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2026:CGHC:18929-DB
Digitally signed
by V
PADMAVATHI
Date: 2026.05.02
15:49:44 +0530
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 2216 of 2025
Ashwani Tiwari S/o Late Sohan Tiwari Aged About 19 Years R/o Santoshi Chowk,
Kushalpur, Near Durga Pan Palace P.S. Puranibasti Raipur District Raipur (C.G.)
--- Appellant(s)
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer Puranibasti Raipur District
Raipur (C.G.)
--- Respondent(s)
CRA No. 247 of 2026
Jitendra Sen @ Gajni S/o Santosh Sen Aged About 19 Years R/o Bazar Chowk,
Kushalpur, P.S. Purani Basti, Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
---Appellant(s)
Versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Incharge, P.S. Purani Basti, Raipur, Distt. Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
---Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------For Respective Appellants
: Shri Varun Sharma, and Shri Satya
Prakash Verma, Advocates
For Respondent/State
: Ms Vaishali Mahilang, GA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
Judgment on Board
Per Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
24.04.2026
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
Heard Shri Varun Sharma, and Shri Satya Prakash Verma, learned
counsel for the respective appellants. Also heard Ms Vaishali Mahilang,
learned Government Advocate appearing for the State.
1.
CRA- 2216 of 2025 is listed for consideration on IA -1 of 2025 whereas
CRA- 247 of 2026 is listed for consideration on IA - 3 of 2026, which are
applications for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the respective
appellants. Since appellant- Ashwani Tiwari (for short, ‘Ashwani’) is in jail
since 17.07.2025 and appellant- Jitendra Sen @ Gajni (for short, ‘Jitendra’)
is in jail since 16.09.2019, considering the detention period of the appellants,
with the consent of the parties both these appeals are being heard together
and decided finally.
2.
Both these appeals are arising out of same incident, same session trial
and a common judgment, therefore, they are being heard and decided
together.
3.
These two appeals have been filed by the respective appellants
against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.07.2025
passed by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge , Raipur in Sessions
Case-272 of 2019, whereby appellants have been convicted and sentenced
in the following manner with default stipulation and with a direction to run the
sentences concurrently.
Appellant- Ashwani Tiwari in CRA-2216 of 2025
Conviction
Under Section 302/34 IPC
Sentence
RI for life and to pay fine of
Rs.1,000/-
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
Appellant- Jitendra Sen @ Gajni in CRA-247 of 2026
4.
Conviction
Under Section 302/34 IPC
Sentence
RI for life and to pay fine of
Rs.1,000/-
Under Section 25(1-b)(B) of the
Arms Act
RI for 2 years and to pay fine of
Rs.500/-
Under Section 27 of the Arms
Act
RI for 5 years and to pay fine of
Rs.500/-
Brief facts of the case are that on 13.09.2019 in the night at the time of
Lord Ganesha immersion, in the procession, appellant- Jitendra was flirting
the ladies who were present over there.
PW2- Yuvraj slapped him and
protected the ladies from his flirting and send him away from the place.
When the procession came to Tiranga Chowk, both the appellants along with
one juvenile in conflict with law came there and started assaulting the
witness the PW2 Yuvraj. The incident was intervened by one Yogendra @
Golu Nayak (since the deceased), on which the appellant Jitendra took a
knife which he kept with him and made a knife blow on his abdomen and
thereafter they ran away from the spot. The deceased was immediately
taken to the nearest hospital and thereafter, he was shifted to the City 24
Hospital, where he declared dead.
Doctor sent merg intimation to
Moudhapara, where unnumbered merg Ex.P1 was recorded on 14.09.2019
at about 10.10hrs.
