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2026:JHHC:19809-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 355 of 2026
Barun Prasad Singh, S/o Late Muneshwar Prasad Singh, R/o
Mohalla-Gangajal, Ward No. 16, PO & PS-Saharsa, DistrictSaharsa, Bihar
...
...
Appellant
Versus
1. Central Bank of India through its Chairman-cum-Managing
Director, having its registered office at Chandramukhi,
Nariman Point, PO-Nariman Point, PS-Colaba, Mumbai,
Maharashtra
2. General Manager, H.R.D, Central Bank of India, office at 17th
Floor Chandramukhi, Nariman Point, PO-Nariman Point, PSColaba, Mumbai, Maharashtra
3. Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India, having office at 2nd
Floor, Block-B, Maurya Complex, Dakbunglow Road, Patna,
Bihar
4. Regional Manager, Central Bank of India, having office at 2nd
Floor, Krishna Arcade, H.B. Road, Dipatoli, Booty More, PO &
PS-Bariatu, Ranchi
5. Assistant General Manager, Central Bank of India, Regional
Office, Jatinchand Road, Lalpur Chowk, Ranchi
6. Branch Manager, Central Bank of India, TELCO Town Branch,
having its office at Red Carpet Service Station, Jamshedpur,
PO & PS-Telco, District-East Singhbhum
...
…
Respondents
----CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
----For the Appellant
: Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondents
: Mr. P.A.S. Pati, Advocate
----Order No. 02
Dated: 06.07.2026
1.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2.
This appeal challenges the learned Single Judge’s order
dated 27.11.2025 dismissing the appellant’s/writ petitioner’s
W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019.
3.
In this case, the appellant/writ petitioner, who was an officer
with the Central Bank of India, applied for premature
retirement under Voluntary Retirement Scheme (V.R.S) by
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
his application dated 27.06.2007. This was rejected by the
Bank vide letter dated 08.09.2007 on the ground that there
was no V.R.S scheme in vogue at that time.
4.
Further, this communication also said that the appellant’s
application dated 27.06.2007 was treated as one for
“premature retirement” in terms of Clause 19.7 of the
Officer Service Regulation (OSR). However, the petitioner
was ineligible for “premature retirement” as per Clause 19.7
of the OSR because he had neither attained the age of 55
years nor had completed 30 years of service as an officer.
5.
The appellant, without challenging the communication dated
08.09.2007 rejecting his application for voluntary or
premature retirement, proceeded to tender his resignation
vide letter dated 24.11.2007, though the resignation was
made effective from 21.07.2008.
6.
The Bank, by its communication dated 12.07.2008, accepted
the petitioner’s resignation from the date he indicated and
relieved him from service on 21.07.2008. The petitioner was
informed that this was in accordance with Regulation 20.2 of
the OSR.
7.
For almost 8 years, the petitioner did not bother to
challenge either the letter dated 08.09.2007 rejecting his
application for voluntary or premature retirement or the
communication dated 12.07.2008 by which his resignation
was accepted, effective from the date indicated by him, i.e.,
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
21.07.2008.
8.
After eight long years, the petitioner instituted C.W.J.C. No.
1700/2016 in the Patna High Court; however, the same was
dismissed vide order dated 22.09.2016 for want of territorial
jurisdiction.
9.
The petitioner then instituted W.P.(S) No. 7299/2016 before
this Court seeking the following relief:
“That by the instant application the petitioner
above named prays for the issuance of an
appropriate
writ(s)/
order(s)/
direction(s)
commanding upon the respondents to forthwith
fix the retirement benefits of the petitioner who
worked
as
the
Manager
MMG-2
(Middle
Management Grade-2). Having joined the service
on 30.12.1978, with a further direction on the
respondents to pay to him his arrears of pension
and other retiral dues with interest.”
10. Significantly, even in W.P.(S) No. 7299 of 2016, the
petitioner neither challenged the communication dated
08.09.2007 by which his application for voluntary/premature
retirement was rejected, nor the communication dated
12.07.2008 by which his resignation was accepted and he
was relieved with effect from 21.07.2008. The only relief
was to forthwith fix the retirement benefits of the appellant
and to pay him the arrears of pension and other retiral dues
with interest.
