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Serial No. 2, 3, 4
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
AB No. 15 of 2023 with
AB No. 16 of 2023
AB No. 17 of 2023
Date of Decision: 11.08.2023
Shri. Labenn Ch Marak
Shri. Balkarin Ch Marak
Smti. Bernita R. Marak
Vs.
Vs.
Vs.
State of Meghalaya
State of Meghalaya
State of Meghalaya
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. S. Deb, Adv.
: Mr. A. Kumar, AG with
Mr. S. Syngkon, GA
Ms. A. Thungwa, GA
Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, Addl. Sr. GA
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
C O M M O N J UD G M E N T
1.
Separate applications under section 438 Cr.P.C for grant of
anticipatory bail was filed by the three petitioners herein. Since the facts
and circumstances involved relates to the same FIR dated 25.07.2023 filed
by UBI Bitching N. Marak, Circle Inspector (Sadar), West Garo Hills
District out of which, Araimile P.S. Case No. 16(07) 2023 under sections
120B/121/121A/188/307/326/353/435/511/143/147/148/149/150/153/153A
/155/158/34 IPC read with section 13 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act and section 6A/6B/8A/8B of Meghalaya (Maintenance of Public
Order) Act and section 3/4 of Prevention to Damage to Public Property Act
and a common argument being advanced in all three applications,
therefore, this Court would deemed it expedient and convenient to pass a
common order herein.
2.
Heard Mr. S. Deb, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. A.
Kumar, learned Advocate General (AG) along with Mr. N. Syngkon,
learned GA.
3.
Before adverting to the submission and contention made by the
parties, the background details of the case are required to be briefly
recorded. On 05.07.2023 Shri. Thomas M. Marak, President Krima Council
ACHIK sought the permission of the Deputy Commissioner, West Garo
Hills District to hold a peaceful democratic demonstration in the form of a
hunger strike imploring upon the Government to accede to their various
demands, implementation of the reservation roster being one of them. The
Deputy Commissioner vide order dated 10.07.2023 has allowed such
demonstration to be staged on certain terms and conditions.
4.
In course of the said demonstration, the Organizers of the same,
requested the presence of the Hon’ble Chief Minister to allow them to
place their demands before him and accordingly the visit of the Hon’ble
Chief Minister along with other dignitaries were scheduled to be held on
24.07.2023
5.
The Hon’ble Chief Minister along with the Hon’ble MLA,
Williamnagar, the Deputy Commissioner and other officials accordingly
met the ACHIK leaders and other leaders of the NGOs who had
participated in the said demonstration at the Mini Secretariat building,
Tura.
6.
Unfortunately, during the said meeting an untoward incident
occurred wherein some persons who were part of a large group of
protestors who had converged outside the venue of the meeting started to
raise slogans and resorted to stone pelting and assault, as a result of which
the situation went out of control and a number of persons, including police
personnel were injured. It is said that about 18 police, Home Guards and
CRPF personnel sustained injuries in the said incident and about 20
Government and private vehicle were also damaged and burned, with many
doors and windows of the Mini Secretariat being damaged. Fortunately, the
Hon’ble Chief Minister and other Government Officials were unharmed.
7.
In view of such developments involving a crowd of about 500 or so
the said FIR was lodged and the said Araimile P.S. Case No. 16(07) 2023
was registered. In course of investigation, initially, the police arrested about
18 suspects.
8.
Mr. S. Deb, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the
petitioners are not at all involved in the incident though they were present
at the place of occurrence on the said date. In fact, the petitioner Shri.
Labenn Ch Marak, who is a senior leader of the ACHIK, as well as the
petitioner Shri. Balkarin Ch Marak, who is the Co-Chairman of GHSMC
and Smti. Bernita R. Marak, who is the General Secretary, ACHIK were in
the company of the Hon’ble Chief Minister when the incident took place
and as such, they could not have been involved in what happened outside
the building.
9.
However, the petitioners came to know from credible sources that it
was alleged that they were the actual conspirators of the said incident for
which reason the police have started looking for them, apparently to arrest
them in this connection. Being apprehensive of the likelihood of arrest, the
petitioners have accordingly approached this Court with these instant
applications for grant of anticipatory bail.