The unnumbered merg intimation was sent to the
jurisdictional Police, Purana Basti Raipur, where numbered merg intimation
Ex.P15 was recorded. The inquest Ex.P3 of the dead body of the deceased
was prepared in presence of the witnesses and the dead body was sent for
its postmortem to the Dr.Ambedkar Memorial Hospital, Raipur. Dr.M.Nirala
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
PW15 conducted the postmortem of dead body of the deceased and gave
his report Ex.P13. While conducting the postmortem, doctor noticed one
stab injury present on left side upper quadrant of abdomen 4 x 1.5cm,
intestines exposed outside from stab injury. He also noticed puncture wound
on the left side of the large intestine 2.5 x 1cm. He opined cause of the
death was due to hemorrhagic shock as a result of stab injury, nature of
death was homicidal and the injuries were antemortem in nature, caused by
hard, sharp and pointed object, sufficient to cause death. Spot map Ex.P4
was prepared by the police and Ex.P5 was prepared by the patwari. Blood
stained clothes of the deceased have been seized vide seizure memo
Ex.P6. Blood stained and plain soil have been seized from the spot vide
seizure memo Ex.P17. FIR Ex.P23 was registered against Jitendra, Ashwani
and Juvenile in conflict with law for the offence under section 302/34 of the
IPC.
Appellants were arrested on 16.09.2019 and their memorandum
statements were recorded vide Ex.P18.
statement of appellant-Jitendra,
Based on the memorandum
one steel knife has been seized vide
seizure memo Ex.P19 and his shirt and jeans have been seized vide seizure
memo Ex.P20. Knife seized from the appellant- Jitendra has been sent for
its query report to the doctor who gave his report vide Ex.P14, wherein he
opined that injuries found on the body of deceased could have been caused
by the said knife. For confirmation of blood on the knife and clothes, it has
been referred for its chemical examination from the FSL, Raipur.
Blood
stained and plain soil, T-shirt, banian, jeans and underwear of the deceased
and Trouser, T-shirt and knife seized from the appellant Jitendra were sent
for their chemical examination to the FSL Raipur from where its report
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
Ex.P.25 was received and as per the FSL report, blood was found on blood
stained soil, T-shirt and Banian of the deceased and T-shirt of the appellantJitendra.
5.
Statements of the witnesses under section 161 CrPC have been
recorded and after completion of usual investigation, charge-sheet was filed
against the appellants Jitendra and Ashwani before the learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate for the offence under Section 302/34 and Section
25 / 27 of the Arms Act. The third accused being juvenile in conflict with law,
separate charge-sheet was filed for him before the Juvenile Justice Board,
Raipur.
6.
Case was committed to the court of learned Sessions Judge, Raipur,
from where it has been transferred to the learned trial court for its trial. The
learned trail court framed charge against appellant Jitendra for the offence
under Section 302 / 34 IPC and Section 25 (1-b)(B)/ 27 of the Arms Act. The
charge against appellant-Ashwani has been framed under Section 302/34 of
IPC. The accused persons / appellants denied the charge and claimed trial.
7.
In order to prove the charge against the appellants, prosecution has
examined as many as 20 witnesses. Statement of the accused persons
under Section 313 CRPC have also been recorded in which they denied the
circumstances appearing against them, pleaded innocence and submitted
that they have been falsely implicated in the offence.
8.
After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the
prosecution, the learned trial court has convicted and sentenced the
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
appellants as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment, hence these
appeals by the appellants.
9.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Ashwani (CRA 2216 of
2025) would submit that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt against the appellant that he caused any injury to the
deceased. From the postmortem report Ex.P13, only one stab injury was
found on the body of the deceased which was caused by the co-accused
Jitendra and there is no allegation that appellant-Ashwani also assaulted the
deceased. It is not the case of the prosecution that the accused persons
have predetermination to commit murder of the deceased. Incident was
occurred in a spur of moment while the immersion procession of Lord
Ganesha was proceeded and some hot talk occurred between the persons
who present there. All of a sudden co-accused Jitendra took out his knife
and gave a knife blow on the abdomen of the deceased. There is absolutely
no evidence of their meeting of minds or pre-determination.
He would
further submit that in absence of any positive evidence with respect to
sharing common intention appellant-Ashwani cannot be convicted for the
alleged offence. Therefore, appeal of the appellant-Ashwani may be allowed
and he may be acquitted from the charge.
10.
Learned counsel for the appellant- Jitendra would submit that there are
material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution
witnesses with respect to allegation against this appellant. It was a crowded
procession and in the hot talk between the persons deceased fell down on a
sharp edged object which was lying there on the road and received injury.
