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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.857 of 2024
Date of Decision: 31.03.2026
_________________________________________________________________________
Sh. Bhagirath
……...Petitioner
Versus
Punjab National Bank
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Rajinder Singh Thakur & Ms. Kiran Verma,
Advocates.
For the Respondent:
Mr. Vinod Sharma, Advocate vice Mr. Jitender Pal
Ranote, Advocate.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 of
Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays challenge to judgment
dated 12.09.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I,
Solan, District Solan, H.P., in Criminal Appeal No.3-AK/10 of 2024,
affirming the judgment of conviction dated 16.01.2024 and order of
sentence dated 29.01.2024, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Arki, District Solan, H.P. in Criminal Complaint No.217/3 of 2018,
whereby the learned Court below, while holding the petitioner-accused
(hereinafter "accused") guilty of having committed offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the "Act”), convicted
and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six
months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.80,000/- to the
respondent-complainant (hereinafter "complainant").
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that complainant instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Act
before the competent Court of law, alleging therein that accused applied for
loan amounting to Rs.2,00,000/- from the complainant’s bank and loan
was sanctioned in the name of accused on 15.09.2015. Afore loan was to be
repaid/returned by the accused as per terms and conditions of loan
agreement. However, on account of default in repayment, loan account of
the accused was declared as NPA and sum of Rs.2,14,272/- along with
interest was shown to be outstanding in his account. With a view to
discharge his lawful liability and regularization of his loan account, though
accused issued cheque bearing No. 025601 dated 01.07.2018 amounting to
Rs.60,000/-, drawn on Punjab National Bank, Branch Arki, Tehsil Arki,
District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, but aforesaid cheque on its presentation
was returned back vide memo dated 06.07.2018 with the remarks
“Insufficient Funds”. Since accused failed to make the payment good within
the stipulated period despite his having received legal notice dated
28.07.2018, complainant had no option, but to initiate proceedings under
Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of law.
3.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 16/29.01.2024, held
the accused guilty of his having committed offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per
the description given herein above.
4.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of
conviction recorded by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Arki,
District Solan, H.P., accused preferred an appeal before the learned
Additional Sessions Judge-I, Solan, District Solan, H.P., but same was
dismissed vide judgment dated 12.09.2024. In the aforesaid background,
accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying
therein for setting-aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence
recorded by the learned Court below.
5.
Vide order dated 02.01.2025, this Court suspended the
substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below subject to
petitioner’s depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing
personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like
amount within a period of eight weeks, however, fact remains that aforesaid
order was never complied with. Repeatedly time was granted to the accused
to comply with the aforesaid order, but in vain.
Vide order dated
23.02.2026, this Court, while granting last opportunity to the petitioner to
do the needful, specifically observed in the order that in case needful is not
done, interim protection granted vide order dated 02.01.2025 shall come to
an end and respondent would be at liberty to get the judgment of learned
trial Court executed in accordance with law.
6.
Today, during the proceedings of the case, learned counsel for
the accused submitted that since accused is not coming forward to impart
instructions, this Court may proceed to decide the case on its own merits.
7.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Solan, District
Solan, H.P., whereby judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded
by the learned trial Court came to be upheld, this Court is not persuaded to
agree with Mr. Rajinder Singh Thakur, learned counsel for the accused,
that learned Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right
perspective, rather this Court finds that both the Courts below have dealt
with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and there is no
scope left for this Court to interfere. Evidence led on record by the parties,
especially statement of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. clearly reveals
that there is no denial, if any, on the part of accused with regard to
issuance of cheque as well as his signatures thereupon. Since factum of
issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon never came to be
refuted at the behest of accused, both the learned Courts below rightly
invoked Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which talk about presumption in
favour of holder of cheque that cheque in question was issued towards
discharge of lawful liability.
8.
No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut
such presumption person seeking to rebut such presumption is expected to
raise probable defence. However, in the instant case, no probable defence
ever came to be raised.