10.
The learned counsel for the petitioners has again submitted that apart
from the number of offences under the Indian Penal Code, the inclusion of
the provision of section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 and on prayer by the I/O, two days after the filing of these
applications, for inclusion of section 15(1)(b)/16 of the said Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act in the case against the petitioners herein and
others was only made to harass the petitioners and to curtail their personal
liberty as enshrined in the Constitution of India under Article 21.
11.
The learned counsel went on to submit that as far as unlawful
assembly is concerned, it cannot be said that the petitioners have taken part
in such an assembly when the demonstration that they were part of was
conducted peacefully and that too, on being given due permission by the
District Administration. Therefore, there being no prima facie evidence
against the petitioners, even if this fact is to be established, if the petitioners
have been arrested for which the provision of section 43D(5) and the
proviso thereto would be applicable. However, even in an application for
grant of anticipatory bail, if no prima facie evidence is found against the
petitioners, they are entitled to be enlarged on bail in the event of their
arrest. In this connection, the case of Anand Teltumde v. The State of
Maharashtra & Ors.; (2021) 12 SCC 125, wherein at para 2 of the same the
Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with a case for grant of anticipatory bail
under section 438 Cr.P.C vis-à-vis section 43D(4) of the UAP Act, has, in
other words, held that if a prima facie case is made out, the provision of
section 43D(4) will be applicable, which means that if no prima facie case
is made out, an application under section 43D(4) will not be applicable.
12.
It is, therefore, prayed that this Court may be pleased to allow these
applications and to direct for release of the petitioners in the event of their
arrest in connection with the aforementioned Araimile P.S. Case No.
16(07) 2023.
13.
On the other hand, the learned AG submitting for the State
respondent has submitted that the magnitude of what has happened on
24.07.2023, especially involving high dignitaries no less than the Hon’ble
Chief Minister, such incident would indeed qualify as an ‘unlawful
activity’ coming within the definition as found under section 2(o) of the
UAP Act. The punishment for such unlawful activities would therefore be
under section 13 of the said Act. Again, such act has threatened the unity,
integrity and security of the State and is also to attempt to cause death of
any public functionary, section 15(1)(b)/16 are also justified in their
application to the case of the prosecution.
14.
In this backdrop, the applications of the petitioners for grant of
anticipatory bail cannot be considered in view of the bar under section
43D(4) of the UAP Act, 1967 further submits the learned AG. In support of
this contention, the case of Ahammedkutty Pothiyil Thottiparambil v.
Union of India; 2023 SCC Online Ker 5501, para 3, 7, 12, 16, 17 and 18
was referred to.
15.
The learned AG has also referred to the contents of the case diary to
say that the I/O had affirmatively indicated that the petitioners are very
much present on the said day, that is, on 24.07.2023 at the Mini Secretariat
building and there are also statements made by witnesses who have stated
that they were instigated by the petitioners to protest at the said venue.
Therefore, in view of the above, the learned AG has submitted that this is
not a fit case for exercise of powers of this Court under section 438 Cr.P.C.
16.
The submission and contention made by the parties have been duly
noted by this Court and facts as detailed above need not be repeated, except
if so required.
17.
Under the facts and circumstances of what has happened on
24.07.2023 and the consequent registering of the police case, investigation
is still going on. The I/O in his wisdom has thought it fit that the incident
apart from being violent in nature, the presence of the Hon’ble Chief
Minister and other dignitaries and obviously being the target of the mob’s
ire, on being instigated by the petitioners herein and others who have taken
part in the said violent action, therefore, a case under the UAP Act, 1967,
apart from the penal provisions under the IPC has been made out.
18.
From the contents of the case diary, it is found that the involvement
of the petitioners in the case has been referred to by some witnesses,
however as to the exact role or involvement of the petitioners in the said
incident, the I/O has not been able to detail the same. Be that as it may,
considering the fact that the nature of the offence is serious and grave, at
this juncture this Court cannot interfere with the process of investigation.
19.