11. W.P.(S) No. 7299 of 2016 was dismissed by the learned
Single Judge of this Court (Hon’ble Mr Justice Shree
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
Chandrashekhar, as His Lordship then was) by observing
thus,
“1.
The petitioner’s resignation was accepted
on 21.07.2008. It is admitted at Bar that scheme
for pension was brought into existence in the
year, 2010 and the employees should have opted
for pension under the scheme provided they
were in service as on the date of application. Not
only that, to a pointed query of the Court the
learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to
indicate whether an application opting pension
under 2010 scheme was made.
2.
The respondents have pleaded that all
admissible post-retiral benefits including gratuity
have been paid to the petitioner.
3.
In the aforesaid facts, finding no merit in
the writ petition, it is dismissed.”
12. The appellant instituted L.P.A No. 444 of 2017 against the
learned Single Judge’s order dated 14.07.2017. This time, in
appeal, however, the appellant tried to make out a
completely different case by referring to the pension scheme
brought into existence in 2010 and relying upon the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shashikala
Devi Vs. Central Bank of India & Ors., (2014) 16 SCC
260. The appellant also urged that under Rules 14 and 29
of
the
Central
Bank
of
India
(Employees’)
Pension
Regulations, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “Regulations,
1995”), he was entitled to pensionary benefits.
13. The Division Bench held that it did not consider it necessary
to interfere with the learned Single Judge's reasoning in
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
dismissing the appellant’s writ petition. However, the
Division Bench, considering the new materials brought by
the appellant at the appellate stage, disposed of the appeal
giving liberty to the appellant to apply afresh before the
appropriate forum. The appellant, in pursuance of such
liberty, filed a representation with the Bank on 21.01.2019,
and because the same was not disposed of, instituted
W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019 in which the impugned order dated
27.11.2025 came to be passed.
14. In W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019, the appellant/writ petitioner, for
the first time, sought for the following reliefs:
“(A) For quashing of letter dated 08.09.2007 as
contained
in
ref.
no.
RO/HRD/07-08/843
(Annexure-3), issued under the signature of the
Assistant General Manager to the Branch Office,
Telco Town, Central Bank of India, whereby and
whereunder application of the petitioner for
Voluntary
Retirement
Application
dated
27.06.2007 has not been considered under the
Central Bank of India (Employees’) Pension
Regulations, 1995 and treated it as application
for premature retirement;”
(B) For quashing of letter dated 20.09.2007
(Annexure-4), issued under the signature of
Senior Manager, Central Bank of India, Telco
Branch,
whereby
the
petitioner
has
been
informed that his application for voluntary
retirement has been returned by the Regional
Office as he has not completed 55 years of age
or has not completed 30 years of service;
(C) For a direction upon the respondents to
forthwith fix the pension of the petitioner since
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
21.07.2008 when the petitioner’s resignation has
been accepted, release arrears of pension with
all consequential benefits with statutory interest
pursuant to Regulations 14 and 29 of the Central
Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations,
1995.
15. The learned Single Judge, by a detailed order dated
27.11.2025, dismissed W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019 against
which the appellant has instituted the present Letters Patent
Appeal.
16. Mr Rajesh Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant,
submitted that the learned Division Bench, vide order dated
02.01.2019, while disposing of L.P.A. No. 444 of 2017 had
given the appellant liberty to apply afresh before the
appropriate forum. He, however, submitted that under this
liberty, it was open to the appellant to rely on fresh material
in the form of the 2010 Scheme/Settlement and the law laid
down in the case of Shashikala Devi (supra).
17. Mr Rajesh Kumar submitted that in terms of this fresh
material, the appellant was neither entitled to seek quashing
of letter dated 08.09.2007 by which the appellant’s
application for voluntary/premature retirement was rejected
and also, the letter dated 20.09.2007 by which the appellant
was informed that his application for voluntary retirement
has been returned by the regional office since he had not
attained the age of 55 years or completed 30 years of
service.
