Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2025:MLHC:522-DB
Serial No.01
Daily List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Arb.A.No.1/2024
Date of CAV
: 20.05.2025
Date of pronouncement : 19.06.2025
Astra Construction Pvt. Ltd.
..... Appellant
Vs.
North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd. (NEEPCO)
Coram:
..... Respondent
Hon’ble Mr. Justice I.P. Mukerji, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellant
: Mr. P. Jain, Adv with
Ms. S. Nair, Adv
For the Respondent
: Mr. K. Agarwal, Sr.Adv with
Mr. D. Senapati, Adv
Dr. P. Agarwal, Adv
F
i)
Whether approved for
reporting in Law journals etc.:
Yes/No
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Note: For proper public information and transparency, any media
reporting this judgment is directed to mention the
composition of the bench by name of judges, while reporting
this judgment/order.
2025:MLHC:522-DB
JUDGMENT
(Delivered by the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice)
A point of some impotance is involved in this appeal.
There were arbitral proceedings between the parties resulting in an
arbitral award in favour of the appellant. In the award the Arbitral Tribunal
granted pre-reference and pendente lite interest on awarded claims.
This award was challenged by the respondent in an application
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short the
“Act of 1996”) before the learned Commercial Court, East Khasi Hills,
Shillong. The learned judge by a judgment and order dated 15 th February,
2024 upheld the substantive part of the award but set aside the grant of prereference and pendente lite interest, the ground being that clause 54 of the
terms and conditions of the contract between the parties read with Section
31(7) of the Act of 1996 prohibited grant of such interest.
The Appellant appeals to this Court from that part of the judgment
and order against them. The respondent has not preferred any appeal from
the part upholding the award.
Therefore, the issue in this appeal was confined to the extremely
small area relating to grant of pre-reference and pendente lite interest.
2025:MLHC:522-DB
I set out Section 31 (7) of the Act of 1996 below:
31. Form and contents of arbitral award. – …
(7) (a) unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and in so far
as an arbitral award is for the payment of money, the arbitral
tribunal may include in the sum for which the award is made
interest, at such rate as it deems reasonable, on the whole or any
part of the money, for the whole or any part of the period between
the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which
the award is made.
(b) a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall,
unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of two
per cent higher than the current rate of interest prevalent on the
date of award, from the date of award to the date of payment.
Explanation. – The expression “current rate of interest” shall
have the same meaning as assigned to it under clause (b) of
section 2 of the Interest Act, 1978 (14 of 1978)”.
One has to first look at the terms of the contract between the
parties, namely clause 54 of the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) to
examine whether it bars and if yes, to what extent an interest claim before
the arbitral tribunal.
Clause 54 of the contract is in the following terms:
“54.0 No Claim for Delayed Payment due to Dispute Etc.
No claims for interest or damages will be entertained by the
Corporation with respect to any money or balance which may be
lying with the Corporation owing to any dispute, difference or
misunderstanding between the Engineer-in-Charge on the one hand
and contractor on the other or with respect to any delay on the part
of the Engineer-in-Charge making periodical or final payments or
in any other respect whatsoever.”
What is the impact of clause 54 on any claim for interest?
2025:MLHC:522-DB
Section 31 (7) clearly states that unless expressly agreed to the
contrary by the parties, the arbitral tribunal would have power to grant prereference and post-arbitral interest.
Assuming that the clause expressly barred grant of interest, on any
claim whether by conduct, the respondent revoked this prohibition?
Similarly, worded clauses fell for consideration over several years
before the Supreme Court.
The main question before the court was the meaning to be ascribed
to the words “or in any other respect whatsoever”.
In State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra & Co with a connected matter
reported in (1999) 1 SCC 63 the contract term was as follows:
“1.9 No claim for delayed payment due to dispute etc.–No claim
for interest or damages will be entertained by the Government with
respect to any moneys or balances which may be lying with the
Government owing to any dispute, difference; or misunderstanding
between the Engineer-in-Charge in marking periodical or final
payments or in any other respect whatsoever.”