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
Since it was the dispute arose earlier on the same occasion when the
witness PW2 Yuvraj slapped the accused-Jitendra, he was being implicated
in the offence that he gave knife blow on the body of the deceased. He
would further submit that the incident occurred in a heat of passion and all of
a sudden. Appellant-Jitendra has not taken any undue advantage and has
not acted in cruel or unusual manner. There was no intention to cause death
of the deceased and act of the appellant- Jitendra, if any, does not travel
beyond the scope of 304 of the IPC and therefore, he may be acquitted from
the alleged offence, or in alternative, his conviction may be altered to one
under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and his sentence may be reduced for
the period already undergone by him as he is in jail since 16.09.2019 and
has completed more than 6 years of the sentence.
11.
On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the state opposes
submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants and submitted
that but for minor omissions and contradictions, evidence of the prosecution
witnesses is reliable and sufficient to hold guilty of the appellant in the
offence in question. There are number of eye witnesses who deposed that
both these accused persons started assaulting the deceased and in that
event appellant-Jitendra gave a knife blow on the victim by which he
received injuries on his body and ultimately died. Since both the accused
persons came together and raised quarrel with PW2 Yuvraj and deceased
while intervening in the said quarrel, he was assaulted by the appellants.
The knife blow was given with such an intensity that his intestines were
perforated and came out from injured part of the body. Therefore, there is
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
sufficient and overwhelming evidence against the appellants to convict them
for the alleged offence which is rightly been done by the learned trail court
and their appeals are liable to be dismissed.
12.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused record of
the trial court.
13.
The first question for consideration would be whether the deceased
died homicidal death under unnatural circumstances, or not.
14.
In order to determine the aforesaid issue, prosecution has relied upon
the evidence of witnesses to the inquest- PW2 Yuvraj, PW3 Dinesh, PW18
Kishore Kumar, who have stated in their evidence that they saw injuries on
the body of the deceased and his clothes were pooled with blood. PW2 and
PW3 were the eye witnesses to the incident, who clearly deposed that on a
stab wound, caused by the appellants, the deceased received injuries on his
abdomen and his intestines came out from the injured part of the body. They
took him to the hospital where he died.
15.
Prosecution has also relied upon PW15-Dr.M.Nirala, who conducted
postmortem on the dead body of the deceased. He stated in his evidence
that on 14.09.2019 he conducted the postmortem of the deceased-Yogendra
@ Golu Nayak, and found one stab wound on left side upper quadrant of
abdomen. Intestines exposed from stab injury and on internal examination
large intestine was also punctured. He opined that cause of death was due
to hemorrhagic shock as a result of stab injury and injuries are antemortem
in nature, caused by hard, and pointed sharp object, sufficient to cause
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
death and nature of death was homicidal. He proved the postmortem report
Ex.P30 and also proved the query report Ex.P14 by which he opined that the
injury found on the dead body of the deceased would have been caused by
the knife which has been sent to him for its query report.
In his cross-examination he admitted that while conducting postmortem
he found that the deceased was under intoxication of liquor. He also found
alcoholic fluid in his intestines. However, the defense could not elicit any
material so that nature of death or cause of death could be disbelieved that
he has not died due to the injuries but he died from any other reason.
16.
PW16 Dr.Naveen Singh, is an Orthopedic doctor, working in Shivam
Hospital, Kushalpur. When he received information about the incident, he
rushed to the hospital and considering the seriousness of the injuries of the
deceased, he shifted him to the City 24 Hospital, Badaipara, Raipur by his
own car and thus the injuries found on the body of the deceased are also
supported by this witness, who shifted him to the City 24 Hospital.
17.
Thus, the prosecution is able to prove that the death of the deceased is
homicidal in nature due to injuries caused to him and learned trial court has
rightly considered nature of injuries and cause of death of the deceased
which are not required to be interfered with.
18.
Now, the question for consideration would be whether the appellants
herein are the perpetrators of the crime in question or not.
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
19.
