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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 27.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 17.02.2026
+
ARB.P. 1756/2025
BRAJ MOHAN AGARWAL & ANR.
.....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Sarang S. Chowdhry, Mr.
Shashank S. Chowdhry and Ms.
Nandita Chowdhry, Advocates.
versus
IRAMYA DEVELOPERS PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Harsh Sinha, Mr. Kunal
Makhija and Ms. Anushka
Verma, Advocates for R-2 & R3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present petition has been filed under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, seeking the appointment of
a Sole Arbitrator in terms of Article 34 of the Apartment Buyer’s
Agreements dated 22.01.2016 and 12.03.20162.
2.
Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are husband and wife, residing in New
Delhi. Respondent No. 1 is a company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 1956, and is engaged in the business of real estate
A&C Act
Apartment Buyer’s Agreements
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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development and construction of residential and commercial projects
in New Delhi and its adjoining areas. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are
Directors of Respondent No. 1-Company and are stated to be
responsible for its affairs and representations made to the Petitioners.
3.
In January 2016, the Petitioners came into contact with
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, acting on behalf of Respondent No. 1, in
relation to a residential project titled <Iramya Heights=, stated to
be located at Plot No. 42, Sector-13, Dwarka, New Delhi3.
4.
It is averred that Petitioner No. 1, vide cheques dated
11.01.2016 and 18.01.2016, paid sums of ₹1,00,000/- and ₹8,46,000/respectively towards booking and part consideration for a 2 BHK
residential apartment along with one car parking space in the said
project.
5.
It is further stated that between 22.02.2016 and 25.02.2016,
Petitioner No. 1, on behalf of Petitioner No. 2, made additional
payments aggregating to an amount of ₹11,55,000/- towards booking
and part consideration for a second 2 BHK residential apartment with
a car parking space in the same project. The said payments were duly
acknowledged by the Respondents through the issuance of receipts.
6.
Pursuant to the aforesaid payments, an Apartment Buyer’s
Agreement dated 22.01.2016 was executed between Petitioner No. 1
and Respondent No. 1 in respect of the first apartment, and a separate
Apartment Buyer’s Agreement dated 12.03.2016 was executed
between Petitioner No. 2 and Respondent No. 1 in respect of the
second apartment.
7.
The aforesaid Apartment Buyer’s Agreements contain an
arbitration clause, being Article 34, which provides that all disputes
project
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arising out of or in relation to the Apartment Buyer’s Agreements
shall, upon failure of amicable settlement, be referred to a Sole
Arbitrator for adjudication.
8.
On the same respective dates as the Apartment Buyer’s
Agreements, i.e., 22.01.2016 and 12.03.2016, Deeds of Guarantee
were also executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of the Petitioners.
Under the said Guarantees, Respondent No. 1 assured, inter alia, a
return at the rate of 15% per annum on the amounts invested, payable
upon expiry of 24 months from the respective dates of execution of
the Apartment Buyer’s Agreements.
9.
The
Petitioners
contend
that
the
Respondents
neither
commenced nor completed construction at the project site, nor
delivered possession of the allotted apartments and car parking spaces.
It is further alleged that the Respondents failed to refund the invested
amounts together with the assured return of 15% per annum, as
contractually guaranteed.
10.
It is stated that between January 2018 and May 2018, the
Petitioners addressed multiple emails to the Respondents seeking
refund of the principal amounts along with the assured returns. By
email dated 05.03.2018, the Respondents indicated that arrangements
were being made to process the refund and that a timeline was under
consideration.
11.
Subsequently, by email dated 07.06.2018, the Respondents
informed the Petitioners that certain funds were blocked with the
Delhi Development Authority and assured that the refund would be
processed upon release of such funds. However, no refund was
effected thereafter.
12.
The Petitioners, through counsel, issued a legal notice dated
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09.06.2018 seeking refund of the amounts paid along with assured
returns. Complaints dated 03.07.2018 and 22.09.2019 were also
lodged before the local police authorities. Thereafter, Consumer
Complaints bearing Nos. 548/2023 and 549/2023 were instituted
before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, South West
District, Dwarka, which were dismissed by Orders dated 29.05.2024
on the ground of limitation.
