Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
Appellate Side
21.07.2026
S/L 50
Court No. 4
(Naba)
W.P.S.T. 233 of 2025
Ayan Ghosh
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
Mr. Sarosij Dasgupta,
Mr. Bikramjit Mandal
...the Petitioner
Ms. Chandreyi Alam, ld. A.G.P.,
Ms. Runu Mukherjee
...the State
Ms. Shraboni Sarkar,
Ms. Umme Habiba Khatun
...the P.S.C., W.B.
1.
Heard the learned advocate for the writ petitioner
and the learned A.G.P. appearing on behalf of the
State. The Commission is also represented.
2.
The writ petitioner was the applicant before the
West Bengal Administrative Tribunal („Tribunal‟
for short) in O.A. No. 73 of 2024, filed seeking the
relief
of
quashing
of
the
entire
disciplinary
proceeding initiated against the writ petitioner
vide
charge-memo
dated
26.04.2019.
The
substance of the allegations in the charge-memo
was conduct of an auction by the petitioner while
working as a Divisional Forest Officer and Ex-
Officio Divisional Manager of the West Bengal
Forest
Development
Corporation
Limited
(hereinafter referred to as „the Corporation‟). The
charge alleged irregularity in conduct of the
auction below the fixed reserved price with the
mala
fide
intention
on
part
of
the
writ
petitioner/applicant.
3.
While the proceeding was pending before the
Tribunal, the order of punishment was passed by
the disciplinary authority on 15.04.2024, whereby
and whereunder the petitioner was awarded the
punishment in the following terms :
“the pay of the Charged Officer, Shri Ayan
Ghosh be reduced to 03(three) stages lower
in the current pay band for a period of
03(three) years under Rule 8(iv) of West
Bengal Services (Classification, Control &
Appeal) Rules, 1971 and during the period
of such reduction, he will not earn any
increment of pay, and the reduction of pay
will not have the postponing effect; and (ii)
A total amount of Rs. 82,872/ - be
recovered from Shri Ayan Ghosh under
Rule 8(iii) of West Bengal Services
(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules,
1971 in 8(eight) number of instalments;”
4.
In
view
of
the
punishment
passed
during
pendency of the Original Application, the Tribunal
has disposed of the Original Application without
passing any orders on the petitioner‟s claim raised
in the O.A. The order of the Tribunal dated
16.05.2024, passed in O.A. No. 73 of 2024 is the
subject matter of the present writ proceeding.
5.
Passing of the impugned order by the Tribunal
and its sustainability cannot be considered in
isolation. The same is required to be considered
keeping
in
background
the
facts
and
circumstances under which the O.A. was filed.
6.
Thus, it is pertinent to take note of filing of an
earlier Original Application bearing O.A. No.477 of
2023, wherein the writ petitioner being aggrieved
by the inordinate delay in conclusion of the selfsame
departmental
proceeding
invoked
the
Tribunal‟s jurisdiction. The Tribunal was pleased
to direct :
“In the event, if this disciplinary
proceeding is not concluded within six
months from the date of communication of
this order, the Tribunal will consider the
entire disciplinary proceeding as vitiated.
Accordingly,
the
application
is
disposed of.”
7.
In view of such order being passed by the Tribunal
the proceeding arising out of the charge-memo
dated 26.04.2019, was required to be concluded
by 24.01.2024. The admitted position is that the
proceeding
was
concluded
thereafter
i.e.
on
15.04.2024. In between passing of the order by
the Tribunal and conclusion of the proceedings by
order of the disciplinary authority, the second
O.A. No. 73 of 2024 was filed, order of which is
the subject matter of the present proceeding.
8.
The primary issue, therefore, arises whether a
second O.A. was required to be filed by the
petitioner having regard to the order passed in
O.A. No. 477 of 2023. The order passed in O.A.
No. 477 of 2023 leaves no ambiguity as to the fate
of the departmental proceedings in case of failure
on the part of the disciplinary authority to
conclude the proceeding within the six months‟
period, specified therein. The order had a clear
mandate of the proceedings being vitiated in case
of failure to pass an order within the timeframe.
9.
Be that as it may, the fact remains that the
petitioner filed a second O.A. seeking the relief of
quashing of the departmental proceedings, and it
is during pendency of this proceeding that the
order of punishment was passed. The order of
punishment
was
passed
by
the
disciplinary
authority beyond the time fixed for passing of
such an order in terms of the Tribunal‟s earlier
order, without seeking any extension of the time
granted by the Tribunal in the earlier order dated
25.07.2023 in O.A. No. 477 of 2023.
10. Therefore, whether the disciplinary authority‟s
order of punishment passed beyond the time limit
fixed by the Tribunal, and without seeking an
extension of the time for passing of such an order
is
sustainable
or
not
was
required
to
be
considered by the Tribunal.
11. The learned advocate for the writ petitioner has
drawn attention of the Court towards a judgement
dated 18.05.2025, passed by this Court in the
case of State of West Bengal & Ors. Versus
Biswanath Das in W.P.S.T. No. 122 of 2023.
