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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 5th October, 2026
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CNR No. DLHC010928462025
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ARB.P. 1965/2025
BALAJI MEDICAL AND DIAGNOSITC RESEARCH
CENTRE
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rohit Puri, Advocate.
versus
EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE
CORPORATION
Through: Mr.
Madhu
Advocate.
.....Respondent
Sudan
Bhayana,
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH
JUDGEMENT
JYOTI SINGH, J. (ORAL)
1.
This petition is filed on behalf of the Petitioner under Section 11(5)
and (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (1996 Act) seeking
appointment of the Sole Arbitrator.
2.
Case of the Petitioner as pleaded in the petition is that an Agreement
was executed between the Respondent and the Petitioner on 27.03.2013 for
availing super speciality treatment services/special diagnostic investigation
facilities for ESI beneficiaries receiving medical care in various ESI run
hospitals. Petitioner provided services on cashless basis to the beneficiaries
referred by ESI network hospitals between 2013 to 2020 and submitted the
bills to the Competent Authority from time to time. However, complete
payments were not reimbursed to the Petitioner, compelling the Petitioner to
Digitally Signed
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ARB.P. 1965/2025
send notice invoking arbitration dated 26.03.2024 in terms of Clause 35 of
the Agreement, proposing the name of an Arbitrator. Respondent sent reply
dated 18.04.2024 denying that any bill was pending and thus, refusing to
concur in the appointment of an Arbitrator.
3.
Learned counsel for the Respondent denies the averments in the
petition pertaining to the alleged outstanding bills of the Petitioner and
without prejudice submits that the claims sought to be referred to arbitration
are even otherwise time barred albeit existence of the Arbitration Agreement
between the parties, envisaging reference of disputes arising out of the
Agreement in question to arbitration, is not denied.
4.
It is no longer res integra that scope of the jurisdiction of a Referral
Court under Section 11(6) of 1996 Act is limited to examining the existence
of an arbitration agreement and question whether the claims are ex facie
time barred or deadwood is to left to be decided by Arbitral Tribunal
and in this context, it will be profitable to refer to the judgment of the
Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Company Limited v.
Krish Spinning, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754. The three questions that arose
for consideration before the Supreme Court in the said case were as
follows:“D. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
34. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the following three
questions fall for our consideration:i. Whether the execution of a discharge voucher towards the full and final
settlement between the parties would operate as a bar to invoke
arbitration?
ii. What is the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny that an application
under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996 can be subjected to when a plea of
“accord and satisfaction” is taken by the defendant?
iii. What is the effect of the decision of this Court in In Re : Interplay
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Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1966 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 on the scope of powers of the
referral court under Section 11 of the Act, 1996?”
5.
On the scope of judicial interference under the 1996 Act, the Supreme
Court, after referring to the decisions in Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga
Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1 and DLF Home Developers Limited
v. Rajapura Homes Private Limited and Another, (2021) 16 SCC 743,
examined the effect of the decision of the Seven-Judge Bench of the
Supreme Court in In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1666 and held that scope of examination under Section 11(6-A)
is confined to existence of an Arbitration Agreement on the basis of Section
7 of 1996 Act and the use of the term ‘examination’ is different from the
term ‘rule’ under Section 16 of 1996 Act and is limited to prima facie
scrutiny of the existence of the Arbitration Agreement and does not include
a contested or laborious enquiry, which is to be left to the Arbitral Tribunal
under Section 16. This approach, according to the Supreme Court, serves
two purposes: firstly, it allows the Referral Court to weed out non-existent
Arbitration Agreements and secondly, it protects jurisdictional competence
of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on the issue in depth. Relevant passages are
as follows:108. Section 11 of the Act, 1996 is provided to give effect to the mutual
intention of the parties to settle their disputes by arbitration in situations
where the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator(s). The parameters of
judicial review laid down for Section 8 differ from those prescribed for
Section 11. The view taken in SBP & Co. (supra) and affirmed in Vidya
Drolia (supra) that Sections 8 and 11 respectively of the Act, 1996 are
complementary in nature was legislatively overruled by the introduction of
Section 11(6-A) in 2015. Thus, although both these provisions intend to
compel parties to abide by their mutual intention to arbitrate, yet the
scope of powers conferred upon the courts under both the sections are
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different.
xxx
xxx
xxx
110. The scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined to the
existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7. The
examination of validity of the arbitration agreement is also limited to the
requirement of formal validity such as the requirement that the agreement
should be in writing.
