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Serial No. 01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
MC[WP(C)] No. 7 of 2023
Date of Decision: 21.08.2023
Shri Bijoy Lal
Vs.
Union of India & 3 Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Mr. S. Jindal, Legal Aid Counsel
For the Respondent(s)
:
Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. K. Gurung, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
It is the case of the petitioner that he had preferred a writ petition
before the Hon‟ble Gauhati High Court, Shillong Bench (as this Court then
was) registered as WP(C) No. 81(SH) of 2008 being aggrieved with the order
whereby he was discharged from service in the Assam Rifles, affected vide
order dated 08.09.2007 of the authority concerned.
2.
That in course of proceedings of the said writ petition, the same was
dismissed for default vide order dated 30.10.2009. The reason for such
dismissal according to the petitioner is that it was due to negligence of the
conducting counsel who was entrusted to pursue the petition, but because of
his callous conduct by not appearing diligently whenever the matter was
heard, the Court was pleased to pass the said dismissal order. This fact was
made known to the petitioner only in the year 2012.
3.
The petitioner, who by then was residing in the village of Kothagi in
the State of Uttarakhand, came to Guwahati to meet the said counsel who
handed over the file to him with a remark that nothing could be done now.
4.
The petitioner, on being advised, approached the Assam State Legal
Services Authority for legal aid and accordingly, a Legal Aid Counsel was
assigned to take up his case. However, this Legal Aid Counsel had sent a letter
dated 17.04.2013 to the Assam State Legal Service Authority indicating to the
effect that since the High Court of Meghalaya has started functioning, the
petitioner may approach the same for revival of his dismissed petition. This
letter, copy of which was enclosed to be forwarded to the petitioner, was
never received by him. The petitioner came to know of the fate of his case
only in the month of September 2022 when the Assam State Legal Services
Authority forwarded all the related papers to the Meghalaya State Legal
Services Authority.
5.
The petitioner in the meantime was bereaved by the death of his
mother who died on 31.03.2014 and that of his father who died on 05.04.2021
coupled with the fact that he is not financially sound, he is not able to come
from Uttarakhand to enquire about his case. Having no option, the petitioner
wrote a letter to the Registrar, Gauhati High Court for being provided with an
Amicus Curiae (Legal Aid Counsel) and the said application dated 18.07.2022
was forwarded to the Member Secretary, Meghalaya State Legal Services
Authority and again, on receipt of such communication by the High Court
Legal Services Committee, High Court of Meghalaya, the present Legal Aid
Counsel was appointed to take care of the petitioner‟s case.
6.
That in the light of the above narrative, there has occurred a delay of
about 13 years or so in preferring the application for restoration of the writ
petition of the petitioner and for which delay, this instant application for
condonation of the same was filed.
7.
In response to this, the respondent/Union of India has filed an
affidavit-in-opposition raising points of objections to the averments made in
the petition. The main objection is that the case of the petitioner, that is,
WP(C) No. 81(SH) of 2008 was filed before the Gauhati High Court and was
also dismissed by the said Court on 30.10.2009, which was then the common
High Court. This petition is, therefore, not maintainable before this Court in
view of the provision of sub-section (3) of Section 28-I of the North-Eastern
Areas (Re-Organisation) Act, 1971 as amended by Section 4 of the NorthEastern Areas (Re-Organisation) and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act,
2012.
8.
The other objections raised were with regard to the conduct of the
petitioner in not diligently pursuing the matter and that there was no day-today explanation of such delay.
9.
Heard Mr. S. Jindal, learned Legal Aid Counsel, who has submitted
that the initial hurdle to overcome as far as the case of the petitioner is
concerned is that, the fact that the writ petition filed by the petitioner was
dismissed vide the relevant order dated 30.10.2009, the petitioner has now
approached this Court for restoration of the said writ petition, in effect, to
overturn the order dated 30.10.2009. However, to reach this point, the
petitioner has incurred a delay of about 13 years or so to file such application.
This being the case, the petitioner has therefore, now press his prayer before
this Court for condonation of delay in filing the said restoration petition.
10.
In the light of the abovementioned scenario, the learned legal aid
counsel has submitted that the provision of Section 28-I and sub-section 3 of
the same under the Re-organisation Act of 2012 will not be applicable in this
regard.
