Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Serial No. 01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
CRP No. 2 of 2024
Date of Decision: 22.04.2024
Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads),
Govt. of Meghalaya,
Lower Lachumiere, Meghalaya,
Shillong-793003.
- Versus –
M/s BSC&C and C JV,
6-2-913/914, Progressive Tower,
Khaitrabad, Hyderabad,
Telangana-500004.
… Petitioner(s)
… Respondent(s)
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. A. Kumar, AG with
Mr. E.R. Chyne, GA
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. R. Banerji, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. R. Prakash, Adv.
Mr. A. Pande, Adv.
Mr. A. Raghuwanshi, Adv.
Ms. S. Gangar, Adv.
Ms. G.C. Marboh, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
CRP No. 2 of 2024
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
The brief facts necessary are that, on the inability of an
Arbitral Tribunal which was constituted on 13.03.2019, to render an
award within the stipulated time and subsequent extension thereof,
the respondent herein, had preferred an application for extension of
the mandate under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as A&C Act) before the
Commercial Court, East Khasi Hills. The petitioner then filed an
application under Section 11 of the Commercial Courts Act, read
with Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, challenging the jurisdiction of the
Commercial Court to entertain an application under Section 29A of
the A&C Act, 1996.
2.
The learned District Judge, Commercial Court, East
Khasi Hills, Shillong then by Judgment and Order dated
16.02.2024, passed in Commercial Misc. Case No. 1 of 2024, held
that the said Court had the jurisdiction to entertain an application
for extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section
29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Being aggrieved
CRP No. 2 of 2024
thereby, the petitioner has preferred the instant revision application
before this Court.
3.
The main issue in this Revision Application is with
regard to the interpretation of the expression ‘Court’ as given in
Sub-sections (4), (5) & (6) of Section 29A of the A&C Act.
Essentially, the interpretation revolves around whether the
expression ‘Court’ used in Section 29A would mean the High
Court, or the Principal Civil Court in a District.
It has been contended by the petitioner that the learned
Commercial Court had committed an error in holding that the
expression ‘Court’ would mean the Principal Civil Court in
accordance with Section 2(1)(e) of the A&C Act, inasmuch as, the
power of extension of the mandate is concomitant with the power of
appointment of arbitrator. The further contention is that Section
29A (6) of the A&C Act, provides that the Court while extending
the mandate can substitute one or all the arbitrators, thus such
power of substitution being part and parcel of the power of
appointment of arbitrator, which is only available with the High
CRP No. 2 of 2024
Court under Section 11(6), the expression ‘Court’ used in Section
29A cannot mean the Principal Civil Court in the District under
Section 2(1)(e).
4.
Further submissions advanced on behalf of the
petitioner are that Section 2 of the A&C Act is preceded with the
expression ‘unless the context otherwise requires’ which it is
asserted means the expression ‘Court’ would mean the Principal
Civil Court in a District only if the context does not indicate
otherwise. Section 29A (6) it is submitted, clearly indicates that the
expression ‘Court’ would mean the High Court, as the power of
appointment of arbitrator is only with the High Court in the context
of domestic arbitration.
5.
Mr. A. Kumar, learned Advocate General assisted by
Mr. E.R. Chyne, learned GA in support of his arguments, has
placed heavy reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in
the case of DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co. 2020 SCC
Online Del 2501, wherein he submits, it has been held that the
conflict can be resolved or reconciled by interpreting the term
CRP No. 2 of 2024
‘Court’ in the context of Section 29A of the A&C Act to be a Court
which has the power to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11 of the
Act. Reliance has also been placed on the following judgments on
this point.
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
Cabra Instalaciones Y Servicios vs. Maharashtra State
Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Bom
1437.
Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel and Ors. vs. Bhanubhai
Ramanbhai Patel and Ors.
K.V. Ramana Reddy vs. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited
and Ors. (04.01.2023- APHC) I.A. No. 2 of 2022 in
Arbitration Application No. 50 of 2018.
