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2026:JHHC:1076
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Misc. Appeal No. 470 of 2025
Awadhesh Kumar Tiwary, aged about 58 years, son of Late
Maksudan Tiwary, resident of Qtr. No. F-82, Mandir Colony, P.O.
and P.S. Dugda, District Bokaro (owner of alleged offending
Ambassador Car).
…
…
…
Appellant
Versus
1. Vijay Kumar Jaiswal son of Late Anant Lal Jaiswal, resident of
Village Dugda, Tola Chandwadih, P.O. and P.S. Dugda, District
Bokaro.
2. Ajay Kumar Jaiswal, son of Late Anant Lal Jaiswal, resident of
Village Dugda, Tola Chandwadih, P.O. and P.S. Dugda, District
Bokaro (Owner of Motorcycle No. JH-10B-5772). … Respondents
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
--------For the Appellant
: Mr. Atanu Banerjee, Advocate
For the Respondent No.1: Mr. Jiten Kumar Dey, Advocate
Mr. Basu Kumar Dey, Advocate.
For the Respondent No.2: Miss. Pragati Prasad, Advocate
08/Dated:15.01.2026
---------
1.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2.
With the consent of and at the request of the learned counsel
for the parties, this appeal is taken up for final disposal.
3.
This appeal challenges the judgment and Award dated
19.09.2024 made by the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Bermo at
Tenughat.
4.
By the impugned judgment and Award, the Tribunal has
awarded one Mr. Vijay Kumar Jaiswal (respondent No. 1)
compensation of Rs. 3,24,314/- along with simple interest @ 7 per
cent per annum from the date of filing of the complaint petition i.e.
31.07.2004 till realization of the same from the appellant herein for
the disability suffered by the 1st respondent after being involved in a
vehicular accident which occurred on 24.11.2003 in which the first
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respondent was alleged to have suffered medical as well as
functional disability of 51 per cent.
5.
Earlier, vide judgment and Award dated 30.07.2018, the same
compensation had been awarded to the 1st respondent. However,
that Award was set aside by this Court vide judgment and order dated
22.11.2023 in M.A. No. 597 of 2018 and the matter was remanded to
the Tribunal to examine any member of the Medical Board constituted
in this case for issuing the Disability Certificate to the first respondent
and decide the case afresh in the light of the guideline issued by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar &
Anr., (2011) 1 SCC 343.
6.
Pursuant to the above remand, the impugned judgment and
award have been made after examining Dr Mahendra Prasad, one of
the members of the Medical Board, as was directed by this Court in
its judgment and order dated 22.11.2023.
7.
Mr. Atanu Banerjee learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that in this case, there was no evidence of the appellant’s vehicle
being involved in the accident. He submitted that, though the first
respondent claimed that the accident occurred on 24.11.2003, the
complaint was filed only on 17.04.2004. Ultimately, the appellant was
acquitted on 29.03.2007, and the judgment of acquittal is a part of the
record, as Exhibit-E. He submitted that there was no independent
evidence or witnesses in support of the appellant’s vehicle being
involved in the accident.
8.
Mr Banerjee, without prejudice, submitted that even if the first
respondent’s
motorcycle
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did
come
and
hit
the
appellant’s
2026:JHHC:1076
Ambassador car, there was no evidence that this impact was
responsible for any alleged injuries or disabilities that the first
respondent claims he suffered. He has submitted that in fact the
appellant’s vehicle was stationary and it was the first respondent who
came and collided with the same.
9.
Mr. Banerjee submitted that the impugned Award ignores the
distinction between the medical disability and the functional disability.
Both disabilities have been equated, in breach of the law laid down in
Raj Kumar (Supra). For this reason, the impugned Award warrants
interference.
10.
Mr Banerjee finally submitted that the falsity of the first
respondent’s claim becomes evident because no prescription or
medical document has been produced, only bills from pharmacies or
cash memos. He submitted that no claim should have been allowed
based upon such sketchy evidence. He further submitted that there
was no explanation by the first respondent as to why the first
respondent obtained treatment in Dhanbad when the accident took
place in Dugda in Bokaro district.
11.
For all the above reasons, Mr. Banerjee submitted that this
appeal should be allowed and the impugned judgment and Award
should be set aside.
12.
Mr Basu Kumar Dey, the learned counsel for the first
respondent (claimant), submitted that in this case, soon after the
accident, the appellant assured that he would finance the medical
treatment and therefore, there may have been some delay in filing the
complaint. He submitted that this is reflected in the ‘punchnama’,
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which is part of the record at Exhibit-2. He submitted that an acquittal
in a criminal case is not particularly relevant, as criminal trials are
decided on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He submitted that the
proceedings for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act are to be
decided on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities.
13.
