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Serial No. 05
Supp. List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
CRP. No. 9 of 2020
Date of Decision: 12.08.2022
___________________________________________________________
Smti. Banisha Tariang
Vs.
The District Collector, West Jaintia
Hills District & Anr.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.S.Thangkhiew, Judge.
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. J.Shylla, Adv. with
Mr. M.L.Nongpiur, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. V.K.Jindal, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. V.Kumar, Adv. for R 2.
i)
ii)
:
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc:
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
The instant Civil Revision Petition is directed against the impugned
orders dated 13-12-2019 and 19-12-2019, passed by the Court of the
Special Judicial Officer, West Jaintia Hills District, Jowai, dismissing the
condonation and substitution applications filed by the petitioner and
thereafter disposing of the main LA. (J) Case No. 54 of 2015 on the ground
of abatement on the death of the claimant.
2.
The brief facts of the case is that by Notification No. RDA.
34/81/378 dated 28-01-1999, under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, the Government of Meghalaya notified that the land of the
petitioner’s father (L) M.J. Garod and others was needed by the respondent
No. 2 for construction of the Kupli Hydel Project at Saphai Village, Elaka
Raliang, Jaintia Hills District. Thereafter, after subsequent notification
under the Act, the petitioner’s father was called upon to receive the
compensation for the acquired land of 1750 sq.mtrs. and 1000 sq.mtrs.
amounting to Rs. 37,159/- and Rs. 21,234/- respectively. The petitioner’s
father accepted the compensation amount along with other land owners
under protest and filed applications under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 for reference to court for enhancement. Thereafter,
on the reference being made, the petitioner’s father filed his claim petition
in the year 2015, before the court of the Special Judicial Officer,
Meghalaya, Shillong. The said claim petition, on the separation of the
Judiciary from the Executive in West Jaintia Hills District, was transferred
to the court of Special Judicial Officer, West Jaintia Hills District, Jowai,
and was renumbered as LA. (J) Case No. 54 of 2015. The petitioner’s father
expired on 01-02-2010, and the petitioner at that point of time had no
knowledge of the pendency of the land acquisition case, and became aware
of the same, only after she received a notice dated 21-08-2018, whereafter,
she filed a substitution application before the court on 12-11-2018. As there
was a delay of 3117 days in filing the substitution application, the petitioner
also filed a condonation application which was registered as Misc. Case
No. 30 of 2018.
3.
The respondent No. 2 to these applications for substitution and
condonation, filed a show cause primarily on the ground that Section 53 of
the LA Act, 1894, provided that the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure would be applicable to the proceedings before the Special
Judicial Officer and as such, it was contended that the substitution
application would have to be filed within the stipulated period of 90 days,
and the same not having been done so, the suit had abated.
4.
The learned court below then vide the impugned order dated 13-12-
2019, dismissed the application on the ground that it was not satisfied with
the reasons given by the petitioner and thereafter, subsequently, vide the
impugned order dated 19-12-2019, disposed of the main case being LA (J)
Case. No. 54 of 2015, on the ground that the case had abated on the death
of the claimant. The petitioner being aggrieved is therefore before this
Court by way of the instant revision application.
5.
It has been contended by Mr. J. Shylla, learned counsel for the
petitioner that the learned court below failed to appreciate that proceedings
under the LA Act, 1894, is not a suit and that it cannot abate. Learned
counsel refers to the judgment passed in Abdul Karim vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh reported in AIR 1964 MP 171, which he submits was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Khazan Singh vs. Union of India, reported in (2002)
2 SCC 242. It was also submitted by the learned counsel that the Limitation
Act is not applicable to proceedings under the LA Act, 1894, and reference
has been made to the judgment of Alihusain Abbashbhai & Ors. vs.
Collector, Panch Mahals of the Gujarat High Court, reported in AIR
1967 Guj 118. It has been further argued that the petitioner had no
knowledge about the pendency of the case until receipt of notice dated 1410-2019, and that the learned court below failed to appreciate that the
respondents never filed any show cause objecting to the substitution and
condonation applications on the lack of sufficient cause, but had only filed
objections on technical issues dealing with abatement.
