The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
7. Facts leading to the lodging of the FIR and filing of the challan have already been noted in para 2 of this order. As per the case of the prosecution, complainant was assaulted by the petitioners at about 9:00 P.M. on 17.07.2022. FIR was lodged on 21.09.2022 u/s 323, 341 r/w Section 34 IPC. As noted above, Section 468 Cr.P.C. bars taking cognizance of an offence after the lapse of period of limitation. Subsection 2(b) of Section 468 clearly provides that the period of limitation is one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. Section 341 and 323 IPC are punishable with maximum imprisonment of one year. In the case in hand, the challan was filed on 21.03.2025. As already noted above, order dated 21.03.2025 (Annexure P-2) is totally silent as to whether the prosecution had filed any application for condoning the delay and whether the same had been allowed or not. In the reply filed by the State, they tried to explain the delay by pointing out that initially the investigating officer of the case had been orally requesting the concerned doctor to provide the medical record but when nothing was done, an application in 2026.01.17 14:15 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-68282-2025 writing to this effect was moved on 12.10.2023. Even then, the complete medical record was not supplied. Though there is nothing on …
8. In view of the afore-referred judgments i.e. Sarah Mathew (supra) and M/s Cheminova India Ltd. (supra) as also the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners, the present petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 17.10.2025 is hereby set aside. Consequently, discharge the petitioners in FIR No.126 dated 21.09.2022 u/s 341, 323 r/w Section 34 IPC registered against them.
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CRM-M-68282-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-68282-2025
Date of decision: 08.01.2026
Baljinder Singh Batth and another
Versus
State of Punjab
...Petitioners
...Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE AARADHNA SAWHNEY
Present :
Mr. M.K. Dhot, Advocate for the petitioners.
*****
AARADHNA SAWHNEY, J.(ORAL)
1.
Challenge in the present petition is to order dated 17.10.2025
(Annexure P-6) passed by the learned Magistrate, vide which an application
dated 29.05.2025 filed by petitioners-accused u/s 514 of BNSS, 2023
(erstwhile 468 Cr.P.C.) was dismissed.
2.
Relevant facts as emerging from documents on record be
noticed hereinbelow:Ramzan Mohammad, son of Ghulam Navi, resident of Village
Matoi, set the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint
pointing therein that he is working in AC Manufacturing
Factory in Malerkotla. At about 9:00 P.M. on 17.07.2022, he
had gone out for an after-dinner stroll. Some co-villagers were
also accompanying him. When he reached the outskirts of the
village, motorcycle (make Bullet), driven by Baljinder Singh
halted near him. He also noticed Simu, son of Fakiria, riding
pillion on the said motorcycle. Without any exchange of hot
words, Baljinder Singh alighted from the vehicle and hit him on
his face. Simu handed over an iron rod to Balwinder, who then
repeatedly hit him (C) with the same on his head. As expected,
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CRM-M-68282-2025
he fell down, raised an alarm and cried for help. Sensing
trouble Baljinder and Simu fled away on their vehicle along
with their weapons. Complainant further pointed out that that
those who were accompanying him and had witnessed the
incident also slipped away from the spot. He gathered his
strength, reached home from where his father immediately
rushed him to Civil Hospital, Malerkotla. At the hospital, he
was provided first aid but on seeing his delicate medical
condition, he was sent to Civil Hospital, Ahmedgarh, where he
was undergoing treatment. Complainant also pointed out that
son of paternal uncle of Baljinder Singh is his (C) friend.
Feeling unhappy on this account, Baljinder Singh had assaulted
him. Primarily with this backdrop, complainant requested to
catch hold of all the assailants as also to initiate appropriate
proceedings against them.
On the basis of the said complaint and MLR, a formal case vide
FIR No.126 dated 21.09.2022 u/s 341, 323 read with Section 34 IPC was
registered.
3.
It further emerges from the documents on record that the
challan in the present case was filed in the Court on 21.03.2025, when the
following order was passed by the learned Magistrate (Annexure P-2):“Challan presented today in absence of accused. Report of
Ahlmad seen. It be registered. Remand papers be disposed of, if
any. The investigating officer has got his statement recorded
that he will produce the accused persons on the next date of
hearing. Notice to accused persons be issued for 12.05.2025.”
