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2026:HHC:39637
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 899 of 2026
Reserved on: 10.9.2026
Date of Decision: 17.9.2026.
Baljinder Singh
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P.
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Vijay Kumar Arora, Senior
Advocate, assisted by M/s
Gaurav Kumar, Hitansh Raj,
and Avantika Bhandari.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned
Deputy Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No. 123 of 2016, dated 31.12.2017, registered at
Police Station Theog, District Shimla, H.P. for the commission of
an offence punishable under Section 431 of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for
convenience).
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:39637
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant, Assistant Engineer, National
Highway Sub-Division, HPPWD, Narkanda, made a complaint to
the police that road digging work from Narkanda to Galu was
closed and optical fibre cable had been laid throughout the
stretch. The check posts constructed by M/s Vindhya Telelinks
Limited (VTNL) were open, which could cause an accident at any
moment. VTNL is the executing agency that had damaged the
National Highway. Many notices were issued to the company, but
no action was taken. An estimate of ₹5,10,010/- was sent to the
company. Hence, it was prayed that action be taken against the
accused.
3.
The police registered the FIR and investigated the
matter. The site plan was prepared. The documents were seized.
The petitioner was arrested and was released on bail. It was
found after the investigation that the work of laying optical fibre
cable was allotted to VTNL. However, VTNL had caused damage
to the NH. Many notices were served upon the company, but the
company had failed to take any remedial action. Hence, the police
filed the charge-sheet before the learned Trial Court.
2026:HHC:39637
4.
Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and
filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioner has filed the present
petition asserting that Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL)
had invited bids from the contractors for procurement,
trenching, laying, installation, testing, and maintenance of
optical fibre installation. This tender was intended to roll out an
OFC network to be owned and operated by Defence Services
under the Project Implementation Core Group (PICG), Ministry
of Defence. The work was allotted to VTNL, and the petitioner
was assigned the responsibility as a Route In-charge for
executing the work between Shimla and Jhakri. M/s VTNL had
applied for right-of-way permission for laying the OFC. A
demand notice was issued, and VTNL deposited an amount of
₹7,66,17,360/- with the HPPWD. The work of laying the OFC was
executed by the company as per the terms and conditions of the
HPPWD. No damage or mischief was ever caused by the
petitioner. The petitioner was working as a Route In-charge for
execution of the work and was not directly concerned with the
execution of the work on the site. The allegations in the FIR do
not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence. The
petitioner has not committed any mischief by doing any act
2026:HHC:39637
which rendered the public road less passable. The charges were
not framed against the petitioner. The continuation of the
proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and
the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be
quashed.
5.
The
Respondent-State
filed
a
status
report
reproducing the contents of the FIR and the steps taken during
the investigation.
6.
I have heard Mr Vijay Kumar Arora, learned Senior
Advocate, assisted by Mr Gaurav Kumar, Mr Hitansh Raj, and Ms
Avantika Bhandari, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr
Ajit
Sharma,
learned
Deputy
Advocate
General,
for
the
respondent-State.
7.
Mr Vijay Kumar Arora, learned Senior Advocate for
the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he
was falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the
petitioner to the commission of the crime. As per the allegations
in the FIR, the work was allotted to M/s VTNL, and the company
has not been arrayed as an accused. The petitioner was only
2026:HHC:39637
appointed as a Route In-charge and was not concerned with the
actual execution of the work. Therefore, he prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential
proceedings arising out of it be quashed. He relied upon the
judgments in Sanjay Dutt & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.
MANU/SC/0032/2025 and Sharad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangita Rane
(2015) 12 SCC 781 in support of his submissions.
8.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was Route
In-charge and was responsible for ensuring the safety of the
users of the road. He failed to do so, and the learned Trial Court
has rightly summoned the accused/petitioner. The allegations in
the FIR constitute the commission of a cognizable offence, and
the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. This Court should
not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in the present matter.
Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
9.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
2026:HHC:39637
10.
The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
some
of
the
principles
under
which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
2026:HHC:39637
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable based on which no prudent person
can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings, and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.
2026:HHC:39637
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
11.
This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature
of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are
embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of
process or where intervention is essential to uphold the
ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-
2026:HHC:39637
empting the Prosecution from building its case before the
Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,
contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal
complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR
represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie
offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v)
the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;
and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the
dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335).
12.
