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* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
+ WRIT PETITION No.34357 of 2025
% Dated: 01.07.2026
Between:
# Cheemparthi Shaheen
..…Petitioner
And
The State of Andhra Pradesh and three others….Respondents
! Counsel for the petitioner
: Sri D.Purna Chandra Reddy
^ Counsel for the Respondents
: Sri Kirthi Teja Kondaveeti,
Government Pleader
< GIST :
> HEAD NOTE :
IN THE HIGH COUR
? Cases referred:
(1999) 1 SCC 417
(1980)2 SCC 338
(2012) 11 SCC 745
(2013) 4 SCC 435
(1991)1 SCC 476
(1980)4 SCC531
2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 515
(2015) 16 SCC 253
2020 SCC Online AP 565
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
WRIT PETITION No.34357 of 2025
Between:
……Petitioner
Cheemparthi Shaheen
And
The State of Andhra Pradesh and three others …….Respondents
Submitted for approval:
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
Yes/No
Marked to Law Reporters/Journals.
3. Whether Their Lordship wishes
Yes/No
to see the fair copy of the Judgment?
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
______________________
SUBHENDU SAMANTA, J
APHC010665832025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA
PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3562]
WEDNESDAY, THE 1st DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
WRIT PETITION NO: 34357/2025
Between:
1. CHEEMPARTHI SHAHEEN, W/O. FAKURUDDIN, AGED 32
YEARS, R/O. D.NO. 2/218, 2ND WARD, KHADAR PALLE,
KADAPA, YSR KADAPA DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
AND
1. THE STATE OF AP, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF
SECRETARY, SECRETARIAT BUILDINGS, AMARAVATHI
AT VELAGAPUDI, GUNTUR DISTRICT
2. THE COLLECTOR AND DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, YSR
KADAPA DISTRICT.
3. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, YSR KADAPA
DISTRICT.
4. THE SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL PRISON, KADAPA,
YSR KADAPA DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying
that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the
High Court may be pleased topleased to issue writ order or
direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of Habeas
Corpus under Article 226 of the constitution of India directing the
4th respondent to produce Cheemparthi Fakruddin S/o Pakru Valli,
who is now detained in Central Prison, Kadapa before this Hon'ble
Court and he may be ordered to be released forthwith after
declaring his detention vide REV-CSECOPDL(PRCO)/2/2025SA(Cl)-KDPCO, dt. 02.09.2025, passed by the 2nd respondent
which was confirmed by the 1st respondent vide G.O.Rt.No. 1976,
dt.24.10.2025 General Administration (Law and Order) Dept., as
illegal and un constitutional and pass
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. D PURNACHANDRA REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. ADDL ADVOCATE GENERAL
The Court made the following:
Date of reserved for orders
: -----------
Date of pronouncement
: 01-07-2026
Date of uploading
: 08-07-2026
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
WRIT PETITION No.34357 of 2025
ORDER: (per Hon‟ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)
Heard Sri D.Purna Chandra Reddy, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri Kirthi Teja Kondaveeti, learned Government
Pleader, attached to the office of the learned Additional Advocate
General, appearing for the respondents.
2. The detenu namely Cheemparthi Fakruddin, is the husband of
the petitioner.
3. An order of detention vide File No.REV-CSECOPDL(PRCO)/2/
2025-SA(C1)-KDPCO dated 02.09.2025 was passed under the
Andhra
Pradesh
Prevention
of
Dangerous
Activities
of
Bootlegggers, Dacoits, Drug offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (in short ‘the Act, 1986’)
by the Collector & District Magistrate, Y.S.R. Kadapa District. The
order of detention was passed considering eight criminal cases
pending against him. The State Government accorded approval to
the detention order vide G.O.RT.No.1675, General Adminsitration
(SC-I) Department, dated 11.09.2025. The Advisory Board
submitted its report of the meeting dated 26.09.2025 that there was
sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu.The detention order
was confirmed by the State Government vide G.O.Rt.No.1976,
General Administration (SC-I) Department, dated 24.10.2025 for a
period of twelve months from the date of detention(Ex.P2).