6.
In continuation of his arguments, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that the learned court below failed to appreciate
that only a meagre amount had been paid as compensation for the land
depriving the heirs of valuable property, and had lost sight of the fact that
the LA Act, 1894, is a socially beneficial Act and thus, must be construed
and interpreted liberally to protect the rights of claimants whose lands have
been acquired. He then closes his submissions by praying that the
impugned orders be set aside and allow the legal heirs of the claimants to
be substituted so that they may pursue their rightful claims.
7.
Mr. V.K. Jindal, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. V. Kumar,
learned counsel for the respondents submits that Order 22 Rule 9 (3) of the
CPC has to be taken into consideration in the instant case, inasmuch as, it
clearly stipulates that the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877
(now the Limitation Act, 1963) shall apply. Thus, he submits as Section 53
of the LA Act, 1894, has made the CPC applicable to proceedings under
the LA Act, 1894, by application thereof, there is no question as to why the
Limitation Act should not apply. Learned Senior counsel submits Order 22
Rule 9 (3) was inserted by Amendment Act of 1976 with effect from 0102-1977, and the judgments relied upon namely, Abdul Karim (supra) and
Alihusain Abbasbhai (supra) being judgments prior to the amendment of
the CPC will have no application. However, he fairly concedes that a
reference once made must be answered. He therefore submits that the no
interference is called for with the impugned orders.
8.
The issues in the instant Civil Revision application being limited to
the question as to whether the claimant for compensation must be deemed
to be a plaintiff in view of Section 53 of the LA Act, 1894, which makes
the CPC applicable to the proceedings under Section 18 of the LA Act,
1894, will directly be dealt with by this Court without alluding any further
to the other facts and circumstances of the case.
9.
Section 53 of the LA Act, 1894, stipulates that the Code of Civil
Procedure is to apply to proceedings under the LA Act, 1894 and reads as
follows:
“53. Code of Civil Procedure to apply to proceedings
before Court – Save in so far as they may be
inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), shall apply to all proceedings before the Court
under this Act.”
In a proceeding under Section 18 and on a plain reading of Section
53, it appears that, Order 22 of the CPC would ordinarily be applicable, to
bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased claimant. Should
the application under Order 22 be time barred, it would necessarily also
require that an application for condonation be filed in terms of the
Limitation Act, 1963. The issue as to whether a proceeding under Section
18 of the LA Act, 1894, is to strictly follow the rigours of the CPC and
whether a claim petition can abate, therefore comes into question.
10.
To address the above noted proposition, notwithstanding Order 22
Rule 9 (3) which was inserted by Amendment Act of 1976 with effect from
01-02-1977, reference can be made to the judgment of Abdul Karim vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (1966) ILR Madhya Pradesh Series
page 237 (AIR 1964 MP 171). In this judgment, the issues raised in the
present petition have been addressed in detail and in the view of this Court,
still constitutes good law. The relevant paragraphs are quoted herein below:
“The sole question that arises for determination
in this appeal is whether when a reference is made
under Section 18 at the instance of a person
interested, who has not accepted the award made by
the Land Acquisition Officer, it can abate
subsequently if the person interested dies and his legal
representatives do not apply for being brought on
record. Put briefly, the question to consider is whether
Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure and articles
171 and 176 of the Limitation Act apply to
proceedings under section 18 of the Act. Now, there
can be no doubt that Order 22 in terms applies only to
suits and appeals, the trial and hearing of which are
regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. The word
"suit'' has not been defined in the Code of Civil
Procedure. But, as has been held by the Privy Council
in Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun M.E.T. Co. Ltd. (1),
the word "suit" ordinarily means, and apart from
some context must be taken to mean, a civil
proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint.