13.
Thereafter, the Petitioners invoked arbitration by issuing a
Notice under Section 21 of the A&C Act dated 11.06.2025 to the
registered office of the Respondents, which was also served through
emails. Despite service, the Respondents neither responded to the said
Notice nor took any steps for the appointment of a Sole Arbitrator in
terms of the arbitration clause.
14.
In such circumstances, the Petitioners have approached this
Court by way of the present petition under Section 11(6) of the A&C
Act seeking appointment of a Sole Arbitrator.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:
15.
At the outset, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents would submit that there exists no privity of contract
between the Petitioners and Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, and would
contend that, in the absence of any contractual relationship, the
present petition, insofar as it seeks relief against them, is not
maintainable.
16.
He would further submit that the Apartment Buyer’s
Agreements were executed exclusively between the Petitioners and
Respondent No. 1-Company, that the signatures of Respondent No. 2,
wherever appended, were affixed strictly in his capacity as Director
and authorised signatory of Respondent No. 1 and not in his personal
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BHATIA
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capacity, and that Respondent No. 3 is not a signatory to any of the
Apartment Buyer’s Agreements or allied documents forming part of
the contractual arrangement between the parties.
17.
On the aforesaid basis, learned counsel would contend that no
contractual liability can be fastened upon Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in
their individual capacities and, consequently, no relief, including the
appointment of an Arbitrator against them, can be granted in the
present proceedings.
18.
Learned counsel would additionally submit that Respondent No.
1-Company has been struck off from the Register of Companies and
would rely upon a copy of the reply to the present petition along with
relevant supporting documents, which have been handed over in
support of the said contention, though not yet formally brought on
record.
19.
Learned counsel would additionally contend that the Petitioners
are not without remedy, inasmuch as Section 252(3) of the Companies
Act, 2013, provides a statutory mechanism for seeking restoration of
the name of a struck-off company before the National Company Law
Tribunal, and that the Petitioners ought to avail the said remedy before
pursuing relief in the present petition.
20.
Per contra, learned counsel for the Petitioners would submit
that the Apartment Buyer’s Agreements as well as the Deeds of
Guarantee bear the signatures of Respondent No. 2, and would
contend that, in view of his execution of the said documents and his
active involvement in the transaction, the arbitration clause has been
validly invoked against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
21.
Learned counsel would further submit that the signatures of
Respondent No. 2 on the Apartment Buyer’s Agreements and the
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Deeds of Guarantee are admitted and undisputed, and would contend
that, even assuming arguendo that Respondent No. 3 may not
ultimately be proceeded against in arbitration, Respondent No. 2, by
virtue of having executed the relevant documents and participated in
the transaction, would in any event be liable to be impleaded and
proceeded against in the arbitral proceedings.
ANALYSIS & DECISION:
22.
This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length
and, with their able assistance, carefully perused the pleadings and the
documents placed on record as well as handed during the course of
hearing.
23.
Before adverting to the rival submissions, it is apposite to note
that the legal position governing the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act is no longer res integra.
A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBI General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg.4, after taking into consideration the
authoritative pronouncement of the seven-Judge Bench in Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 &
Stamp Act, 1899, In re5, comprehensively delineated the contours of
judicial intervention at the stage of Section 11of the A&C Act. The
excerpt of Krish Spg (supra) reads as under: <(c) Judicial interference under the 1996 Act
110. The parties have been conferred with the power to decide and
agree on the procedure to be adopted for appointing arbitrators. In
cases where the agreed upon procedure fails, the courts have been
vested with the power to appoint arbitrators upon the request of a
party, to resolve the deadlock between the parties in appointing the
arbitrators.
111. Section 11 of the 1996 Act is provided to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties to settle their disputes by arbitration
(2024) 12 SCC 1
(2024) 6 SCC 1
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in situations where the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator(s). The
parameters of judicial review laid down for Section 8 differ from
those prescribed for Section 11. The view taken inSBP &
Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 and affirmed inVidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 that Sections 8
and 11, respectively, of the 1996 Act are complementary in nature
was legislatively overruled by the introduction of Section 11(6-A)
in 2015. Thus, although both these provisions intend to compel
parties to abide by their mutual intention to arbitrate, yet the scope
of powers conferred upon the courts under both the sections are
different.
