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2026:HHC:3340
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 2720 of 2025
Reserved on: 16.1.2026
Date of Decision: 23.1.2026.
Chaman Lal
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Chetan, Advocate, vice
Mr Arun Sehgal, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has &led the present petition for
regular bail in F.I.R. No. 89 of 2025, dated 9.7.2025, registered at
Police Station, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission
of o3ences punishable under Sections 20 and 29 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS).
2.
It has been asserted that co-accused Kishori Lal and
Vinay Kumar were apprehended with 2 kilograms and 84 grams
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:3340
of charas. The police implicated the petitioner based on the
telephone calls and the relationship with the co-accused. No
recovery was e3ected from the petitioner. The petitioner has
been in custody since 11.7.2025. Ten FIRs were registered against
the petitioner, and the petitioner was acquitted in three FIRs;
the remaining FIRs are pending before the Courts. The police
have &led the charge sheet before the Court, and no fruitful
purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody.
The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the
Court may impose. Hence, the petition.
3.
The petition is opposed by &ling a status report
asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 8.7.2025.
They received secret information at 1.20 AM that Kishori Lal and
Vinay Kumar were waiting for someone in a vehicle bearing
registration No. PB-08-CC-4977 with charas, and a huge
quantity of charas could be recovered by searching the vehicle.
The police reduced the information into writing and sent it to
the Sub Divisional Police O?cer, Jawali. The police associated
Sohan Lal and Pawan Kumar and went to 32 Mile near Gaurav
Hotel, Jawali where a vehicle bearing registration No. PB-08CC4977 was parked. The driver identi&ed himself as Vinay Kumar,
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and the person sitting beside the driver identi&ed himself as
Kishori Lal. The police searched the vehicle and recovered 2.84
kilograms of charas. The police seized the charas and arrested
Vinay Kumar and Kishori Lal, who revealed on inquiry that they
had brought the charas for Vidya Devi and Chaman Lal (the
present petitioner). They were also in touch with Vidya Devi and
Chaman Lal. This fact con&rmed the statements made by the
co-accused. Charas was sent to SFSL, Junga and as per the result
of analysis, it was found to be extract of cannabis and a sample
of charas. 10 FIRs have been registered against the petitioner,
out of which &ve are pending before the Court. The charge sheet
was &led before the Court on 29.11.2025. Hence, the status
report.
4.
I have heard Mr Chetan, learned vice counsel,
representing the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned
Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
5.
Mr Chetan, learned vice counsel representing the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated based on the statement made by the coaccused and the call details record. These are not su?cient to
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connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime. Hence, he
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
released on bail.
6.
Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner
had abetted the possession of a commercial quantity of charas
and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the
present case. The petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin
conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and he is
not entitled to bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page
380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of
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a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that
should be considered while granting bail, which are
extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is con&rmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering
with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting
the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational,
in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man
who is applying for bail to $nd whether he has a bad
record, particularly a record which suggests that he is
likely to commit serious o%ences while on bail. In regard
to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to in&ict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary
manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in
mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
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support thereof, the severity of the punishment which
conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means
and standing of the accused, circumstances which are
peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing
the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the
larger interests of the public or State and similar other
considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the
purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the
words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the
evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant
of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a
genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution
will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of
the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking
through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising
discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same
judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be
granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning,
this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, calls
for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and
not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any
cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record,
however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the
contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court
and facts do always vary from case to case. While the
placement of the accused in society, though it may be
considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the
matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled
with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The
nature of the o%ence is one of the basic considerations for
the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the
greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though,
however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.”
(emphasis supplied)
2026:HHC:3340
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although
it is established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the
said order would su3er from the vice of non-application
of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under
with regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
o%ence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or &eeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the o%ence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
in&uenced; and
2026:HHC:3340
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497
: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of
this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual
order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar,
(2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para
35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate
material brought on record so as to enable a court to
arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an
application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion
must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after
having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on
record. Due consideration must be given to facts
suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents
of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that
would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the o%ence(s) alleged
against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
2026:HHC:3340
10.
The status report mentions that the co-accused
Kishori Lal and Vinay Kumar had revealed during interrogation
that the petitioner and Vidya Devi had asked them to bring
charas. Kishori Lal made a disclosure statement under Section
67 of the NDPS Act, and he showed the houses of the petitioner
and Vidya Devi to the police. It is undisputed that no recovery
was e3ected by the police pursuant to the disclosure statement
made by Kishori Lal. Therefore, the statement does not fall
within the purview of the proviso to Section 23(2) of Bharatiya
Sakshay Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023 and, prima facie its admissibility
is doubtful.