Copy of the judgment was passed on to the Court
after service upon the learned A.G.P. Relying upon
decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in
the case of State of Uttar Pradesh through
Principal
Secretary,
Panchayati
Raj,
Department
Lucknow
Versus
of
Ram
Prakash Singh reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 891, this Court dealing with the same issue,
whether an order could be passed after lapse of
the time fixed; and without seeking an extension
of the time fixed for passing of an order held :
“33. The apex court also held that if the
order fixing a time for conclusion of
proceeding is coupled with a rider that, in
default the proceeding would stand lapsed,
then the disciplinary authority in such a
case would cease to have jurisdiction to
proceed further. Unless of course the
application is made for recall of the default
clause on genuine grounds, and the recall
is allowed. Having laid down the law in this
regard, the Apex court proceeded to hold:
“63. We also hold that continuation
of disciplinary proceedings beyond
the time stipulated by a tribunal/court
could invite interdiction if no bona
fide attempt is shown to have been
made to seek an extension of time.
However, much would depend on the
facts of each case and it may not be
possible to lay down a common
formula applicable to each case. In
an
exceptional
tribunal/court
case,
would
the
have
the
discretion to overlook the laxity and
make such direction as it deems fit in
the circumstances.
64. The answer to the fourth issue, in
view of our discussion, has to be in
favour of the respondent and against
the appellant. Without an extension
of time, no order of punishment could
have been validly made and the
grievance of the respondent in this
behalf is absolutely legitimate.”
34. In the present case a plea was raised
that an extension of time could not be filed
due
to
the
intervening
circumstances
arising out of national lockdown imposed
on account of COVID 19 pandemic. An
attempt is made to justify the delay in
approaching
the
Tribunal
by
placing
reliance on the decision of the Special
Bench of this Court in WPA 5323 of 2020.
The reliance placed by the Special Bench
judgment is thoroughly misplaced in our
opinion since the judgment is of 23.02.2022.
The time stipulated by the Tribunal had
lapsed long prior thereto in the last week of
June
2021.
The
authorities
therefore
cannot derived any substance from the
Special Bench Order dated 23.02.2022
passed in WPA 5323 of 2020.”
12. Upon consideration of the legal position, we find
that extension of the time could have been prayed
for by the respondents, but within the time limit
fixed by the Tribunal in O.A. No. 477 of 2023. The
judgement contemplates making of an application
even
thereafter,
but
in
“exceptional”
circumstances.
13. In the present case, no application whatsoever
was made for extension of the time (6 months) for
concluding the departmental proceeding. The
Tribunal,
however,
accepted
the
delayed
punishment order on the premise that the delay
was only two months twenty-one days and that
the delay was despite due diligence on the part of
the authorities.
14. Having regard to the judgement of the Co-ordinate
Bench relying upon decision of the Apex Court, it
is clear that the disciplinary authority ceased to
have jurisdiction to proceed further with the
matter after lapse of the timeframe specified in the
order passed in O.A. No. 477 of 2023. There being
no extension whatsoever, there was no occasion
for the Tribunal to accept the order of punishment
recorded after lapse of the timeframe specified in
O.A. No. 477 of 2023.
15. We, therefore, hold that the proceeding stood
vitiated/lapsed in terms of the order passed in
O.A. No. 477 of 2023, on account of failure by the
disciplinary authority to conclude the proceeding
within the time specified therein.
16. In Ram Prakash Singh (supra) and in the case of
Biswanath Das (supra) the law has already been
stated to the effect that if the Tribunal/Court
stipulates a fixed time for conclusion of an
enquiry or proceedings for disciplinary action and
the same ought to be concluded with a rider that
in default the proceeding will stand lapsed. In
Ram Prakash Singh (supra) it was held “62….
the disciplinary authority in such a case would
cease to have the jurisdiction to proceed further
unless, of course, citing genuine grounds, a recall of
such default clause is sought and obtained to
proceed further in accordance with law…”. In the
present case, as noted above the order of the
Tribunal contemplates that in case of failure to
conclude the proceeding within six months from
the date of communication of the order passed by
the Tribunal, the Tribunal would consider the
entire disciplinary proceeding as vitiated. The
expression vitiated is defined in Black‟s Law
Dictionary, 11th Edition “1. To impair; to cause to
have no force or effect ….. 2. To make void or
voidable; to invalidate either completely or in
part…” Therefore, there can be no gain saying a
fact that the order of the Tribunal passed in O.A.
No. 477 of 2023 contemplated a lapse of the
proceeding if not concluded within the six months‟
time frame specified in the order. In absence of
any extension of the time frame, we hold that
order of punishment passed by the disciplinary
authority was without jurisdiction. Order of the
disciplinary
authority
unsustainable
in
view
dated
of
the
15.04.2024,
legal
is
position
considered hereinabove and is hereby quashed.
17. The petitioner would be entitled to monetary
benefits,
as
a
result
of
quashing
of
the
punishment order.
18. The order of the Tribunal is set aside. The Writ
Petition is allowed.
19. There will be no order as to costs.
20. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if
applied for, be supplied to the parties upon
compliance with all requisite formalities.
(Madhuresh Prasad, J.)
(Prasenjit Biswas, J.)
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review