The view expressed by Mr. Justice Majumdar was:
“10. A mere look at the clause shows that the claim for interest by
way of damages was not to be entertained against the Government
with respect to only a specified type of amount, namely, any
moneys or balances which may be lying with the Government
owing to any dispute, difference between the Engineer-in-Charge
and the contractor; or misunderstanding between the Engineer-inCharge and the contractor in marking periodical or final payments
or in any other respect whatsoever. The words “or in any other
2025:MLHC:522-DB
respect whatsoever” also referred to the dispute pertaining to the
moneys or balances which may be lying with the Government
pursuant to the agreement meaning thereby security deposit or
retention money or any other amount which might have been with
the Government and refund of which might have been withheld by
the Government. The claim for damages or claim for payment for
the work done and which was not paid for would not obviously
cover any money which may be said to by lying with the
Government. Consequently, on the express language of this clause,
there is no prohibition which could be culled out against the
respondent-contractor that he could not raise the claim for interest
by way of damages before the arbitrator on the relevant items
placed for adjudication. …..”
The issue once again engaged the attention of the Supreme Court in
Sayeed Ahmed & Company v. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors reported in
(2009) 12 SCC 26. The case of Harish Chandra was placed before the
Supreme Court. The Court distinguished Harish Chandra on facts
observing that “a different version of clause G-1.09 was considered …
but in the present case, clause G-1.09 is significantly different … the bar
under clause G-1.09 in this case being absolute, the decision in Harish
Chandra will not assist the appellant in any manner”.
Ratio decidendi is the legal reasoning process by which the
conclusion or the decision in a case is made by a judge. It is only these
reasons which are binding on a court below. Obviously, if the facts of
another case are absolutely similar to the facts of a previous case decided
2025:MLHC:522-DB
by a superior court, a judge of the court below is required to apply the
same legal reasoning or ratio decidendi and come to the same conclusion.
This principle ensures uniformity and consistency in the justice delivery
system. Ratio decidendi is quite different from res judicata which is a
decision on facts by a court between the same parties. That decision on
facts is binding on those parties and cannot be regurgitated in a
subsequent proceeding between them, but does not bind any third party.
It follows from the above that once the facts are different a court is
not bound by the ratio decidendi of a superior court in an earlier case and
is required to apply the law on the given facts.
In my opinion, interpretation and application of clause 54 is partly
in the realm of interpretation and ascertainment of a term of the contract
which is factual in nature and partly legal reasoning based on those facts.
In Jaiprakash Associates Limited (JAL) through its Director v.
Tehri Hydro Development Corporation (India) Limited (THDC)
through its Director reported in (2019) 17 SCC 786, a three-judge bench
of the Supreme Court, once again, considered this clause as in the Sayeed
case and came to the following conclusion:
2025:MLHC:522-DB
“21. It is also pertinent to note that the judgment in Sayeed Ahmed
& Co. distinguishing the restrictive wording in Harish Chandra
has been consistently followed by this Court in number of cases
thereafter. In this scenario, when we find that Harish Chandra
case which is of the vintage of the 1940 Act and is distinguished
in Sayeed Ahmed & Co. coupled with the fact that the ratio of
Sayeed Ahmed & Co. has been consistently followed, there is no
reason to deviate from the construction to Clauses 50 and 51 of
the GCC given by the Arbitral Tribunal in the first instance as
well as the High Court. Above all, these clauses are in pari
materia with Clauses 1.2.14 and 1.2.15 of GCC in THDC case
which was a judgment between the same parties.”
I would consider the judgment in Jaiprakash Associates Limited
(JAL) through its Director v. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation
(India) Limited (THDC) through its Director reported in (2019) 17 SCC
786 as most relevant because it copiously considered all the judgments in
the field. It approved the decision in Tehri Hydro Development
Corporation Limited & anr. v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd. reported in
(2012) 12 SCC 10.
