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2026:HHC:13744
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Arb. Case No. :
24 of 2026
Decided on
27.04.2026
Ashwani Dogra
:
…Applicant
Versus
Union of India and others
…Respondents
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the applicant
: Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocate.
For the respondents : Mr. Janak Raj, Central Government
Counsel, for respondent No. 1.
Ms. Sneh Bhimta, Advocate, vice
Ms. Shreya Chauhan, Advocate, for
respondent No. 2.
Mr. Mohinder Zharaick, Additional
Advocate General, assisted by Mr.
Rohit Sharma and Ms. Ranjna
Patial, Deputy Advocates General,
for respondents No. 3 and 4.
Virender Singh, Judge. (Oral)
Applicants have filed the present application,
under
Section
29A
(4)
(5)
of
the
Arbitration
Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
and
2026:HHC:13744
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’),
seeking indulgence of this Court to extend the time to
conclude the arbitration proceedings in Arbitration Case
No. 43 of 2020, titled as Rajinder Dogra & others versus
GOI & others, before the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla,
Camp at Solan, District Solan, H.P. (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Arbitrator’).
2.
Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present
application, before this Court, may be summed up, as
under:
3.
The land, measuring 00-01-26 hectares (0-03
biswas), comprised in khasra No. 583/1, situated in Mauza
Katoh, Tehsil Kandaghat, District Solan, H.P., alongwith
three storeyed building, of which, the applicants are the
owners-in-possession, was acquired by the respondents for
widening/four
laning,
maintenance,
management
and
operation of National Highway 22, from Solan to Shimla.
The award, in this regard, was passed on 5th October,
2018,
bearing
authority.
Award
No.
14/B,
by
the
competent
4.
2026:HHC:13744
Dissatisfied with the said award, the applicants
approached
the learned Arbitrator, by way of Claim
Reference Petition No 43 of 2020, titled as Rajinder Dogra
& others versus UOI & others, for enhancement of
compensation, under Section 3-G (5) of the National
Highways Act. However, the learned Arbitrator, vide order,
dated 2nd August, 2025, closed the arbitral proceedings,
due to the termination of the mandate, as provided, under
Section 29A (1), with liberty to the parties, to seek
extension of time, under Section 2 (e) of the Act. Hence,
the instant application.
5.
The extension of time has been sought, on the
ground, that the matter was pursued, by both the parties
sincerely
and
with
due
diligence,
however,
those
proceedings could not be concluded due to administrative
reasons, as, the learned Arbitrator also happens to be the
Divisional Commissioner, Mandi, and the requisite time, as
per Section 29A (1) of the Act, for passing the award, has
already elapsed, due to administrative exigencies.
6.
On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has
been made to extend the time, for a period of six months,
2026:HHC:13744
for completion of the arbitral proceedings, before the
learned Arbitrator.
7.
Issue notice.
Mr. Janak Raj, learned Central
Government Counsel; Ms. Sneh Bhimta, Advocate; and Mr.
Mohinder Zharaick, learned Additional Advocate General,
appear and waive service of notice on behalf of respondent
No. 1; respondent No. 2; and respondents No. 3 & 4,
respectively.
8.
The
factual
position,
as
asserted
in
the
application, has not been disputed. However, in the reply,
filed on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2, a number of
objections have been taken, which have been considered.
9.
As per the averments, made in the application,
on 2nd August, 2025, the case was listed for arguments,
however, the proceedings were closed by the learned
Arbitrator, in the absence of the counsel, while passing the
following order:
“A perusal of this case reveals that this
petition was instituted in this tribunal on 0602-2020 and the proceedings are going on
which were not objected to by either of the
parties. There is a time limit prescribed under
section 29-A(1) of the Act, which mandate that
award shall be made by the Arbitral Tribunal
within a period of twelve months from the date
of arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference
2026:HHC:13744
subject to further extension of maximum period
of six months by consent between the parties.
Ld. Counsel for respondent NHAI pointed out
that the arbitration proceeding may be closed
being the mandate stood terminated as per the
provisions under Section 29-A(1) of the Act.
