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2026:HHC:3573
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 17 of 2026
Reserved on: 8.1.2026
Date of Decision: 23.2.2026.
Balbir Singh
...Petitioner
Versus
Raj Kumar and another
...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Akshay Katoch, Advocate.
For the Respondents
:
None.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the order
dated 15.10.2025, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Court No.1, Solan, HP (learned Trial Court), vide
which the complaint filed by the petitioner (applicant before the
learned Trial Court) under Section 175(3) of Bhartiya Nagrik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) was dismissed.
(Parties shall
hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed
before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:3573
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the applicant filed an application before the
learned Trial Court for issuing a direction to the Station House
Officer, Police Station, Sadar, Solan, HP, to register the FIR
against the accused under Section 175(3) of BNSS. It was asserted
that accused No. 1 is working as Managing Director in Baghat
Urban Cooperative Bank Limited, whereas accused No.2 is
working as a Manager in the Branch of Baghat Urban Cooperative
Bank Limited, Chowk Bazar, Solan. HP. The applicant approached
the Bank for financial assistance in the year 2011. The bank
sanctioned a term loan of ₹12.00 lacs to the applicant, which was
to be repaid in 60 monthly equated installments of ₹27,250/subject to the floating rate of interest as per the directions issued
by the Reserve Bank of India from time to time. The applicant
paid some installments, but could not pay the remaining
installments because of financial crises. The accused added
wrong and illegal overdues to the applicant’s loan account. The
applicant deposited money in his account, but it was adjusted
against wrong and illegal deductions. The accused initiated
proceedings under the SARFAESI Act and took the symbolic
possession of the mortgaged property. The accused No.1 issued a
2026:HHC:3573
loan account statement showing a balance of ₹12,84,327.17 on
10.6.2022. The applicant transferred ₹6.00 lacs on 13.7.2022 and
₹7,80,000/- on 14.7.2022 to the account of the accused. He
requested accused No.1 to adjust the entire loan amount and issue
a no-objection certificate. The accused, in collusion with each
other, adjusted ₹6,00,000/- on 14.7.202 and ₹6,80,000/- on
15.7.2022. The applicant had deposited the excess money (₹1.00
lac) in his account, but his loan account was not cleared. The
applicant applied for documents under the Right to Information
Act, but the accused withheld the applicant’s loan statement. The
amount of ₹1.00 lac was adjusted against the wrong deduction,
and the overdue amount of ₹1,51,026/- was shown. The applicant
issued a legal notice to the bank, and the bank sent a reply
claiming an amount of ₹14,762/-. The proceedings under the
SARFAESI Act were wrongly initiated. The applicant filed a
consumer complaint against the bank for a deficiency in service.
He also filed a complaint before the Superintendent of Police,
Solan and Station House Officer, Sadar, Solan, HP, for taking
action against the accused, but no action was taken. Hence, it was
prayed that the action be taken against the accused.
2026:HHC:3573
3.
Learned Trial Court held that the complaint should
disclose the commission of a cognizable offence before it can be
referred to the police for investigation. The application in the
present case disclosed a civil dispute between the parties
regarding the adjustment of the amount paid by the applicant.
Civil breach of contract or financial irregularity does not
constitute a criminal offence. No prima facie case was made out
for taking action as per the law. Hence, the application was
dismissed.
4.
Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
Trial Court, the petitioner/applicant has filed the present petition
asserting that the statement of account showed an outstanding
amount of ₹12,84,327.74 on 13.4.2022. The applicant deposited an
amount of ₹13,80,000/-. The bank was bound to issue a No
Objection Certificate (NOC) in the applicant’s favour. The
applicant had also filed a complaint before the Consumer
Commission, Solan. The accused initiated proceedings under the
SARFAESI Act to harm the applicant’s reputation. The loan
availed by the applicant is not disputed. It is also not disputed
that the amount of ₹13,80,000/- was paid by the applicant. The
subsequent adjustments are wrong and against the law. The
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accused are the employees of Baghat Urban Cooperative Bank,
and they were bound to discharge their duties as per the
instructions issued by the Reserve Bank of India. Learned Trial
Court erred in holding that no offence is made out against the
accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be setaside.
5.
Mr
Akshay
Katoch,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner/applicant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred
in dismissing the application. The applicant had deposited
₹13,80,000/- against the outstanding amount of ₹12,84,327.74/-,
and he was entitled to a no-objection certificate. The accused
adjusted the amount deposited by the applicant against the heads
not mentioned in the agreement. This constituted offences
punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC. Learned Trial
Court failed to appreciate this aspect. Hence, he prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned
Trial Court be set aside.
6.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
2026:HHC:3573
7.