112. The difference between Sections 8 and 11, respectively, of the
1996 Act is also evident from the scope of these provisions. Some
of these differences are:
112.1. While Section 8 empowers any <judicial authority= to refer
the parties to arbitration, under Section 11, the power to refer has
been exclusively conferred upon the High Court and the Supreme
Court.
112.2. Under Section 37, an appeal lies against the refusal of the
judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration, whereas no such
provision for appeal exists for a refusal under Section 11.
112.3. The standard of scrutiny provided under Section 8 is that of
prima facie examination of the validity and existence of an
arbitration agreement. Whereas, the standard of scrutiny under
Section 11 is confined to the examination of the existence of the
arbitration agreement.
112.4. During the pendency of an application under Section 8,
arbitration may commence or continue and an award can be passed.
On the other hand, under Section 11, once there is failure on the
part of the parties in appointing the arbitrator as per the agreed
procedure and an application is preferred, no arbitration
proceedings can commence or continue.
113. The scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined
to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section
7. The examination of validity of the arbitration agreement is also
limited to the requirement of formal validity such as the
requirement that the agreement should be in writing.
114. The use of the term <examination= under Section 11(6-A) as
distinguished from the use of the term <rule= under Section 16
implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited
to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration
agreement, and does not include a contested or laborious enquiry,
which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal to <rule= under Section 16.
The prima facie view on existence of the arbitration agreement
taken by the Referral Court does not bind either the Arbitral
Tribunal or the Court enforcing the arbitral award.
115. The aforesaid approach serves a twofold purpose 4 firstly, it
allows the Referral Court to weed out non-existent arbitration
agreements, and secondly, it protects the jurisdictional competence
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BHATIA
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of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on the issue of existence of the
arbitration agreement in depth.
****
117. In view of the observations made by this Court in Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996
& the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, it is clear that the
scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it difficult to
hold that the observations made inVidya Drolia v. Durga Trading
Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 and adopted inNTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra
Ltd., (2023) 9 SCC 385 that the jurisdiction of the Referral Court
when dealing with the issue of <accord and satisfaction= under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the subsequent
decision inInterplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC
1.
****
119. The question of <accord and satisfaction=, being a mixed
question of law and fact, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Arbitral Tribunal, if not otherwise agreed upon between the
parties. Thus, the negative effect of competence-competence would
require that the matter falling within the exclusive domain of the
Arbitral Tribunal, should not be looked into by the Referral Court,
even for a prima facie determination, before the Arbitral Tribunal
first has had the opportunity of looking into it.
120. By referring disputes to arbitration and appointing an
arbitrator by exercise of the powers under Section 11, the Referral
Court upholds and gives effect to the original understanding of the
contracting parties that the specified disputes shall be resolved by
arbitration. Mere appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal does not in
any way mean that the Referral Court is diluting the sanctity of
<accord and satisfaction= or is allowing the claimant to walk back
on its contractual undertaking. On the contrary, it ensures that the
principle of arbitral autonomy is upheld and the legislative intent of
minimum judicial interference in arbitral proceedings is given full
effect. Once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, it is always open
for the defendant to raise the issue of <accord and satisfaction=
before it, and only after such an objection is rejected by the Arbitral
Tribunal, that the claims raised by the claimant can be adjudicated.
121. Tests like the <eye of the needle= and <ex facie meritless=,
although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they
require the Referral Court to examine contested facts and
appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of
enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the principles
of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and judicial
non-interference on the highest pedestal.
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BHATIA
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122. Appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal at the stage of Section 11
petition also does not mean that the Referral Courts forego any
scope of judicial review of the adjudication done by the Arbitral
Tribunal. The 1996 Act clearly vests the national courts with the
power of subsequent review by which the award passed by an
arbitrator may be subjected to challenge by any of the parties to the
arbitration.
