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CGHC010431482025
2026:CGHC:28134-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 2067 of 2025
Budheshwari Paikra W/o Bansal Paikra Aged About 27 Years R/o Village
Jargim, Police Station Shankargarh, District Balrampur- Ramanujganj,
Chhattisgarh
... Appellant(s)
versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Shankargarh, District
Balrampur- Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh
...Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant
For Respondent/State
:
:
Mr. Bhaskar Payashi, Advocate.
Mr. Priyank Rathi, Government
Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
08.07.2026
1.
Digitally
signed by
BRIJMOHAN
BRIJMOHAN MORLE
MORLE
Date:
2026.07.13
16:13:46
+0530
Heard Mr. Bhaskar Payashi, learned counsel for the appellant. Also
heard Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the
State/respondent.
2.
Though the matter is listed today for hearing on I.A. No. 1 of 2025
(application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail), however,
considering that the appellant has been in custody since 14.02.2021, and
with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is taken up
for final hearing.
3.
This criminal appeal is preferred under Section 415 (2) of the
Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘BNSS’) is directed
against the impugned judgment dated 01.09.2025 passed by the learned
First Additional Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj, District BalrampurRamanujganj (C.G.) (for short, ‘the learned trial Court’) in Session Case
No. 73 of 2021, by which the appellant has been convicted and sentenced
as under:
Conviction under Section
Sentence
Section 302 of the Indian
Rigorous imprisonment (for short,
Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’),
‘R.I.’) for life and fine of Rs. 500/-, in
default of payment of fine, 03 months
R.I. more.
4.
The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant, Bansai
Paikra (PW-2), appeared before Police Station Shankargarh and lodged a
merg intimation stating that frequent quarrels used to take place between
his wife, Budheshwari Paikra (the appellant), and his mother, Dauni Paikra
(the deceased), over household work. According to him, his mother often
accused his wife of maintaining an illicit relationship with Bhetan, the
husband of her sister Mankyari, which led to recurring disputes between
them. On 13.02.2021, at about 9:30 p.m., when another quarrel erupted
between his wife and his mother, he left the house and went to a
neighbour's place to sit near a bonfire. At about 10:00 p.m., upon returning
home, he witnessed the appellant assaulting the deceased with the
wooden handle of a Tangi (axe). Although he intervened and separated
them, the appellant, in his presence, again assaulted the deceased
repeatedly on her head with a piece of firewood, causing serious injuries
as a result of which the deceased fell to the ground. On the following
morning, i.e., 14.02.2021, when the appellant attempted to wake the
deceased, she did not respond and was found dead. Thereafter, the
complainant informed the village Kotwar and the Sarpanch and proceeded
to the police station to lodge the report. On the basis of the said merg
intimation,
Merg
No.09/2021
was
registered
at
Police
Station
Shankargarh. During the course of the merg enquiry, it was found that the
death of the deceased was the result of injuries allegedly inflicted by the
appellant. Consequently, Crime No.31/2021 was registered against the
appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, and the
matter was taken up for investigation.
5.
During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer Umesh
Baghel (PW-6), visited the place of occurrence on 14.02.2021 and
prepared the spot map (Ex.P/3). Notices were issued to the Panch
witnesses, and in their presence the inquest proceedings were conducted
vide Inquest Panchanama (Ex.P/7). Thereafter, the dead body of the
deceased was sent to the Community Health Centre, Shankargarh, for
postmortem examination. Blood-stained soil and plain soil were collected
separately from the place of occurrence and seized vide seizure memo
(Ex.P/8). The appellant was taken into custody and, pursuant to the
memorandum statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act
(Ex.P/9), one iron Tangi fitted with a bamboo handle and one piece of
firewood, alleged to have been used in the commission of the offence,
were recovered and seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P/10). The appellant
was formally arrested vide arrest memo (Ex.P/11), and information
regarding her arrest was furnished to her relatives. Subsequently, a
requisition was sent to the Tahsildar, Shankargarh, for preparation of the
Patwari map of the place of occurrence. The Investigating Officer also
sought medical opinion from the Block Medical Officer regarding the nature
of the injuries sustained by the deceased and obtained a query report with
respect to the seized weapons.