It also considered Sayeed Ahmed & Company v. State of Uttar
Pradesh & ors reported in (2009) 12 SCC 26, Sree Kamatchi Amman
Constructions v. Railways reported in (2010) 8 SCC 767, Union of India
v. Bright Power Projects (India) Private Limited reported in (2015) 9
SCC 695, Reliance Cellulose Products Ltd. v. ONGC reported in (2018)
9 SCC 266.
2025:MLHC:522-DB
Great reliance was placed on paragraph No. 25 of the Reliance
judgment setting out paragraph Nos.18 and 19 from the Sayeed judgment
which are set out below:
“18. In Harish Chandra a different version of clause 1.09 was
considered. Having regard to the restrictive wording of that clause,
this Court held that it did not bar award of interest on a claim for
damages or a claim for payments for work done and which was not
paid. This Court held that the said clause barred award of interest
only on amounts which may be lying with the Government by way
of security deposit/retention money or any other amount, refund of
which was withheld by the Government.
19. But in the present case, Clause G1.09 is significantly different.
It specifically provides that no interest shall be payable in respect
of any money that may become due owing to any dispute,
difference or misunderstanding between the Engineer-in-charge
and contractor or with respect to any delay on the part of the
Engineer-in-Charge in making periodical or final payment or in
respect of any other respect whatsoever. The bar under Clause
G1.09 in this case being absolute, the decision in Harish Chandra
will not assist the appellant in any manner.”
The principal reason advanced by the Supreme Court in its
subsequent decisions departing from Harish Chandra was that according
to it, the clauses under consideration by it were different from Harish
Chandra. On interpretation on those clauses, it came to the conclusion, in
each of those cases, that the clause completely barred any claim for
interest. In Sayeed’s case, the Supreme Court observed that it was
considering “a different version of clause G-1.09”.
2025:MLHC:522-DB
Therefore, I am entitled to make an interpretation of clause 54.
It is in my opinion it is identical to the clause in Harish Chandra. If
one ascribes an ordinary, literal and grammatical meaning to the clause, it
states that no claim for interest would lie on any money or balance lying
with the government because of (i) a dispute regarding payment between
the Engineer-in-charge and the contractor; (ii) delay on the part of the
Engineer-in-Charge to make payment; and (iii) “any other respect
whatsoever.”
Now, (iii) is to be understood as any delayed payment which the
Corporation would be making to the contractor from the contractor’s
account with it, on account of (i) or (ii) or any other circumstance. “Any
other respect” in the clause could only refer to any other circumstance
attending delayed payment and any meaning given to it as referring to
other claims which the contractor may have against the Corporation
would be totally absurd, and a wholly erroneous understanding and
interpretation of the english language. Hence, interest claim on deferred
payment of the contractor’s money lying with the Corporation which is
held up for the above reasons is barred. It does not bar a claim for interest
on any other head or an interest on an award on such head of claim. On a
2025:MLHC:522-DB
plain, ordinary, literal and grammatical meaning of the clause only this
interpretation is tenable and reasonable in my opinion.
This meaning was ascribed to the clause in Harish Chandra’s case.
I would make the same interpretation.
Furthermore, it has been held by the Supreme Court in the other
cases that the clauses on which it denied interest claims are different from
Harish Chandra.
Therefore, on clause 54 which in my opinion is identical in
meaning to that in Harish Chandra, I am entitled to adopt the same legal
reasoning or ratio decidendi as in that case. It does not bar claims for
interest on heads of award other than those relating to payment of
withheld amounts by the Corporation. It did not bar the arbitral tribunal
from awarding interest on payment towards escalation in minimum wages
for ₹96,99,848/-, payment of 10% contractor’s profit amounting to
₹55,20,000.00/- and claim on account of idle overhead charges from
May, 1999 to 31st December, 2000 amounting to ₹32,17,741.00/-. At best
interest on the head of the award against serial no.3(a) at page 40 of the
award “payment towards unjust deductions towards reinforcement steel
and refund of amount deducted” could be denied under the above clause.
2025:MLHC:522-DB
Now, having held that clause 54 could only restrain the arbitral
tribunal from granting interest on awards on specific claims and did not
prohibit it from granting interest on other claims, I turn to the issue of
waiver.
Alternatively, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the
respondent had waived its right in the contract barring claim for interest
by its subsequent conduct. It was said that the claim of the appellant for
interest was not raised in the application under Section 11 of the Act of
1996, in the counter statement or in any argument before the learned
arbitrator. It was contended that in Union of India v. Susaka Pvt. Ltd.
reported in (2018) 2 SCC 182 the facts were similar. The point of interest
bar in the contract was not taken up to the Division Bench. The Supreme
Court held that there was waiver of this right by the Union of India and
the claim for interest was upheld.