*****
126. The power available to the Referral Courts has to be construed
in the light of the fact that no right to appeal is available against
any order passed by the Referral Court under Section 11 for either
appointing or refusing to appoint an arbitrator. Thus, by delving
into the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal at the nascent stage of
Section 11, the Referral Courts also run the risk of leaving the
claimant in a situation wherein it does not have any forum to
approach for the adjudication of its claims, if its Section 11
application is rejected.
127. Section 11 also envisages a time-bound and expeditious
disposal of the application for appointment of arbitrator. One of the
reasons for this is also the fact that unlike Section 8, once an
application under Section 11 is filed, arbitration cannot commence
until the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted by the Referral Court. This
Court, on various occasions, has given directions to the High
Courts for expeditious disposal of pending Section 11 applications.
It has also directed the litigating parties to refrain from filing bulky
pleadings in matters pertaining to Section 11. Seen thus, if the
Referral Courts go into the details of issues pertaining to <accord
and satisfaction= and the like, then it would become rather difficult
to achieve the objective of expediency and simplification of
pleadings.
128. We are also of the view that ex facie frivolity and dishonesty
in litigation is an aspect which the Arbitral Tribunal is equally, if
not more, capable to decide upon the appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the parties. We say so because the Arbitral Tribunal has
the benefit of going through all the relevant evidence and pleadings
in much more detail than the Referral Court. If the Referral Court is
able to see the frivolity in the litigation on the basis of bare
minimum pleadings, then it would be incorrect to doubt that the
Arbitral Tribunal would not be able to arrive at the same inference,
most likely in the first few hearings itself, with the benefit of
extensive pleadings and evidentiary material.=
(emphasis supplied)
24.
The decision in Krish Spg (supra) thus unequivocally reiterates
that the Referral Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11
of the A&C Act, is required to confine itself to a prima facie
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examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and nothing
beyond. The Court’s role is facilitative and procedural, namely, to give
effect to the parties’ agreed mechanism of dispute resolution when it
has failed, without embarking upon an adjudication of contentious
factual or legal issues, which are reserved for the Arbitral Tribunal.
25.
The Apex Court has further clarified that tests such as <ex facie
meritless= or <eye of the needle=, which necessitate an evaluation of
contested facts or a preliminary appreciation of evidence, are
inconsistent with the modern arbitration framework that accords
primacy to arbitral autonomy and restricts judicial interference.
Accordingly, while the Referral Court must ensure that a valid
arbitration agreement prima facie exists, all substantive objections,
including those relating to accord and satisfaction, limitation, or other
jurisdictional issues, are to be raised before and decided by the
Arbitral Tribunal in the first instance, subject thereafter to statutory
remedies available under the A&C Act.
26.
Turning now to the facts of the present case, there is no dispute
with regard to the execution of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreements,
and consequently, no controversy as to the existence of an arbitration
agreement. Article 34 of both Agreements, which is identically
worded, constitutes the arbitration clause and reads as follows:
<34. DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY ARBITRATION
All or any disputes arising out of or touching upon or in relation to
the terms of this Agreement or its termination including the
interpretation and validity of the terms hereof and the respective
rights and obligations of the Parties shall be settled amicably by
mutual discussions failing which the same shall be settled through
reference to a sole Arbitrator to be appointed by a resolution of the
Board of Directors of the COMPANY, whose decision shall be
final and binding upon the Parties. The Allottee hereby confirms
that it shall have no objection to the appointment of such sole
Arbitrator even if the person so appointed, is an employee or
advocate of the COMPANY or is otherwise connected to the
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COMPANY and the Allottee hereby accepts and agrees that this
alone shall not constitute a ground for challenge to the
independence or impartiality of the said sole Arbitrator to conduct
the arbitration. The arbitration proceedings shall be governed by
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any statutory
amendments/modifications thereto and shall be held at the
COMPANY's offices or at a location designated by the said sole
Arbitrator in Delhi. The language of the arbitration proceedings
and the Award shall be in English. The COMPANY and the
Allottee will share the fees of the Arbitrator in equal proportion.=
27.
The principal objection raised by the Respondents is two-fold.