6.
During investigation, the statements of the complainant Bansai
Paikra (PW-2), Mankyari (PW-1), Dhola Ram Paikra (PW-3), Tedu Ram
Paikra (PW-4), Smt. Kunti Bai (PW-5), Deepak Bhagat (PW-9), Tuneshwar
Paikra (PW-10) and other witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of
the Cr.P.C. The seized articles were forwarded to the Forensic Science
Laboratory, Ambikapur, for chemical examination. Upon completion of the
investigation, sufficient material was found against the appellant for
commission of the offence.
7.
On completion of the investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet
against the appellant before the Court of the jurisdictional Judicial
Magistrate First Class for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the
IPC. Since the offence was exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the
case was committed to the Court of Session by order dated 05.07.2021,
where it was registered as Sessions Trial No.73/2021 and thereafter
transferred to the Court concerned for trial.
8.
The learned trial Court, after hearing the parties, framed charge
against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the
IPC. The charge was read over and explained to the appellant, who denied
the same, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
9.
In order to establish the charge, the prosecution examined as many
as 10 witnesses and exhibited 22 documents. After closure of the
prosecution evidence, the appellant was examined under Section 313 of
the Cr.P.C., wherein all the incriminating circumstances appearing against
her were put to her. She denied the allegations, pleaded innocence and
stated that she had been falsely implicated in the case. In defence, she
examined one witness, namely, Sunita (DW-1).
10.
Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available
on record, the learned trial Court, by the impugned judgment dated
01.09.2025, convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under
Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced her as stated hereinabove. Feeling
aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present criminal appeal.
11.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the
learned trial Court has erred in convicting the appellant under Section 302
of the IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt. It is contended that the conviction is based on
conjectures and surmises and that the seizure witnesses have not fully
supported the prosecution case.
12.
It is further submitted by the learned counsel, appearing for the
appellant that, even if the prosecution case is accepted in its entirety, the
incident occurred due to a sudden quarrel arising out of a domestic dispute
between the appellant and the deceased. There was no premeditation or
intention on the part of the appellant to cause the death of the deceased.
The alleged act was committed in the heat of passion and, therefore, the
case falls within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC and the offence
would amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable
under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC. He further contended that
the appellant is in custody since 14.02.2021 and has already undergone
more than 5 years and 4 months of incarceration. Considering the facts
and circumstances of the case and the period already undergone, it is
prayed that the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC be altered to
Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC and the sentence be modified
accordingly.
13.
Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment
and submits that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral
and documentary evidence available on record and has recorded the
conviction in accordance with law. It is contended that the prosecution has
succeeded in proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt
by adducing cogent and reliable evidence. The medical evidence fully
corroborates the prosecution case that the deceased sustained multiple
injuries on her head, which proved fatal.
14.
Learned State counsel further submits that the evidence on record
clearly establishes that the appellant assaulted the deceased with the
handle of a Tangi and a piece of firewood, resulting in her death. The
nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased, the weapons used and
the manner in which the assault was committed clearly establish the
intention of the appellant to cause such bodily injuries as were sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is further submitted that
the present case does not fall within the ambit of any of the Exceptions to
Section 300 of the IPC, as the appellant repeatedly assaulted the
deceased on a vital part of the body. Therefore, the learned trial Court has
rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC, and no
interference with the impugned judgment is warranted. Accordingly, the
appeal deserves to be dismissed.
15.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable
length, considered their rival submissions and carefully perused the entire
record of the case.
16.
The first question that falls for consideration is whether the death of
the deceased, Dauni Paikra, was homicidal in nature.
17.
