The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
11. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order impugned dated
30. 05.2026 passed by the respondent authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenu to be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted. (GITA GOPI,J) (L. S. PIRZADA, J) Pankaj/16 Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
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R/SCR.A/8109/2026
ORDER DATED: 30/06/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8109 of 2026
==========================================================
BHARTIBEN MAHESHBHAI THAKOR THRO MAHESHKUMAR PRATAPJI
THAKOR
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
SALMAN S KHAN(9496) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR JAY MEHTA APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE NOT RECD BACK for the Respondent(s) No. 2
RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 3
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE L. S. PIRZADA
Date : 30/06/2026
ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI)
1.
The petitioner herein came to be preventively detained
vide the detention order dated 30.05.2026 passed by the
respondent No.2 as a bootlegger as defined under Section
2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act,
1985 (herein after referred as “the Act of 1985”).
2.
By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the
legality and validity of the aforesaid order.
3.
This Court has heard learned advocate Mr. Salman
S.Khan and learned A.P.P. Mr. Jay Mehta for the respective
parties.
4.
Learned advocate for the detenu submits that three
cases have been registered against the detenu under the
R/SCR.A/8109/2026
ORDER DATED: 30/06/2026
Prohibition Act and has been condemned as a bootlegger. It is
submitted that the petitioner has already been released on
bail by the competent Court. Learned advocate submitted that
without any evidence, the cases have been registered against
the detenu and there is no case of any public disorder.
Learned advocate for the petitioner has relied on the
judgments in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta vs.
Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad (City) reported in
AIR 1989 SC 491 and in the case of Pushkar Mukherjee
Vs. State of Bengal, reported in 1969 (1) SCC 10.
5.
Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the
grounds of detention has no nexus to the “public order”, but is
a purely a matter of law and order, as registration of the
offence cannot be said to have either affected adversely or
likely to affect adverse the maintenance of public order as
contemplated under the explanation sub-section (4) of Section
3 of the Act of 1985 and therefore, where the offences alleged
to have been committed by the detunue have no bearing on
the question of maintenance of public order and his activities
could be said to be a prejudicial only to the maintenance of
law and order and not prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order, then the detention order becomes invalid.
6.
On the other hand, learned A.P.P for the State opposing
the application contended that the detenu is a habitual
offender and his activities affects the society at large. In such
set of circumstances, the Detaining Authority, considering the
antecedents and past activities of the detenu, has passed the
impugned order with a view to prevent him from acting in any
R/SCR.A/8109/2026
ORDER DATED: 30/06/2026
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the
area of Ahmedabad.
7.
Having considered the facts as well as the submissions
made
by
the
respective
parties,
the
issue
arise
for
consideration as to whether the order of detention passed by
the Detaining Authority in exercise of his powers under the
provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable in law?
8.
The order impugned was executed upon the petitioner
and presently he is in Jail. In the grounds of detention, a
reference of three criminal cases i.e. (i) for the offence under
Sections 116B, 81 dated 22.04.2025 with Isanpur Police
Station, (ii) for the offence under Sections 6(1)B and 81 dated
04.01.2026 with Madhupura Police Station, (iii) for the
offence
under
Sections
66(1)B,
65(e)
and
dated
04.01.2026 with Madhupura Police Station, registered against
the petitioner under the Prohibition Law were made and
further it is alleged that, the activities of the detenu as a
“bootlegger” affects adversely or are likely to affect adversely
the maintenance of ‘public order’ as explained under Section
3 of the Act of 1985. Admittedly, in said offences, the
petitioner was granted bail.
9.
After careful consideration of the material, we are of the
considered view that on the basis of the said prohibition
cases, the authority has wrongly arrived at the subjective
satisfaction that the activities of the detenu could be termed
to be acting in a manner ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order’. In our opinion, the said offences do not have any
R/SCR.A/8109/2026
bearing
on
ORDER DATED: 30/06/2026
the
maintenance
of
public
order.
In
this
connection, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in
the case of Piyush Kantilal (supra), wherein, the detention
order was made on the basis of the registration of the two
prohibition offences. The Apex Court after referring the case
of Pushkar Mukherjee (supra), held and observed that
mere disturbance of law and order leading to detention order
is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under preventive
detention Act.
Paras-17 & 18 are relevant to refer, which
read thus:
“17. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of this
Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, where
the distinction between `law and order' and `public order'
has been clearly laid down. Ramaswami, J. speaking for the
Court observed as follows:
10. "Does the expression `public order' take in
every kind of infraction of order or only some
categories thereof? It is manifest that every act
of assault or injury to specific persons does not
lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel
and fight and assault each other inside a house
or in a street, it may be said that there is
disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are
dealt with under the powers vested in the
executive authorities under the provisions of
ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be
detained
on
the
ground
that
they
were
disturbing public order. The contravention of any
law always affects order but before it can be said
to
affect
public
order,
it
must
affect
the
community or the public at large. In this
R/SCR.A/8109/2026
ORDER DATED: 30/06/2026
connection we must draw a line of demarcation
between
serious
and
aggravated
forms
of
disorder which directly affect the community or
injure the public interest and the relatively
minor breaches of peace of a purely local
significance
which
primarily
injure
specific
individuals and only in a secondary sense public
interest. A mere disturbance of law and order
leading to disorder is thus not necessarily
sufficient
for
action
under
the
Preventive
Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect
public order comes within the scope of the Act."
18. In the instant case, the detaining authority, in our
opinion, has failed to substantiate that the alleged antisocial activities of the petitioner adversely affect or are
likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
It is true some incidents of beating by the petitioner had
taken place, as alleged by the witnesses. But, such
incidents, in our view, do not have any bearing on the
maintenance of public order. The petitioner may be
punished for the alleged offences committed by him but,
surely, the acts constituting the offences cannot be said to
have affected the even tempo of the life of the community.
It may be that the petitioner is a bootlegger within the
meaning of section 2(b) of the Act, but merely because he
is a bootlegger he cannot be preventively detained under
the provisions of the Act unless, as laid down in subsection (4) of section 3 of the Act, his activities as a
bootlegger affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely
the maintenance of public order We have carefully
considered the offences alleged against the petitioner in
the order of detention and also the allegations made by the
witnesses and, in our opinion, these offences or the
allegations cannot be said to have created any feeling of
R/SCR.A/8109/2026
ORDER DATED: 30/06/2026
insecurity or panic or terror among the members of the
public of the area in question giving rise to the question of
maintenance of public order. The order of detention
cannot, therefore, be upheld.”
10.
We are of the considered opinion that, the material on
record are not sufficient for holding that the alleged activities
of the detenu alleging him as a bootlegger have either
affected
adversely
or
likely
to
affect
adversely
the
maintenance of public order, we are of a considered view that
the registration of cases against the present detenu under
Prohibition Act would not have, any effect on public order,
unless it is proved by way of material on record that the
activity of detenu has created tension in the area and has
raised panic to adversely affect the public order. Therefore, it
can be concluded that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by
the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in
accordance with law.
11.
Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order
impugned
dated
30.05.2026
passed
by
the
respondent
authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenu to be set at
liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Rule
is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.
(GITA GOPI,J)
(L. S. PIRZADA, J)
Pankaj/16
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