First, that Respondent No. 1-Company has been struck off from the
Register of Companies and, therefore, no arbitral proceedings can be
initiated or continued against it; and second, that Respondent Nos. 2
and 3 cannot be proceeded against in arbitration in the absence of
privity of contract, as the Apartment Buyer’s Agreements were
executed by Respondent No. 1-Company and not by them in their
personal capacities.
28.
As noted hereinabove, while exercising jurisdiction as a
Referral Court under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act, the scope of
examination is circumscribed and confined to a prima facie
determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. In the
present case, the execution of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreements and
the incorporation of Article 34 therein are not in dispute.
Consequently, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between
the contracting parties stands prima facie established.
29.
The objections raised on behalf of the Respondents, particularly
with regard to the alleged absence of privity of contract between the
Petitioners and Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, necessarily involve an
enquiry into the factual matrix, the nature of the transactions, the role
played by the said Respondents, and the extent of their involvement
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and obligations, if any.
30.
Such issues cannot be determined merely on a superficial
reading of the Agreements and would require a deeper appreciation of
facts and surrounding circumstances. In view of the limited
jurisdiction at this stage, this Court does not consider it appropriate to
undertake such an examination, which squarely falls within the
domain of the Arbitral Tribunal.
31.
Insofar as the contention that Respondent No. 1-Company has
been struck off from the Register of Companies is concerned, this
Court finds no merit in the submission that such striking off, by itself,
constitutes an absolute bar to arbitral proceedings. The scheme of the
Companies Act, 2013, particularly Sections 248 and 250, clarifies the
effect and consequences of the removal of the name of a company
from the Register of Companies. The said provisions read as under:
<248. Power of Registrar to remove name of company from
register of companies. (1) Where the Registrar has reasonable cause to believe that4
(a) a company has failed to commence its business within one year
of its incorporation; or
*****
(c) a company is not carrying on any business or operation for a
period of two immediately preceding financial years and has
not made any application within such period for obtaining the
status of a dormant company under section 455; or
(d) the subscribers to the memorandum have not paid the
subscription which they had undertaken to pay at the time of
incorporation of a company and a declaration to this effect has
not been filed within one hundred and eighty days of its
incorporation under sub-section (1) of section 10A; or
(e) the company is not carrying on any business or operations, as
revealed after the physical verification carried out under subsection (9) of section 12.
he shall send a notice to the company and all the directors of the
company, of his intention to remove the name of the company from
the register of companies and requesting them to send their
representations along with copies of the relevant documents, if any,
within a period of thirty days from the date of the notice.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), a
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company may, after extinguishing all its liabilities, by a special
resolution or consent of seventy-five per cent. members in terms of
paid-up share capital, file an application in the prescribed manner
to the Registrar for removing the name of the company from the
register of companies on all or any of the grounds specified in subsection (1) and the Registrar shall, on receipt of such application,
cause a public notice to be issued in the prescribed manner:
Provided that in the case of a company regulated under a special
Act, approval of the regulatory body constituted or established
under that Act shall also be obtained and enclosed with the
application.
(3) Nothing in sub-section (2) shall apply to a company registered
under section 8.
(4) A notice issued under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be
published in the prescribed manner and also in the Official Gazette
for the information of the general public.
(5) At the expiry of the time mentioned in the notice, the Registrar
may, unless cause to the contrary is shown by the company, strike
off its name from the register of companies, and shall publish
notice thereof in the Official Gazette, and on the publication in the
Official Gazette of this notice, the company shall stand dissolved.
(6) The Registrar, before passing an order under sub-section (5),
shall satisfy himself that sufficient provision has been made for the
realisation of all amount due to the company and for the payment
or discharge of its liabilities and obligations by the company within
a reasonable time and, if necessary, obtain necessary undertakings
from the managing director, director or other persons in charge of
the management of the company:
Provided that notwithstanding the undertakings referred to in this
sub-section, the assets of the company shall be made available for
the payment or discharge of all its liabilities and obligations even
after the date of the order removing the name of the company from
the register of companies.
(7) The liability, if any, of every director, manager or other officer
who was exercising any power of management, and of every
member of the company dissolved under sub-section (5), shall
continue and may be enforced as if the company had not been
dissolved.