11.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC
547: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 588 that a
statement made by co-accused during the investigation is hit by
Section 162 of Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 181 of BNSS),
2023 and cannot be used as a piece of evidence. Further, the
confession made by the co-accused is inadmissible because of
Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act (corresponding to Section
23 of BSA). It was observed at page 568:-
2026:HHC:3340
“44. Such a person, viz., the person who is named in the
FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eyes of the law, can
indeed be questioned, and the statement is taken by the
police o?cer. A confession that is made to a police o?cer
would be inadmissible, having regard to Section 25 of the
Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under
Section 24 of the Evidence Act, would also be
inadmissible. A confession, unless it ful&ls the test laid
down in Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, 1939 SCC
OnLine PC 1: (1938-39) 66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47 and as
accepted by this Court, may still be used as an admission
under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however, is
subject to the bar of admissibility of a statement under
Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a statement contains
an admission, the statement being one under Section 161,
it would immediately attract the bar under Section 162
CrPC.”
12.
Similarly, it was held in Surinder Kumar Khanna vs
Intelligence ODcer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2018 (8) SCC
271 that a confession made by a co-accused cannot be taken as a
substantive piece of evidence against another co-accused and
can only be utilised to lend assurance to the other evidence. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently held in Tofan Singh Versus
State of Tamil Nadu 2021 (4) SCC 1 that a confession made to a
police o?cer during the investigation is hit by Section 25 of the
Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, no advantage can be derived by
the prosecution from the confessional statement made by the
co-accused to implicate the petitioner.
2026:HHC:3340
13.
The police have also relied upon the call details
record to connect the petitioner with the commission of a crime.
It was laid down by this Court in Saina Devi vs State of Himachal
Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 211 that where the police have no
material except the call details record and the disclosure
statement of the co-accused, the petitioner cannot be kept in
custody. It was observed: “[16] In the facts of the instant case, the prosecution, for
implicating the petitioner, relies upon &rstly the
confessional statement made by accused Dabe Ram and
secondly the CDR details of calls exchanged between the
petitioner and the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram. Taking
into consideration the evidence with respect to the
availability of CDR details involving the phone number of
the petitioner and the mobile phone number of the wife of
co-accused Dabe Ram, this Court had considered the
existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner and
had rejected the bail application as not satisfying the
conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
[17] Since the existence of CDR details of accused
person(s) has not been considered as a circumstance
su?cient to hold a prima facie case against the accused
person(s), in Pallulabid Ahmad's case (supra), this Court is
of the view that petitioner has made out a case for
maintainability of his successive bail application as also
for grant of bail in his favour.
[18] Except for the existence of CDRs and the disclosure
statement of the co-accused, no other material appears to
have been collected against the petitioner. The disclosure
made by the co-accused cannot be read against the
petitioner as per the mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Tofan Singh Vs State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 4 SCC 1.
2026:HHC:3340
Further, on the basis of the aforesaid elucidation, the
petitioner is also entitled to the bene&t of bail.
14.
A similar view was taken by this Court in Dabe Ram
vs. State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 1894 of 2023, decided on 01.09.2023,
Parvesh Saini vs State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 2355 of 2023, decided
on 06.10.2023 and Relu Ram vs. State of H.P. Cr.MP(M) No. 1061 of
2023, decided on 15.05.2023.
15.
Therefore, there is prima facie insu?cient material to
connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime.
16.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,
and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his
furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following
conditions:(I)
The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses,
nor will he inQuence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.
(II)
The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and
every hearing and will not seek unnecessary
adjournments.
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for
a continuous period of seven days without
furnishing the address of the intended visit to the
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SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and
the Trial Court.
17.
(IV)
The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
(V)
The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from
the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social
Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile
number or social media accounts, the same will be
intimated to the Police/Court within &ve days from
the date of the change.
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to
&le a petition for cancellation of the bail.
18.
The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy
of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Lala Lajpat Rai
Correctional Home, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. and the
learned Trial Court by FASTER.
19.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding
the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever
on the case's merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Vacation Judge
23rd January, 2026
(Chander)
CHANDER
SHEKHAR
CHANDER
SHEKHAR
Date: 2026.01.23
16:55:23 +0530
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