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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AT AMARAVATI
*****
WRIT PETITION No.30886 OF 2024
Between
Canara Bank,
(A body corporate constituted under the Banking Companies
(Acquisitions and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, having its
Head Office at 112, J.C. Road, Bangalore, Karnataka-560002
(And having branch offices at other places, inter alia)
Branch Office: Tirupati Main Branch at MM Complex, near Railway Gate,
R.C. Road, Tirupati, Chittoor (Tirupathi) District, Andhra Pradesh-517501
Represented by its authorised officer.
.. Petitioner
and
1. M/s Kiranmayee, a proprietorship firm Represented by its
Proprietor P.Srinivasa Sarma, Residing at: D.No.1-50/2A,
S.V.P. Colony, Tiruchanoor, Tirupathi District, Chittoor,
Andhra Pradesh-517503 and 1 another.
.. Respondents
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 11.02.2026
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA
1.
Whether Reporters of Local
newspapers may be allowed to see
the Judgments?
Yes/No
2.
Whether the copies of judgment
may be marked to Law
Reports/Journals?
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3.
Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship
wish to see the fair copy of the
Judgment?
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___________________________________
CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY, J
________________________
TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA, J
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA
+ WRIT PETITION No.30886 OF 2024
% DATE: 11.02.2026
# Canara Bank,
(A body corporate constituted under the Banking Companies
(Acquisitions and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, having its
Head Office at 112, J.C. Road, Bangalore, Karnataka-560002
(And having branch offices at other places, inter alia)
Branch Office: Tirupati Main Branch at MM Complex, near Railway Gate,
R.C. Road, Tirupati, Chittoor (Tirupathi) District, Andhra Pradesh-517501
Represented by its authorised officer.
.. Petitioner
Vs.
$ 1. M/s Kiranmayee, a proprietorship firm Represented by
its Proprietor P.Srinivasa Sarma, Residing at: D.No.1-50/2A,
S.V.P. Colony, Tiruchanoor, Tirupathi District, Chittoor,
Andhra Pradesh-517503 and 1 another.
.. Respondents
! Counsel for the petitioner
: Mr. T.B.L.Murthy
^Counsel for respondents
:
-
< Gist:
Head Note:
? CASES REFERRED:
1. (2023) 2 SCC 168
2. (2013) 10 SCC 83
3. AIR 2004 Supreme Court 5100
4. 2023 AIR (SC) 4457
APHC010590142024
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
W.P.No.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3558]
WEDNESDAY, THE ELEVENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA
WRIT PETITION NO: 30886/2024
Between:
1. CANARA BANK, (A BODY CORPORATE CONSTITUTED UNDER THE
BANKING COMPANIES (ACQUISITIONS AND TRANSFER OF
UNDERTAKINGS) ACT, 1970, HAVING ITS HE
HEAD
AD OFFICE AT 112,
J.C. ROAD, BANGALORE, KAMATAKA
KAMATAKA-560002
560002
(AND HAVING
BRANCH OFFICES AT OTHER PLACES, INTER ALIA) BRANCH
OFFICE. TIRUPATI MAIN BRANCH AT MM COMPLEX, NEAR
RAILWAY GATE, R.C. ROAD, TIRUPATI, CHITTOR (TIRUPATHI)
DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH
PRADESH-517501
1 REPRESENTED BY ITS
AUTHORISED OFFICER
...PETITIONER
AND
1. M/S KIRANMAYEE, PROPRIETORSHIP FIRM REPRESENTED BY
ITS PROPRIETOR P. SRINIVASA SARMA, RESIDING AT. D. NO. 1
150/2A, S.V.P. COLONY, TIRUCHANOOR, TIRUPATHI, DISTRICT
CHITTOOR, ANDHRA PRADESH
PRADESH-517503
2. MRS P V NAGALAKSHMI, WIFE OF MR. P.S.R. MOHAN RAO,
RESIDING AT. D. NO. 1
1-50/2A,
50/2A, S.V.P. COLONY, TIRUCHANOOR,
TIRUPATHI, DISTRICT CHITTOOR, ANDHRA PRADESH
PRADESH-517503
...RESPONDENT(S):
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be
pleased to issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of
Writ of Certiorari to. (I) Call for the case records relating to Appeal No. 15 of
2019 on the file of Hon’ble Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata and
(II) To set aside the Final Order/judgment dated 18.07.2023 passed by
Hon’ble Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata in Appeal No. 15 of
2019, and consequently to set aside order dated 29.01.2019 passed by the
Hon’ble Debts Recovery Tribunal-2 at Hyderabad in SA No.l26 of 2012 (old
SA No. 255 of 2012 on the file of DRT-1 at Hyderabad) and (III) To pass
IA NO: 1 OF 2024
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
may be pleased to suspend the operation of the Final Order/ judgment dated
18.07.2023 passed by Hon’ble Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata in
Appeal No. 15 of 2019 pending the disposal of the above writ petition and to
pass
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. T B L MURTHY
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1.