A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State
of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:
“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear
that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of
any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the
ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only
empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its
inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new
power on the High Court but rather saves the power which
the High Court already possesses, from before the
enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very
existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate
for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the
High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it
may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the
proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”
13.
The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
14.
It is undisputed that the petitioner was a Route In-
charge for executing the work of laying the OFC between Shimla
and Jhakri. This fact was asserted in Para 6 of the petition. The
2026:HHC:39637
record of the learned Trial Court shows that a certificate was
issued by Vindhya Telelinks Limited on 3.9.2024 certifying that
the petitioner was working in the capacity of a Senior Manager
(Projects) and was Route In-charge for the Shimla to Jhakri NFS
Telecom Project from 1.7.2015 to 10.1.2018. The petitioner had
filed an application under Section 70(2) of Cr.P.C. before the
learned Trial Court in which he asserted in Para-5 that he was
Route In-charge of the company and was working as a
supervisor.
15.
Various officials of the HPPWD had written letters to
M/s VTNL stating that the work was not being carried out
properly, which was leading to the sinking of the road on the
valley side. The inspecting officers were not vigilant, and the
working staff was damaging the road by damaging the
foundation of retaining walls, crash barriers, and parapets on the
valley side. No responsible person other than labour was present
on the spot who could be asked about the movement of vehicular
traffic. Therefore, VTNL was apprised of the fact that there was a
lack of supervision, which was causing damage to the road.
2026:HHC:39637
16.
Section 431 of the IPC deals with mischief by doing
any act which renders, or which he knows to be likely to render,
any public road, bridge, navigable river, or navigable channel
impassable or less safe for travelling or conveying property.
Section 32 of the Indian Penal Code provides that in every part of
the Code, the words which refer to acts also extend to illegal
omissions. The term "omission" has been defined in Section 33
as a single act or series of omissions. The term "illegal" has been
defined in Section 43 as applicable to everything which is an
offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes a
ground for a civil action.
17.
Thus, it is apparent that the act referred to in Section
431 will refer to an omission which would be an offence or would
furnish a ground for civil action. In the present case, the
company had appointed the petitioner as the supervisor;
therefore, he was bound to supervise the work and ensure that no
damage is caused to the road so as to make it less safe or
impassable to the users of the road. The officials of the HPPWD
wrote repeated letters to the company pointing out various acts
constituting the violation of the agreement, making the road less
safe for travellers and the absence of supervision. The petitioner,
2026:HHC:39637
being Route In-charge, was bound to look into the matter and
ensure that the work was executed in such a manner as not to
cause any danger to the users of the road. As per the material
collected by the prosecution, the petitioner failed to do so, and
his omission made the road less safe or passable to the users of
the road.
18.
It was submitted that primarily the work was to be
executed by the company, and the company should have been
held responsible. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI,
(2015) 4 SCC 609: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 687: (2015) 191 Comp Cas 177:
2015 SCC OnLine SC 18 that a person committing the offence on
behalf of the company is liable. It was observed at page 638:
“43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the
commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be
made an accused, along with the company, if there is
sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal
intent. The second situation in which he can be implicated
is in those cases where the statutory regime itself attracts
the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically
incorporating such a provision.”
19.
liable.
Thus, the person who was responsible can be held
2026:HHC:39637
20.
In Sharad Kumar Sanghi (supra), the allegations were
made against the company, and allegations against the
Managing Director were absolutely vague. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that the company was not made a party, and the
Managing Director could not be prosecuted based on vague
allegations made against him. In the present case, the
prosecution has collected sufficient material to show that the
petitioner was in charge, and therefore he was responsible for
ensuring the safe execution of the work. He failed to do so; thus,
the allegations are not vague. In Sanjay Dutt (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court found that the director was being held vicariously
liable, which is not permissible in the absence of a specific act
attributable to the director. In the present case, a specific act is
being attributed to the petitioner, and this judgment will not help
the petitioner.
21.
It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge
sheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of
the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that
when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court
should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:
2026:HHC:39637
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is
ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the
FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the
absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged
offences, we are of the view that the appellants should
prefer a discharge application before the trial court under
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We
say so because even according to the State, the
investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be
filed before the competent court. In such circumstances,
the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials
which the investigating officer might have collected
forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge
application is filed, the trial court shall look into the
materials and take a call whether any discharge case is
made out or not.”
22.
No other point was urged.
23.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and
the same is dismissed.
24.
The present petition stands disposed of, and so are
the miscellaneous applications, if any.
25.
The observations made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
17th September, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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