The Privy Council case no doubt related to the
meaning of the word “suit” as used in the Limitation
Act. But that definition is very much in point here as
the question whether a suit has or has not abated
under Order 22, Rule 4, must be decided with
reference to the fact whether an application for
bringing on record the legal representatives of the
deceased plaintiff was or was not made within the time
prescribed by article 176 of the Limitation Act. It is
thus clear that for the purpose of Order 22 a "suit"
must be taken as one meaning a suit instituted by the
presentation of a plaint as laid down in the
Explanation to Section 3 of the Limitation Act.
It is obvious enough that reference
proceedings under section 18 are not suit
proceedings. An application for reference
under section 18 is not made by the person interested
to the Court but to the Collector asking him to make a
reference to the Court. The reference is made not by
the party but by the Collector albeit at the instance of
the party. If the reference proceedings had been suit
proceedings, then there would have been no necessity
of inserting in the Act section 53 laying down that
"Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with
anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings
before the Court under this Act." So also there would
have been no need to create the fiction embodied
in section 26(2) that an award made under section
18 shall be deemed to be a decree within the meaning
of section 2, clause (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
If the proceedings under section 18 of the Act had
been proceedings in a suit, then the Code of Civil
Procedure would have applied automatically and the
award under that provision would have been even
without the aid of fiction a decree within the meaning
of section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is
noteworthy that section 53 of the Act has not the effect
of making "all proceedings before the Court under
the Act suit proceedings". All that it does is to apply
to the proceedings before the Court under the Act the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure unless any
of the provisions is "inconsistent with anything
contained in the Act". It is one thing to say that the
Code of Civil Procedure will apply to the proceedings
under the Act and very much another to say that they
are suit proceedings and consequently the Code of
Civil Procedure will apply to them. Section 53 cannot
be read as creating a fiction for deeming "proceedings
before the Court under the Act" as proceedings in any
suit. It is thus plain that Order 22 of the Code of Civil
Procedure cannot be applied to proceedings
under section 18 of the Act taking those proceedings
as suit proceedings in reality or fictionally under the
Code of Civil Procedure. Its applicability to
proceedings under section 18 of the Act can only be
by virtue of section 53 and subject to the limitation
contained in that section. The limitation is that the
provision of the Code of Civil Procedure intended to
be applied must not be inconsistent with anything
contained in the Act. For the purpose of inconsistency
it is not necessary that there should be an express
provision to the contrary in the Act itself. It would be
enough if the applicability of a provision of the Code
of Civil Procedure to any proceedings before the
Court under the Act would be incompatible with the
nature of the proceedings.
The decision, therefore, of the question whether
Order 22 can be applied to proceedings under section
18 of the Act must depend on the construction and
proper
understanding
of
the
proceedings
under section 18 and of the scope of the proceedings.
In this connection, the first material provision to
notice is section 12 which says of an award made by
the Land Acquisition Officer that "such award shall
be filed in the Collector's office and shall, except as
hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive
evidence, as between the Collector and the persons
interested,....." The finality of the award is destroyed
when a reference under section 18 is made. Once
there is a proper reference under section 18 before the
Court, the final order made by the Court on the
reference is the award, no matter whether by the
decision of the Court the claimant has been given an
additional amount of compensation or given no
additional amount or whether the Acquisition
Officer's award is upheld or not upheld for some other
reason. As has been said in Assistant Development
Officer, Trombay v. Tayaballi (1), the acquiring
officer's award is strictly speaking not an award at all
but an offer. If his award is not accepted and the
matter is taken to Court by way of a reference
under section 18, then the final award is the one made
by the Court. Once a reference is made, the Court is
required under section 20 of the Act to give notice of
the hearing of the objections to the award made by the
Land Acquisition Officer, inter alia, to the person at
whose instance the reference has been made and to all
persons interested in the objection, except to those
who have consented to receive the payment of
compensation awarded without any protest. Sections
21, 22 and 23 deal with the scope of the enquiry
before the Court and the determination of the amount
of compensation. Section 24 enumerates the matters
which the Court shall not take into consideration in
determining the compensation. The next section
contains rules as to amount of compensation.