4. The order of detention, informed that the detenu could make
representation, but any representation was not made initially. After
the order of confirmation, representation dated 27.10.2025 was
made to the Government for release of the detenu with the prayer
to set aside the order of detention.
5. The detenu’s representation dated 27.10.2025 was rejected by
the State Government vide G.O.No.34, General Administration
(SC-I) Department, dated 06.01.2026(page No.447 of the counteraffidavit), during pendency of the writ petition.
6. Challenging the aforesaid orders of detention the writ petition for
Habeas Corpus has been filed to set aside those orders of
detention and to release and set free, the detenu.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner, raised the following two
grounds:
1) that the representation dated 27.10.2025 was rejected on
06.01.2026 during pendency of the writ petition. There is
long delay in deciding the representation by the State
Government. The consideration must be with promptness
and expeditious. The delay has also not been explained in
the counter affidavit; and
2) that the detenu was in judicial custody in Crime No.41 of
2025 of RSASTF Police Station, Tirupati, on the date of
passing of the order of detention but no satisfaction has
been recorded by the District Collector that there was
likelihood of the detenu being released on bail, in that
case.
There is no such satisfaction recorded which is
required to be recorded on the relevant material.
8. In support of the first contention, learned counsel for the
petitioner placed reliance in the cases of Rajammal v. State of
Tamilnadu and another1, Pabitra N.Rana v. Union of India and
others2, Rashid Kapadia v. Medha Gadgil and others3, Abdul
Nasar Adam Ismail v. State of Maharashtra4, K.M.Abdulla
Kunhi and B.L.Abdul Khader v. Union of India and others5 and
Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India and others6.
9. In support of the second contention, learned counsel for the
petitioner placed reliance in Syed Mohiyuddin Vs. State of
Andhra
Pradesh7,
Champion
R.
Sangma
Vs.
State
of
Meghalaya8, V.Adi Lakshmi Vs. State of A.P9, Cheemparthi
Parvin v. the State of A.P(W.P.No.1803 of 2021 dated
27.04.2021), W.P.Nos.7335 of 2023 and Batch dated 03.07.2023,
and Cheemparthi Salma v. State of A.P (W.P.No.932 of 2025
dated 26.09.2025)
(1999) 1 SCC 417
(1980)2 SCC 338
(2012) 11 SCC 745
(2013) 4 SCC 435
(1991)1 SCC 476
(1980)4 SCC531
2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 515
(2015) 16 SCC 253
2020 SCC Online AP 565
10.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of
detention is unsustainable and deserves to be set aside.
The
detention is illegal and the detenu deserves to be set at liberty.
11.
Per contra, learned Government Pleader appearing for the
respondents submits that the representation dated 27.10.2025 was
submitted by the petitioner and the same was forwarded to the
District Collector, YSR Kadapa District, to furnish remarks, vide
Government
memo
No.2965917/SC-I/A3/2025-4,
GA(SC-I)
Department, dated 06.11.2025, which were received from the
District
Collector
vide
Lr.No.REVCSECOPDL/(PRCO)/2/2025-
SA(C1)-KDPCO, dated 03.12.2025. Thereafter, vide G.O.Rt.No.34,
General Administration (SC-I) Department, dated 06.01.2026 on
consideration representation was rejected.
12.
Learned Government Pleader submits that, except the
mention of the aforesaid dates, there is no explanation given for the
dates in between i.e. from the date of receipt of representation till
passing of the G.O.Rt.No.34, dated 06.01.2026 neither in the
G.O.Ms.No.34 nor in the counter-affidavit. However, the learned
Government Pleader further submits that even if there is
unexplained delay in deciding the representation that would not
vitiate the order of detention but it is only the continued detention
that may become illegal.
13.
We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused
the material on record.
14.