After the accused put in appearance on 29.05.2025, they were
extended the concession of bail. On the same day, an application u/s 514 of
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BNSS (erstwhile Section 468 Cr.P.C.) was filed on the ground that FIR
having been lodged on 21.09.2022, challan having been presented on
21.03.2025, proceedings against accused are liable to be quashed on the
ground that they are time barred.
On notice, State through learned PP filed detailed reply
opposing the application on the ground that no delay occurred at the end of
Investigating Agencies. In fact, an application was moved by the IO to
collect MLR of complainant-Ramzan Mohammad on 12.10.2023, but
hospital authorities failed to provide the necessary record. Consequent
thereto, no opinion was expressed with regard to nature of injuries, hence the
delay in filing the challan.
The second plea taken by the State, in the reply filed by them
was that the challan was accepted by the Court on 21.03.2025. Notice was
issued to the accused, after taking cognizance of the offence. The application
in question, having been moved on 29.05.2025, has thus been rendered
infructuous. Dismissal of the application was prayed for.
Learned Magistrate, in terms of impugned order dated
17.10.2025 dismissed the application. The operative portion of the said order
reads as under:“Perusal of the file reveals that the challan/chargesheet was
presented on 21.3.2025 and notice was also issued to the
accused persons on the same day. Thereafter vide order dated
29.05.2025 bail was also granted to the accused persons. This
shows that cognizance has already been taken by the court.
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Taking of cognizance means application of judicial mind by the
court and as per section 204 of Cr.P.C: "if in the opinion of
magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there are sufficient
grounds for proceedings, the magistrate shall issue summons
for the attendance of accused in a summons case or secondly he
may issue warrants or if he thinks fit issue summons for causing
the accused to be brought or to appear before the court in a
warrant case. Thus, this shows that in the present case
cognizance has already been taken and the present application
filed at the later stage has become infructuous. Accordingly the
same is hereby dismissed being infructuous.”
4.
Aggrieved of the said order, the present petition has been filed
praying therein to quash/set aside the same being legally unsustainable and
consequently to discharge the accused.
5.
During his brief submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners
contends that the alleged incident occurred on 17.07.2022. However, the FIR
bearing No.129 was lodged on 21.09.2022 u/s 341, 323 read with Section 34
IPC. The offences u/s 323, 341 are punishable with maximum imprisonment
of one year. As per Section 468 Cr.P.C., challan in such cases is required to
be presented within one year from the date of registration of the FIR. In the
instant case, filing of challan on 21.03.2025 i.e. after 2½ years from the date
of registration of the FIR, particularly in view of the fact that no specific
order condoning the delay was passed by the learned Magistrate on the said
day i.e. 21.03.2025, proceedings are time barred and thus petitionersaccused are liable to be discharged.
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It is further the submission of learned counsel that investigating
officer, for reasons best known to him, did not place on record any
application to substantiate his plea that he had been requesting the hospital
authorities for obtaining medical record, even prior to 2025 and that the
authorities had refused to supply the documents. Proceeding further, it is
also the submission of learned counsel that assuming for the sake of
arguments that IO had moved an application to Medical Superintendent of
the hospital on 12.10.2023 to collect the medical record of the injured and
that the needful was not done, the said application having been filed one
year after registration of the FIR, is clearly time barred, the benefit of which
deserves to be extended to the accused.
Towards the end, learned counsel contends that the observation
of the learned Magistrate that the cognizance of the offence had been taken
on 21.03.2025 and the application u/s 514 BNSS having been filed on
29.05.2025 has become infructuous, is totally erroneous. Impugned order
deserves to be set aside.
6.
