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Civil

Baljinder Singh vs State of Hp

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Court
Himachal Pradesh High Court
Date
17 September 2026
Case No.
CRMMO 899/2025
Result
Disposed
Bench
Rakesh Kainthla
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23. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed.

24. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any.

Filed under

Indian Penal Code, 1860 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 155, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

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2026:HHC:39637 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 899 of 2026 Reserved on: 10.9.2026 Date of Decision: 17.9.2026. Baljinder Singh …. Petitioner Versus State of H.P. …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Vijay Kumar Arora, Senior Advocate, assisted by M/s Gaurav Kumar, Hitansh Raj, and Avantika Bhandari. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 123 of 2016, dated 31.12.2017, registered at Police Station Theog, District Shimla, H.P. for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 431 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2026:HHC:39637 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant, Assistant Engineer, National Highway Sub-Division, HPPWD, Narkanda, made a complaint to the police that road digging work from Narkanda to Galu was closed and optical fibre cable had been laid throughout the stretch. The check posts constructed by M/s Vindhya Telelinks Limited (VTNL) were open, which could cause an accident at any moment. VTNL is the executing agency that had damaged the National Highway. Many notices were issued to the company, but no action was taken. An estimate of ₹5,10,010/- was sent to the company. Hence, it was prayed that action be taken against the accused. 3. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The site plan was prepared. The documents were seized. The petitioner was arrested and was released on bail. It was found after the investigation that the work of laying optical fibre cable was allotted to VTNL. However, VTNL had caused damage to the NH. Many notices were served upon the company, but the company had failed to take any remedial action. Hence, the police filed the charge-sheet before the learned Trial Court. 2026:HHC:39637 4. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) had invited bids from the contractors for procurement, trenching, laying, installation, testing, and maintenance of optical fibre installation. This tender was intended to roll out an OFC network to be owned and operated by Defence Services under the Project Implementation Core Group (PICG), Ministry of Defence. The work was allotted to VTNL, and the petitioner was assigned the responsibility as a Route In-charge for executing the work between Shimla and Jhakri. M/s VTNL had applied for right-of-way permission for laying the OFC. A demand notice was issued, and VTNL deposited an amount of ₹7,66,17,360/- with the HPPWD. The work of laying the OFC was executed by the company as per the terms and conditions of the HPPWD. No damage or mischief was ever caused by the petitioner. The petitioner was working as a Route In-charge for execution of the work and was not directly concerned with the execution of the work on the site. The allegations in the FIR do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence. The petitioner has not committed any mischief by doing any act 2026:HHC:39637 which rendered the public road less passable. The charges were not framed against the petitioner. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 5. The Respondent-State filed a status report reproducing the contents of the FIR and the steps taken during the investigation. 6. I have heard Mr Vijay Kumar Arora, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Gaurav Kumar, Mr Hitansh Raj, and Ms Avantika Bhandari, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 7. Mr Vijay Kumar Arora, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. As per the allegations in the FIR, the work was allotted to M/s VTNL, and the company has not been arrayed as an accused. The petitioner was only 2026:HHC:39637 appointed as a Route In-charge and was not concerned with the actual execution of the work. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. He relied upon the judgments in Sanjay Dutt & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. MANU/SC/0032/2025 and Sharad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangita Rane (2015) 12 SCC 781 in support of his submissions. 8. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was Route In-charge and was responsible for ensuring the safety of the users of the road. He failed to do so, and the learned Trial Court has rightly summoned the accused/petitioner. The allegations in the FIR constitute the commission of a cognizable offence, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. This Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in the present matter. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 2026:HHC:39637 10. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers 2026:HHC:39637 under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. 2026:HHC:39637 In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 11. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- 2026:HHC:39637 empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 12. A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed: “70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.” 13. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. It is undisputed that the petitioner was a Route In- charge for executing the work of laying the OFC between Shimla and Jhakri. This fact was asserted in Para 6 of the petition. The 2026:HHC:39637 record of the learned Trial Court shows that a certificate was issued by Vindhya Telelinks Limited on 3.9.2024 certifying that the petitioner was working in the capacity of a Senior Manager (Projects) and was Route In-charge for the Shimla to Jhakri NFS Telecom Project from 1.7.2015 to 10.1.2018. The petitioner had filed an application under Section 70(2) of Cr.P.C. before the learned Trial Court in which he asserted in Para-5 that he was Route In-charge of the company and was working as a supervisor. 15. Various officials of the HPPWD had written letters to M/s VTNL stating that the work was not being carried out properly, which was leading to the sinking of the road on the valley side. The inspecting officers were not vigilant, and the working staff was damaging the road by damaging the foundation of retaining walls, crash barriers, and parapets on the valley side. No responsible person other than labour was present on the spot who could be asked about the movement of vehicular traffic. Therefore, VTNL was apprised of the fact that there was a lack of supervision, which was causing damage to the road. 2026:HHC:39637 16. Section 431 of the IPC deals with mischief by doing any act which renders, or which he knows to be likely to render, any public road, bridge, navigable river, or navigable channel impassable or less safe for travelling or conveying property. Section 32 of the Indian Penal Code provides that in every part of the Code, the words which refer to acts also extend to illegal omissions. The term "omission" has been defined in Section 33 as a single act or series of omissions. The term "illegal" has been defined in Section 43 as applicable to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes a ground for a civil action. 17. Thus, it is apparent that the act referred to in Section 431 will refer to an omission which would be an offence or would furnish a ground for civil action. In the present case, the company had appointed the petitioner as the supervisor; therefore, he was bound to supervise the work and ensure that no damage is caused to the road so as to make it less safe or impassable to the users of the road. The officials of the HPPWD wrote repeated letters to the company pointing out various acts constituting the violation of the agreement, making the road less safe for travellers and the absence of supervision. The petitioner, 2026:HHC:39637 being Route In-charge, was bound to look into the matter and ensure that the work was executed in such a manner as not to cause any danger to the users of the road. As per the material collected by the prosecution, the petitioner failed to do so, and his omission made the road less safe or passable to the users of the road. 18. It was submitted that primarily the work was to be executed by the company, and the company should have been held responsible. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 687: (2015) 191 Comp Cas 177: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 18 that a person committing the offence on behalf of the company is liable. It was observed at page 638: “43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. The second situation in which he can be implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically incorporating such a provision.” 19. liable. Thus, the person who was responsible can be held 2026:HHC:39637 20. In Sharad Kumar Sanghi (supra), the allegations were made against the company, and allegations against the Managing Director were absolutely vague. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the company was not made a party, and the Managing Director could not be prosecuted based on vague allegations made against him. In the present case, the prosecution has collected sufficient material to show that the petitioner was in charge, and therefore he was responsible for ensuring the safe execution of the work. He failed to do so; thus, the allegations are not vague. In Sanjay Dutt (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the director was being held vicariously liable, which is not permissible in the absence of a specific act attributable to the director. In the present case, a specific act is being attributed to the petitioner, and this judgment will not help the petitioner. 21. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: 2026:HHC:39637 “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 22. No other point was urged. 23. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 24. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any. 25. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. 17th September, 2026 (Chander) (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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