Given the fact that section 13 of the UAP Act have been included in
the case with section 15(1)(b)/16 sought to be added, the applications under
section 438 Cr.P.C preferred by the petitioners have to be considered in the
light of the provisions of the UAP Act, section 43D(4) being the relevant
provision.
20.
It would be profitable to bring out the provision of section 43D(4)
for a clear picture of what is required to be looked into, the same reads as
follows:
“43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code.–
…
(4) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any
case involving the arrest of any person accused of having committed
an offence punishable under this Act.”
21.
On the applicability of section 43D(4) of the said UAP Act, the case
of Ahammedkutty Pothiyil Thottiparambil (supra) cited by the prosecution
would have persuasive value which this Court also respectfully agrees to.
Relevant portions of the said judgment are reproduced herein below:
“12. After the matter was heard and reserved for orders, the learned
Deputy Solicitor General of Inia has brought to the notice of this
court, the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Anand
Teltummde v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 1692, in
which an application preferred by an accused in a case registered
under the UAP Act for anticipatory bail has been dismissed as not
maintainable, rejecting the identical argument put forward by the
learned counsel for the appellant that the exclusion of the
application of Section 438 of the Code to the offences punishable
under the UAP Act is not absolute. The learned Deputy Solicitor
General of India submitted that the said decision has been affirmed
by the Apex Court in Anand Teltumde v. State of Maharashtra,
(2021) 12 SCC 125.
16. As evident from the extracted provisions, sub-section (4) of
Section 43D is the provision excluding the application of Section 438
of the Code to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of
having committed an offence punishable under the UAP Act….
17. …If the scheme of the UAP Act is that no person accused of an
offence punishable under chapter IV and VI of the UAP Act shall be
released on bail unless the twin conditions referred to in sub-section
(5) of Section 43D are satisfied, there cannot be any doubt that the
Statute does not contemplate grant of anticipatory bail to accused
under any circumstance whatsoever, for if the provision is
interpreted to hold that the Statute does not bar absolutely the
application of Section 438 of the Code, in the absence of any
restriction in the Statute in the matter of granting anticipatory bail, it
would lead to an anomalous and absurd position that anticipatory
bail can be granted to a person accused of an offence punishable
under the UAP Act unconditionally and restrictions would apply only
in the matter of claiming regular bail. Needless to say, the exclusion
of the application of Section 438 of the Code to any case involving
any person accused of having committed an offence punishable
under the UAP Act is absolute. We take this view also for the reason
that the right to seek anticipatory bail is not part of the fundamental
right guaranteed to the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Having regard to the present dimension and impact of international
terrorism on civil society, the UAP Act being a Statute intended for
the prevention of, and for coping with terrorist activities, we are also
of the view that the Statute is framed excluding the application of
Section 438 of the Code to the offences punishable under the UAP
Act, consciously. Needles to say, an application for anticipatory bail
is not maintainable in respect of offences punishable under the UAP
Act.”
22.
In response to the reliance of the petitioners on the case of Anand
Teltumde(supra), this Court would again agree with what has been observed
in the case of Ahammedkutty Pothiyil Thottiparambil (supra) at para 18 of
the same which also reads as follows:
“18. As pointed out by the learned Deputy Solicitor General of India,
identical view is taken by the High Court of Bombay also in Anand
Teltumde and the decision in the said case has been affirmed by the
Apex Court in the case of Anand Teltumde v. State of Maharashtra.
We do not find any merit in the argument advanced by the learned
counsel for the appellant based on the observations made by the
Apex Court in paragraph 2 of the judgment in the said case, for the
Apex Court in terms of the said judgment affirmed the view taken by
the Bombay High Court that the application for anticipatory bail
preferred by the accused involved in that case, in not maintainable.
There is also no merit in the argument advanced by the learned
counsel for the appellant based on the decision of this Court in
Jayarajan P., for this court has not considered in that case the
question whether the exclusion of the application of Section 438 of
the Code to the offences punishable under UAP Act is absolute.”
23.
In conclusion, when there is an express bar under section 43D(4) of
the UAP Act, these applications under section 438 Cr.P.C cannot be
maintained. The same are hereby rejected.
24.
Registry to send back the case diary.
25.
Petitions disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
11.08.2023
“Tiprilynti–PS”
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