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
18. Mr. Rajesh Kumar submitted that under the very same
liberty referred to above, the appellant was also entitled to
urge that consequent upon the acceptance of his resignation
w.e.f. 21.07.2008, he was entitled to pension under
regulations 14 and 29 of the Regulations, 1995 and for a
direction for release and payment of such arrears of pension
with statutory interest.
19. Mr. Rajesh Kumar submitted that the decision in the case of
Shashikala Devi (supra) entirely supports the case of the
appellant. Further, given the liberty granted to the appellant,
learned Single Judge could not have dismissed the
appellant’s writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019 on
the ground of delay and laches.
20. Mr. Rajesh Kumar submitted that for the above reasons, the
impugned order dated 27.11.2025 dismissing W.P.(S) No.
934 of 2019 warrants interference.
21. Mr. P.A.S. Pati, the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank,
defended the impugned order based on the reasons set out
therein. He pointed out that W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019 was
barred by inordinate delay and laches, as well as by the
principles of res judicata and/or constructive res judicata.
22. Mr Pati submitted that reliance on the case of Shashikala
Devi (supra) was misplaced as in that matter, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court had not dealt with the regulations applicable
to officers like the appellant. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
Court was concerned with the case of a peon who had
completed 34 years of service and who, instead of applying
for voluntary retirement, mistakenly applied to resign from
service.
23. Mr Pati submitted that, in the present case, the appellant
was an officer governed by the OSR, 1979, and that he had
initially applied for voluntary/premature retirement and,
upon its rejection, made a single application to resign with
prospective effect. Mr Pati further pointed out that, in the
case of LIC Vs. Shree Lal Meena, (2019) 4 SCC 479,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the context of the decision in
Shashikala Devi (supra), held that the pension scheme,
though it should be construed as beneficial legislation,
cannot be dealt with on a charitable principle.
24. Accordingly, Mr. Pati submitted that this appeal may be
dismissed.
25. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.
26. At the very outset, we have discussed the facts and list of
dates as applicable in this appeal.
27. In W.P.(S) No. 934 of 2019, in which the impugned order
dated 27.11.2025 has been made, the appellant/writ
petitioner has sought to challenge, practically after 12 years
of the communications of 2007 and 2008, by which his
applications for voluntary/premature retirement or for
acceptance of his resignation request w.e.f. 21.07.2008 were
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
rejected. There is no explanation, or in any event no
sufficient explanation, for this inordinate delay of over 12
years in raising such challenges. Rather, the material on
record shows that the appellant accepted the position
arising out of the 2007-2008 communications and, belatedly,
still tried to make out the case that, notwithstanding such
communications, he was entitled to certain pensionary
benefits under the Regulations, 1995.
28. The record shows that the appellant, for the first time,
instituted petitions in 2016, first before the Patna High Court
and then this High Court regarding his predicament. Even in
those petitions, there were no challenges to the 2007-2008
communications which are now sought to be challenged
after almost 12 years. All that the appellant sought for was
some pensionary benefits based upon his interpretation of
the Regulations, 1995.
29. The learned Single Judge, by order dated 14.07.2017 in
W.P.(S) No. 7299 of 2016 as quoted above, held that the
appellant/writ petitioner was not entitled to any pensionary
benefits based upon the Regulations or Scheme which
entered force in 2010, long after the appellant was no
longer in service with the Bank.
30. This decision of the learned Single Judge was specifically
approved by the Division Bench in its order dated
02.01.2019 in L.P.A. No. 444 of 2017. By this order, however,
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
liberty was given to the appellant to apply afresh before the
appropriate forum because he claimed to have come up with
“new materials” and had tried to make out a case which was
completely different from the one pleaded by the appellant
in W.P.(S) No. 7299 of 2016.
31. Now, liberty cannot be construed as carte blanche to raise
the same old issues by trying to pass them off as new
material. The learned counsel for the appellant contended
that the new material comprised Regulations 14 and 29 of
the Regulations, 1995 and 2010 Settlement, by which the
pension scheme was introduced, and the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shashikala Devi
(supra). We note that the Regulations, 1995, were already
in force when the appellant instituted his belated W.P.(S) No.
