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C/CA/3725/2026(GJHC240531372026)
JUDGMENT DATED: 25/08/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 3725 of
In F/SECOND APPEAL/21859/2026
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
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Approved for Reporting
Yes
✓
No
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CIRCLE RANGE OFFICER , PALANPUR, ARVINDKUMAR DAHYALAL
CHAUDHARI
Versus
CHAUHAN GANPATSINH RAMSINH & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR. CHIRAGKUMAR UPADHYAY, ASST. GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the
Applicant(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 25/08/2026
JUDGMENT
1.
Heard Mr. Chiragkumar Upadhyay, learned Asst. Government
Pleader for the applicants.
2.
At the outset, Mr. Upadhyay, learned AGP, would tender the draft
amendment. The draft amendment is taken on record and it is hereby
allowed. The necessary amendment shall be carried out by the applicants
forthwith.
3.
This application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
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1963 (for short ‘the Act, 1963’) seeking condonation of delay of 1093
days in filing the Second Appeal by the State and Range Forest Officer of
Dantiwada, State of Gujarat.
4.
Mr. Upadhyay, learned AGP would submit that there is no
intentional or mala fide delay on the part of the applicants not to file an
appeal within stipulated time, but due to administrative exigency and the
procedure set out by the State before filing an appeal, which caused delay
in filing the second appeal.
4.1
It is submitted that the applicants have explained the delay in a
satisfactory manner and due to involvement of various authorities who
were required to take appropriate decision before filing an appeal, the
delay occurred in filing the appeal, which may be condoned by this Court
by exercising its powers under Section 5 of the Act,1963.
4.2
Mr. Upadhyay, learned AGP would further submit that by
imposing reasonable cost upon the applicants, whereby the other side can
be compensated, this Court may condone the delay in filing the appeal,
failing which the meritorious matter of the State may not be decided on
its own merits.
4.3
Making above submissions, learned AGP would request this Court
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JUDGMENT DATED: 25/08/2026
to admit and allow this delay application.
4.4
No other and further submissions being made by learned AGP.
5.
Having heard learned AGP and upon perusal of the delay
application, it appears that the impugned judgment and decree passed by
the Appellate Court on 19.04.2023, whereas the Second Appeal appears
to have been filed on 15.07.2026, whereby there was a delay of 1093 days
in filing the second appeal. After going through the delay application, it
appears that it is a case of a sheer carelessness and lackadaisical approach
on the part of the Government Officials who did not take appropriate
decision for quite long time, as they moved the file from one office to
another, which ultimately resulted into gross delay in filing the Second
Appeal.
5.1
As can be seen from paragraph-7 of the application, the Deputy
Conservator of Forest, Wildlife, Banaskantha, vide letter dated
21.08.2023, recommended to the Conservator of Forest, Wildlife,
Gandhinagar Circle, State of Gujarat, to file an appeal in the matter. In
paragraph-8, it was stated that Chief Conservator of Forest, Wildlife,
Gandhinagar, vide his letter dated 12.02.2025, has remanded back the
recommendation and requested the concerned Officer to correct the
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recommendation. There is no explanation forthcoming from the side of
the applicants as to what happened between 21.08.2023 and 12.02.2025.
There was a substantial delay on the part of the Chief Conservator of
Forest, Gandhinagar to take the said decision, which he could have easily
taken in no time if he found that recommendation sent by his sub-ordinate
officer was not in proper format. In no case, the Chief Conservator could
have sit tight over the proposal for more than 1 ½ year from its receipt.
5.2
Moreover, rest of the paragraphs would indicate that due to
administrative procedure, lots of time consumed which could have been
easily avoided if the applicants were seriously thinking to challenge the
impugned judgment and decree by way of second appeal. The approach
of the applicants to file the appeal after substantial delay would not
inspire any confidence at least to this Court that there was a bona fide
delay on the part of the applicants to approach this Court by way of
Second Appeal; rather, upon perusal of the delay application, it shows
gross negligence and inordinate delay on the part of the applicants to file
the Second Appeal.
6.
It is now well settled position of law that the delay occurred due to
administrative contingency and / or approval to be obtained from the
higher authority cannot not be a ground to condone the delay unless it has
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JUDGMENT DATED: 25/08/2026
been shown that there is a justifiable cause on the part of the higher
officials who could not take appropriate decision within reasonable time.
