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THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.722 of 2025
Date of Decision: 17.06.2026
_______________________________________________________
Chhyal Singh
…….Petitioner
Versus
Himachal Pradesh Gramin Bank
… Respondent
_______________________________________________________
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. Virender K. Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Mr. K. B. Khajuria, Advocate.
_______________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):
Instant Criminal Revision petition filed under Section 438
read with Section 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
lays challenge to judgment dated 12.09.2025, passed by learned
Additional Sessions Judge-I, Mandi (camp at Karsog) District Mandi,
Himachal Pradesh, in case filing No.1251 of 2023(Reg. CIS No.105 of
2023), affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
29.04.2023, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Karsog, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in criminal complaint
Registration No.142 of 2021, titled Himachal Pradesh Gramin Bank
VS. Chhyal Singh”, whereby learned trial Court, while holding
petitioner-accused (hereinafter referred to as the ‘accused’) guilty
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
of his having committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short ‘Act’), convicted and
sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two
months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.1,80,000/- to the
respondent-complainant-bank(hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
‘complainant’).
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the
pleadings as well as other documents adduced on record by the
respective
parties,
are
that
the
respondent-complainant-bank
instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Act in the competent
Court of law, alleging therein that on the request of the accused,
complainant-bank sanctioned term loan for Agri Allied activities of
Rs. 1, 39,000/- to the accused, who with a view to discharge his lawful
liability issued cheque bearing No.246064, dated 19.07.2021,
amounting to
Rs. 1, 70,000/-, drawn on Himachal Pradesh Gramin
Bank Churag. However, fact remains that aforesaid cheque on its
presentation to the bank concerned was dishonoured on the ground
of insufficient funds in the bank account of the accused vide memo
dated 20.07.2021. Immediately, after receipt of return memo,
complainant served accused with legal notice dated 09.08.2021,
calling upon the accused to make the payment good within stipulated
time, but since he failed to do the needful within stipulated time,
complainant had no option, but to initiate proceedings under Section
138 of the Act in the competent Court of law, which subsequently, on
the basis of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties,
held the accused guilty of his having committed offence punishable
under S. 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him
as per description given herein above.
3.
Being
aggrieved
and
dissatisfied
with
aforesaid
judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by learned trial
Court, present petitioner-accused preferred an appeal in the Court of
learned Additional Sessions Judge-1, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal
Pradesh, but same also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated
12.09.2025. In the aforesaid background, petitioner-accused has
approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for
his acquittal after quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment
of conviction and order of sentence recorded by Courts below.
4.
Vide order dated 31.12.2025, this Court suspended the
substantive sentence imposed by Court below, subject to petitioneraccused furnishing personal bonds and
depositing 25% of the
compensation amount within a period of four weeks. However, fact
remains that aforesaid order never came to be complied with.
Repeatedly, matter was adjourned on the request of the petitioner,
enabling him to deposit or settle the matter with the respondent-bank,
but in vain and as such, this Court has no option, but to decide the
petition on its own merit.
5.
Having heard learned counsel representing the parties
and perused material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned
in the impugned judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions
Judge-1, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, affirming judgment
of conviction and order of sentence recorded by learned trial Court,
this Court finds no illegality or infirmity in the same and as such, no
interference is called for. Though, learned counsel representing the
petitioner vehemently argued that both the Courts below have failed
to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, however having
carefully perused the pleadings as well as evidence adduced on
record by the complainant, this Court has no hesitation to conclude
that complainant successfully proved on record that accused had
issued cheque Ex. CW1/B with a view to discharge his lawful liability,
however same was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds in
the bank account of the accused. Before initiating proceedings under
Section 138 of the Act, complainant served accused with legal notice
Ex. CW1/D, but fact remains that petitioner despite his having
received legal notice neither filed the reply nor made any payment
and as such, complainant had no option, but to initiate proceedings
under Section 138 of the Act, which subsequently on the basis of the
pleadings as well as evidence rightly came to be allowed.
6.