7299 of 2016. Similarly, even the decision in the case of
Shashikala Devi (supra), assuming it could be called
“new material”, was delivered in 2014. Therefore, the only
so-called “new material” was the 2010 Settlement Scheme.
32. The argument regarding the 2010 Settlement Scheme was
specifically raised by the appellant before the learned Single
Judge in W.P.(S) No. 7299 of 2016, and the same was
expressly rejected. The learned Single Judge, in fact, noted
that the learned counsel for the appellant was unable to
indicate whether the appellant had ever made an application
opting for a pension under the 2010 Scheme. The learned
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
Single Judge also noted that it was admitted at Bar that the
pension scheme was introduced only in the year 2010, and
that employees should have opted for pension under the
scheme, provided they were in service as on the date of
application.
33. Admittedly, the appellant was not even in the service of the
Bank in the year 2010, when the pension scheme came into
force. Therefore, by misconstruing the liberty granted by the
Division Bench in its order dated 02.01.2019 and ignoring
the rules of res judicata or in any event constructive res
judicata, the appellant could not have filed W.P.(S) No. 934
of 2019 to belatedly challenge the communications of 2007
and 2008 by which his application for voluntary/premature
retirement came to be rejected, or communications by which
he was denied any pension despite the acceptance of his
resignation w.e.f. 21.07.2008.
34. Even if inordinate delay and laches, or the principle of
constructive res judicata, which is applicable to the present
case, are to be ignored on demurrer, the appellant is still
unable to specify to us the errors, if any, in the
communications dated 08.09.2007 or 20.09.2007. The
communication dated 08.09.2007 informed the appellant
that there was no scheme for voluntary retirement and even
in terms of the rules for premature retirement, the appellant
was ineligible as he had not completed 55 years of age or
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
30 years of service. This decision was entirely consistent
with OSR, 1979.
35. Incidentally, in the case of Shashikala Devi (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court was not concerned with OSR, 1979,
but was dealing with the rules applicable to Class-IV
employees, which were governed by different regulations
and schemes. On facts as well, the peon, who was involved
in the case of Shashikala Devi (supra), had put in 34
years of service at the time when he applied for resignation
by confusing it with voluntary retirement.
36. The case of Shashikala Devi (supra) runs on its own
facts which are not comparable with the facts of the
appellant’s case. As noted earlier, the appellant was an
officer governed by OSR, 1979, in contrast with the peon in
Shashikala Devi’s case who was governed by different
regulations. Further, the peon had put in 34 years of service
and was otherwise eligible for the benefits of voluntary
retirement, which was not the case with the appellant
herein.
37. Further, we also note that in the case of LIC Vs. Shree Lal
Meena (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the specific
context of Shashikala Devi’s case, has observed that such
issue cannot be dealt with on a charity principle. When the
legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain beneficial
provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
particular date and on particular terms and conditions,
aspects which are excluded cannot be included in it by
implication. The provisions will have to be read as they read
unless there is some confusion or they are capable of
another interpretation.
38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that when framing such
schemes, an important aspect is their financial implications.
These implications affect both the employees (contributors)
and the State. Thus, it would be inadvisable to expand such
beneficial schemes beyond their contours and to extend
them to employees for whom they were not intended by the
legislature.
39. The learned Single Judge has also drawn out the distinction
between resignation and voluntary retirement by relying
upon several decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In this
case, the appellant was aware of the distinction because
first, he made an application for voluntary retirement and
upon its rejection, without challenging such rejection,
specifically applied for relief to resign services with a
prospective date. Even after the resignation was accepted,
the appellant’s only contention was that he was entitled to
pensionary benefits. Even this contention was never made
good in the petitions filed by the appellant. The learned
Single Judge has considered the matter in substantial detail,
and we detect no error in the reasoning or in the findings of
2026:JHHC:19809-DB
fact which are mostly indisputable.
40. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal, though, without any
order for costs.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
July 06, 2026
Manish/Ritesh
A.F.R.
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