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
The Court made the following:
ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Cheekati Manavendranath Roy)
This writ petition is filed assailing the judgment dated 18.07.2023 of the
Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata, passed in appeal No.15 of 2019,
confirming the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal-2 of Hyderabad passed in
S.A.No.126 of 2017, whereby, the Tribunal has set-aside the auction held on
21.11.2015 of the secured asset by the Bank.
2.
Heard Mr. T.B.L.Murthy, learned counsel for the writ petitioner. None
appeared for the respondents despite service of notice on them.
3.
Brief over view of the facts leading to the lis in this writ petition may be
stated as follows:
The writ petitioner is a Canara Bank, a body corporate constituted
under the Banking companies (Acquisitions and Transfer of Undertakings)
Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Bank’). The 1st respondent is a
proprietor firm represented by its proprietor. The 1st respondent has availed
loan from the Bank and the 2nd respondent stood as guarantor by offering her
immovable property as security for repayment of the loan amount by the 1st
respondent (hereinafter called as ‘principal borrower’). The principal borrower
committed default in repayment of the loan amount. Therefore, the Bank has
initiated measures under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (for short, ‘the Act’)
and sold away the secured asset in a public auction after complying with the
procedure prescribed under law. The auction was knocked down in favour of
the highest bidder. The auction purchaser has deposited 25% of the sale
consideration before the Bank on the date of the auction. The balance sale
consideration is required to be paid by the auction purchaser to the
authorized officer on or before the fifteenth day of confirmation of sale of the
immovable property or such extended period as may be agreed upon in
writing between the parties. The auction purchaser could not deposit the
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
balance sale consideration within fifteen days from date of confirmation of
sale of the immovable property. Therefore, the time for payment of the
balance sale consideration is extended, as agreed in writing between the
Bank, being the secured creditor and the auction purchaser. Thereafter, the
auction purchaser has deposited the balance sale consideration and sale
certificate was issued in favour of the auction purchaser.
4.
The principal borrower and the guarantor have challenged the said
auction held by the Bank, who is the secured creditor, before the Debt
Recovery Tribunal-2 of Hyderabad on the ground that the time to deposit the
balance sale consideration can be extended under Rule 9(4) of the Security
Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, (for short, ‘the Rules’) only with the
consent of all parties and all parties include the principal borrower and
without the consent of the principal borrower that the time was extended only
as per the agreement arrived at between the secured creditor and the
purchaser and it is not valid under law. The said contention of the principal
borrower found favour with the Tribunal. The Tribunal, after considering Rule
9(4) of the Rules, held that as there is no consent of the principal borrower
given for extending the period of time to deposit the balance sale
consideration that the sale held by way of auction is not valid and thereby has
set aside the said sale. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, the Bank
has preferred an appeal to the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata, in
appeal No.15 of 2019. The Appellate Tribunal also took the same view that
as the consent of the principal borrower is not taken for extending the period
for payment of balance sale consideration, as contemplated under Rule 9(4)
of the Rules, that the sale is not valid and thereby affirmed the order of the
Tribunal and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved thereby, the instant writ
petition has been preferred by the Bank, being the secured creditor, assailing
the impugned judgment of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal.
5.