To this learned counsel for the respondent responded by arguing
that Section 31(7) of the Act of 1996 provided for grant of interest for
pre-reference and pendente lite period unless expressly agreed. Clause 54
was the express agreement barring such claim. That agreement could only
be revoked or varied by another express agreement. Waiver could not be
2025:MLHC:522-DB
termed as an express agreement. Hence, the argument of learned counsel
for the appellant on this issue could not be sustained. He also submitted
that the point had been raised in the affidavit of the relevant application
and in the counter statement. He, however, could not deny the contention
that the point was not argued before the learned arbitrator.
In Anson’s Laws of Contract 31st edition it is stated that “a party,
who voluntarily agrees to forbear from insisting on the mode of
performance or time of performance which is provided by the contract or
forbears from so insisting will be held to have waived the right to require
that the contract be performed by the other party in accordance with its
terms”. Denning LJ in Charles Rickards L.D. v. Oppenhaim reported in
1950(1) KB 616 remarked “whether it be called waiver or forbearance on
his part, or an agreed variation or substituted performance, does not
matter. It is a kind of estoppel. By his conduct he evinced an intention to
affect their legal relation. He made, in effect, a promise not to insist on
his strict legal rights. That promise was intended to be acted on, and was
in fact acted on. He cannot afterwards go back on it”.
Therefore, the concept of waiver is based on the doctrine of
promissory estoppel.
2025:MLHC:522-DB
The plea regarding interest was taken very laconically in the
opposition to the Section 11 petition, as well as in the counter statement
and not argued before the learned arbitrator. The Supreme Court ruled
that the point regarding interest had to be specifically argued before the
arbitrator and the court and if not so done, could not be taken in a higher
forum. Mr. Justice Sapre delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court
in Susaka held that the Union having failed to urge the point from the
stage of the arbitral tribunal to the Division Bench of the High Court, was
estopped from taking the point before the Supreme Court. Just making a
cursory denial in a pleading would not do. The Union was held to have
waived it.
Here also similar was the situation. Therefore, the judgment in the
Susaka case squarely applies and the respondent is deemed to have
waived its right under clause 54 and also its defence based on this clause.
It could not take up this point in the appeal before us. Hence, the
appellant could claim and the arbitral tribunal could grant pre-reference
and pendente lite interest on any claim.
The last point which I have to deal with in this judgment relates to
Section 28(3) of the Act of 1996. It is in the following words:
2025:MLHC:522-DB
“28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.– …..
(3) While deciding and making an award, the arbitral tribunal
shall, in all cases, take into account the terms of the contract and
trade usages applicable to the transaction.”
When the legislature has enjoined the arbitral tribunal with the duty
of taking “into account the terms of the contract,” it is to be implied that
the arbitral tribunal would only be expected to consider those terms
which are placed before it and not those which are not even relied upon
by any party.
Any other interpretation of this Section would result in a most
unacceptable state of affairs. I will try to explain. The contract between
the parties contains rights and obligations. Now, if certain rights are not
urged before the arbitral tribunal, it simply means that the party in whose
favour those rights are created is not insisting on them or in other words
not insisting on enforcement of a corresponding obligation from the other
party. In other words, as very poignantly pointed out by the Supreme
Court in the Susaka’s case, those rights are to be taken as waived. To fix
the arbitrator with the duty of looking into the terms and conditions which
are not even canvassed before him would result in an award which would
be perverse. This is so because it would point to misconduct on the part
2025:MLHC:522-DB
of the arbitrator, for enforcing rights and which have been given up and
obligation which have been excused.
Hence, the arbitral tribunal rightly did not consider clause 54 of the
contract which was not even relied upon before it.
In those circumstances, this appeal succeeds. The impugned order
of the learned court below is set aside. The appeal is allowed. No order as
to costs.
(B. Bhattacharjee)
Judge
(I.P. Mukerji)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
19.06.2025
“Lam DR-PS”
LAMPHRANG KHARCHANDY
Date: 2025.06.19 01:28:32 IST
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review