111. The use of the term ‘examination’ under Section 11(6-A) as
distinguished from the use of the term ‘rule’ under Section 16 implies that
the scope of enquiry under section 11(6-A) is limited to a prima facie
scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration agreement, and does not include
a contested or laborious enquiry, which is left for the arbitral tribunal to
‘rule’ under Section 16. The prima facie view on existence of the
arbitration agreement taken by the referral court does not bind either the
arbitral tribunal or the court enforcing the arbitral award.
112. The aforesaid approach serves a two-fold purpose - firstly, it allows
the referral court to weed out non-existent arbitration agreements, and
secondly, it protects the jurisdictional competence of the arbitral tribunal
to rule on the issue of existence of the arbitration agreement in depth.
113. Referring to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Arbitration
and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, it was observed in In Re :
Interplay (supra) that the High Court and the Supreme Court at the stage
of appointment of arbitrator shall examine the existence of a prima facie
arbitration agreement and not any other issues. The relevant observations
are extracted hereinbelow:
“209. The above extract indicates that the Supreme Court or High
Court at the stage of the appointment of an arbitrator shall
“examine the existence of a prima facie arbitration agreement and
not other issues”. These other issues not only pertain to the validity
of the arbitration agreement, but also include any other issues which
are a consequence of unnecessary judicial interference in the
arbitration proceedings. Accordingly, the “other issues” also include
examination and impounding of an unstamped instrument by the
referral court at the Section 8 or Section 11 stage. The process of
examination, impounding, and dealing with an unstamped instrument
under the Stamp Act is not a timebound process, and therefore does
not align with the stated goal of the Arbitration Act to ensure
expeditious and time-bound appointment of arbitrators. […]”
(Emphasis supplied)
114. In view of the observations made by this Court in In Re : Interplay
(supra), it is clear that the scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of
arbitrator is limited to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the
arbitration agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it
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difficult to hold that the observations made in Vidya Drolia (supra) and
adopted in NTPC v. SPML (supra) that the jurisdiction of the referral
court when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and frivolous
disputes would continue to apply despite the subsequent decision in In Re :
Interplay (supra).
xxx
xxx
xxx
117. By referring disputes to arbitration and appointing an arbitrator by
exercise of the powers under Section 11, the referral court upholds and
gives effect to the original understanding of the contracting parties that
the specified disputes shall be resolved by arbitration. Mere appointment
of the arbitral tribunal doesn't in any way mean that the referral court is
diluting the sanctity of “accord and satisfaction” or is allowing the
claimant to walk back on its contractual undertaking. On the contrary, it
ensures that the principal of arbitral autonomy is upheld and the
legislative intent of minimum judicial interference in arbitral proceedings
is given full effect. Once the arbitral tribunal is constituted, it is always
open for the defendant to raise the issue of “accord and satisfaction”
before it, and only after such an objection is rejected by the arbitral
tribunal, that the claims raised by the claimant can be adjudicated.
118. Tests like the “eye of the needle” and “ex-facie meritless”, although
try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they require the
referral court to examine contested facts and appreciate prima facie
evidence (however limited the scope of enquiry may be) and thus are not in
conformity with the principles of modern arbitration which place arbitral
autonomy and judicial non-interference on the highest pedestal.
119. Appointment of an arbitral tribunal at the stage of Section 11 petition
also does not mean that the referral courts forego any scope of judicial
review of the adjudication done by the arbitral tribunal. The Act, 1996
clearly vests the national courts with the power of subsequent review by
which the award passed by an arbitrator may be subjected to challenge by
any of the parties to the arbitration
xxx
xxx
xxx
127. In Arif Azim (supra), while deciding an application for appointment
of arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996, two issues had arisen
for our consideration:
i. Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to an application for
appointment of arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996? If yes, whether the petition filed by M/s. Arif
Azim was barred by limitation?
ii. Whether the court may decline to make a reference under Section
11 of Act, 1996 where the claims are ex-facie and hopelessly timebarred?
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ARB.P. 1965/2025
128. On the first issue, it was observed by us that the Limitation Act, 1963
is applicable to the applications filed under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996.
Further, we also held that it is the duty of the referral court to examine
that the application under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996 is not barred by
period of limitation as prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act,
1963, i.e., 3 years from the date when the right to apply accrues in favour
of the applicant. To determine as to when the right to apply would accrue,
we had observed in paragraph 56 of the said decision that “the limitation
period for filing a petition under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996 can only
commence once a valid notice invoking arbitration has been sent by the
applicant to the other party, and there has been a failure or refusal on
part of that other party in complying with the requirements mentioned in
such notice.”
129. Insofar as the first issue is concerned, we are of the opinion that the
observations made by us in Arif Azim (supra) do not require any
clarification and should be construed as explained therein.
