section 11.
(2024) 12 SCC 1
(2024) 6 SCC 1
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112.3. The standard of scrutiny provided under Section 8 is that of
prima facie examination of the validity and existence of an
arbitration agreement. Whereas, the standard of scrutiny under
Section 11 is confined to the examination of the existence of the
arbitration agreement.
112.4. During the pendency of an application under Section 8,
arbitration may commence or continue and an award can be passed.
On the other hand, under Section 11, once there is failure on the
part of the parties in appointing the arbitrator as per the agreed
procedure and an application is preferred, no arbitration
proceedings can commence or continue.
113. The scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined
to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section
7. The examination of validity of the arbitration agreement is also
limited to the requirement of formal validity such as the
requirement that the agreement should be in writing.
114. The use of the term “examination” under Section 11(6-A) as
distinguished from the use of the term “rule” under Section 16
implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited
to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration
agreement, and does not include a contested or laborious enquiry,
which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal to “rule” under Section 16.
The prima facie view on existence of the arbitration agreement
taken by the Referral Court does not bind either the Arbitral
Tribunal or the Court enforcing the arbitral award.
115. The aforesaid approach serves a twofold purpose — firstly, it
allows the Referral Court to weed out non-existent arbitration
agreements, and secondly, it protects the jurisdictional competence
of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on the issue of existence of the
arbitration agreement in depth.
****
117. In view of the observations made by this Court in Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996
& the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, it is clear that the
scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it difficult to
hold that the observations made inVidya Drolia v. Durga Trading
Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 and adopted inNTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra
Ltd., (2023) 9 SCC 385 that the jurisdiction of the Referral Court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the subsequent
decision inInterplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC
1.
****
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119. The question of “accord and satisfaction”, being a mixed
question of law and fact, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Arbitral Tribunal, if not otherwise agreed upon between the
parties. Thus, the negative effect of competence-competence would
require that the matter falling within the exclusive domain of the
Arbitral Tribunal, should not be looked into by the Referral Court,
even for a prima facie determination, before the Arbitral Tribunal
first has had the opportunity of looking into it.
120. By referring disputes to arbitration and appointing an
arbitrator by exercise of the powers under Section 11, the Referral
Court upholds and gives effect to the original understanding of the
contracting parties that the specified disputes shall be resolved by
arbitration. Mere appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal does not in
any way mean that the Referral Court is diluting the sanctity of
“accord and satisfaction” or is allowing the claimant to walk back
on its contractual undertaking. On the contrary, it ensures that the
principle of arbitral autonomy is upheld and the legislative intent of
minimum judicial interference in arbitral proceedings is given full
effect. Once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, it is always open
for the defendant to raise the issue of “accord and satisfaction”
before it, and only after such an objection is rejected by the
Arbitral Tribunal, that the claims raised by the claimant can be
adjudicated.
121. Tests like the “eye of the needle” and “ex facie meritless”,
although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they
require the Referral Court to examine contested facts and
appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of
enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the
principles of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and
judicial non-interference on the highest pedestal.
122. Appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal at the stage of Section 11
petition also does not mean that the Referral Courts forego any
scope of judicial review of the adjudication done by the Arbitral
Tribunal. The 1996 Act clearly vests the national courts with the
power of subsequent review by which the award passed by an
arbitrator may be subjected to challenge by any of the parties to the
arbitration.
*****
126. The power available to the Referral Courts has to be construed
in the light of the fact that no right to appeal is available against
any order passed by the Referral Court under Section 11 for either
appointing or refusing to appoint an arbitrator. Thus, by delving
into the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal at the nascent stage of
Section 11, the Referral Courts also run the risk of leaving the
claimant in a situation wherein it does not have any forum to
approach for the adjudication of its claims, if its Section 11
application is rejected.
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127. Section 11 also envisages a time-bound and expeditious
disposal of the application for appointment of arbitrator. One of the
reasons for this is also the fact that unlike Section 8, once an
application under Section 11 is filed, arbitration cannot commence
until the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted by the Referral Court. This
Court, on various occasions, has given directions to the High
Courts for expeditious disposal of pending Section 11 applications.
It has also directed the litigating parties to refrain from filing bulky
pleadings in matters pertaining to Section 11. Seen thus, if the
Referral Courts go into the details of issues pertaining to “accord
and satisfaction” and the like, then it would become rather difficult
to achieve the objective of expediency and simplification of
pleadings.
128. We are also of the view that ex facie frivolity and dishonesty
in litigation is an aspect which the Arbitral Tribunal is equally, if
not more, capable to decide upon the appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the parties. We say so because the Arbitral Tribunal
has the benefit of going through all the relevant evidence and
pleadings in much more detail than the Referral Court. If the
Referral Court is able to see the frivolity in the litigation on the
basis of bare minimum pleadings, then it would be incorrect to
doubt that the Arbitral Tribunal would not be able to arrive at the
same inference, most likely in the first few hearings itself, with the
benefit of extensive pleadings and evidentiary material.”
(emphasis supplied)
11.
The decision in Krish Spinning (supra) thus unequivocally
reiterates that the Referral Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 11 of the A&C Act, is required to confine itself to a prima
facie examination of the existence of a valid Arbitration Agreement
and
nothing
beyond.
The
Court’s
role
is
facilitative
and
procedural, namely, to give effect to the parties’ agreed mechanism of
dispute resolution when it has failed, without embarking upon an
adjudication of contentious factual or legal issues, which are reserved
for the Arbitral Tribunal.
12.
In view of the aforesaid, it is trite that the scope of this Court’s
jurisdiction under Section 11 of the A&C Act is extremely
circumscribed. All the contentions sought to be raised herein are
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ARB.P. 2073/2025
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matters that can appropriately be urged before the learned Arbitrator,
who is legally empowered and competent to adjudicate upon the same.
13.
The valuation of the subject matter of the disputes is stated to be
approximately Rs. 13,00,000/-.
14.
Accordingly, this Court hereby requests Mr. Kamil Khan,
Advocate (Mobile No. 9899218810), to enter upon the reference and
adjudicate the disputes inter se the parties.
15.
The learned Arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration
proceedings, subject to furnishing to the parties the requisite
disclosures as required under Section 12(2) of the A&C Act.
16.
The learned Arbitrator shall be entitled to a fee in accordance
with the Fourth Schedule of the A&C Act or as may otherwise be
agreed to between the parties and the learned Arbitrators.
17.
The parties shall share the learned Arbitrator’s fee and arbitral
costs equally.
18.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
19.
Needless to state, nothing in this Order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy.
20.
Let a copy of the said Order be sent to the learned Arbitrator
through all permissible modes, including through electronic mode.
21.
Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
Application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the above-stated terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
APRIL 25, 2026/tk/kr/sg
Digitally Signed
By:VARNIKA
ARB.P. 2073/2025
11:57:49
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