In K.M.Abdulla Kunhi (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held
that the representation relates to the liberty of the individual, the
highly cherished right enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Clause (5) of Article 22 therefore casts a legal obligation on
the Government to consider the representation as
early as
possible. It is a constitutional mandate, commanding the concerned
authority to whom the detenu submits his representation to
consider the representation and dispose of the same as
expeditiously as possible.
The words ‘as soon as may be”
occurring in clause (5) of Article 22 reflects the concern of the
framers that the representation should be expeditiously considered
and dispeod of with a sense of urgency without an avoidable delay.
15.
Para No.12 of K.M.Abdulla Kunhi (supra) reads as under:
“The representation relates to the liberty of the individual,
the highly cherished right enshrined in Article 21 of our
Constitution. Clause (5) of Article 22 therefore, casts a
legal obligation on the government to consider the
representation as early as possible. It is a constitutional
mandate commanding the concerned authority to whom
the detenu submits his representation to consider the
representation and dispose of the same as expeditiously
as possible. The words “as soon as may be” occurring in
clause (5) of Article 22 reflects the concern of the
Framers that the representation should be expeditiously
considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency
without an avoidable delay. However, there can be no
hard and fast rule in this regard. It depends upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. There is no
period prescribed either under the Constitution or under
the concerned detention law, within which the
representation should be dealt with. The requirement
however, is that there should not be supine indifference,
slackness or callous attitude in considering the
representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of
representation would be a breach of the constitutional
imperative and it would render the continued detention
impermissible and illegal. This has been emphasised
and re-emphasised by a series of decisions of this Court.
(See: Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of W.M. [(1970) 1 SCC
219] ; Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra [(1980) 2
SCC 275 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 419] ; Rama Dhondu Borade
v. V.K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police [(1989) 3 SCC
173 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 520] and Aslam Ahmed Zahire
Ahmed Shaik v. Union of India [(1989) 3 SCC 277 : 1989
SCC (Cri) 554] .)”
16.
On the point of delayed consideration of representation, In
K.M.Abdulla Kunhi (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that if the detenu does not exercise his right to
make representation against the order of detention but presents the
representation to the Government after the Government has
confirmed the order of detention, the Government still has to
consider such representation and release the detenu if the
detention is not within the power conferred under the statute. It
was held that so long as the representation is independently
considered by the Government and if there is no delay in
considering the representation, the fact that it is considered after
the confirmation of the detention makes little difference on the
validity of the detention or confirmation of the detention.
The
confirmation cannot be invalidated solely on the ground that the
representation is considered subsequent to confirmation of the
detention.
17.
Para Nos.19 and 20 of K.M.Abdulla Kunhi (supra) read as
under:
“19. There is no constitutional mandate under cl. (5) of
Article 22, much less any statutory requirement to
consider the representation before confirming the order
of detention. As long as the Government without delay
considers the representation with an unbiased mind
there is no basis for concluding that the absence of
independent consideration is the obvious result if the
representation is not considered before the confirmation
of detention. Indeed, there is no justification for imposing
this restriction on the power of the Government. As
observed earlier, the Government's consideration of the
representation is for a different purpose, namely to find
out whether the detention is in conformity with the power
under the statute. This has been explained in Haradhan
Saha case, where Ray, C.J., speaking for the
Constitution Bench observed that the consideration of
the representation by the Government is only to
ascertain whether the detention order is in conformity
with the power under the law. There need not be a
speaking order in disposing such representation. There
is also no failure of justice by the order not being a
speaking order. All that is necessary is that there should
be real and proper consideration by the Government.
20. It is necessary to mention that with regard to liberty
of citizens the court stands guard over the facts and
requirements of law, but court cannot draw presumption
against any authority without material. It may be borne in
mind that the confirmation of detention does not preclude
the government from revoking the order of detention
upon considering the representation. Secondly, there
may be cases where the government has to consider the
representation only after confirmation of detention.