Amit Kumar Gupta vs. Dipak Prasad, 2021 SCC OnLine
Cal 2174
Indian Farmers Fertilizers Coop. Ltd., vs. Manish
Engineering Enterprises, 2022 SCC OnLine All 150.
On the meaning of ‘unless the context otherwise
6.
requires’, the learned Advocate General has cited the following
decisions hereinafter given, and submits that the Court has not only
to look at the words, but also to look at the context and to interpret
the same accordingly.
i)
ii)
State of Maharashtra vs. Indian Medical Assn., (2022) 1
SCC 589
Whirlpool Corpn. Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8
SCC 1 at page 12
CRP No. 2 of 2024
iii)
Grasim Industries Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs, (2002)
4 SCC 297
The interpretation suggested by the learned Commercial
Court he contends, has rendered the expression ‘unless the context
otherwise requires’ superfluous. It has also been argued that an
interpretation should be made to avoid anomalous results, and that
the suggestion given by the respondent therefore, would lead to
such a situation where the District Court, would be vested with the
power of appointment of a new arbitrator which would be in the
teeth of Section 11 of the A&C Act.
7.
In conclusion, the learned Advocate General submits
that the learned Commercial Court had failed to deal with the
judgments cited by the petitioners and the impugned order is
perverse, inasmuch as, the same is contrary to provisions of the
A&C Act, and as such bad in law and therefore, liable to be set
aside and quashed.
8.
Mr. R. Banerji, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr.
R. Prakash, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent in reply,
has submitted that the term ‘Court’ under Section 2(1) (e) of the
CRP No. 2 of 2024
A&C Act, read in the context of Section 29A(4) would mean the
Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District including
the High Court, in cases such a High Court is exercising ordinary
civil jurisdiction. The High Court of Meghalaya he submits, does
not exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction, and as such
therefore, the term ‘Court’ appearing in Section 29A of the Act,
would mean Principal Civil Court i.e. the learned Commercial
Court, Shillong. It has been contended by the learned Senior
counsel that the argument of the petitioner presupposes that all
appointments of arbitrators would only be under Section 11(6) of
the A&C Act, and there is no mention about the arbitrators
appointed by mutual consent under Section 11(2) of the Act. The
definition of Court under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, he submits is
clear and unambiguous and the intention of the legislature to
include the High Court, would be only in cases where it exercises
original jurisdiction.
9.
The learned Senior counsel then submits that a bare
perusal of Section 29A, notwithstanding the expression ‘unless the
context otherwise requires’, no context can be attributed indicating
CRP No. 2 of 2024
a contrary intention and therefore, as per settled legal proposition,
the meaning assigned to the term ‘Court’ as defined in Section
2(1(e) of the Act, should be given the same meaning. The Supreme
Court, he submits in various cases, has explained the aforesaid
words to mean that, even when a definition clause is preceded by
the words ‘unless the context otherwise requires’, normally the
definition given in the Section should be applied and given effect
to. As Section 11 of the Act specifically stipulates the ‘Court’ to
mean the High Court or the Supreme Court as the case may be, the
phrase ‘unless the context otherwise requires’, means that the
definition is inclusive of the High Court in cases where it was
required under the Act and specifically indicated therein, including
Section 11, 47 and 56 of the Act. It is further submitted that Section
29A was introduced when Section 11 and 2(1)(e) were already in
existence and therefore, if the legislature had the intention for the
meaning of ‘Court’ under Section 29A to mean otherwise, it would
have specifically carved out such an exception like it did in Section
11.
CRP No. 2 of 2024
10.