It was submitted that the application discloses the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420
of the IPC. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 2024
SCC OnLine SC 171 that the same act of transaction cannot result in
an offence of cheating and criminal breach of trust. It was
observed: 10. The chargesheet also refers to Section 406 of the IPC,
but without pointing out how the ingredients of said
section are satisfied. No details and particulars are
mentioned. There are decisions that hold that the same act
or transaction cannot result in an offence of cheating and
criminal breach of trust simultaneously. Wolfgang
Reim v. State, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3341; Mahindra and
Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. v. Delta Classic (P.)
Ltd., (2011) 6 Gau LR 604; Mukesh Sharma v. State of
Himachal Pradesh, 2024: HHC: 35. For the offence of
cheating, dishonest intention must exist at the inception of
the transaction, whereas, in case of criminal breach of
trust there must exist a relationship between the parties
whereby one party entrusts another with the property as
per law, albeit dishonest intention comes later. In this case,
entrustment is missing; in fact, it is not even alleged. It is a
case of the sale of goods. The chargesheet does refer to
Section 506 of the IPC, relying upon the averments in the
complaint. However, no details and particulars are given,
when and on which date and place the threats were given.
Without the said details and particulars, it is apparent to us
that these allegations of threats, etc., have been made only
with the intent to activate police machinery for the
recovery of money.
2026:HHC:3573
8.
This position was reiterated in Delhi Race Club (1940)
Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2024) 10 SCC 690, and it was held that an
offence of cheating and criminal breach of trust is independent
and distinct. They cannot coexist similarly in the same set of
facts. It was observed: “43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust
and cheating. For cheating, the criminal intention is
necessary at the time of making a false or misleading
representation, i.e. since inception. In a criminal breach of
trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case
of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully
entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly
misappropriates the same. Whereas, in the case of
cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces
a person by deceiving him to deliver any property. In such a
situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.
55. It is high time that police officers across the country are
imparted proper training in law to understand the fine
distinction between the offence of cheating vis-à-vis
criminal breach of trust. Both offences are independent
and distinct. The two offences cannot coexist
simultaneously in the same set of facts. They are
antithetical to each other. The two provisions of IPC (now
BNS, 2023) are not twins, and they cannot survive without
each other.”
9.
Hence,
the
submission
that
the
accused
have
committed offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of
the IPC cannot be accepted.
10.
In the present case, the application does not mention
that any misrepresentation was made to the applicant by any
2026:HHC:3573
person. The petitioner/applicant stated in para-5 of the
application that he had approached accused No.1 to repay the
entire loan in a single instalment. The accused no. 1 issued a loan
account statement (Annexure P-1) disclosing that an amount of
₹12,84,327.17 was outstanding on 10.6.2022. The statement of
account (Annexure P-5) also shows an amount of ₹12,84,327.74
due on 10.6.2022. Thereafter, various amounts have been shown
to be deposited in the account, and still an amount of ₹2,84,427/was shown due on 15.7.2022. Various amounts were added
subsequently. Therefore, the statement of account does not show
that the amount deposited by the petitioner was not credited to
his account. The grievance of the petitioner is that the charges
were wrongly reflected in the statements of account. This is
purely a civil dispute and has to be determined with reference to
the agreement executed between the parties. Even if there is some
error, the same would not constitute any misrepresentation on
behalf of accused No. 1, justifying the initiation of criminal
proceedings.
11.
The allegations in the application disclose a dispute
regarding the deduction made by the bank. Learned Trial Court
had rightly held that it was a civil dispute and could not be
2026:HHC:3573
investigated by the police. It is undisputed that a consumer
complaint has been filed before the Consumer Commission at
Solan, which also shows that the dispute is civil in nature.
12.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Anukul Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060, that
criminal proceedings cannot be used for enforcing civil rights. It
was observed: 17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated
the tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal
proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.
(2006) 6 SCC 736, it was held that criminal law cannot be
used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual
matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of process.
The following paragraphs from the decision are apposite:
“9. The principles relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the
allegations made in the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out the case alleged against
the accused. For this purpose, the complaint
has to be examined as a whole, but without
examining the merits of the allegations.
Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous
analysis of the material nor an assessment of
the reliability or genuineness of the allegations
in the complaint is warranted while examining
a prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is
a clear abuse of the process of the court, as
when the criminal proceeding is found to have
2026:HHC:3573
been initiated with malafides/malice for
wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where
the allegations are absurd and inherently
improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be
used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate
prosecution. The power should be used
sparingly and with abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim
reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence
alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is
laid in the complaint, merely on the ground
that a few ingredients have not been stated in
detail, the proceedings should not be quashed.