Clause (5) of Article 22 suggests that the representation
could be received even after confirmation of the order of
detention. The words „shall afford him the earliest
opportunity of making a representation against the order‟
in clause (5) of Article 22 suggest that the obligation of
the government is to offer the detenu an opportunity of
making a representation against the order, before it is
confirmed according to the procedure laid down under
Section 8 of the Act. But if the detenu does not exercise
his right to make representation at that stage, but
presents it to the government after the government has
confirmed the order of detention, the government still
has to consider such representation and release the
detenu if the detention is not within the power conferred
under the statute. The confirmation of the order of
detention is not conclusive as against the detenu. It can
be revoked suo motu under Section 11 or upon a
representation of the detenu. It seems to us therefore,
that so long as the representation is independently
considered by the government and if there is no delay in
considering the representation, the fact that it is
considered after the confirmation of detention makes
little difference on the validity of the detention or
confirmation of the detention. The confirmation cannot
be invalidated solely on the ground that the
representation is considered subsequent to confirmation
of the detention. Nor it could be presumed that such
consideration is not an independent consideration. With
all respect, we are not inclined to subscribe to the views
expressed in V.J. Jain [(1979) 4 SCC 401 : 1980 SCC
(Cri) 4] , Om Prakash Bahl [ W.P. No. 845 of 1979,
decided on October 15, 1979 (Unreported)] and Khairul
Haque cases [ W.P. No. 246 of 1969, decided on
September 10, 1969 (Unreported)] . They cannot be
considered to be good law and hence stand overruled.”
18.
In Rajammal (supra), it has been held that the delay in
considering the representation, for which there was no, explanation
vitiates further detention, which becomes illegal and the detenu
entitled for the release. Para Nos.9 to 11 in Rajammal (supra),
read as under:
9. What happened in this case was that the Government
which received remarks from different authorities
submitted the relevant files before the Under Secretary
for processing it on the next day. The Under Secretary
forwarded it to the Deputy Secretary on the next working
day. Thus there is some explanation for the delay till
9.2.1998. Thereafter the file was submitted before the
Minister who received it while he was on tour. The
Minister passed the order only on 14.2.1998. Though
there is explanation for the delay till 9.2.1998, we are
unable to find out any explanation whatsoever as for the
delay which occurred thereafter. Merely stating that the
Minister was on tour and hence he could pass orders
only on 14.2.1998 is not a justifiable explanation, when
the liberty of a citizen guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution is involved. Absence of the Minister at the
Headquarters is not sufficient to justify the delay, since
the file could be reached the Minister with utmost
promptitude in cases involving the vitally important
fundamental right of a citizen.
10. Mr. V.R. Reddy, learned senior counsel for the State
of Tamil Nadu referred to a decision of this Court in Mrs.
U. Vijayalakshmi v. State o/Tamil Nadu and another, AIR
(1994) SC 165 to contend that it could not be said that
there was any delay in considering the representation
from 9.2.1998 to 14.2.1998. In that case also the
detention was under Section 3(1) of the Act. The detenu
made representation against the detention which was
received by the State Government which conveyed the
rejection of the representation on 23.6.1992. The detenu
received the rejection order on 26.6.1992. It was
submitted that there was an inordinate long delay in
dealing with the representation and that the detenu was
entitled to have the detention order quashed. This Court
noticed that in the counter affidavit filed by the Deputy
Secretary to the State Government the manner in which
the representation was dealt with after its receipt on
18.5.1992 had been stated in detail. The Court then
observed:
"We have perused the stages through which the file
containing the representation was dealt with promptly
and there was no indifference lethargy or negligence in
dealing with the same. The file was not unnecessarily
held up at any level but moved from level to level
promptly. We are, therefore, satisfied that the
explanation tendered by the Deputy Secretary in this
behalf is acceptable and does not betray any lack of
sense or urgency in dealing with the representation. We
therefore, do not see any merit. in the first contention."