Before appreciating the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the petitioners, it would be appropriate to refer to Sections 467,
468, 469, 473 Cr.P.C., which are as under:“467. Definitions. – For the purposes of this Chapter, unless
the context otherwise requires, “period of limitation” means
the period specified in section 468 for taking cognizance of an
offence”
Section 468 reads as under:
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“468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of
limitation. –(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this
Code, no Court, shall take cognizance of an offence of the
category specified in sub-section(2), after the expiry of the
period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for
a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in
relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be
determined with reference to the offence which is punishable
with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the
most severe punishment.”
Section 469 reads as under:
“469. Commencement of the period of limitation. - (1) The
period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence(a) on the date of the offence; or
(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the
person aggrieved by he offence or to any police officer, the first
day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such
person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or
(c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed,
the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to
the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer
making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier.
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(2) In computing the said period, the day from which such
period is to be computed shall be excluded.”
Section 473 reads as under:
“473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases. –
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions
of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence
after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on
the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has
been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the
interests of justice.”
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarah Mathew vs. Institute, Cardio
Vascular Diseases and others, 2014(1) SCC 721, while interpreting the
aforesaid Sections held as under:“41. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of
computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the
Cr.P.C. the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or
the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which
the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat
Kale which is followed in Japani Sahoo lays down the correct
law. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts
and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is
the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of
limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C.”
In M/s Cheminova India Ltd. and another vs. State of Punjab
and others, SLP (Crl.) No. 4102 of 2020, it was held as under:“Section 468 of Cr.PC prohibits taking cognizance of an
offence after the lapse of period of limitation.
sub-section (2)(c) thereof,
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the
period
of
As per
limitation
is
CRM-M-68282-2025
three
years,
if
the
offence
is punishable with
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding
three years.
Section 469 of Cr.PC deals with the
‘commencement of the period of limitation’. As per the said
provision, the period of limitation, in relation to an offender,
shall commence on the date of offence or where the commission
of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the
offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such
offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police
officer, whichever is earlier.”
7.
Facts leading to the lodging of the FIR and filing of the challan
have already been noted in para 2 of this order. As per the case of the
prosecution, complainant was assaulted by the petitioners at about 9:00 P.M.
on 17.07.2022. FIR was lodged on 21.09.2022 u/s 323, 341 r/w Section 34
IPC. As noted above, Section 468 Cr.P.C. bars taking cognizance of an
offence after the lapse of period of limitation. Subsection 2(b) of Section 468
clearly provides that the period of limitation is one year, if the offence is
punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. Section
341 and 323 IPC are punishable with maximum imprisonment of one year.
In the case in hand, the challan was filed on 21.03.2025. As already noted
above, order dated 21.03.2025 (Annexure P-2) is totally silent as to whether
the prosecution had filed any application for condoning the delay and
whether the same had been allowed or not. In the reply filed by the State,
they tried to explain the delay by pointing out that initially the investigating
officer of the case had been orally requesting the concerned doctor to
provide the medical record but when nothing was done, an application in
HAMANT
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CRM-M-68282-2025
writing to this effect was moved on 12.10.2023. Even then, the complete
medical record was not supplied. Though there is nothing on record to
indicate that such an application dated 12.10.2023 was moved by the IO but
assuming for the sake of arguments the same was filed one year after
lodging of FIR i.e. on 21.09.2022. In the factual scenario of the case in hand,
challan having been filed on 21.03.2025 was time barred. Thus, cognizance
could not have been taken. As has rightly been submitted by learned counsel
the observation of the learned trial Court that since the cognizance of the
offence had been taken on 21.03.2025, the application u/s 514 BNSS having
been filed on 29.05.2025 has become infructuous, is totally erroneous.
8.
In view of the afore-referred judgments i.e. Sarah Mathew
(supra) and M/s Cheminova India Ltd. (supra) as also the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners, the present petition is
allowed and the impugned order dated 17.10.2025 is hereby set aside.
Consequently, discharge the petitioners in FIR No.126 dated 21.09.2022 u/s
341, 323 r/w Section 34 IPC registered against them.
(AARADHNA SAWHNEY)
JUDGE
08.01.2026
Hemant
Whether speaking/reasoned
Whether reportable
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:
:
Yes / No
Yes / No
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