Since the time limit for arbitral proceedings to
pass an award in accordance with law has
lapsed on account of provisions of section 29-A
of the Act, if any award is passed by this
tribunal, it shall become void. Thus I am of the
considered view that the parties can extend
the mandate of arbitrator u/s 29-A (5) of the
Act, on the terms and conditions as imposed
by the competent court defined under section 2
(e) of the ibid Act. Therefore, his arbitrator due
to termination of mandate as per section 29A(1) is bound to close proceedings of this case
and the same can be reopened only after
orders of appropriate court.”
10.
From the above facts, it is crystal clear that the
case was listed on 2nd August, 2025, before the learned
Arbitrator for arguments, however, the award could not be
passed only on account of the fact that the statutory period
has already elapsed.
11.
The applicant is before this Court, under
Section 29A (4) (5) of the Act. The relevant provisions of
Section 29A of the Act, are reproduced, as under:
“29A. Time limit for arbitral award. — (1)
The award in matters other than international
commercial arbitration shall be made by the
arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve
months from the date of completion of
pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23.
2026:HHC:13744
Provided that the award in the matter of
international commercial arbitration may be
made as expeditiously as possible and
endeavor may be made to dispose of the
matter within a period of twelve months from
the date of completion of pleadings under subsection (4) of section 23.
(2) If the award is made within a period of six
months from the date the arbitral tribunal
enters upon the reference, the arbitral tribunal
shall be entitled to receive such amount of
additional fees as the parties may agree.
(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the
period specified in sub-section (1) for making
award for a further period not exceeding six
months.
(4) If the award is not made within the period
specified in sub-section (1) or the extended
period specified under sub-section (3), the
mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate
unless the Court has, either prior to or after the
expiry of the period so specified, extended the
period:
Provided that while extending the period under
this sub-section, if the Court finds that the
proceedings have been delayed for the
reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal,
then, it may order reduction of fees of
arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent. for
each month of such delay:
Provided further that where an application
under sub-section (5) is pending, the mandate
of the arbitrator shall continue till the disposal
of the said application:
Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given
an opportunity of being heard before the fees
is reduced.
2026:HHC:13744
(5) The extension of period referred to in subsection (4) may be on the application of any of
the parties and may be granted only for
sufficient cause and on such terms and
conditions as may be imposed by the Court.
(6) While extending the period referred to in
sub-section (4), it shall be open to the Court to
substitute one or all of the arbitrators and if
one or all of the arbitrators are substituted, the
arbitral proceedings shall continue from the
stage already reached and on the basis of the
evidence and material already on record, and
the arbitrator(s) appointed under this section
shall be deemed to have received the said
evidence and material.
(7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed
under this section, the arbitral tribunal thus
reconstituted shall be deemed to be in
continuation of the previously appointed
arbitral tribunal.
(8) It shall be open to the Court to impose
actual or exemplary costs upon any of the
parties under this section.
(9) An application filed under sub-section (5)
shall be disposed of by the Court as
expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall
be made to dispose of the matter within a
period of sixty days from the date of service of
notice on the opposite party.”
12.
The bare perusal of sub-clause (4) of Section
29A of the Act demonstrates that the period can be
extended either prior to or after the expiry of the period, so
specified. Meaning thereby, the time limit for passing the
arbitral award can be extended by this Court, even after
2026:HHC:13744
the expiry of the period, so specified, in Section 29A (1) and
(3) of the Act
13.
The provisions of Section 29A (4) and (5) have
elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in its recent decision in Rohan Builders (India) Private
Limited versus Berger Paints India Limited, reported in
(2025) 10 Supreme Court Cases 802. Relevant paras-19
to 23 of the said judgment, are reproduced, as under:
“19. Rohan Builders (India) (P) Ltd. v. Berger
Paints India Ltd. 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 2645,
highlights that an interpretation allowing an
extension application post the expiry period
would encourage rogue litigants and render the
timeline for making the award inconsequential.
However, it is apposite to note that under Section
29-A(5), the power of the court to extend the time
is to be exercised only in cases where there is
sufficient cause for such extension. Such
extension is not granted mechanically on filing of
the application. The judicial discretion of the
court in terms of the enactment acts as a
deterrent against any party abusing the process
of law or espousing a frivolous or vexatious
application. Further, the court can impose terms
and conditions while granting an extension.