Supplementing his main arguments, the learned Senior
counsel has argued that the ‘Court’ under Section 34 of the Act has
the power to set aside an award passed by an Arbitral Tribunal on
certain grounds as laid down in the said provision, irrespective of
the fact whether the award has been passed by an arbitrator
appointed by the High Court or even the Supreme Court. Therefore,
he submits when the legislature has empowered the Principal Civil
Court of a District to set aside an award passed by arbitrators
appointed by higher Courts, there is no justification as to why such
arbitrators cannot be substituted by the Principal Civil Court under
Section 29A of the Act. Learned Senior counsel then referred to the
following judgments in support of his case.
i)
A’Xykno Capital Services Private Ltd. etc. vs. State of
U.P. etc. (Neutral Citation No. – 2023:AHC-LKO:37194)
ii)
Aplus Projects and Technology (P.) Ltd. vs. Oil India
Ltd. (2020) 1 Guwahati Law Reports 99
iii)
M/s URC Construction (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. M/s BEML Ltd.
2017 SCC OnLine Ker 20520
iv)
Nimet Resources Inc. and Anr. vs. Essar Steels Limited
(2009) 17 SCC 313.
CRP No. 2 of 2024
11.
Heard learned counsels for the parties and examined
the materials on records, and perused the various judgments cited
by the parties. As aforenoted, the entire issue revolves around the
definition of ‘Court’ as given in Section 2 (1)(e) of the A&C Act,
and whether the High Court under Section 29A would be the
‘Court’ within the meaning of the said Section. For the sake of
convenience, it would be expedient if Section 2(1)(e) is reproduced
hereinbelow:“2. Definition - (1) In this part, unless the context
otherwise requires, (e) “Court” means –
(i) in case of an arbitration other than
international commercial arbitration, the principal
Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and
includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary
original jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide
the questions forming the subject-matter of the
arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter
of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a
grade interior to such principal Civil Court, or any
Court of Small Causes;
(ii) in the case of international commercial
arbitration, the High Court in exercise of its
ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having
jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the
subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had
been the subject matter of a suit, and in other
cases, a High Court having jurisdiction to hear
appeals from decrees of courts subordinate to that
High Court;]”
CRP No. 2 of 2024
12.
A plain reading of Section 2(1)(e) has defined ‘Court’
to mean the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a
District and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary civil
jurisdiction. This provision has also clearly distinguished the term
‘Court’ to mean those Principal Civil Courts which have
jurisdiction only with regard to domestic arbitration, inasmuch as, it
has been provided therein “in the case of arbitration other than
international commercial arbitration”. The legislative intent is
therefore, patent on the face of the provision itself and in fact,
requires no further interpretation.
13.
The other question for consideration is whether Section
29A in its application, even taking into account Section 29A(6)
would denude the powers of the High Court not exercising original
civil jurisdiction, and therefore, would not come within the meaning
of ‘Court’ as given in Section 2(1)(e). Section 29A (4) and (6) are
reproduced hereinbelow:“29A. Time limit for arbitral award.—[(1)The award in
matters other than international commercial arbitration
shall be made by the arbitral tribunal within a period of
twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings
under sub-section (4) of section 23:
(1) ………….
CRP No. 2 of 2024
(2) ………….
(3) …………
(4) If the award is not made within the period specified in
sub-section (1) or the extended period specified under subsection (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate
unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the
period so specified, extended the period:
Provided that while extending the period under this
sub-section, if the Court finds that the proceedings have
been delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral
tribunal, then, it may order reduction of fees of arbitrator(s)
by not exceeding five per cent. for each month of such delay.
[Provided further that where an application under
sub-section (5) is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator
shall continue till the disposal of the said application:
Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an
opportunity of being heard before the fees is reduced.]
(5) …………….
(6) While extending the period referred to in sub-section (4),
it shall be open to the Court to substitute one or all of the
arbitrators and if one or all of the arbitrators are substituted,
the arbitral proceedings shall continue from the stage
already reached and on the basis of the evidence and
material already on record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed
under this section shall be deemed to have received the said
evidence and material.”
14.