In the present case, however, there is no explanation
forthcoming as to why the representation could not be
dealt with by the Minister concerned from 9.2.1998 to
14.2.1998.
11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the delay from
9.2.1998 to 14.2.1998 remains unexplained and such
unexplained delay has vitiated further detention of the
detenu. The corollary thereof is that further detention
must necessarily be disallowed. We, therefore, allow this
appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. We direct
the appellant-detenu to be set at large forthwith.
19.
The Apex Court held in Pabitra(supra), that there was
unreasonable delay in deciding the representation filed by the
detenu, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, that by itself was
sufficient to render the detention void. The relevant part of para
No.2 reads as under:
“In this view of the matter, we are satisfied that there has
been unreasonable delay in deciding the representation
filed by the detenu and that by itself is sufficient to
render the detention void. For these reasons we allow
this petition, set aside the order of detention and direct
that the detenu be released forthwith.”
20.
In Rashid Kapadia (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that
the right of a person, who is preventively detained, to make a
representation and have it considered by the authority concerned
as expeditiously as possible, is a constitutional right under Article
22(5). Any unreasonable and unexplainable delay in considering
the representation is to be fatal to the continued detention of the
detenu. Para No.13 of Rashid Kapadia (supra) reads as under:
“It is well settled that the right of a person, who is
preventively detained, to make a representation and
have it considered by the authority concerned as
expeditiously as possible, is a constitutional right under
Article 22(5). Any unreasonable and unexplainable delay
in considering the representation is held to be fatal to the
continued detention of the detenu. The proposition is too
well settled in a long line of decisions of this Court. We
do not think it necessary to examine the authorities on
this aspect, except to take note of a couple of judgments
where the principle is discussed in detail. They are:
Mohinuddin v. District Magistrate, Beed((1987) 4 SCC
58) and Harshala Santosh Patil v. State of
Maharashtra(2006) 12 SCC 211).”
21.
In Abdul Nasar Adam Ismail (supra) also, the Hon’ble
Apex Court held as follows:
14 We shall now turn to the submission that there
is delay in disposal of the detenu's representation
by the State Government. Several judgments have
been cited by the learned counsel for the appellant.
It is not necessary to refer to all of them because
they reiterate the same principles. We may begin
with the observations of this Court in Frances
Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra [(1980) 2 SCC 275:
1980 SCC (Cri) 419 : AIR 1980 SC 849] . The
relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus:
(SCC p. 279, para 5)
“The time imperative can never be absolute or
obsessive”.
In L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral [(1981) 3
SCC 317 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 720] it was held: (SCC
p. 322, para 7)
“The occasional observations made by this Court
that each day's delay in dealing with the
representation must be adequately explained are
meant to emphasise the expedition with which the
representation must be considered and not that it is
a magical formula, the slightest breach of which
must result in the release of the detenu. Law deals
with the facts of life. In law, as in life, there are no
invariable absolutes. Neither life nor law can be
reduced to mere but despotic formulae.
15. It is also necessary to refer to the observations
of the Constitution Bench of this Court in K.M.bdulla
Kunhi v. Union of India.
"12. Clause (5) of Article 22 therefore, casts a legal
obligation on the Government to consider the
representation as early as possible. It is a
constitutional mandate commanding the authority
concerned to whom the detenu submits his
representation to consider the representation and
dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible.
The words 'as soon as may be' occurring in clause
(5) of Article 22 reflects the concern of the Framers
that the representation should be expeditiously
considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency
without an avoidable delay. However, there can be
no hard-and-fast rule in this regard. It depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
There is no period prescribed either under the
Constitution or under the detention law concerned,
within which the representation should be dealt
with. The requirement however, is that there should
not be supine indifference, Stackness or callous
attitude in considering the representation. Any
unexplained delay in the disposal of representation
would be a breach of the constitutional imperative
and it would render the continued detention
impermissible and illegal."