In this regard prosecution has examined eyewitness PW2-Yuvraj,
PW3-Dinesh Dhruv, PW4-Chandan Thakur, PW5-Laxman Verma, PW6-Sunil
Yadav, PW7-Lokesh Kumar Dhruv, PW9-Tekchand Sharma, and PW11Narendra Kumar Dhruv, who were present on the spot. Presence of these
witnesses cannot be doubted for the reason that the incident was occurred
in a procession of Lord Ganesha and crowd was there in the procession.
When we examined evidence of all these witnesses, we find no
inconsistency in the evidence of those eye witnesses.
20.
PW2 Yuvraj is the witness with whom initial incident was occurred and
he slapped the accused appellant-Jitendra when he was flirting the ladies
present in the procession. He stated in the evidence that when he slapped
appellant-Jitendra who was creating nuisance in the Ganesh procession and
he went off from the place. When the procession reached to Tiranga Chowk,
accused-Jitendra again came there along with two other friends who are coaccused-Ashwini and Juvenile in conflict with law.
They were about to
assault him (PW2) but deceased-Yogendra alias Golu Nayak tried to stop
them and then they started altercation with him.
In that event accused
Jitendra took his knife and assaulted the deceased on his abdomen by
which his intestines came out from the injured part of the body.
Other
members of the Ganesh Samiti came there and let them flee from the place.
He and his friends Dinesh Dhru took the injured to Shivam Hospital from
where he was shifted to Badaipara Hospital.
21.
In his detailed cross examination, defense could not extract any
material to disbelieve his evidence and he firmly answered all the questions
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
put to him in his cross-examination and stuck in saying that appellant
Jitendra gave a knife blow to the deceased. He also remained firm in saying
that it was the incident arose in the immersion procession of Lord Ganesha
and the accused persons were creating nuisance by flirting the ladies
present in the procession.
In the evidence of this witness, allegation of
assault by knife is only upon Jitendra but not upon appellant Ashwani.
22.
PW3-Dinesh Dhruv has stated almost the similar statement as the
evidence PW2 Yuvraj Sahu stated. He too has stated in his evidence that
accused-Jitendra gave knife blow to the deceased by which his intestines
came out from the injured part of the body. In his cross-examination also
nothing could be elicited to disbelieve his evidence that deceased has
received injuries by any other reason and not by the assault made by
appellant-Jitendra.
23.
All the aforesaid eyewitnesses have consistently stated about the
assault made by the accused-Jitendra while the appellant’s act has been
objected by the witnesses.
24.
None of the prosecution witnesses have stated that when the
appellants came on the spot, appellant-Jitendra was having knife in his hand
which was known to the co-accused Ashwani, or that they came there with
an intention to cause death to the deceased. Rather, consistently it has
come in the evidence of the witnesses that on the first occasion when the
accused Jitendra tried to create nuisance by flirting the ladies present in the
procession, PW2 Yuvraj Sahu slapped him and send him away from there.
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
After some time, when the procession reached near Tiranga Chowk,
accused-Jitendra came there with his two friends and they again started
altercation. In between the period, appellant-Jitendra took knife and made
assault upon the deceased. There is no evidence that they were having
meeting of minds to commit murder of the deceased prior to the incident and
the assault made by the accused-Jitendra was all of a sudden.
25.
From the appellant-Ashwani, neither any blood-stained clothes nor
weapon of offence has been seized and it is only from Jitendra, bloodstained clothes and knife have been seized. Appellant-Ashwani has been
convicted for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC for sharing common
intention with the co-accused Jitendra Sen @ Gajni.
26.
To attract common intention with the co-accused who caused injury to
the deceased, prosecution should establish prior meeting of minds and the
said incident was preplanned.
27.
Upon an independent appreciation of the entire evidence on record,
this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to
establish the existence of any shared or pre-concerted intention so as to
attract the rigour of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The material on
record merely discloses that both accused persons had gone to the house of
the deceased where a quarrel ensued; however, the fatal injury was inflicted
suddenly by the co-accused, who alone produced a knife and dealt the blow.