Quashing of the complaint is warranted only
where the complaint is so bereft of even the
basic facts that are necessary for making out
the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely
a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence;
or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A
commercial transaction or a contractual
dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action
for seeking a remedy in civil law, may also
involve a criminal offence. As the nature and
scope of a civil proceeding are different from a
criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the
complaint relates to a commercial transaction
or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy
is available or has been availed, is not by itself a
ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The
test is whether the allegations in the complaint
disclose a criminal offence or not.
10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice
of a growing tendency in business circles to convert
purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is
obviously on account of a prevalent impression that
2026:HHC:3573
civil law remedies are time-consuming and do not
adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors.
Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes,
also leading to an irretrievable breakdown of
marriages/families. There is also an impression that
if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal
prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent
settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and
claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by
applying pressure through criminal prosecution
should be deprecated and discouraged.”
18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal
(2007) 12 SCC 1: AIR 2008 SC 251, it was emphasised that
criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an
instrument of harassment or private vendetta. In Ganga
Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam (2015) 9 SCC 647, this Court
again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of
property disputes of a civil nature, filed solely to harass the
accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an
abuse of process.
19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R.
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2025 INSC 869, this Court
disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as a
substitute for civil remedies, observing that money
recovery cannot be enforced through criminal prosecution
where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned
High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but to
apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following
paragraphs are relevant in this context:
“9. What we have been able to understand is that
there is an oral agreement between the parties. The
Respondent No. 4 might have parted with some
money in accordance with the oral agreement, and it
may be that the appellant, herein, owes a particular
amount to be paid to the Respondent No. 4. However,
the question is whether, prima facie, any offence of
cheating could be said to have been committed by the
appellant.
2026:HHC:3573
10. How many times are the High Courts to be
reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating,
there has to be something more than prima facie on
record to indicate that the intention of the accused
was to cheat the complainant right from the
inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not
disclose any element of criminality.
11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent
pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi
Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh”,
(2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire law
as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach
of trust, respectively, has been exhaustively
explained. It appears that this very decision was
relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of
looking into the matter on its own merits, the High
Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for
mediation and that too by making payment of Rs.
25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition
precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court
should undertake such an exercise. The High Court
may either allow the petition, saying that no offence
is disclosed or may reject the petition, saying that no
case for quashing is made out. Why should the High
Court attempt to help the complainant to recover the
amount due and payable by the accused? It is for the
Civil Court or Commercial Court, as the case may be,
to look into a suit that may be filed for recovery of
money or in any other proceedings, be it under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the
IB Code, 2016.
12. Why the High Court was not able to understand
that the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil
nature.
13. We also enquired with the learned counsel
appearing for the Respondent No. 4 whether his
client has filed any civil suit or has initiated any other
2026:HHC:3573
proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears
that no civil suit has been filed for the recovery of
money to date. Money cannot be recovered, more
particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by
filing a First Information Report and seeking the help
of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of
law.
14. We could have said many things, but we refrain
from observing anything further. If the Respondent
No. 4 has to recover a particular amount, he may file
a civil suit or seek any other appropriate remedy
available to him in law. He cannot be permitted to
take recourse to criminal proceedings.
15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the
High Court has passed the impugned order. The High
Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.
25,00,000/- to the Respondent No. 4 and thereafter
directed him to appear before the Mediation and
Conciliation Centre for settlement. That's not what is
expected of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution or a
miscellaneous application filed under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, for quashing of
FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is
expected of the High Court is to look into the
averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR,
along with the other material on record, if any. The
High Court seems to have forgotten the well-settled
principles as enunciated in the decision of this Court
in the “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal”, 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335.
13.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Kapil Agarwal vs.
Sanjay Sharma, (2021) 5 SCC 524: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 154 that
criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to become a weapon of
harassment. It was observed:
2026:HHC:3573
“18.1. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of
decisions, inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC
and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution is designed to
achieve a salutary purpose that criminal proceedings ought
not to be permitted to degenerate into weapons of
harassment. When the Court is satisfied that criminal
proceedings amount to an abuse of process of law or that it
amounts to bringing pressure upon the accused, in the
exercise of inherent powers, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
14.
Thus, the learned Trial Court was justified in refusing
to refer the matter to the police for investigations.
15.
The application does not mention that the amount was
deposited with accused Nos. 1 and 2; rather, it mentions that the
amount was deposited with the bank, which was duly reflected in
the statements of account. Therefore, no offence of criminal
breach of trust was made out against the accused.
16.
In view of the above, no fault can be found with the
order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the present
petition fails, and it is dismissed.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
23rd February, 2026
(Chander)
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