16. The principles which have been laid down by
the Constitution Bench and the other judgments
which we have referred to earlier can be
summarised. Article 22(5) of the Constitution casts
a legal obligation on the d Government to consider
the detenu's representation as early as possible.
Though no time-limit is prescribed for disposal of
the representation, the constitutional imperative is
that it must be disposed of as soon as possible.
There should be no supine indifference, slackness
or callous attitude. Any unexplained delay would be
a breach of the constitutional imperative and it
would render the continued detention of the detenu
illegal. That does not, however, mean that every
day's delay in dealing with the representation of the
detenu has to be explained. The explanation
offered must be reasonable indicating that there
was no slackness or indifference. Though the delay
itself is not fatal, the delay which remains
unexplained becomes unreasonable. The court can
certainly consider whether the delay was
occasioned due to permissible reasons or
unavoidable causes. It is not enough to say that the
delay was very short. Even longer delay can as well
be explained. So the test is not the duration or the
range of delay, but how it is explained by the
authority concerned. If the inter-departmental
consultative procedures are such that the delay
becomes inevitable, such procedures will
contravene the constitutional mandate. Any
authority obliged to make order of detention should
adopt a procedure calculated towards expeditious
consideration
of
the
representation.
The
representation must be taken up for consideration
as soon as such representation is received and
dealt with continuously (unless it is absolutely
necessary to wait for some assistance in
connection with it) until a final decision is taken and
communicated to the detenu.”
22.
In Abdul Nasar Adam Ismail (supra), the Hon’ble Apex
Court found that there was delay in transmitting the representation
to the detaining authority as also in disposal of such representation
and held that, that vitiated only the continued detention
of the
detenu and not the detention order. Para Nos. 20 to 24 of Abdul
Nasar Adam Ismail (supra) read as under:
“20. We would like to make it clear that the delay in
disposal of the representation of the detenu has vitiated
only the continued detention of the detenu and not the
detention order. In Meena Jayendra Thakur v. Union of
India(1999) 8 SCC 177, this Court was considering a
case where the detenu was detained under the provisions of the said Act. This Court held that if the detaining
authority on the basis of the materials before him did ar-
rive at his satisfaction with regard to the necessity for
passing an order of detention and the order is passed
thereafter, the same cannot be held to be void because
of a subsequent infraction of the detenu‟s right or of noncompliance with the procedure prescribed under law because that does not get into the satisfaction of the detaining authority while making an order of detention under Section 3(1) of the said Act.. It does not affect the
validity of the order of detention issued under Section
3(1) of the said Act.
21.Similar view has been taken by this Court in Sayed
Abdul Ala v. Union of India(2007(15) SCC 208. In that
case, this Court was concerned with an order of detention issued under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. It
was argued that there was delay in considering the representation of the detenu. Relying on Meena Jayendra
Thakur, this Court expressed that even if it is to be assumed that there was some delay in considering the representation, the same would not vitiate the original order of detention. By reason of the delay, only further detention of the detenu will become illegal. The delay in
considering the representation does not vitiate the order
of detention itself.
22. In Union of India v. Harish Kumar (2008) 1 SCC 195,
this Court was again considering an order of detention
issued under the provisions of the said Act. This Court
reiterated the same view and held that:
“14…..The detention order …..passed at the
satisfaction of the detaining authority on the basis of the
material available in no manner gets vitiated for the
reason of non-consideration of the representation made
by the (detenu) to the Central Government.”
It was held that initial order of detention was not
rendered void ab initio.
23. It may be noted that even the Constitution Bench of
this Court in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi, held that any unex-
plained delay in disposal of representation of the detenu
would be a breach of the constitutional imperative and it
would render the continued detention impermissible and
illegal and set aside the continued detention of the detenu.
24. In view of this clear legal position, we hold that the
order of detention dated 16/4/2012 is valid. However, on
account of delay in disposal of the representation of the
detenu by the State Government, the continued detention of the detenu is rendered illegal. We, therefore, direct that the detenu – Abdul Nasar Adam Ismail be released from detention forthwith if he is not already released from detention and he is not required in any other
case. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.”