9.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence, which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused, besides leading evidence in defence,
can rely on the materials produced by the complainant. Needless to say, if
the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable
defence nor is able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It
would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras of the judgment herein:
“23.
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of
Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the
legislative
objective
of
improving
the
credibility
of
negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable
presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in
the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it
must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section
138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing
of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is
usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial
transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should
guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and
the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly
high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled
position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption
under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all
preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence
which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt
or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a
defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the
accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable
defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI
Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is
not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the
complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to
qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to
avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by
the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a
notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the
time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the
said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence,
hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not
there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof
the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have
to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in
view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is
presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this
the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct
the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment
despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a
sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
10.
In the case at hand, complainant, with a view to prove its case,
examined its authorized officer as CW-1 Sh. Bhupender Gupta, who
tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ext. CW-1/A, wherein he
reiterated the facts as averred in the complaint. He also placed on record
GPA Ext. CW-1/B, cheque Ext. CW-1/C, dishonour memo Ext. CW-1/D,
demand notice Ext. CW-1/E and post receipt Ext. CW-1/F. If the crossexamination conducted upon this witness is perused in its entirety, it can
be safely concluded that opposite party was unable to extract anything
contrary to what this witness stated in his examination-in-chief. In his
cross-examination, CW-1 stated that he was posted at PNB Branch Arki in
the year 2018. He further stated that accused took a C.C. Limit loan from
the complainant's bank. While stating that loan was sanctioned in favour of
accused in his presence, he stated that copy of account statement, though
not attached with the case file, but he has brought it with him. Not even a
single suggestion ever came to be put to afore witness with regard to fact
that cheque in question was never issued by the accused towards discharge
of lawful liability and same has been misused.
11.
In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, though
accused denied the case of complainant in toto, but despite sufficient
opportunities, he was unable to led evidence in defence.
12.
By way of leading cogent and convincing evidence, complainant
successfully proved on record that it had sanctioned a loan to the tune of
Rs. 2,00,000/- in favour of the accused in the present case on 15.09.2015
and the same was agreed to be repaid/returned by the accused as per the
conditions and terms of loan agreement. Complainant also proved that
accused did not pay regular monthly installments and loan amount was
outstanding to the tune of Rs. 2,14,272/-. It also came to be proved at the
behest of complainant-bank that though accused had issued a cheque
bearing No.025601, on 01.07.2018, amounting to Rs. 60,000/-, drawn at
P.N.B Bank, Branch Arki, Tehsil Arki, District Solan, H.P. in favour of
complainant towards discharge of his lawful liability, but the same was
dishonored with the remarks “Insufficient Funds” vide return Memo dated
06.07.2018. Factum with regard to issuance of legal notice prior to
institution of proceedings under Section 138 of Act also came to be proved
by the complainant by placing on record legal notice as well as postal
receipt. Though in the case at hand, accused denied the case of the
complainant in toto, while getting his statement recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C, but that may not be sufficient to discard the full proof case of
the complainant. As observed hereinabove, the testimony of CW-1, i.e., the
evidence adduced on record by the complainant, could not be shattered by
the accused.
Having scanned pleadings as well as evidence adduced on
13.
record
by
the
complainant,
this
court
finds
that
complainant
successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act.
Similarly, factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by
the accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established
on record.
14.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in
view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the Courts
below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by
Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath
Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein
it has been held as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine
the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order.
In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But
the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an
appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the
High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal,
unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court
which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”
15.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/
incorrectness committed by inferior criminal Court in its judicial process or
illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused
has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the Courts
below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the Courts
below.
16.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no reason
to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the Courts below,
which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence
available on record and as such, same are upheld.
17.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender before the
learned trial Court within 15 days to serve the sentence as awarded by the
learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands
vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. Bail bonds, if
any, furnished by the accused are cancelled.
18.
Amount, if any, lying deposited by the accused with the
learned trial Court as well as Registry of this court is ordered to be
released in favour of complainant by remitting the same in its bank
account, detail whereof, shall be furnished within a period of one week.
March 31, 2026
(sunil)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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