None of the eyewitnesses have deposed that the knife in the hand of coaccused Jitendra Sen @ Gajni was visible when they came to the place of
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
occurance. There is no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to indicate
that the present accused had prior knowledge of the weapon or that he
acted in furtherance of any common intention to cause death. His conduct
does not travel beyond mere presence at the scene, and in the absence of a
prior meeting of minds or any overt act indicating participation in the assault,
the essential ingredients of Section 34 IPC remain unfulfilled. Fastening
constructive liability in such circumstances would amount to stretching the
provision beyond its settled limits. The principles enunciated in “Krishna
Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra”, AIR 1963 SC 1413 clearly
underscore that common intention cannot be inferred merely from presence
or from a sudden and independent act of a co-accused in the absence of
prior concert. Applying these settled principles, this Court finds that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against
the present accused, who is thus entitled to the benefit of doubt.
28.
In view of the evidence available on record in the present case and the
evidence of the eye witnesses, there is no prior meeting of minds to commit
murder of the deceased nor they came tothe spot preplanned. All of a
sudden in a spur of moment incident took place and assault made by
Jitendra by knife. There is no allegation against appellant- Ashwani that he
also intended to cause death of the deceased and there is no evidence of
any common intention, yet the learned trial court has convicted appellantAshwani for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC with the aid of Section
34 of the IPC.
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
29.
In the case of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another Vs State
of Uttarakhand with Ashad Singh Negi Vs State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5
SCC 433, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the earlier decisions of
the scope of applicability of Section 34 of the IPC, held in para 30 of its
judgement as under:
“30.By now it is a settled principle of law that for convicting the
accused with the aid of Section 34 IPC the prosecution must
establish prior meetings of minds. It must be established that all
the accused had pre-planned and shared a common intention to
commit the crime with the accused who has actually committed the
crime. It must be established that the criminal act has been done in
furtherance of the common intention of all the accused. Reliance in
support of the aforesaid proposition could be placed on the
following judgments of this Court in the cases of:
(i) Ezajhussain Sabdarhussain v. State of Gujarat;
(ii) Jasdeep Singh v. State of Punjab;
(iii) Gadadhar Chandra v. State of W.B.; and
(iv) Madhusudan v. State of M.P.”
30.
Considering the evidence available on record and also in view of the
aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of
Constable 907 Surendra Singh (supra), we are of the considered opinion
that there is no act of appellant-Ashwani which attributed to cause any injury
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
to the deceased and it is the appellant-Jitendra who alone is responsible for
causing stab injury to the deceased, by which he died. Therefore, appellant
Ashwani is entitled for “benefit of doubt” and his appeal is allowed
accordingly.
31.
So far as involvement of the appellant-Jitendra is concerned, his
involvement and assault made by him to the deceased has been
consistently deposed by the eye witnesses-
PW2-Yuvraj, PW3-Dinesh
Dhruv, PW4- Chandan Thakur, PW5- Laxman Verma, PW6-Sunil Yadav,
PW7-Lokesh Kumar Dhruv, PW9-Tekchand Sharma and PW11-Narendra
Kumar Dhruv. Therefore, involvement of the appellant-Jitendra is there in
the crime in question which was further corroborated by the FSL report
Ex.P25 in which blood was found on the T-shirt of this appellant for which no
explanation has been offered by him in his 313 CRPC statement.
The
weapon of offence-knife has been seized from him as per the query report
Ex.P14. The injuries found on the body of the deceased could have been
caused by the appellant- Jitendra
and thus his involvement has been
proved by the prosecution unerringly, that he caused injuries to the
deceased by which the deceased died.
32.
The next question for consideration would be whether the case of
appellant-Jitendra is covered within exception 4 of section 300 of the IPC
vis-à-vis culpable homicide not amounting murder and his conviction can be
converted to 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC as contended by the learned
counsel for the appellant-Jitendra.
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
33.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev Vs. State of
Pepsu1 has made the following observations :
“Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention
and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man
to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the
consequences of the act. In many cases intention and
knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing
more or less and intention can be presumed from
knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and
intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that
they connote different things. Even in some English
decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this
has led to a certain amount of confusion.”
34.