A literal flurry of judgments have been pressed by both
sides in support of their respective case, wherein opposing views
have been taken by various High Courts and also interpretations of
the judgments of the Supreme Court have also been placed and
elaborated for consideration. Notable among these cases is the
CRP No. 2 of 2024
judgment placed by the respondent Senior counsel in the
compilation i.e. A’Xykno Capital Services Private Ltd. etc. vs.
State of U.P. (supra) wherein various judgements concerning the
ambit of Section 29A have been digested and discussed. After
taking into account the judgment in the case of Nimet Resources
(supra) and in the case of Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Limited
vs. Krishna Travel Agency reported in (2008) 6 SCC 741 and
discerning from the findings in the case of Indian Farmers
Fertilizers Cooperative Limited (supra) apart from other judgments
at Para-54 & 69 thereof, it has been held as follows:“54. In view of aforesaid, the intention of legislature
to include a High Court specifically having
jurisdiction over aspects under specific provisions of
the Act of 1996 has clearly been delineated. However
no such amendment has been incorporated in Section
2 (1)(e) to exclude a civil court of original jurisdiction
so far as it pertains to Section 29A of the Act.
Considered in the light of amendments made
in Sections 47 and 56 of the Act, the intention of
legislature to include a High Court only when it has
original jurisdiction is thus clear and unambiguous
and in such circumstances, where there is no
ambiguity, no purposive interpretation is required to
be resorted to implant a perceived casus, which even
otherwise was not omissus.
69. In the light of aforesaid aspects as indicated
hereinabove, the question is answered as follows:-
CRP No. 2 of 2024
'The concept of 'Court' as envisaged under Section
29A read with Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996 does
not include a High Court not having original civil
jurisdiction as in the case of Allahabad High Court
and an application as such under Section 29A of the
Act of 1996 would be maintainable only in the
Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a
district.'
Though on behalf of the petitioner it has been submitted
that the above quoted judgment precedes on a wrong pretext in
approaching the query from the perspective of original civil
jurisdiction rather than looking at Section 29A(6) of the A&C Act,
this Court is of the view that A’Xykno Capital Services Private
Ltd. etc. vs. State of U.P. (supra) has great persuasive value as the
High Court of Meghalaya does not possess original civil
jurisdiction.
15.
However, on another important aspect, the judgment of
the Bombay High Court in Cabra Instalaciones Y Servicios vs.
Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd (supra), has a
bearing on the instant case. This judgment, has touched upon the
purport of Section 29A(6), which provides that while extending the
period referred to in Sub-section (4), it would be open to the Court
CRP No. 2 of 2024
to substitute one or all of the arbitrators; and has held it to be in
fact, a power to make appointment of a new/substitute arbitrator, or
any member of the arbitral tribunal, and as the arbitral tribunal was
appointed by the Supreme Court, the High Court was found to lack
jurisdiction to pass any orders under Section 29A of the Act. This
finding has been followed by the Delhi High Court in the case of
DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co.(supra), wherein it
has been held at Para-29 thereof as follows:“29. In case a petition under Section 29A of the Act is
filed before the Principal Civil Court for extension of
mandate and the occasion for substitution arises, then
the Principal Civil Court will be called upon to
exercise the power of substituting the Arbitrator. In a
given case, the Arbitrator being substituted could be
an Arbitrator who had been appointed by the Supreme
Court or the High Court. This would lead to a
situation where the conflict would arise between the
power of superior Courts to appoint Arbitrators
under Section 11 of the Act and those of the Civil
Court to substitute those Arbitrators under Section
29A of the Act. This would be clearly in the teeth of
provisions of Section 11 of the Act, which confers the
power of appointment of Arbitrators only on the High
Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. The
only way, therefore, this conflict can be resolved or
reconciled, in my opinion, will be by interpreting the
term ‘Court’ in the context of Section 29A of the Act,
to be a Court which has the power to appoint an
Arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act. Accepting the
contention of the respondent would lead to an
inconceivable and impermissible situation where,
particularly in case of Court appointed Arbitrators,
CRP No. 2 of 2024
where the Civil Courts would substitute and appoint
Arbitrators,
while
extending
the
mandate
under Section 29A of the Act.”