(8) Nothing in this section shall affect the power of the Tribunal to
wind up a company the name of which has been struck off from the
register of companies.
250. Effect of company notified as dissolved.- Where a company
stands dissolved under section 248, it shall on and from the date
mentioned in the notice under sub-section (5) of that section cease
to operate as a company and the Certificate of Incorporation issued
to it shall be deemed to have been cancelled from such date except
for the purpose of realising the amount due to the company and for
the payment or discharge of the liabilities or obligations of the
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company.=
(emphasis supplied)
32.
A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it abundantly
clear that the removal of a company’s name from the Register of
Companies does not ipso facto extinguish its liabilities or those of its
directors and officers. The statutory framework itself contemplates the
continuation
and
enforcement
of
liabilities
notwithstanding
dissolution, and therefore, the mere fact of striking off cannot, at this
stage, be construed as an impediment to the invocation of arbitration.
33.
In view of the above, this Court is of the prima facie opinion
that the striking off of Respondent No. 1-Company does not, by itself,
render the arbitration agreement inoperative or incapable of being
acted upon. Further, the question whether Respondent Nos. 2 and 3
can be held personally liable, whether they can be proceeded against
in arbitration, and the extent of their contractual or statutory
obligations, if any, are matters which would require a comprehensive
examination of both law and fact. Such issues are more appropriately
adjudicated by the learned Arbitral Tribunal upon consideration of
pleadings and evidence, rather than by this Court at the threshold stage
under Section 11 of the A&C Act.
34.
The objections raised by the Respondents thus involve mixed
questions of law and fact, including issues relating to privity of
contract, continuation of liability post striking off, and the role of the
individual Respondents in the underlying transactions. In light of the
limited scope of scrutiny permissible at the referral stage, this Court is
of the considered view that all such objections may be raised before
the learned Arbitral Tribunal, which shall be competent to examine
and decide the same in accordance with law under Section 16 of the
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A&C Act.
35.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that there exists no
legal impediment to the appointment of an Arbitrator in the present
case. The petition is accordingly allowed and an Arbitral Tribunal is
constituted to adjudicate the disputes inter se the parties.
36.
Accordingly, Ms. Neelima Tripathi, Senior Advocate, (Mob.
No. 9810099919) is appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the
disputes arising between the parties under the Apartment Buyer’s
Agreements.
37.
The learned Sole Arbitrator shall enter upon reference and
proceed with the arbitral proceedings in accordance with law, subject
to furnishing to the parties the requisite disclosures in terms of Section
12(2) of the A&C Act.
38.
The learned Sole Arbitrator shall be entitled to fees in
accordance with the Fourth Schedule to the A&C Act, or such other
fee structure as may be mutually agreed upon between the parties and
the learned Sole Arbitrator.
39.
The parties shall bear and share the fees of the learned Sole
Arbitrator, as well as the arbitral costs and administrative expenses, in
equal proportion, subject to any final determination as to costs that
may be made by the learned Sole Arbitrator in the Award.
40.
The Registry is directed to forthwith communicate a copy of
this order to the learned Sole Arbitrator through all permissible
modes,
including
electronic
mail,
to
enable
expeditious
commencement of the arbitral proceedings.
41.
It is clarified that all rights and contentions of the parties in
relation to their respective claims and counterclaims are expressly kept
open and are left to be adjudicated by the learned Sole Arbitrator on
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
16:40:13
ARB.P. 1756/2025
their own merits, in accordance with law.
42.
Needless to state, nothing contained in this order shall be
construed as an expression of opinion by this Court on the jurisdiction
or merits of the disputes between the parties, and all observations
herein are confined solely to the adjudication of the present petition
under Section 11 of the Act.
43.
The Registry is further directed that the documents handed over
across the Bar during the hearing, comprising a copy of the reply
along with the relevant supporting documents, be taken on record and
form part of the electronic record of this Court.
44.
Accordingly, the present petition stands disposed of in the
above terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 17, 2026/sm/her
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
16:40:13
ARB.P. 1756/2025
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