It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid
decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different
terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are
provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is
likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act
is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely
to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal
terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the
circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring
the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was
any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the
accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the
accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this
AIR 1956 SC 488
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background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely
“intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of
distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in
given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section
300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would
not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section
300 IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular
bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause
death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that
was intended to be inflicted.
35.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of
Haryana2 has observed as under:“21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the
case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the
existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to
have committed the offence of culpable homicide
without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of
passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a
cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by
Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable
under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts
below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of
murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside
and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable
under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay
(2002) 3 SCC 327
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a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.”
36.
The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of
Haryana3 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into
consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with
reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as
under :“23. These are some factors which are required to be
taken into consideration before awarding appropriate
sentence to the accused. These factors are only
illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has
to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors
are as under :
(a) Motive or previous enmity;
(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the
spur of the moment;
(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while
inflicting the blow or injury;
(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or
the victim died after several days;
(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;
(f) The age and general health condition of the
accused;
(g)
Whether
the
injury
was
caused
without
premeditation in a sudden fight;
(h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting
the injury and the force with which the blow was
inflicted;
(i) The criminal background and adverse history of
(2009) 15 SCC 635
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
the accused;
(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death but
the death was because of shock;
(k) Number of other criminal cases pending against
the accused;
(l) Incident occurred within the family members or
close relations;
(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after
the incident.
Whether the accused had taken the injured/the
deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure
that he/she gets proper medical treatment ?
These are some of the factors which can be
taken
into
consideration
while
granting
an
appropriate sentence to the accused.
24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only
illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view,
proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the
bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour
of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives
appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be
according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of
the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view
while convicting and sentencing the accused.”
37.
Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda4, their Lordships of
the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause
death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail
sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or
with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable
(2012) 8 SCC 450
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death
of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the
accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death.
38.
Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of
Chhattisgarh5 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in
paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are
to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in
Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 :
1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :
(SCC p. 220, para 7)
“7. To invoke this exception four requirements
must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden
fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the
act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the
assailant had not taken any undue advantage
or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the
quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who
offered the provocation or started the assault.
The number of wounds caused during the
occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is
important is that the occurrence must have
been sudden and unpremeditated and the
(2017) 3 SCC 247
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of
course, the offender must not have taken any
undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the
heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is
handy and causes injuries, one of which proves
fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this
exception provided he has not acted cruelly.”
21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 :
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of
law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section
300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been
explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9)
“9. …. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if
death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in
a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having
taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have
been with the person killed. To bring a case
within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned
in it must be found. It is to be noted that the
“fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It
takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
requires that there must be no time for the
passions to cool down and in this case, the
parties had worked themselves into a fury on
account
of
the
verbal
altercation
in
the
beginning. A fight is a combat between two or
more persons whether with or without weapons.
It is not possible to enunciate any general rule
as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden
quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a
quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily
depend upon the proved facts of each case. For
the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient
to show that there was a sudden quarrel and
there was no premeditation. It must further be
shown that the offender has not taken undue
advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner.
The expression “undue advantage” as used in
the provisions means “unfair advantage”.
39.
In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304
Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to
cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304
Part-II of the IPC.
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
40.
Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State
(NCT of Delhi)6 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to
bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which
reads as under:
“16.
A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC
shows that the following four ingredients are required:
(i) There must be a sudden fight;
(ii) There was no premeditation;
(iii) The act was committed in a heat of
passion; and
(iv) The offender had not taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner.”
41.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of
Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in
Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defined the
context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge
of the accused in doing the act as under:
“60. Few important principles of law discernible from the
aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:
(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what
offence the accused could be said to have committed, the
true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the
accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge
(2019) 6 SCC 122
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section
300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a
single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand
and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the
head
of
‘A’,
shoots
‘A’ in
his
head
killing
him
instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding
that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him,
though only single injury was caused. The case would,
therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section
300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into
the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on
his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly
plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’
dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be
sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death.