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
The material facts of the case are absolutely not in controversy. As the
principal borrower failed to repay the borrowed amount, the Bank has
initiated measures under the Act and took possession of the secured asset
and sold away the same in the public auction. The sale was knocked down in
favour of the highest bidder. The auction purchaser has deposited 25% of the
sale consideration before the Bank on the date of the auction and did not
deposit the balance sale consideration within fifteen days from date of
confirmation of sale of the secured asset. The Bank, with the consent of the
auction purchaser, has extended the time for deposit of the balance sale
consideration, as contemplated under Rule 9(4) of the Rules. According to
the principal borrower, the time for payment of balance sale consideration
can be extended beyond the period of fifteen days under Rule 9(4) of the
Rules, as agreed upon in writing between the parties and according to him
the term “parties” include the principal borrower and as such the consent of
the principal borrower is also required and as his consent is not taken that the
decision taken to extend the time to deposit the balance sale consideration is
not valid under law and the sale is also not valid.
6.
As per the version of the Bank, the consent of the principal borrower is
not required to be taken under Rule 9(4) of the Rules and as the word
“between the parties” is used, it is confined to the consent of two parties only
and the said two parties are only the Bank, being the secured creditor and
the auction purchaser and the principal borrower cannot be included in the
said term “parties”, as used in Rule 9(4) of the Rules, as it is not stated in the
Rule as agreed “among” the parties to include the third person.
7.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Rule 9(4) of the Rules,
as it stood prior to amendment, says that the time can be extended as may
be agreed upon in writing between the parties and it was subsequently
amended with effect from 04.11.2016, clarifying that the time can be
extended as may be agreed upon in writing between the purchaser and the
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
secured creditor and as it is a clarificatory amendment that it operates with
retrospective effect and the amendment applies to the present case also
even though the auction and sale took place prior to the said amendment and
it clearly indicates that the consent of the principal borrower is not necessary
to extend the time to deposit the balance sale consideration and the period of
time can be extended by agreement upon writing between the purchaser and
the secured creditor and in that view of the matter, the sale that took place in
the present case is perfectly valid under law. So, he submits that both the
Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal took an erroneous view and arrived at a
wrong conclusion and has set aside the sale. So, he prayed to set aside the
impugned orders of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal and allow the writ
petition.
8.
Considering the controversy involved in this writ petition, the neat
question of law that arises for our determination in this writ petition is whether
the consent of the principal borrower is essential to extend the period of time
for deposit of the balance sale consideration under Rule 9(4) of the Rules
and whether the amended provision of Rule 9(4) of the Rules, which came
into effect from 04.11.2016 operates with retrospective effect or not and
whether the sale of the secured asset that took place in the present case is
valid under law or not.
9.
To answer the said question and to resolve the controversy involved in
the lis, the Rule 9(4) of the Rules, as it stood prior to the amendment and
after its amendment is required to be looked into and considered. Prior to the
amendment, Rule 9(4) of the Rules reads thus:
“(4) The balance amount of purchase price payable shall be
paid by the purchaser to the authorized officer on or before the
fifteenth day of confirmation of sale of the immovable property
or such extended period as may be agreed upon in writing
between the parties.”
10.
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
The amended provision, which came into effect from 04.11.2016, reads
thus:
“(4) The balance amount of purchase price payable shall be
paid by the purchaser to the authorized officer on or before the
fifteenth day of confirmation of sale of the immovable property
or such extended period as may be agreed upon in writing
between the purchaser and the secured creditor, in any case
not exceeding three months.”
11.
The amendment that was made to Rule 9(4) of the Rules, as can be
seen from the amended provision, is only relating to explanation as to who
are the parties who can agree for extension of the period of time to deposit
the balance sale consideration. In the original provision, as it stood prior to its
amendment, it is only stated that the time can be extended as agreed upon in
writing between the parties. Who are those parties is not made clear in the
said provision. Therefore, the Tribunal has taken a view that the consent of
the principal borrower is also required. The same view was taken by the
Appellate Tribunal also. As the consent of the principal borrower is not taken,
the Tribunal has set aside the sale and the same was confirmed by the
Appellate Tribunal. But, both the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal did not
make any effort to interpret the said term or expression “between the parties”
as used in the original provision, as it stood prior to its amendment. Both the
Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal simply held that as the consent of the
principal borrower is not taken that the period for deposit of the balance sale
consideration cannot be extended.