Finally, section 26 requires the presiding Judge to
make an award specifying the amount awarded under
clause first of section 23(1) and also the amounts (if
any) respectively awarded under each of the other
clauses of the same sub-section, together with the
grounds of awarding each of the said amounts. It is
thus clear that once a reference is made under section
18, the Court has to render an award under section
26. The reference proceedings cannot be dismissed for
any reason. So to do would be to refuse to award
compensation for land compulsorily acquired under
the Act and for which the Act requires that
compensation has got to be awarded. It is no doubt
true that in proceedings under section 18 the burden
of proving that the award made by the Land
Acquisition Officer is inadequate or erroneous is on
the party objecting to the award and at whose instance
the reference has been made. If he succeeds in
showing prima facie that the award is inadequate,
then the Government must support the award by
producing evidence. If, on the other hand, he fails to
appear in the Court or to produce any evidence, the
award made by the Land Acquisition Officer will
stand. But the Court then has to make the award made
by the Land Acquisition Officer as its own award
under section 26. If, then, as we think, once a
reference under section 18 is made, the Court has to
make an award, no matter whether the person at
whose instance the reference has been made appears
or fails to appear before the Court or fails to produce
evidence in support of his objection, it is clear that
there cannot be any dismissal or abatement of a
reference proceeding. It follows, therefore, that the
application of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure
is altogether inconsistent with the very nature and
scope of the proceedings under section 18.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
11.
In the present case, the petitioner had sought substitution in place of
her father the deceased claimant. In view of the position that a reference
made under Section 18 of the LA Act, 1894, has to be answered by the
Court notwithstanding the substitution or non-substitution of the claimants;
by application of the ratio of the above noted judgment, which has
addressed the issues which are in contention herein, there cannot be
abatement. The legal heirs of the claimant therefore, will necessarily on
their application for substitution be substituted in place of the deceased
claimant. Order 22 Rule 9 (3) which was inserted by Amendment Act of
1976, will also therefore have no application to the proceedings under
Section 18 of the LA Act, 1894, as the application of the Limitation Act,
1963, will be inconsistent with the scheme of the LA Act, 1894, which is a
beneficial legislation.
12.
Abdul Karim (supra) has also found approval in the judgment of
Khazan Singh vs. Union of India reported in (2002) 2 SCC 242 wherein,
it has been held that reference to court following non-acceptance of award
cannot be dismissed in default and that the Civil Court is duty bound to
pass an award in answer to the reference. Para 6 of the judgment which is
relevant is quoted herein below:
“6. Section 18 of the Act empowers a person
interested in the land to move by a written application
to the Collector requiring that the matter be referred
for determination of the Court, whether his objection
be to the measurement of the land, the amount of
compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the
apportionment of the compensation among the
persons interested. If the application for reference is
in order the Collector is bound to make a reference of
it to the Court. Section 20 of the Act enjoins on the
Court to "proceed to determine the objection". The
Court shall after holding such inquiry as may be
necessary pass an award. Section 26 of the Act reads
thus:
"26. Form of Awards.- (1) Every award
under this Part shall be in writing signed by the
Judge, and shall specify the amount awarded
under clause first of sub-section (1) of Section
23, and also the amounts (if any) respectively
awarded under each of the other clauses of the
same sub-section, together with the grounds of
awarding each of the said amounts.
(2) Every such award shall be deemed to
be a decree and the statement of the grounds of
every such award a judgment within the
meaning of Section 2 clause (2) and Section 2
clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908."
13.
In view of the judgments as stated, and the facts of the instant case
being similar on the points of law as raised, the Civil Revision application
is allowed and the impugned orders dated 13-12-2019 and 19-12-2019, are
hereby set aside and quashed. The court of the Special Judicial Officer,
West Jaintia Hills, is therefore directed to consider the substitution
application and proceed with the matter to answer the reference as made
under Section 18 of the LA Act, 1894.
14.
No order as to costs.
15.
Lower court record to be transmitted back immediately.
Judge
Meghalaya
12.08.2022
“Samantha PS”
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