Delay, even on the part of the Arbitral Tribunal,
is not countenanced {H.P. Singh v. Northern
Railways, 2023 SCC OnLine J&K 1255}. The
first proviso to Section 29-A(4) permits a fee
reduction of up to five per cent for each month of
delay attributable to the Arbitral Tribunal.
20. Lastly, Section 29-A(6) does not support the
narrow interpretation while deciding an of the
expression "terminate". It states that the court
extension application under Section 29-A(4) may substitute one or all the arbitrators. Section
2026:HHC:13744
29-A(7) states that if a new arbitrator(s) is
appointed, the reconstituted Arbitral Tribunal
shall be deemed to be in continuation of the
previously appointed Arbitral Tribunal. This
obliterates the need to file a fresh application
under Section 11 of the A&C Act for the
appointment of an arbitrator. In the event of
substitution
of
arbitrator(s),
the
arbitral
proceedings will commence from the stage
already reached. Evidence or material already
on record is deemed to be received by the newly
constituted tribunal. The aforesaid deeming
provisions underscore the legislative intent to
effectuate efficiency and expediency in the
arbitral process. This intent is also demonstrated
in Sections 29-A(8) and 29-A(9). The court in
terms of Section 29-A(8) has the power to impose
actual or exemplary costs upon the parties.
Lastly, Section 29-A(9) stipulates that an
application for extension under sub-section (5)
must be disposed of expeditiously, with the
endeavour of doing so within sixty days from the
date of filing.
21. As per the second proviso to Section 29-A(4),
the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal continues
where an application under sub-section (5) is
pending. However, an application for extension
of period of the Arbitral Tribunal is to be decided
by the court in terms of sub-section (5), and subsections (6) to (8) may be invoked. The power to
extend time period for making of the award vests
with the court, and not with the Arbitral
Tribunal. Therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal may
not pronounce the award till an application
under d Section 29-A(5) of the A&C Act is sub
judice before the court. In a given case, where an
award is pronounced during the pendency of an
application for extension of period of the Arbitral
Tribunal, the court must still decide the
application under sub-section (5), and may even,
where an award has been pronounced, invoke,
when required and justified, sub-sections (6) to
(8), or the first and third proviso to Section 29A(4) of the A&C Act.
2026:HHC:13744
22. While interpreting a statute, we must strive
to give meaningful life to an enactment or rule
and avoid cadaveric consequences that result in
unworkable or impracticable scenarios. 26 An
interpretation which produces an unreasonable
result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is
some other equally possible construction which
is acceptable, practical and pragmatic.
23. In view of the above discussion, we hold that
an application for extension of the time period for
passing an arbitral award under Section 29-A(4)
read with Section 29-A(5) is maintainable even
after the expiry of the twelve-month or the
extended six-month period, as the case may be.
The court while adjudicating such extension
applications will be guided by the principle of
sufficient cause and our observations in para 19
of the judgment.”
14.
If, the facts and circumstances of the present
case, are seen, in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Rohan Builders’ case (supra), there is
no hesitation for this Court to hold that the award, in the
present case, could not be passed, by the learned
Arbitrator, on account of the fact that the mandate of the
learned Arbitrator has already expired and the delay has
been caused on account of administrative exigencies, as,
the learned Arbitrator is also the Divisional Commissioner,
Shimla and on various dates, the proceedings could not be
conducted due to the pre-engagement of the learned
Arbitrator in other administrative matters.
15.
2026:HHC:13744
The term ‘sufficient cause’ has nowhere been
defined in the Act, however, ‘sufficient cause’ means the
situation or the reason, which is beyond the ordinary
control of the litigant/parties to the proceedings.
The
absence of the learned Arbitrator, on the dates, when the
case was listed before it and the proceedings could not be
conducted, on account of administrative exigencies, is
beyond the ordinary control of the parties and would fall
within the definition of the term ‘sufficient cause’, as
mentioned in Section 29A (5) of the Act.
16.
the
Consequently, the application is allowed and
learned
Arbitrator
is
directed
to
culminate
the
proceedings by or before 29th July, 2026.
17.
The application stands disposed of, in above
terms.
( Virender Singh )
Judge
April 27, 2026
( rajni )
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