There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally
inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that
the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act
of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and
render him guilty of the offence of murder although only
single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused
may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be
murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the
accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions
enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling
within any of those exceptions, the offence would be
culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within
Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the
accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of
Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of
Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4)
of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or
knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or
3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but
not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that
situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not
amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It
would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the
case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be
an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall
within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person
falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable
homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is
punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however,
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the
second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first
part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty
intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when
there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury
was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the
requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC,
are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following
classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the
other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by
one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury
caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is
covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree
of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury
‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under
Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is
done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but
without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause
death.
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two
parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part,
the crime of murder is first established and the accused is
then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section
300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of
murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the
purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence
punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the
IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the
exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished
from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are
even or greater than its not happening, we may say that
the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the
conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of
the accused and then judge whether the accused had the
knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section
299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has
always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a
charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category
of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable
homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting
to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
when the case is brought within the five exceptions to
Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said
five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on
the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be
required under the law to bring the case under any of the
four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the
charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this
onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section
300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of
murder would not be made out and the case may be one
of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as
described under Section 299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens
rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the
assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the
deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct
evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn
from the proved circumstances of the case. The court
must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon
used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree
of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack,
the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a
culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to
cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if
death has actually been caused and intention to cause
such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts
resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in
the death of the victim, no inference, as a general
principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the
intention to cause the death or that particular injury which
resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused
had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of
fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had
the intention to cause death of any person or to cause
bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if
he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the
victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of
Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions
applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had
guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a
single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact
that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight
or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury
was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a
simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty
knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section
304 Part II of the IPC.”
42.
Referring to the facts of the present case in light of the principles of law
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above said judgements, it is
quite vivid that the incident occurred suddenly in a course of quarrel between
the accused and the deceased on a dispute occurred on the spot. The
prosecution evidence itself indicates that there was a previous altercation,
immediately proceeding the incident. It is also evident that the deceased
was under the influence of alcohol at the time of incident and the act was
committed all of a sudden in a heat of passion upon sudden provocation
without any premeditation. There is nothing on record to show that the
accused had any prior intention, or preplanned to commit murder of the
deceased.
43.
Though injury was inflected on abdomen of the deceased, the
concerning circumstances clearly indicate that the act of appellant-Jitendra
falls within the ambit of exception 4 of section 300 of the IPC as the incident
was without any premeditation in a sudden fight occurred in heat of passion,
as such his case would fall within the purview of except 4 of section 300 IPC.
Appellant-Jitendra completely satisfy the four necessary ingredients of
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, i.e. (i) There must be a sudden fight;
(ii)There was no premeditation; (iii)The act was committed in a heat of
passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted
in a cruel or unusual manner.
44.
Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant-Jitendra Sen @ Gajni
(CRA 247 of 2026) under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside, instead
thereof, he is convicted under Section 304 Part II of the IPC and sentenced
for the period already undergone by him.
45.
Conviction and sentence of the appellant-Jitendra for the offence under
Section 25(1b)(B)/27 of the Arms Act is maintained.
46.
Appellant-Jitendra is reported to be in jail since 16.09.2019. He shall
be released forthwith if not required in any other case, as he has been
sentenced for the period already undergone by him for the offence under
Section 304 Part-II IPC and he has already served the sentence awarded
under Section 25(1b)(B)/27 of the Arms Act, as there is direction that all
sentences shall run concurrently.
47.
Appellant-Ashwani (Criminal Appeal 2216 of 2025) is acquitted from
the offence 302 / 34 IPC by giving him “Benefit of Doubt”. Conviction and
sentence against this appellant is set aside and his appeal is allowed.
48.
Appellant-Ashwani is also reported to be in jail since 17.07.2025. He
be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
Cra 2216 of 2025 and connected case
49.
Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the BNSS 2023, the
appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form
No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs. 25,000/each with one reliable surety in the like amount before the court concerned
which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking
that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant
judgement or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice
thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
50.
The trial court records along with a copy of this judgment be sent back
immediately to the trial court for compliance and necessary action.
Sd/-d/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
padma
Sd/Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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