Mr Basu Kumar Dey submitted that in this case, the impugned
Award specifically refers to the aspect of functional disability, but after
considering the nature of duties that were being discharged by the
first respondent and the disability suffered, concludes that the
functional disability would be equal to the medical disability.
Therefore, he submits that no incorrect principle has been applied.
14.
Mr Dey submitted that there is ample evidence on record to
establish the accident and the fact that the first respondent suffered
permanent disablement of 51 per cent on account of the injuries
sustained in the said accident. He submitted that the compensation
has been determined conservatively, if not incorrectly, because no
provision has been made for future prospects. Accordingly, Mr Dey
submitted that this appeal may be dismissed, but the compensation
amount may be enhanced.
15.
Mrs. Pragati Prasad learned counsel for the second respondent
adopted the arguments of Mr. Dey, the learned counsel for the first
respondent.
16.
The rival contentions now fall for determination.
17.
In this case, there is ample evidence on record to establish the
factum of the accident and that the first respondent suffered injuries
resulting in his 51 per cent disablement on account of the accident
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that took place on 24.11.2003 involving an accident with the
appellant’s motor vehicle. Such evidence is both oral and
documentary. The fact that the complaint was filed, was ultimately
registered as an F.I.R., and, after investigation, the police authorities
deemed it appropriate to charge-sheet the appellant is one of the
pieces of evidence that could have been considered and has been
correctly considered.
18.
Though, there was some delay in filing the complaint, the same
has been explained by the first respondent and the explanation,
particularly, when considered with the ‘punchnama’ on record, cannot
be said to be moonshine or unacceptable. The subsequent acquittal
in the criminal case is also not quite relevant. It is well settled that
criminal trials are adjudicated on the touchstone of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. In contrast, claims under the Motor Vehicles Act
are adjudicated on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities.
Therefore, based upon the subsequent acquittal, there is no ground
to hold that the accident was not on account of any rashness or
negligence on the part of the appellant.
19.
After the remand, Dr. Mahendra Prasad was examined on
behalf of the first respondent (claimant). Admittedly, he was a
member of the Medical Board, which had certified that the first
respondent had 51 per cent bodily disabilities. Evidence of Dr.
Mahendra Prasad is considered in detail in paragraphs 5, 8 and other
paragraphs of the impugned Award. This is not a case where the
Tribunal has mechanically equated the medical disability with the
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functional disability in breach of the principles laid down in the case of
Raj Kumar (Supra).
20.
The Tribunal has given due weight to the Doctor’s evidence that
the first respondent was capable of performing his work with his hand
and could move freely with the help of a stick. However, the Tribunal
has also noted that the first respondent was working as an Assistant
in a T.V./Fridge shop owned by his brother, where it would be normal
for him to have to bend down or climb stairs to lift heavy
articles/object. The Tribunal noted that with hip injury and disability of
almost 51 per cent, it would not be possible for the first respondent to
do all the tasks which he could otherwise easily do before the
accident for earning his livelihood. Therefore, the finding that the
medical and functional disability being at par is not a product of some
non-application of mind or the misapplication of the law laid down in
the case of Raj Kumar (Supra).
21.
The Tribunal in this case has determined the compensation
amount extremely conservatively. No addition has been made
towards future prospects. Therefore, there is no case made out to
interfere with the compensation amount determined in this matter.
The Tribunal has awarded only compensation of Rs. 3,24,314/-, with
interest at 7 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the claim
petition.
22.
There is no case made out to interfere with the impugned
judgment and Award and this appeal is liable to be dismissed.
23.
Though the accident took place on 24.11.2003, to date, it
appears that the first respondent has not been paid any
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2026:JHHC:1076
compensation. Even at the time of securing a stay, the appellant has
not deposited any amount. Even today, while I was inclined to order a
deposit, the submission made was that the appeal itself be taken up
for final hearing since the execution was already pending. The appeal
was accordingly taken up for final hearing.
24.
In the peculiar circumstances of this case, a direction is liable to
be issued to the appellant to deposit the entire awarded amount in
this Court within four weeks without insisting upon the first
respondent pursuing the execution petition. This is, unless, of course,
the appellant secures a stay on the judgment and order just
pronounced in the meantime.
25.
The amount should be deposited in this Court within four weeks
with due intimation to the learned counsel for the first respondent.
Upon deposit, the learned counsel for the first respondent must
furnish bank and identity details of the first respondent to the Registry
of this Court so that the Registry can transfer this amount directly into
the first respondent’s Bank account.
26.
This appeal is dismissed. Though the appeal is dismissed, the
matter should be posted for reporting compliance on 19.02.2026. In
any event, the stay on the execution is also vacated. No order as to
costs. Pending Interlocutory Application no longer survives and is
accordingly disposed of.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
15.01.2026
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