23.
It is thus well settled in law that the detenu has a
fundamental right to make the representation against his detention
order and has a right for its consideration as expeditiously as
possible with a sense of urgency without an avoidable delay.
Though there is no hard and fast rule with respect to the time and
delay but it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. In case of delayed disposal of representation the delay must
be explained and such explanation must stand the test of
reasonableness to the satisfaction of the Court.
24.
The representation, even if not filed against the order of
detention at the initial stage but is filed after the order of detention
has been confirmed by the State still the detenu will have a right to
make the representation which survives even after the confirmation
of the detention order. The same principle for expeditious disposal
of the representation without delay continues to be the fundamental
right of the detenu in terms of the law as laid down in the aforesaid
judgments in view of Articles 21 and 22 (5) of the Constitution of
India. So delay in disposal of the representation even after the
order of detention has been confirmed by the State must be
justified by giving proper and sufficient explanation. If there is no
sufficient explanation or a Court finds delay unreasonable and is
not satisfied on the grounds for delay, the continued detention
would become illegal. The order of detention on such ground would
not be illegal or void but pursuant to that order of detention, the
detenu cannot be detained any further. Any unexplained delay in
the disposal of representation would be a breach of the
constitutional imperative and it would render the continued
detention impermissible and illegal.
25.
In the present case, the facts are not in dispute that the
representation dated 27.10.2025 was made against the orders of
detention after the order of confirmation by the State. Remarks
were invited from the District Collector on 06.11.2025, which were
received on 03.12.2025.
The order on the representation was
passed on 06.01.2026. There is delay of 32 days even from the
date of the receipt of the remarks from the District Collector prior
thereto from the date of representation considerable time was
taken to call for the remarks which remarks were also send taking
a long time. Taking such a long time for decision on representation
in the matter of detention is most unreasonable. Decision has to
be taken with promptness as the personal liberty of an individual is
involved which is a fundamental right of an individual of which one
cannot be deprived save by authority of law under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. There may be, many times, genuine reasons
for delayed decision but for such delays, there should be
reasonable explanation to the satisfaction of the Court, which
should be set forth in the order deciding the representation or in
any case in the counter-affidavit filed with supporting material.
26.
So, in the present case, there is unexplained delay from the
date of receipt of the remarks from the Collector on the
representation of the petitioner.
The continued detention of the
detenu becomes impermissible pursuant to the order of the
detention.
27.
Since in our view, this petition deserves to be allowed on the
aforesaid ground alone, we need not enter into the other ground of
challenge to the order of detention.
28.
So far as ground No.(1) in Crime No.41 of 2025 of RSASTF
Police Station, Tirupati, is concerned that the detenu was in judicial
custody at the time of the detention order, if the judicial custody of
the detenu continues in that case subject to that order the detenu
shall not be in continued detention pursuant to the orders of
detention as impugned in the present writ petition.
29.
We hold that the continued detention of the detenu is illegal
and he is entitled for release.
30.
The writ petition is allowed, setting aside the impugned order
of preventive detention dated 02.09.2025 passed against the
detenu,
and the
order
of confirmation by the State
by
G.O.Rt.No.1976, General Administration (SC-I) Department, dated
24.10.2025. The detenu by name Shaik Simpathi @ Cheemparthi
Fakruddin @ Goresab Fakruddin @ Pongodu @ Bongodu @
Thellodu, shall be released/set free forthwith on receipt of copy of
this order.
As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending if any, shall
stand closed.
_____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
______________________
SUBHENDU SAMANTA, J
Date: 01.07.2026
Note:
L.R. copy to be marked.
B/o.
Pab
Whether the order is:
Speaking
Reportable
Reasoned
☑
Non-reportable
☑
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
WRIT PETITION No.34357 of 2025
DATE: 01.07.2026
Pab
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