11.
The learned legal aid counsel has further submitted that sub-section 3
of Section 28-I contemplates a situation where the common High Court shall
have jurisdiction to the exclusion of the High Court of Meghalaya, as the case
may be, to entertain, hear and dispose appeals, applications for leave to the
Supreme Court, applications for review and other proceedings where any such
proceedings seek any relief in respect of any order passed by the common
High Court.
12.
The prohibition under Section 28-I (3) therefore applies to only the
following categories viz;
a) appeals; b) applications for leave to the Supreme Court; c) review;
and d) other proceedings, where such proceedings seek any relief in
respect of any order passed by the common High Court, that is, the
Gauhati High Court.
13.
The learned Legal Aid Counsel then went on to submit that the present
petition filed by the petitioner being a petition for condonation of delay, it
obviously does not fall under either of the abovementioned categories since
the petitioner is not seeking any relief against any order passed by the court at
this point of time but has sought for leave to seek such relief only in the event
the delay for filing of the application for restoration of the writ petition is
condoned by the court.
14.
To further elaborate on this point, the learned Legal Aid Counsel has
stressed on the use and definition of the word or term „relief‟ to say that in P.
Ramanatha Aiyar’s ‘The Law Lexicon’, 2nd Edition, 2008, relief has been
defined as under:
““RELIEF” means the remedy which a Court of Justice may afford in
relation of some actual or apprehended wrong or injury”
15.
The learned counsel has reiterated that the petitioner is not seeking
relief as contemplated under Section 28-I (3) of the Reorganisation Act, 2012
as the petition for condonation of delay is not because of a right being
infringed, but is rather an imploration before this Court for exercise of its
discretionary power to condone the delay in filing the petition for restoration
of the writ petition. Even if this Court chooses to condone the delay, the
prayer seeking restoration of the dismissed petition would still not be one
where relief for an alleged wrong being inflicted is sought for, but again, the
discretionary power of this Court is sought to be exercised for restoration of
the writ proceedings since dismissed.
16.
As to the ratio of the order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in
the case of Shri Manish Bhattacharjee v. State Bank of India & Ors. in MC
(WA) No. 45 of 2016, the same speaks only of the applicability of Section 28I (3) in the context of appeals, application for leave to Supreme Court and
review petition, but the fourth category, that is, „other reliefs‟ was not
discussed by this Court and thereby have been consciously omitted, submits
the learned counsel.
17.
The learned counsel has finally submitted that in the interest of justice
and practicality, this Court may be pleased to allow the prayer of the petitioner
and to pass necessary order keeping in mind that when substantial justice is to
be done, the technical considerations thereto have to give way to the former.
The case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst Katiji &
Ors.; (1987) 2 SCC 107, para 3(4) was referred to where the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court has observed that:
“3. …
(4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are
pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to
be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.”
18.
Dr. N. Mozika, learned DSGI while opposing the stand and prayer
made by the petitioner has led this Court to the provision of Section 28-I (3)
of the North-Eastern Areas (Re-Organisation) and Other Related Laws
(Amendment) Act, 2012 and has submitted that this provision makes it very
clear that the jurisdiction of this Court is barred as far as entertainment of
appeals, applications for leave to the Supreme Court, applications for review
and other proceedings where such proceedings seeks any relief in respect of
any order passed by the common High Court before the commencement of the
North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) and Other Related Laws (Amendment)
Act, 2012.
19.
This situation was reaffirmed by the order of a Division Bench of this
Court passed in the case of Manish Bhattacharjee (supra) where it was held
that:
“…We are thus, of the opinion that the present intra-court appeal
could not have been filed before the Meghalaya High Court in view of
the explicit mandatory provision contained in Sub-section (3) of
Section 28-I of the Act of 2012…”
20.
The learned DSGI has submitted that the contention of the petitioner
that no relief is sought for as far as the prayer for condonation of delay is
concerned is not correct, since an application for condonation of delay is an
ancillary proceeding in aid of the application for restoration of the dismissed
writ petition. As such, if the court does not have the power to restore, it can
also have no power to condone the delay.
21.