12.
The said view taken by both the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal that
the consent of the principal borrower is essential for extending the period of
time to deposit the balance sale consideration under Rule 9(4) of the Rules, in
our considered view, is not correct. The same is clarified by way of an
amendment effected to Rule 9(4) of the Rules. By way of an amendment, the
Parliament has removed the term and the expression “between the parties” in
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
the Rule and included the term “between the purchaser and the secured
creditor”. Therefore, as per the amended provision, it is made clear that the
period of time can be extended as may be agreed upon in writing between the
purchaser and the secured creditor. So, it is clear that it was not the intention
of the Parliament even earlier that the consent of the principal borrower is
required for the purpose of extending the period of time under Rule 9(4) of the
Rules. As the term “between the parties” used in the earlier provision was not
defined, the Parliament, by way of the amendment, has clarified it and
removed the ambiguity stating that the time can be extended as agreed
between the purchaser and the secured creditor only. The Apex Court in the
case of Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B.Sreenivasulu and others 1 , has
considered the pre-amended provision of Rule 9(4) and the amended
provision of Rule 9(4) and held at para No.42 as follows:
“It clearly manifests that the pre-amended Rule 9(4) refers to
the period of fifteen days for confirmation of sale or such extended
period, but the outer limit has not been defined and that appears
to be not as sacrosanct and the period can be extended, as
agreed upon in writing between the parties. In sequel thereto, if
the time stands extended, the auction purchaser would not be
considered to be a defaulter, as referred under Rule 9(5) of the
Rules and if the amended provisions are being taken note of, of
which reference has been made, effective from 04.11.2026,
however, may not be relevant as the auction in the instant case
was held in March, 2015, but the fact remains that by an
amendment, the legislature with its consciousness has clarified
that the agreement has to be between the purchaser and the
secured creditor exceeding fifteen days but in any case may not
exceed three months although who are the parties to the
agreement is not clear in the pre-amended Rule 9(4) of the
Rules.”
13.
Earlier, while considering a case under pre-amended provision of Rule
9(4) in Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Ltd. and another v. Ikbal and
(2023) 2 SCC 168
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
others2, the Apex Court was of the view that the period which is referred to in
Rule 9(4) is not that sacrosanct and may be extended if there is a written
agreement between the parties and since parties to the written agreement is
not defined in Rule 9(4), the Court was of the view that it covers into its fold
the secured creditor, the auction purchaser and the borrower. But
subsequently the legislature, taking into consideration the judgment in
Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Ltd. case, made its intention clear by
making an appropriate amendment in Rule 9(4) of the 2002 Rules, which
came into effect by a notification dated 03.11.2016, which came into effect
from 04.11.2016. This has been noticed by the Apex Court at para No.43 of
the judgment in the above Varimadugu case. So, even though, in
Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Ltd. Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative
Bank Ltd. case, the term “as may be agreed upon in writing between the
parties”, as used in the un-amended provision of Rule 9(4) is interpreted
stating that it includes the borrower also within its ambit along with the
secured creditor and the auction purchaser, the said term is amended in the
year 2016 in Rule 9(4), clarifying that the parties to agreement means the
secured creditor and the auction purchaser only. The borrower is not included
within the ambit of the said term “between the parties”. It has excluded the
borrower in the amended Rule 9(4).
14.
Thus, it is clear from the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment that
the amendment of Rule 9(4), which came into effect from 04.11.2016 stating
that the time can be extended by agreement between the secured creditor and
the purchaser, is clarificatory in nature. It is now well settled law that
clarificatory amendments always operate with retrospective effect. The said
legal position has been dealt with by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in
the case of Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and others3. Para Nos.13 and 14
of the said judgment are relevant in the context to consider. For better
(2013) 10 SCC 83
AIR 2004 Supreme Court 5100
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
appreciation, para Nos.13 and 14 of the judgment are extracted hereunder
and it reads as follows:
“13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is
prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary
implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule
in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to
affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair
existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute
sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect
existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only 'nova
constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis' - a
new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past. (See:
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh,
Ninth Edition, 2004 at p.438). It is not necessary that an
express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and
the presumption against retrospectivity may be rebutted by
necessary implication especially in a case where the new law is
made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the
community as a whole (ibid, p.440).