In order to answer the aforesaid question, it would be appropriate to
examine the medical evidence available on record. Dr. Deepak Kumar Rai
(PW-8), who conducted the postmortem examination on the body of the
deceased, deposed that on 14.02.2021, while posted as Medical Officer at
Community Health Centre, Shankargarh, he conducted the postmortem
examination and found rigor mortis present all over the body. On external
examination, he noticed a contusion measuring 5 × 2 cm over the posterior
aspect of the left shoulder joint, an abrasion measuring 1 × 0.5 cm behind
the left ear, a contusion measuring about 3 cm in diameter over the frontal
bone and a blood clot measuring 3 × 2 cm beneath the frontal bone near
the midline. On internal examination, both chambers of the heart were
found containing blood, whereas the remaining internal organs were
normal. According to him, the death had occurred within approximately 24
hours prior to the postmortem examination and was caused by shock due
to haemorrhage resulting from injuries inflicted on the head by a hard and
blunt object. He proved the postmortem report (Ex.P/19).
18.
The testimony of the autopsy surgeon has remained unshaken in
cross-examination and nothing has been elicited to discredit his medical
opinion. The defence has also not brought on record any material to
indicate that the death of the deceased was accidental or suicidal. The
medical evidence clearly establishes that the deceased sustained antemortem injuries on her head caused by a hard and blunt object, which
proved fatal.
19.
Having considered the medical evidence available on record, we are
in agreement with the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the
death of the deceased, Dauni Paikra, was homicidal in nature. The said
finding is based on proper appreciation of the evidence and does not call
for any interference by this Court.
20.
The next question that falls for consideration is whether it was the
appellant who caused the injuries which resulted in the death of the
deceased. The learned trial Court has answered the said issue in the
affirmative on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by
the prosecution. We shall now examine the evidence available on record
to determine whether the prosecution has been able to establish, beyond
reasonable doubt, that it was the appellant who committed the offence in
question.
21.
If the aforesaid question is answered in the affirmative, the next
issue that would arise for consideration is whether the case of the
appellant would fall within the ambit of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the
IPC, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, so as to bring
the offence within the purview of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder punishable under Section 304 Part I or Part II of the IPC.
22.
The question whether a case falls within the ambit of Exception 4 to
Section 300 of the IPC has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana1 has observed
as under:“21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of
the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of
the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is
proved to have committed the offence of culpable
homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the
heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act
in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered
by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable
under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the
courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of
offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is
set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of
(2002) 3 SCC 327
offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder
punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10
years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of
payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for one year.”
23.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v.
State of Haryana2 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into
consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with
reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as
under :“23. These are some factors which are required to be
taken into consideration before awarding appropriate
sentence to the accused. These factors are only
illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case
has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant
factors are as under :
(a) Motive or previous enmity;
(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the
spur of the moment;
(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while
inflicting the blow or injury;
(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or
(2009) 15 SCC 635
the victim died after several days;
(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;
(f) The age and general health condition of the
accused;
(g) Whether the injury was caused without
premeditation in a sudden fight;
(h) The nature and size of weapon used for
inflicting the injury and the force with which the
blow was inflicted;
(i) The criminal background and adverse history of
the accused;
(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death but
the death was because of shock;
(k) Number of other criminal cases pending
against the accused;
(l) Incident occurred within the family members or
close relations;
(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused
after the incident.
Whether the accused had taken the injured/the
deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure
that he/she gets proper medical treatment ?
These are some of the factors which can be taken
into consideration while granting an appropriate
sentence to the accused.
24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only
illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view,
proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the
bounded obligation and duty of the court. The
endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the
accused receives appropriate sentence, in other
words, sentence should be according to the gravity of
the offence. These are some of the relevant factors
which are required to be kept in view while convicting
and sentencing the accused.”
24.
Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda3, their Lordships
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is
likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause
death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years
or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an
offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution
has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was
caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is
likely to cause death.
(2012) 8 SCC 450
25.
Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State
of Chhattisgarh4 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in
paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that
are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in
Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 :
1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :
(SCC p. 220, para 7)
“7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be
satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there
was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat
of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any
undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The
cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant
who offered the provocation or started the assault. The
number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not
a decisive factor but what is important is that the
occurrence
must
have
been
sudden
and
unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a
fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have
taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel
manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the
heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy
and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he
(2017) 3 SCC 247
would be entitled to the benefit of this exception
provided he has not acted cruelly.”