The earlier writ petition having been dismissed/disposed of by the
common High Court, it would be but proper for the relevant procedure to be
followed and on this application being filed before the common High Court,
that is, the Gauhati High Court, perhaps the matter may be transferred to this
Court for adjudication as is provided under sub-section (4) of Section 28-I of
the North-Eastern Areas (Re-Organisation) and Other Related Laws
(Amendment) Act, 2012.
22.
This Court having heard the parties, at the outset, would observe that
the moot issue required to be decided herein is as regard the applicability of
the provision of Section 28-I of the North-Eastern Areas (Re-Organisation)
and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2012.
23.
On the factual aspect, the learned Legal Aid Counsel has impressed
upon this Court that though the ultimate goal of the petitioner is to get the writ
petition, since dismissed, restored to file, however, before the merits of the
related application for restoration is to be urged upon before this Court, the
initial hurdle sought to be overcome by the petitioner is the issue of delay in
filing such application, for without condonation or waiving of such delay, the
said application for restoration would not be taken up by the Court.
24.
Again, the learned Legal Aid Counsel has submitted before this Court
that the prayer for condonation of delay is not a relief sought for, as for a
relief to be granted, it presupposes that a wrong has been inflicted upon the
one who has sought such relief, whereas, for condonation of delay a relief is
not prayed for but the discretionary powers of the Court is sought to be
exercised to allow the petitioner to move to the next step, that is, to seek
appropriate relief upon such delay being condoned.
25.
The logic applied by the petitioner herein cannot be comprehended by
this Court since the main thrust of the petitioner‟s case is for restoration of the
said WP(C) No. 81(SH) of 2008, that the application for such restoration was
not filed within reasonable time but after a delay of about 13 years or so, the
prayer for condonation of such delay though incidental, cannot be entirely
divorced from the main prayer, where relief is sought for. It is, therefore,
logical to conclude that if the delay is condoned, the application wherein relief
is sought for would be taken up for consideration and conversely, if the delay
is not condoned, the application would stand dismissed. The prayer for
condonation of delay would be, in other words, a relief prayed for. In such a
scenario, in the context of the case of the petitioner, the provision of subsection 3 of Section 28-I (supra) would apply.
26.
Coming to the other aspect of the matter, the case of Manish
Bhattacharjee (supra) referred to by the learned DSGI is indeed relevant to the
issue raised herein inasmuch as in the said case, the Division Bench of this
Court was dealing with a matter where condonation of delay of 1108 days in
filing the related appeal has been prayed for. Even while holding that there
was no sufficient cause to explain the delay, the court has elaborately
explained the purport of sub-section (3) of Section 28-I of the said Act.
27.
It would be worthwhile to note the observations made by the Division
Bench of this Court in the said case which reads as follows:
“…Sub Section (3) of Section 28-I makes it apparently clear that the
provision is mandatory giving no choice to the litigant to choose
between the two forums. The applicability and the fairness of this
provision can be seen from another angle. An order which is passed
by the Gauhati High Court, if it is reviewed by the Meghalaya High
Court in an appeal or on a review application or on an application
seeking leave to appeal would create anomalous situation. One High
Court which has dealt with one matter should conclude the matter and
bring finality to it and should not leave it open to another High Court
to dwell further into the matter. The Legislature was conscious of the
matter and in order to avoid the anomalous situation, a mandatory
provision was created confining that petition, which was decided by
the common High Court to achieve finality from that Court itself.
Thus, the decision of the common High Court cannot be criticised or
overruled or set aside before the appellate forum by another High
Court. The word “shall” was consciously used making it apparent and
explicit that a litigant who has availed the jurisdiction of the Guahati
High Court can only file an intra-court appeal before the same High
Court and cannot be given a choice to choose the common High
Court, namely, Gauhati High Court or Meghalaya High Court….”
28.
In the light of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that no
effective order can be passed in the instant matter in view of the stated
position of law as is found in sub-section (3) of Section 28-I of the NorthEastern Areas (Re-Organisation) Act, 1971 as amended by Section 4 of the
North-Eastern Areas (Re-Organisation) and other related laws (Amendment)
Act, 2012.
29.
This petition is accordingly dismissed.
30.
Before parting, it may be pointed out that in view of the
aforementioned provision of law, it is open to the petitioner to approach the
common High Court without prejudice to his rights in spite of the
observations made hereinabove.
Judge
Meghalaya
21.08.2023
“Tiprilynti–PS”
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