Most importantly, factum with regard to issuance of
cheque as well as signatures thereupon never came to be refuted at
the behest of the accused. In his statement recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C, accused admitted that he had raised term loan of
Rs. 3,00,000/- in the year 2019 and at the time of sanction of loan, his
three blank signed cheques were taken by the bank. He also admitted
issuance of legal notice to him, but claimed that he had deposited
some amount. Though, accused repeatedly sought time to lead
defence evidence, but no evidence was laid, as a result of which,
defence otherwise proposed to be set up never came to be
probablized.
7.
To the contrary, complainant successfully proved his
case by examining Sh. Joginder Kumar Saini as CW-1, who tendered
his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. CW1/A,
wherein he specifically
reiterated the averments contained in the complaint. Besides above,
he also tendered cheque Ex. CW1/B, memo Ex. CW1/C, legal notice
Ex. CW1/D, postal receipt Ex. CW1/E, status report Ex. CW1/F,
statement of account Ex. CW1/G, Ex.CW1/H and Ex. CW1/J and
GPA Ex. CW1/K on record. Cross-examination conducted upon afore
witness, nowhere suggests that accused was able to extract anything
contrary to what this witness stated in his examination-in-chief, rather
pattern of cross-examination conducted upon afore witness clearly
establishes factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as
signature thereupon. If it is so, no illegality otherwise can be said to
have been committed by the learned Courts below, while invoking
Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which speak about presumption in
favour of the holder of the cheque that cheque was issued towards
discharge of lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is
rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption, accused either can refer to
the documents and evidence led on record by the complainant or
presumption can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any,
sought to be raised by him, while deposing under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
8.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V.
State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that
if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates
doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the
prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on
the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the
accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable
defence nor is able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt
or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into
play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of
the judgment herein:“23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the
matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section
139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has
been included in furtherance of the legislative objective
of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments.
While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong
criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the
cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139
is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of
litigation. The Court however, further observed that it
must be remembered that the offence made punishable
by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory
offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the
nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually
confined to the private parties involved in commercial
transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the
defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an
unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further
observed that it is a settled position that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption under Section
139, the standard of proof for doing so is all
preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a
probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the
prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to
raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in
some cases the accused may not need to adduce the
evidence
of
his/her
own.
If
however,
the
accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises
a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory
presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding
commission of the offence comes into play if the same
is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted
by the complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques
in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of
the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer
is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity
to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the
cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the
receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to
make the payment within the time stipulated under the
statute does not pay the amount, that the said default
would be considered a dishonour constituting an
offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the
question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable
debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was
issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have
to examine having regard to the evidence adduced
before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that
unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been
issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the
responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons
to conduct the trial in matters where there has been
instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of
funds and whether the same would be a sufficient
ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely
heavy.
9.
By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued
as “security” can also attract offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati
Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of
2021, decided on 28.10.2021, has held as under:
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper
under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the
state of being safe and the security given for a loan is
something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited
or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to
which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a
transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to
repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque
as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not
repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no
other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer
the payment of amount,
the cheque which is issued as security would mature for
presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to
present the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section
138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
10.
Needless to say, expression “security cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act,
rather same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if
any, led on record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The
Negotiable Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in
respect of a “security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of
such a cheque would not be maintainable as there is a debt existing
in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued, same would
attract provision of Section 138 of the Act in case of its dishonour.
11.
Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record
by the respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients
of Section 138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Similarly,
factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by the
accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established
on record.
12.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially,
in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the
courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment
passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs.
Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court
Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the
jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by
the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the
said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of
an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second
appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be
appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence
and come to its own conclusion on the same when the
evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as
well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature
is brought to the notice of the High Court which would
otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”
13.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as
fact, if any, committed by the courts below, while passing impugned
judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the
revisional power.
14.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme
Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a
failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure,
sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to
prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct
irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its
judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel
representing the accused has failed to point out any material
irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the
evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the
well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below.
15.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein
above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court
sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments
recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based
upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as
such, same are upheld.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is
16.
dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to
surrender himself before the learned trial Court within a period of 30
days to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if
not already served. Bail bonds of the petitioner are cancelled. Interim
direction, if any, stands vacated. Pending applications, if any, also
stand disposed of.
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
June 17, 2026
(shankar)
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