21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 :
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition
of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to
Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it
has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9)
“9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked
if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in
a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having
taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been
with the person killed. To bring a case within
Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it
must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight”
occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not
defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to
make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there
must be no time for the passions to cool down and
in this case, the parties had worked themselves
into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in
the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or
more persons whether with or without weapons. It
is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to
what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is
a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden
or not must necessarily depend upon the proved
facts of each case. For the application of
Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there
was a sudden quarrel and there was no
premeditation. It must further be shown that the
offender has not taken undue advantage or acted
in cruel or unusual manner. The expression
“undue advantage” as used in the provisions
means “unfair advantage”.
26.
In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section
304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the
intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of
Section 304 Part-II of the IPC.
27.
Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State
(NCT of Delhi)5 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to
bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC,
which reads as under:
“16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC
shows that the following four ingredients are required:
(i)
There must be a sudden fight;
(ii)
There was no premeditation;
5 (2019) 6 SCC 122
(iii)
The act was committed in a heat of passion;
and
(iv)
The offender had not taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.”
28.
Bansai Paikra (PW-2), the complainant, husband of the appellant
and son of the deceased, did not fully support the prosecution case and
was, therefore, declared hostile. Though he admitted his signatures on the
merg intimation (Ex.P/2), spot map (Ex.P/3), dead body handing over
memo (Ex.P/4) and First Information Report (Ex.P/5), he denied having
knowledge about the manner in which the deceased died.
29.
However, during his cross-examination by the prosecution, PW-2
admitted that frequent quarrels used to take place between the appellant
and the deceased over household work and that the deceased often
suspected the character of the appellant by alleging that she had an illicit
relationship with Bhetan, the husband of her sister Mankyari (PW-1). He
further admitted that on the date of the incident, while they were having
dinner, the deceased again quarreled with the appellant on the same
issue. Although he attempted to pacify them, when they did not relent, he
left the house and went outside to sit near a bonfire. Though, during his
cross-examination by the defence, PW-2 attempted to dilute the
prosecution case, the aforesaid admissions regarding the strained
relationship between the appellant and the deceased and the quarrel
immediately preceding the incident remained unshaken. It is well settled
that the testimony of a hostile witness is not to be rejected in its entirety
and can be relied upon to the extent it inspires confidence and is
corroborated by other evidence on record.
30.
Mankyari (PW-1), the daughter of the deceased and sister-in-law of
the appellant, deposed that she was at her matrimonial home on the date
of the incident and reached her parental house only after receiving
information about the death of her mother. She stated that by the time she
reached, the police had already arrived at the spot. According to her, in her
presence, the appellant told the police that she had assaulted her motherin-law with an axe and a piece of wood, resulting in her death. Since she
did not fully support the prosecution case, she was declared hostile.
However, during her cross-examination by the prosecution, she admitted
that frequent quarrels used to take place between the appellant and the
deceased over household work and that the appellant's behaviour towards
her was also not cordial, due to which she seldom visited her parental
home. She further admitted that, upon reaching the house, she found the
dead body of the deceased lying in the kitchen. Though certain
suggestions were put to her during cross-examination by the defence,
nothing material could be elicited to discredit her testimony regarding the
strained relationship between the appellant and the deceased.
31.
Kunti Paikra (PW-5) and Deepak Bhagat (PW-9) did not support the
prosecution case and were declared hostile. Tuneshwar Paikra (PW-10),
who reached the house of the deceased on the following morning after
receiving information about her death, deposed that the police were
already conducting the investigation. During his cross-examination by the
prosecution, he admitted that the villagers were stating that the deceased
had been assaulted by the appellant and that the appellant herself had
informed the Sarpanch and the Mitanin that she had killed her mother-inlaw.
32.
Inspector Umesh Baghel (PW-6), the Investigating Officer, deposed
that on 14.02.2021 he seized blood-stained and plain soil from the place of
occurrence vide seizure memo (Ex.P/8). He further stated that, while the
appellant was in custody, her memorandum statement (Ex.P/9) was
recorded, pursuant to which one iron Tangi fitted with a bamboo handle
and one piece of firewood were recovered at her instance and seized vide
seizure memo (Ex.P/10). He also proved the arrest memo (Ex.P/11) and
the intimation of arrest (Ex.P/13).
33.