14. The presumption against retrospective operation is not
applicable to declaratory statutes.........In determining, therefore,
the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance
rather than to the form. If a new Act is ‘to explain’ an earlier Act,
it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An
explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious
omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the
previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or
merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is
generally intended.......An amending Act may be purely
declaratory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act
which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this
nature will have retrospective effect (ibid, pp.468-469) @
page-SC5104”
15.
The Supreme Court in the case of NHPC Ltd v. State of Himachal
Pradesh and others4 also at para No.11 of the judgment held that it is open
to the legislature to alter the law retrospectively.
16.
Thus, from the law enunciated in the aforesaid judgments, to decide
whether a particular amendment brought in the statute operates prospectively
or retrospectively, the legal position is made very clear that when by way of
2023 AIR (SC) 4457
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
amendment, if the statute did not take away the right or obligation of the
parties and if the amendment is only clarificatory in nature explaining the
anomaly in the un-amended provision or the ambiguity in the un-amended
provision by way of clarification brought in in the amended provision then the
said amended provision always operates with retrospective effect and it
applies to the past transactions also.
17.
As the Supreme Court clearly held in Varimadugu case that the
amendment effected to Rule 9(4) of the Rules, which came into effect from
04.11.2016, is clarificatory in nature, explaining as to who are the parties
relating to the wording used in the previous provision “between the parties”,
stating that they are the secured creditor and the purchaser, it is to be held
that the said amendment is retrospective in nature and applies to the present
sale that took place on 21.11.2015 also. Therefore, in view of the said clear
legal position, we have absolutely no hesitation to hold that even under the
earlier provision, as it stood prior to amendment of Rule 9(4) of the Rules, the
principal borrower is not a necessary party, whose consent is required for
extending the period of time. Although, Varimadugu case was referred to by
the Appellate Tribunal, it failed to notice that the Supreme Court held in the
said judgment that the amendment to Rule 9(4) of the Rules is clarificatory in
nature. The Appellate Court also did not consider the law relating to the
preposition that clarificatory amendments are always retrospective in nature to
resolve the issue that is before it. So, the Appellate Tribunal arrived at an
erroneous conclusion and upheld the judgment of the Tribunal.
18.
After considering the amended provision of Rule 9(4) of the Rules and
the law explained by the Supreme Court that it is a clarificatory amendment
and as per the law laid down by the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court
that clarificatory amendments are always retrospective in nature, we have
absolutely no hesitation to hold that the amendment applies to the present
sale also. Therefore, the sale cannot be held to be bad in law for want of
CMR,J & GTK,J
W.P.No.30886 of 2024
consent of the principal borrower. The interpretation of any statute or
amendments in the statute shall always be made keeping in view the object of
the enactment and the intention of the legislature. The object of the Act is to
enable the Banks to recover the loan amount, which is the public money, by
following the procedure prescribed in the Act, from the borrowers, who
committed default in repayment of the loan amount. Keeping in view the said
object of the enactment in mind and taking it into consideration, the provisions
of the Act and the amended provision of the Act are to be interpreted. Both the
Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal have committed a manifest error of law in
not properly understanding the purport of Rule 9(4) of the Rules, both prior to
its amendment and subsequent to amendment and took an erroneous view.
Therefore, the impugned judgments of both the Tribunal and the Appellate
Tribunal are clearly unsustainable under law and they are liable to be set
aside.
19.
In fine, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned order of the Appellate
Tribunal, confirming order of the Tribunal, setting aside the sale held in the
auction, is hereby set aside. The writ petitioner-Bank is at liberty, as a secured
creditor, to proceed further, relating to the said sale that took place as per law.
There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, Interlocutory Applications pending, if any, shall stand
closed.
________________________________________
JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY
Date: 11.02.2026
Note: LR copy to be marked
(B/o)
MDP
_____________________________
JUSTICE TUHIN KUMAR GEDELA
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