130. On the second issue it was observed by us in paragraph 67 that the
referral courts, while exercising their powers under Section 11 of the Act,
1996, are under a duty to “prima-facie examine and reject non -arbitrable
or dead claims, so as to protect the other party from being drawn into a
time-consuming and costly arbitration process.”
131. Our findings on both the aforesaid issues have been summarised in
paragraph 89 of the said decision thus:“89. Thus, from an exhaustive analysis of the position of law on the
issues, we are of the view that while considering the issue of limitation
in relation to a petition under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996, the
courts should satisfy themselves on two aspects by employing a twopronged test - first, whether the petition under Section 11(6) of the
Act, 1996 is barred by limitation; and secondly, whether the claims
sought to be arbitrated are ex-facie dead claims and are thus barred
by limitation on the date of commencement of arbitration proceedings.
If either of these issues are answered against the party seeking
referral of disputes to arbitration, the court may refuse to appoint an
arbitral tribunal.”
132. Insofar as our observations on the second issue are concerned, we
clarify that the same were made in light of the observations made by this
Court in many of its previous decisions, more particularly in Vidya Drolia
(supra) and NTPC v. SPML (supra). However, in the case at hand, as is
evident from the discussion in the preceding parts of this judgment, we
have had the benefit of reconsidering certain aspects of the two decisions
referred to above in the light of the pertinent observations made by a
seven-Judge Bench of this Court in In Re : Interplay (supra).
133. Thus, we clarify that while determining the issue of limitation in
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ARB.P. 1965/2025
exercise of the powers under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996, the referral
court should limit its enquiry to examining whether Section 11 (6)
application has been filed within the period of limitation of three years or
not. The date of commencement of limitation period for this purpose shall
have to be construed as per the decision in Arif Azim (supra). As a natural
corollary, it is further clarified that the referral courts, at the stage of
deciding an application for appointment of arbitrator, must not conduct an
intricate evidentiary enquiry into the question whether the claims raised
by the applicant are time barred and should leave that question for
determination by the arbitrator. Such an approach gives true meaning to
the legislative intention underlying Section 11(6-A) of the Act, and also to
the view taken in In Re : Interplay (supra).
134. The observations made by us in Arif Azim (supra) are accordingly
clarified. We need not mention that the effect of the aforesaid clarification
is only to streamline the position of law, so as to bring it in conformity
with the evolving principles of modern-day arbitration, and further to
avoid the possibility of any conflict between the two decisions that may
arise in future. These clarifications shall not be construed as affecting the
verdict given by us in the facts of Arif Azim (supra), which shall be given
full effect to notwithstanding the observations made herein.”
6.
In light of the aforesaid judgments, I am of view that there is no
impediment in appointing the arbitrator since existence of the arbitration
agreement is not in dispute. However, it is open to the Respondent to raise
the objection of the claims of the Petitioner being allegedly ex facie time
barred or deadwood before the Arbitrator.
7.
Coming to the next issue as to whether Arbitrator can be appointed by
the authority designated in the Arbitration Clause 35 i.e. Director (Medical),
ESIC, this need not detain this Court. It is settled that an Arbitrator cannot
be appointed by a person interested in the outcome of the dispute and this
being unilateral appointment will be untenable in law in light of the
judgements of the Supreme Court in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and
Another v. HSCC (India) Limited, (2020) 20 SCC 760; Central
Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV)
a Joint Venture Company, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3219; Hindustan
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Petroleum Corporation Limited v. BCL Secure Premises Private Limited,
(2026) 3 SCC 711; and Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others
v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 SCC Online SC 7. Therefore, to this
extent Clause 35 is void and unenforceable albeit this will not dent the
substantive agreement to refer the disputes to arbitration. Therefore, the
Arbitrator has to be appointed by the Court in exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 11(6) of 1996 Act.
8.
Accordingly, Ms. Sukriti Mago, Advocate (Mobile No. 9999413737)
is appointed as Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the
parties. Fee of the Arbitrator shall be fixed as per Fourth Schedule of 1996
Act, as agreed between the parties. The objection of the Respondent that the
claims of the Petitioner are allegedly ex facie time barred or deadwood may
be raised before the Arbitrator and as and when raised, they will be decided
in accordance with law.
9.
Learned Arbitrator shall give disclosure under Section 12 of 1996 Act
before entering upon reference.
10.
It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the case and all rights and contentions of the respective parties are
left open.
11.
It is left open to the Respondent to prefer a counter claim, if any,
before the learned Arbitrator.
12.
Petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
JYOTI SINGH, J
OCTOBER 5, 2026/YA
Digitally Signed
By:KAMAL KUMAR
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ARB.P. 1965/2025
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