Tedu Ram Paikra (PW-4), a witness to the memorandum and
seizure, deposed that when he reached the house of the deceased, he
found the dead body lying on the floor and noticed the appellant wiping
blood from the body of the deceased. He further stated that, in his
presence, the appellant disclosed before the police that she had assaulted
the deceased, whereafter her memorandum statement (Ex.P/9) was
recorded and, pursuant thereto, an iron Tangi and a piece of firewood were
recovered and seized vide Ex.P/10. Although he admitted during crossexamination that no recovery was effected in his presence, his testimony
regarding the execution of the memorandum and seizure proceedings
remains on record and is required to be appreciated along with the other
evidence.
34.
Dhola Ram Paikra (PW-3), the other witness to the memorandum
and seizure, also supported the prosecution case. He deposed that when
he reached the place of occurrence, he found the appellant wiping blood
from the head of the deceased. He further stated that, upon being
questioned by the police, the appellant disclosed that she had assaulted
the deceased with a Tangi and a piece of firewood. He proved the
memorandum statement (Ex.P/9), the seizure memo (Ex.P/10) and the
arrest memo (Ex.P/11). Despite a lengthy cross-examination, no material
contradiction or omission could be elicited so as to discredit his testimony.
His evidence substantially corroborates the testimony of the Investigating
Officer regarding the recovery of the weapons allegedly used in the
commission of the offence.
35.
Having considered the evidence available on record, it is evident
that none of the prosecution witnesses is an eyewitness to the actual
occurrence. The prosecution case rests on the circumstantial evidence,
namely, the strained relationship between the appellant and the deceased,
the quarrel that took place immediately before the incident, the medical
evidence establishing the homicidal death of the deceased and the
recovery of the Tangi and the piece of firewood at the instance of the
appellant. The evidence of Bansai Paikra (PW-2) clearly establishes that
frequent quarrels used to take place between the appellant and the
deceased over domestic issues and that on the date of the incident also, a
quarrel had ensued between them during dinner. Although PW-2
attempted to pacify them, he left the house when they did not relent. The
medical evidence, coupled with the recovery of the weapons and the other
attending circumstances, establishes that it was the appellant who caused
the injuries to the deceased. However, the evidence on record does not
indicate that the appellant had any premeditated intention to cause the
death of the deceased. The incident occurred in the course of a sudden
quarrel arising out of a domestic dispute between the appellant and the
deceased. There is nothing on record to suggest that the appellant had
acted pursuant to any pre-conceived plan or had taken undue advantage
of the situation. In the considered opinion of this Court, the prosecution
has succeeded in proving that the appellant caused the injuries which
resulted in the death of the deceased; however, it has failed to establish
that the offence amounts to murder punishable under Section 302 of the
IPC.
36.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the present case is covered by Exception 4 to Section 300 of
the IPC. The act of the appellant was committed during a sudden quarrel,
without premeditation and in the heat of passion. At the same time, having
regard to the nature of the injuries caused to the deceased, it can safely
be attributed that the appellant had the knowledge that her act was likely
to cause death. Consequently, the conviction of the appellant deserves to
be altered from Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part-II of the IPC.
37.
Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the
IPC and the sentence imposed thereunder by the learned trial Court are
set aside. Instead, the appellant is convicted for the offence punishable
under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and is sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 05 years. The fine amount and the default stipulation, as
imposed by the learned trial Court, shall remain unaltered.
38.
It is not in dispute that the appellant has remained in custody since
14.02.2021 and has already undergone more than five years and four
months of incarceration. Thus, the appellant has already undergone the
substantive sentence awarded by this Court. Accordingly, she shall be
released forthwith, if her custody is not required in connection with any
other case.
39.
Consequently, the present criminal appeal is partly allowed to the
extent indicated hereinabove.
40.
I.A. No. 1 of 2025, being the application for suspension of sentence
and grant of bail, does not survive for consideration in view of the final
disposal of the appeal and is, accordingly, disposed of.
41.
Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the CrPC (now
Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the
appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form
No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall
be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the
event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for
grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall
appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
42.
Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be
sent to the trial Court forthwith for information and necessary compliance.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Brijmohan
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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