Nothing has been brought to the notice of this Court in this regard.
7.
At this stage, it is apposite to refer to and to rely upon the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K.B. Lal (Krishna
Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors., reported in 2024 (4) Scale
759, wherein, after revisiting the law on the aspect of condonation of
delay, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows:
“10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power
of a Court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it
is not to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence
and/or want of due diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji
Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC
384). The discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the
absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate
explanation for the delay (See P.K. Ramachandran v. State of
Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556). Thus, it is apparent that
the words ‘sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act
can only be given a liberal construction, when no negligence,
nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant
(See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer.,
(2013) 14 SCC 81). The principles which are to be kept in mind
for condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by this
Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649, and
are reproduced as under:
“21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an
application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are
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JUDGMENT DATED: 25/08/2026
not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to
remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose
regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically
elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the
obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal
the technical considerations should not be given undue
and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
proof should not affect public justice and cause public
mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so
that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of
justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate
delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the
former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the
latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one
warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a
liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors
to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale
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of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of
liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted, or the
grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts
should be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.”
(emphasis supplied)
7.1
It is also profitable to refer to and to rely upon ratio of the decision
of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a case of Pathapati Subba Reddy
(Died) BY L RS & ORS V/S Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in
2024 INSC 286 : 2024 (4) SCR 241 : 2024 (4) Scale 846, wherein after
referring to its previous decisions, summarized the case law on the issue
of limitation vis-a-vis condonation of delay in context of "sufficient
cause". It has been so observed and held as under:
"[26] On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the
law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is
evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there
should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy
rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed
of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a
fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict
sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
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(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial
justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to
defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3
of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the
delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise
of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised
even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such
as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it
does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if
the Court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in
filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning
the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed,
tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
(emphasis supplied)
7.2
It is also not out of place to rely upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of case of Basawaraj and Another v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2013 (14) SCC 81, wherein
it is held as under:“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the Court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what
was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and
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enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or
for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No Court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the
statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7.3
Even, in last year as well, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Shivamma (DEAD) By Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors.
reported In 2025 INSC 1104, in clear terms held that where there is
delay/laches on the part of the applicant in not prosecuting the legal
remedy, in the absence of any sufficient cause made out by the applicant,
the Court should not condone the delay while exercising its power under
Section 5 of the Act. In the case of Shivamma (Supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held thus: “258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the
Court must take into consideration while considering whether
the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the
approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix
their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for
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JUDGMENT DATED: 25/08/2026
which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held
that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the Court must not start with the merits
of the main matter. The Court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced
that the Court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for
the purpose of condoning the delay.”
(emphasis supplied)
8.
According to my considered view, the aforementioned exposition
of law applied with full force to the application for condonation of delay
filed by the State and or its instrumentality, as everyone is equal before
the court of law. This Court, being Constitutional Court, a protector of
fundamental rights, cannot permit violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India and shall, under no circumstances, treat these
applicants differently than other applicants (whether natural or juristic
person). The applicants must understand that with the advancement of
technology, movement of files between the offices can be significantly
expedited. Furthermore, the legal advisor available in every department
of the State apart from the Government Pleader’s office in every district,
unnecessary delays in decision making can surely be reduced by the
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higher officials, who ordinarily base their decision on legal advice.
9.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and having not
found explained the delay in a satisfactory manner, and as such, there is
no explanation for the period of delay between 21.08.2023 to 12.02.2025,
I am of the considered view that no sufficient cause is made out by the
applicants in this application and as such, the gross and inordinate delay
of 1093 days in filing the Second Appeal cannot be condoned by this
Court even by imposing any condition upon the applicants, including
costs. It is needless to say that as per settled law, the merits of the matter
should not be considered by this Court while adjudicating the application
for condonation of delay.
10.
Thus, for the foregoing discussion and reasons, I don't find any
merit in this application. Accordingly, it is hereby rejected. No order as to
cost.
11.
Registry shall refuse the registration of the Second Appeal and
Civil Application for stay, if any.
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J)
Lalji Desai
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