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R/SCR.A/14454/2025
JUDGMENT DATED: 13/11/2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 14454 of 2025
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS
==========================================================
Approved for Reporting
Yes
No
==========================================================
CHHATRAPALSINH MAHAVIRSINH RANA THRO YASHPALSINH
CHHATRAPALSINH RANA
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR HR PRAJAPATI(674) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MS NISHKA H PRAJAPATI(10717) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MS MONALI BHATT, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS
Date : 13/11/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS)
1.
The
detenue
herein
namely
Chhatrapalsinh
Mahavirsinh Rana came to be preventively detained vide the
detention order dated 17/10/2025 passed by the District
Magistrate, Surendranagar, as a ‘bootlegger’ as de ned
under Section 2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social
Activities Act, 1985 (herein after referred as ‘the Act of 1985).
2.
By way of this petition, the petitioner-the son of the
R/SCR.A/14454/2025
JUDGMENT DATED: 13/11/2025
detenue has challenged the legality and validity of the
aforesaid order.
3.
This Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioner
and learned APP for the respondent-State Authorities.
4.
Learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently argued
that there was no material available with the detention
authority to indicate as to how the public health or public
order or public tranquility was disturbed in any manner.
Thus, in absence of any such material on record, the order of
detention ought not have been passed. It is further submitted
by learned advocate for the petitioner that the impugned
order is passed without application of mind and prima facie
the order is passed mechanically.
4.1. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted
that the impugned order was executed upon the detenue and
presently the detenue is detained in the Central Jail, Lajpor,
Surat.
5.
On the other hand, learned APP, opposing the present
petition contended that the detenue is habitual o3ender and
his activities a3ected at the society at large. Hence, the
Detaining Authority, considering the antecedents and past
activities of the detenue, has passed the impugned order with
a view to preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the area of
Surendranagar and lastly prayed to dismiss the present
petition.
R/SCR.A/14454/2025
6.
JUDGMENT DATED: 13/11/2025
Having considered the facts as well as the submissions
made by the learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties, the core issue arises as to whether the order of
detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of his
powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable
in law or not?
7.
We have carefully gone through the order passed by the
concerned authority. It appears that the order impugned was
executed upon the detenue and presently he is in Central
Jail, Lajpor, Surat. In the grounds of detention, reference of
one criminal case for the o"ences punishable under
Sections 65(A), 65(E), 81, 98(2) and 116(B) of the
Prohibition Act registered with Muli Police Station,
Surendranagar is made out.
7.1. In the impugned order, it is alleged that the activities of
the detenue as a “bootlegger” a3ects adversely or are likely to
a3ect adversely the maintenance of public order as explained
under Section 3 of the Act of 1985. Undisputedly, in the
aforesaid alleged o3ence, the detenue was granted bail by the
concerned court.
8.
Considering the impugned order, it appears that the
provisions of Section 2(b) of the Act of 1985 is referred by the
concerned authorities.
Hence, the same is required to be
reproduced. The same reads as under:
“2(b) "bootlegger"
means
a
person
who
distills,
R/SCR.A/14454/2025
JUDGMENT DATED: 13/11/2025
manufactures, stores, transports, imports, exports, sells
or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other
intoxicant in contravention of any provision of the
Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and the rules and orders
made thereunder, or of any other law for the time being
in force or who knowingly expends or applies any money
or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel or other
conveyance or any receptacle or any other material
whatsoever in furtherance or support of the doing of any
of the things described above by or through any other
person, or who abets in any other manner the doing of
any such thing;”
9.
After consideration of the available material, we are of
the considered view that on the basis of one prohibition
case, the authority has wrongly arrived at the subjective
satisfaction that the activities of the detenue could be termed
to be acting in a manner ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order’. In our considered opinion, the said o3ences do
not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. In
this regard, we would like to refer the decision of the Apex
Court
in
the
case
of
Piyush
Kantilal
Mehta
Vs.
Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, 1989 Supp (1)
SCC 322, wherein,
the detention order was made on the
basis of the registration of the two prohibition o3ences. The
Apex Court after referring the case of Pushkar Mukherjee
Vs. State of Bengal, 1969 (1) SCC 10, held and observed
that mere disturbance of law and order leading to detention
order is thus not necessarily su3icient for action under
preventive detention Act. Paras-17 & 18 are relevant to refer,
which read thus:
“17. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of this
Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal,
R/SCR.A/14454/2025
JUDGMENT DATED: 13/11/2025
where the distinction between `law and order' and
`public order' has been clearly laid down. Ramaswami, J.
speaking for the Court observed as follows:
10. "Does the expression `public order' take in
every kind of infraction of order or only some
categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of
assault or injury to speci8c persons does not lead
to public disorder. When two people quarrel and
8ght and assault each other inside a house or in a
street, it may be said that there is disorder but not
public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under
the powers vested in the executive authorities
under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but
the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that
they
were
disturbing
public
order.
The
contravention of any law always a:ects order but
before it can be said to a:ect public order, it must
a:ect the community or the public at large. In this
connection we must draw a line of demarcation
between serious and aggravated forms of disorder
which directly a:ect the community or injure the
public interest and the relatively minor breaches of
peace of a purely local signi8cance which primarily
injure speci8c individuals and only in a secondary
sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law
and order leading to disorder is thus not
necessarily su:icient for action under the
Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which
will a:ect public order comes within the scope of
the Act."
18. In the instant case, the detaining authority, in our
opinion, has failed to substantiate that the alleged antisocial activities of the petitioner adversely a:ect or are
likely to a:ect adversely the maintenance of public
order. It is true some incidents of beating by the
petitioner had taken place, as alleged by the witnesses.
But, such incidents, in our view, do not have any bearing
on the maintenance of public order. The petitioner may
be punished for the alleged o:ences committed by him
but, surely, the acts constituting the o:ences cannot be
said to have a:ected the even tempo of the life of the
R/SCR.A/14454/2025
JUDGMENT DATED: 13/11/2025
community. It may be that the petitioner is a bootlegger
within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act, but merely
because he is a bootlegger he cannot be preventively
detained under the provisions of the Act unless, as laid
down in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, his
activities as a bootlegger a:ect adversely or are likely to
a:ect adversely the maintenance of public order We
have carefully considered the o:ences alleged against
the petitioner in the order of detention and also the
allegations made by the witnesses and, in our opinion,
these o:ences or the allegations cannot be said to have
created any feeling of insecurity or panic or terror
among the members of the public of the area in question
giving rise to the question of maintenance of public
order. The order of detention cannot, therefore, be
upheld.”
10.
For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered
opinion that, the material available on record are not
su3icient for holding that the alleged activities of the detenue
have either a3ected adversely or likely to a3ect adversely the
maintenance of public order and therefore, the subjective
satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be
said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law.
11.
Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order
impugned dated 17/10/2025 passed by the respondent
authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to be set
at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.
Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.
(N.S.SANJAY GOWDA,J)
(D. M. VYAS, J)
ILA
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