16.
Thus, it is seen that the term ‘Court’ used in Section
29A(4), as the definitive clause has provided in Section 2(1), is to
be interpreted by making use of the expression “unless the context
otherwise requires”. The phrase “unless the context otherwise
requires” in the view of this Court, is a provision in Section 2,
intended by the legislature to allow for flexibility in interpretation
and indicates that the definitions given therein, should be
understood in accordance with the surrounding context, or specific
circumstances,
rather
than
strictly
adhering
to
a
literal
interpretation. This provision hence, enables courts to consider the
broader context, including the intent of the legislature, in
determining the applicable meaning of the provisions at hand. In
essence, it grants discretion to interpret the provision in a manner
that best aligns with the overall purpose and objectives of the
statute.
17.
Though it is correct that the power under Section 11(6)
of the Act, specifically vests the powers of appointment of arbitrator
CRP No. 2 of 2024
in the case of domestic arbitration upon the High Court, this
jurisdiction also is limited, as once an arbitrator is nominated, the
High Court does not retain jurisdiction. However, as noted in
various judgments, if the power under Section 29A is to be
exercised by the Principal Civil Court, though it may be competent
to extend the mandate, an anomalous situation would arise, if there
is a question of substitution, as it may result in an arbitrator
appointed by the High Court being substituted by the Principal Civil
Court, which would then militate against the stipulation of Section
11(6) of the Act.
18.
A contextual interpretation of the term ‘Court’ as given
in the Act, will therefore involve analyzing the facts of the case, the
legislative intent to understand its purpose and its application,
whereas textual interpretation on the other hand, focuses solely on
the language of the provision itself. Balancing both approaches
therefore, will ensure the comprehensive application of the
provisions’ meaning and intent, taking into account both its context
and textual structure to apply it effectively, to fit into the scheme of
the Act. As such, in the considered view of this Court, Section
2(1)(e) allows the interpretation of the term ‘Court’ to be read,
CRP No. 2 of 2024
keeping the object of the statute intact, and the same should not
result in defeating the purpose, for which the provision i.e. Section
29A was inserted.
19.
In the backdrop of the discussions herein above, coming
to the case in hand, the decision rendered in Magnum Opus IT
consulting Private Limited vs. Artcad Systems, Through its
Proprietor Vinay Digambar Shende (2022) SCC OnLine Bom
2861: (2023) 1 Arb LR 441, which has been relied upon by the
respondents, however comes to their aid, as the arbitrators in the
present case were not appointed under Section 11 by the High
Court. As such, by applying this judgment, a distinction can be
drawn to hold that, if the appointment of the arbitrator is not by the
High Court under Section 11, the Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction in this case, the Commercial Court at Shillong, East
Khasi Hills will have the power to entertain an application under
Section 29A for extension of the term, as no anomalous situation
would arise therefrom. As such, by making use of the expression of
Section 2 of the Act “unless the context otherwise requires” the
textual interpretation will be in tune with the contextual one.
CRP No. 2 of 2024
20.
Accordingly, keeping in mind the fact that, the High
Court of Meghalaya does not possess original Civil Jurisdiction,
coupled with the fact that, Section 11 nor Section 29A(6) do not
come into play in the present case, as the arbitrators were not
appointed by the High Court, the Commercial Court, East Khasi
Hills, Shillong being the Principal Court of original jurisdiction will
have the jurisdiction to extend the mandate as prescribed under
Section 29A of the Act.
21.
As such, in conclusion, in view of the discussions made
hereinabove, this Revision Petition is dismissed and disposed of
accordingly.
22.
No order as to costs.
JUDGE
Meghalaya
22.04.2024
CRP No. 2 of 2024
“V. Lyndem PS”
CRP No. 2 of 2024
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review